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Abstract 
The life of conditional sentences of imprisonment in Canada has been, to say the least, 
turbulent. Introduced in 1996, it was not long before restrictions were placed on their 
use—first in 2007 and then again in 2012. To add insult to injury, the sanction was found 
to have essentially failed in meeting its primary objective (of prison reduction) in two 
studies released in 2019. In many people’s minds, this less-than-stellar performance as 
a prison alternative signaled the inevitable end to this sentencing option. Yet, despite the 
many challenges, recent (2021) developments suggest that predictions of its imminent 
death may have been premature. Indeed, a resurrection of sorts may be on the horizon, 
brought about either through jurisprudence (Sharma) or legislation (Bill C-22). Having 
said this, any hope of long-term salvation will require serious analysis of its failings and 
deep reflection of workable remedies.  
This study proposes to carry out this task. To this end, it employs a mixed-methods 
design (quantitative court and survey data as well as qualitative interviews with judges) 
to explore the use of conditional sentences in British Columbia, the province that 
appears to have had the least success in terms of using the sanction as a true prison 
alternative. The many challenges of conditional sentencing (e.g., flawed statutory 
construction, lack of public education, inadequate funding, etc.), are highlighted through 
a thematic analysis of the data. The phenomena of net-widening and circumvention are 
each explored as possible explanations for the apparent stability of imprisonment rates 
over the decades, notwithstanding dramatic swings in Canadian penal policy. Most 
notably, the application of conditional sentences to offenders who would not otherwise 
have been facing jail is linked to a rejection of the sanction as a term of imprisonment 
and/or its appeal as a form of “robust probation.” The future of conditional sentencing in 
Canada is considered and an argument is made that simply removing the restrictions 
introduced in 2012 fails to acknowledge or address the sanction’s many flaws. Indeed, if 
the challenges of conditional sentencing are not resolved, there may be little reason to 
believe that the sanction will fare any better than it did in its earlier (pre-2007/2012) life. 
Keywords:  restraint; sentencing; conditional sentence; prison alternatives; 
circumvention 
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Failure is simply the opportunity to begin again, 
this time more intelligently. 
- Henry Ford 
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Introduction – The resurrection of the conditional 
sentence? The Ontario Court of Appeal reopens the 
debate  
Conditional sentences of imprisonment (s.742.1) were introduced in 1996 for the 
primary purpose of reducing the use of incarceration in Canada. While they also served 
other objectives, none required the creation of a completely new sanction. Surrounded 
by controversy since their introduction, the most recent debate is no longer focused on 
whether conditional sentences have succeeded in their primary objective but, rather, the 
degree to which they have failed.1 Canada’s incarceration rate has not decreased in any 
obvious way since 1996, challenging traditional thinking around the utility of prison 
alternatives generally, and the conditional sentence in particular. Given that the sanction 
once held so much promise as a decarcerative strategy, it is important that we identify 
and seek to understand the mechanisms of its failure.  
This study contributes to the academic literature in this area by exploring the use 
of conditional sentences in British Columbia, the province found to have experienced the 
most disappointing outcomes in recent evaluations that have examined the sanction’s 
impact on the use of traditional imprisonment. The focus is on judicial perspectives on 
conditional sentencing, as provided through a survey and interviews with provincial court 
judges, and as supported through empirical analysis of criminal court data. Exploring 
what judges think about conditional sentences, and how they use them, provides a 
unique lens through which the sanction’s lack of impact (effect) can be understood. As 
Doob noted decades ago, when dealing with the assumptions that promote the 
development and application of alternatives to imprisonment, it is the “beliefs, opinions, 
and decisions of judges” that matter.2  
The timing of this project is serendipitous for two reasons. First, the ongoing 
viability of conditional sentences is uncertain at this point. The legislated restrictions that 
 
1 Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2019). Missed opportunities: A postmortem on Canada’s 
experience with the conditional sentence. Law and Contemporary Problems, 82; Reid, A. A., & 
Roberts, J. V. (2019). Revisiting the conditional sentence of imprisonment after 20 years: Is 
community custody now an endangered species? Canadian Criminal Law Review, 24 (1), 1–37. 
2 Doob, A. N. (1990). Community sanctions and imprisonment: Hoping for a miracle but not 
bothering even to pray for it. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 32(3), 415–428, at p. 421. 
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signalled their “functional demise”3 in 2012 have been struck down recently by a 2020 
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, reopening the debate on conditional 
sentencing.4  Second, the federal Minister of Justice has recently teased his intention to 
review the conditional sentencing legislation as part of a larger effort to address (again) 
“over-incarceration,” particularly of racialized communities.5  
Conditional sentences are at a crossroads. On the one hand, the rhetoric of 
recent (2019) studies has conjured imagery of a “parasitical” sanction that is dead or at 
best diseased.6 On the other hand, we see efforts to resuscitate conditional 
sentencing—judges by being creative, counsel by challenging the restrictions that limit 
their availability and, most recently perhaps, by a government anxious to be seen to be 
“doing something” about systemic racism within the justice system. The disconnect 
between these positions must be explored and better understood prior to the enactment 
of any legislated response. 
 Overview – How did we get here? 
Despite multiple cultural, economic, geographic, and historical affinities, the 
United States stands in sharp contrast to Canada in terms of its continuing belief in the 
use of imprisonment as a crime control strategy. While the US has—until very recently—
encouraged the recourse to incarceration, Canadian penal policy has held firm in its 
belief in restraint for more than a century. In fact, policy has repeatedly framed 
imprisonment as being costly, cruel, and counter-productive as a crime control 
 
3 Pomerance, R. M. (2013). The New Approach to Sentencing in Canada: Reflections of a Trial 
Judge. Canadian Criminal Law Review, 17(3), 305–326, at p. 308. 
4 R. v. Sharma, 2020 ONCA 0478. “For all of these reasons, I would allow the appeal and declare 
that ss. 742.1 (c) and 742.1 (e)(ii) of the Criminal Code unjustifiably infringe ss. 7 and 15 of the 
Charter and are, therefore, of no force or effect” (at para 186). Note: Leave to appeal granted by 
the SCC January 14, 2021 (SCC Docket #39346). 
5 Quote from federal Justice Minister David Lametti. Mulgrew, I. (2020, July 27). Facing the twin 
crises of justice: Fallout from pandemic and systemic racism create dilemma with no easy fix for 
Ottawa. Vancouver Sun, A1–A2. 
6 One study uses rhetoric (“a post-mortem”) that suggests the sanction is already deceased- 
Webster & Doob, supra note 1; the other frames conditional sentences as an “endangered 
species” and “parasitical sanction[s]”- Reid & Roberts, supra note 1 at p. 35. When analyzing the 
impact conditional sentences have had on the use of custodial sentences, both reports note 
substantial variation between provinces, with perhaps the most disappointing results being 
observed in British Columbia. 
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mechanism. Further, this conception has formed the basis of Canada’s longstanding 
promotion of the use of non-custodial options at both pre-sentence (bail) and post-
sentence (parole) stages. Within the context of sentencing itself, efforts to reduce what is 
seen as an over reliance on incarceration have resulted in the creation of sanctions 
designed to act as alternatives to imprisonment. While there has been some (albeit 
limited) success at decarceration (e.g., the YCJA), the history of such reforms has 
largely been one of good intentions and disappointing results.7 Indeed, we have not yet 
solved the problem of over-incarceration, particularly when it comes to Indigenous, 
racialized, and other marginalized offenders, who continue to be disproportionately 
represented in our institutions.8 
If there is any comfort to be taken from our failed efforts to promote restraint in 
the use of adult imprisonment, it is that we have not given up and, where we fail, we tend 
to fail “in the right direction.”9 What is important is not that all programs succeed but, 
rather, that we monitor their utilization and learn from their evaluation. This requires a 
clear understanding of program goals and anticipated impacts; both are necessary to 
identify initiatives that have not lived up to their promise. Indeed, the appropriate 
operationalization of reforms is a prerequisite for objective assessments of their success 
or failure—what worked and what did not. More importantly, we should strive to gain an 
understanding of why a given strategy has not produced expected results.  
As a pertinent example, Parliament directed judges in 1996 to exercise restraint 
in the use of prison and introduced a new sanction intended to provide a non-custodial 
option for offenders otherwise destined for imprisonment—the conditional sentence 
order.10 Constructed not as an alternative to imprisonment but, rather, as an alternate 
 
7 The YCJA explicitly limits the circumstances in which a sentence of imprisonment can be 
considered (s. 39). For another Canadian example which suggests meaningful reductions in the 
use of incarceration can be achieved, see Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2014). Penal reform 
“Canadian style”: Fiscal responsibility and decarceration in Alberta, Canada. Punishment & 
Society, 16(1), 3–31.  
8 Reid, A. A. (2017). The (Differential) Utilization of Conditional Sentences among Aboriginal 
Offenders in Canada. Canadian Criminal Law Review, 22(2), 133; Roberts, J. V., & Reid, A. 
(2017). Aboriginal Incarceration in Canada since 1978: Every Picture Tells the Same Story. 
Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 59(3), 1–32.  
9 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 196. 
10 Bill C-41, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in consequence 
thereof. 35th Parliament, 1st Session. S.C. 1995, c 22 (herein Bill C-41).  
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form of imprisonment,11 conditional sentences were controversial from the start in terms 
of both form and function. Described as an oxymoron enshrined into Canadian law, 
s.742.1 of the Criminal Code initially gave sentencing judges broad discretion by 
connecting eligibility primarily to sentence length, as opposed to identifying specific 
groups of offences for which it would be available (or unavailable).12 Yet, the sanction 
clearly had the potential to result in a substantive shift away from the use of traditional 
imprisonment.  
However, given that judges in Canada already had the option of suspending 
sentence and placing an offender on probation, it was unclear where the conditional 
sentence would fit in terms of existing sanctions. Early research suggested that many 
judges struggled with the new sanction’s purpose, scope, and ability to address 
deterrence and denunciation—sentencing objectives that up to that point had generally 
not been associated with community-based options.13 Academics drew attention to 
theoretical and operational challenges, while the provincial appellate courts attempted, 
with mixed results, to resolve the methodological and conceptual issues that arose from 
the unusual statutory construction. 
In 2000, the Supreme Court of Canada stepped in to provide guidance in terms 
of the scope and methodology of conditional sentencing. In R. v. Proulx,14 the Court 
 
The principle of restraint is codified in sections 718.2(d) and (e) (current wording):   
718.2(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be 
appropriate in the circumstances; and (e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that 
are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the 
community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of 
Aboriginal offenders. 
See Appendix B for full text of the conditional sentencing provisions, including amendments made 
1996-2015. 
11 In this thesis the term “jail” is sometimes used in place of “prison.” This is, in part, a way to 
avoid having to qualify terms (e.g., “real prison” or “traditional prison”), and in part a reflection of 
how most practitioners, including the judges interviewed as part of this project, speak.   
12 For conditional sentences as an “oxymoron” see Brodeur, J.-P. (1999). Sentencing reform: Ten 
years after the Canadian Sentencing Commission. In J. V. Roberts & D. P. Cole (Eds.), Making 
sense of sentencing (pp. 332–348). University of Toronto Press, at p. 341. 
13 Roberts, J. V., Doob, A. N., & Marinos, V. (2000). Judicial attitudes to conditional terms of 
imprisonment: Results of a national survey. (1998 National Survey) Ottawa: Department of 
Justice Canada. The survey was distributed in May of 1998 and completed by September of 
1998. The reported response rate was 36% (461 judges). 
14 R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5. 
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adopted a purposive and benevolent interpretation in an effort, some have suggested, to 
salvage a sanction that had struggled up to that point.15 Appellate court decisions had 
been in conflict on key issues. Did Bill C-41 simply codify existing principles, or did it 
establish a new sentencing framework? Were conditional sentences terms of 
imprisonment (community custody), or were they more accurately characterized as some 
form of enhanced probation? Did they fill only “a small gap”, or did they represent a new 
tool intended to be used broadly to reduce the use of incarceration in Canada?16  
In Proulx the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed Bill C-41 as a prison reduction 
strategy and reconstructed conditional sentences as punitive sanctions capable of 
addressing not only rehabilitative and restorative objectives, but also deterrence and 
denunciation.17 The decision gave sentencing judges the language and methodology 
they needed. The sanction would be more effective than traditional imprisonment, 
supporters argued, because offenders avoided the negative impacts of incarceration 
(e.g., lost employment, fragmented relationships, etc.) and would be highly motivated by 
the facilitated breach mechanisms18 to comply with both punitive and rehabilitative 
conditions. What policy-makers perhaps should have more fully anticipated, however, is 
that the enforceability of conditional sentences would lead judges to conclude they were 
also more effective than suspended sentences.19  
 
15 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 173. 
16 Manson, A. (1998). Conditional sentences: Courts of Appeal debate the principles. Criminal 
Reports (5th), 15, 176–200. 
17 For a general discussion of the impact of the Proulx decision see also Roberts, J. V., & Healy, 
P. (2001). The future of conditional sentencing. Criminal Law Quarterly, 44, 309–341. 
18 The breach provisions set out for conditional sentences (s. 742.6) anticipate an early hearing 
date and an abbreviated process. Breaches are dealt with as allegations as opposed to new 
offences; proof can be satisfied by the supervisor’s written report and must only meet the 
“balance of probabilities” standard (not proof “beyond a reasonable doubt”). See Fleischhaker, C. 
L. (2000). The breach provisions of the conditional sentence a.k.a. "Expeditious Justice.” Criminal 
Law Quarterly, 43, 305. 
19 In fairness, the legislation contained provisions intended to mitigate the negative impact of net-
widening. First, section 742.1(a) requires that the court impose a sentence of imprisonment of 
less than two years, before considering whether to make the sentence conditional. Second, since 
an offender serving a conditional sentence is given credit for time served in the community, in the 
event of a breach the most an offender can be ordered to serve is the remainder of the sentence. 
Finally, section 742.6(9) gives judges several options when responding to proven breaches: 
taking no action, changing optional conditions, or having the offender serve all or part of the 
remaining sentence in custody.  
   
6 
Post Proulx, conditional sentences were longer and more punitive.20 The Court 
chose not to restrict judicial discretion in terms of eligible offences, confirming that 
conditional sentences remained available for any offence that satisfied the minimal 
statutory requirements.21 Notwithstanding their increased punitive “bite,” conditional 
sentences for serious offences remained controversial and, by the mid-2000s, had 
become a talking point in national politics. The politicization of sentencing policy 
continued throughout the decade, with perhaps predictable results. In 2007, serious 
personal injury offences became ineligible for conditional sentencing (Bill C-9),22 and 
with the enactment of the Safe Streets & Communities Act (Bill C-10; 2012),23 almost all 
serious offences were similarly restricted.24 While the primary objective of conditional 
sentences was to divert offenders from prison to the community, overall incarceration 
rates in Canada have remained generally stable, and recent (2019) research suggests 
disappointing results, especially in BC.25 
With the change in federal government in 2015, there was an expectation that a 
more progressive criminal justice agenda would be applied in sentencing. Aside from 
campaign rhetoric, there was a clear direction to the incoming Liberal Justice Minister to 
review the sentencing reforms of the previous decade.26 To date, Bill C-10 restrictions 
 
20 Roberts, J. V. (2002). The evolution of conditional sentencing: An empirical analysis. Criminal 
Reports (6th), 3. 
21 “No offences are excluded from the conditional sentencing regime except those with a 
minimum term of imprisonment, nor should there be presumptions in favour of or against a 
conditional sentence for specific offences.” Proulx, supra note 14 at para 127. 
22 Bill C-9, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (conditional sentence of imprisonment). First 
reading May 2006; passed with amendments May 2007 (herein Bill C-9).  
23 Bill C-10, An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to amend the State 
Immunity Act, the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act and other Acts (Short title: Safe Streets and Communities Act). Introduced September 20, 
2011; Royal Assent March 13, 2012 (herein Bill C-10). 
24 One judge from Ontario’s Court of Justice suggests that the restrictions introduced by Bill C-10 
signaled the “functional demise of the conditional sentence.” Pomerance, supra note 3 at p. 308. 
25 Webster & Doob, supra note 1; Reid & Roberts, supra note 1. As will be discussed in chapter 
2.4.1, two recent (2019) evaluations suggest that the introduction of conditional sentences had 
either “a modest” or “no meaningful” impact on the use of traditional imprisonment. With specific 
reference to the province of British Columbia, the sanction may have ironically contributed to 
increases, rather than decreases, in the use of incarceration. 
26 Excerpt from mandate letter to the Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould (from Prime 
Minister J. Trudeau; 12 Nov 2015) – “You should conduct a review of the changes in our criminal 
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have not been reversed by government, though recent legislation (Bill C-75)27 may have 
the indirect effect of increasing the number of offences eligible for conditional 
sentences.28 In contrast, appellate courts have been more active in neutering the 
restrictive provisions, striking down a number of mandatory minimum sentences and, 
more recently, declaring specific legislated restrictions on conditional sentencing of no 
force or effect.29 Optimistically, one might be tempted to argue that the time is ripe for 
change. Whether through judicial decisions or parliamentary legislation, the conditional 
sentence may have a second chance in fulfilling its intended—but yet unsuccessful—
role in reducing Canada’s use of imprisonment. 
The current study 
This thesis contributes to the dialogue on decarceration and the principle of 
restraint by identifying and exploring the mechanisms of failure generally associated with 
conditional sentencing. At the operational level, these weaknesses include inadequate 
planning and resourcing; at the conceptual level, its unfortunate construction (as a form 
of imprisonment) and its inappropriate application to offenders not initially facing prison 
sentences (net-widening). On paper, conditional sentences should have reduced prison 
populations by diverting offenders who otherwise would have been imprisoned, into the 
community. Certainly, the sanction had the potential to contribute substantially to the 
 
justice system and sentencing reforms over the past decade with a mandate to assess the 
changes, ensure that we are increasing the safety of our communities, getting value for money, 
addressing gaps and ensuring that current provisions are aligned with the objectives of the 
criminal justice system.”  
It should be noted that a more recent mandate letter (13 Dec 2019) includes no mention of further 
sentencing reforms. https://pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/minister-justice-and-attorney-general-
canada-mandate-letter 
27 Bill C-75, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Youth Criminal Justice Act and other Acts 
and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c 25. Royal Assent June 21, 
2019; see also proposed legislation introduced by Senator Kim Pate that would restore judicial 
discretion in sentencing by allowing judges to disregard restrictions, including mandatory 
minimum penalties (MMPs). See Bill S-208, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (independence 
of the judiciary). First reading in the Senate February 2, 2020. 
https://www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=en&Mode=1&billId=10625187.  
28 Most of the restrictions on the use of conditional sentencing that were introduced in 2012 apply 
only to offences when prosecuted by way of indictment. See ss. 742.1(b) -742.1(f) CC. Bill C-75 
reclassifies many indictable offences as hybrids and standardizes the maximum penalty for 
summary offences at two years’ imprisonment. 
29 Sharma, supra note 4 at para 186. 
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decarceration effort.30 To the extent that this did not occur, it is important that we 
understand why so that we can move forward with more effective strategies.31 In that 
sense, the story of conditional sentencing need not be solely one of disappointment. 
This project addresses multiple gaps in the existing research literature. First, the 
data analyzed spans a time (2006-2017) that post-dates the early years of conditional 
sentencing, when the bulk of research on the new sanction occurred.32 Second, the use 
of multiple court datasets allows for a more meaningful analysis of judicial decision-
making on sentence. This includes an assessment of conditional sentence utilization 
relative to other sanctions over time, and detailed information regarding sentence length, 
optional conditions imposed, and the incidence of (and response to) proven breaches. 
Most importantly, this thesis incorporates the perspectives of BC Provincial Court judges 
through the use of a survey and interviews. The survey intentionally repeats several of 
the questions posed in an earlier national survey of judges (1998 National Survey), 
allowing for a comparison of responses “20 years later.”33 
The interviews provide insight into the views of judges and allow us to better 
understand the challenges of conditional sentencing as experienced by those on the 
ground, making the decisions. While academics and policy makers can (and do) debate 
the need for more sentencing options, in paying attention to the voices of judges it 
becomes apparent that the appeal of conditional sentencing is not only, or even 
primarily, related to prison reduction. This is in part related to the rhetoric that has 
surrounded the sanction, if not from its introduction, then certainly since the Supreme 
Court of Canada decision in Proulx. 
 
30 Roberts, J. V., & Gabor, T. (2004). Living in the shadow of prison: Lessons from the Canadian 
experience in decarceration. British Journal of Criminology, 44, 92–112, at p. 97-98. 
31 For instance, in the context of conditional sentencing, there are several possible explanations 
for the lack of success noted overall. These include, but are not limited to, the misapplication of 
the sanction (to offenders not otherwise facing prison), the limited use of conditional sentences 
relative to other sanctions, or the effect of the recalibration of conditional sentences that occurred 
as a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s direction to sentencing judges that they make 
conditional sentences longer than the prison terms they were intended to replace, include 
onerous conditions to confirm their punitive nature, and deal harshly with proven breaches. 
Proulx, supra note 14. 
32 There was a flurry of publications in the first ten years of the sanction’s existence. Almost three-
quarters (74.4%) of the publications referenced in this thesis (specifically on conditional 
sentencing) were produced between 1996 and 2005.  
33 Roberts et al., supra note 13. 
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In its analysis of conditional sentencing as a decarcerative tool, this thesis offers 
a detailed and comprehensive review of the sanction’s use in British Columbia. Chapter 
1 focuses on the history of the Canadian criminal justice system in terms of the 
development of the principle of restraint, and its relationship to the overall stability in 
incarcerated populations. Our historical and ongoing commitment to restraint in the use 
of imprisonment provides the conceptual framework for this research.  
Chapter 2 includes an overview of the creation of conditional sentences (s. 
742.1) and the development of the law on their application. This section considers the 
challenges of conditional sentencing as experienced upon implementation, as continued 
in the wake of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Proulx, and as setting the stage 
for the restrictions imposed by Bill C-10. Chapter 3 sets out the methodological approach 
adopted in this project. This includes the rationale for relying on a strategy that 
integrates both quantitative (court sentencing statistics and a survey) and qualitative 
(interviews with judges) data. The various datasets are defined and described; limitations 
of the research design are addressed. 
Having established the necessary conceptual and methodological context, 
Chapter 4 presents the main results of this study, incorporating, where appropriate, 
findings from the various data sources. Descriptive information regarding the data 
sources utilized in this project is provided in Chapter 4.1. Sub-chapters that follow 
explore the ways in which the conditional sentence has failed to accomplish its 
decarcerative objective. Specifically, Chapter 4.2.1 focuses on data that suggest the 
introduction of conditional sentencing was accompanied by more net-widening than 
previously estimated. Net-widening and the related practice of sentence “up-tariffing” 
(4.2.2) are explored and linked to other identified challenges. In Chapter 4.2.3, the 
analysis shifts to consider the impact of the legislative restrictions placed on the use of 
conditional sentences. Indications that judges found ways to circumvent the restrictions 
are of particular interest, as are appellate court cases that have effectively enabled this 
practice (e.g., the 2015 BCCA decision in Voong).34  
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the findings in terms of their implications for current 
sentencing policy. Provincial appellate court jurisprudence is incorporated to the extent 
 
34 R. v. Voong, 2015 BCCA 285. 
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that it is relevant to the future of conditional sentencing (e.g., the recent (2020) decision 
from the Ontario Court of Appeal in Sharma).35 The concluding section summarizes key 
theoretical, methodological, and practical/policy takeaways and identifies areas for future 
research. 
 
35 Sharma, supra note 4. 
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1 Restraint in the use of imprisonment 
When approaching a large project, it is helpful to have a framework within which 
data can be organized and topics explored.36 Grounding research in theory also relates it 
to existing academic debates and to the work of others.37 This thesis began as an 
exploration of judicial perspectives on conditional sentencing. As the project progressed, 
however, it became clear that the most interesting themes emerging from the data spoke 
to the challenges of conditional sentencing, particularly those that affected the sanction’s 
ability to operate effectively as a tool for prison reduction. While judges differed in terms 
of how they used conditional sentences, there was general agreement that the sanction 
was introduced to offer an alternative to imprisonment, and that incarcerating fewer 
people was a “good thing.” This principle of restraint (in the use of imprisonment) 
provides a useful conceptual framework for this project.38  
1.1 Restraint as a historically entrenched belief in Canada 
The Canadian Sentencing Commission (1987) referenced no fewer than 16 
official reports issued between 1831 and 1983 that identified concerns regarding prisons 
as “schools of crime,” noting, with some frustration, that even these repetitive calls to 
reduce the use of imprisonment resulted in essentially no significant change.39 Similar 
themes of decarceration and the need for restraint are evident throughout the historical 
record in Canada. In fact, if one were to list the principal reports, commissions, and 
committees that have expressed concern about Canada’s recourse to imprisonment as 
well as suggested restraint in its use, the list would be long and extend over the better 
 
36 Lau, R. R., & Schlesinger, M. (2005). Policy frames, metaphorical reasoning, and support for 
public policies. Political Psychology, 26(1), 77–114, at p. 80.  
37 Taekema, S. (2018). Theoretical and Normative Frameworks for Legal Research: Putting 
Theory into Practice. Law and Method. https://doi.org/10.5553/REM/.000031, at p. 4. 
38 For a review of the history of the restraint principle (as it has evolved since the mid-1800s), see 
Canadian Sentencing Commission. (1987). Sentencing reform - a Canadian approach: Report of 
the Canadian Sentencing Commission. J.R. Omer Archambault, Chair. (CSC) Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, at pp. 44-45. 
39 Ibid at pp. 40-44. The CSC describes Canadian penal history as “a tribute to resiliency” and 
refers to the sequence of official reports as “systematic redundancy” (at p. 40).  
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part of a century.40 The following section touches on several such official reports to 
illustrate the consistency with which successive federal governments have embraced the 
principle of restraint. The intent is not to provide an exhaustive review of the literature in 
this area but, rather, to contextualize conditional sentences by establishing them as the 
manifestation of our longstanding desire to reduce our reliance on imprisonment.  
The 1969 Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (herein the Ouimet 
Report) encompassed a broad review of the field of corrections. In addition to endorsing 
the principle of restraint, the report focused on the need to move from a punitive model 
to one that is more rehabilitative in nature. This shift reflected the importance placed 
(and repeatedly stressed) on dealing with the offender in the community. Indeed, 
common sense assumptions are often used to support the greater effectiveness of 
community-based programs, though there is also a call for “long-term empirical 
research” regarding different correctional approaches.41 The overall message of the 
report can be summarized as follows: 
Segregate the dangerous, deter and restrain the rationally motivated 
professional criminal, deal as constructively as possible with every offender 
as the circumstances of the case permit, release the harmless, imprison 
the casual offender not committed to a criminal career only where no other 
disposition is appropriate. In every disposition the possibility of 
rehabilitation should be taken into account.42 
The Ouimet Report is referenced as a landmark document, one that set the tone for 
subsequent publications in its conclusion that “imprisonment or confinement should be 
used only as an ultimate resort when all other alternatives have failed.”43  
Support for restraint continued into the 1970s. Importantly though, during this era 
Canada’s continuing commitment to this principle begins to reveal significant differences 
in sentencing policies between Canada and the United States. Indeed, Webster and 
 
40 Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2020). Principles and politics: Sentencing and imprisonment 
policy in Canada (Ch. 17). In Sentencing in Canada: Essays in law, policy and practice. Irwin 
Law, at p. 348 (Table 17.1). The partial list compiled by Webster and Doob includes 20 
publications released between 1914 and 1998. 
41 Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections. (1969). Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and 
Corrections. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer (Ouimet Report), at p. 15-18.  
42 Ibid at p 185. 
43 Ibid at p. 204. 
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Doob (2018) note this divergence in that decade between the Canadian and American 
experiences: 
In 1976, just as American imprisonment rates were beginning to rise and 
an incapacitation/deterrence model was being established, Canada turned 
in the opposite direction. Restraint in the use of imprisonment became the 
rallying cry.44 
Symptomatically, in 1977 the Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System in 
Canada released its Report to Parliament (herein the MacGuigan Report).45 Chaired by 
Mark MacGuigan, this report focused primarily on the penitentiary service, identifying a 
“crisis” that, it argued, could only be addressed through the “immediate implementation 
of large-scale reforms.”46 In particular, the MacGuigan Report was highly critical of what 
it saw as the overuse of imprisonment as an expensive and ineffective sentencing 
option, noting critically that: 
Society has spent millions of dollars over the years to create and maintain 
the proven failure of prisons. Incarceration has failed in its two essential 
purposes – correcting the offender and providing permanent protection to 
society.47  
Ultimately the Report endorsed the creation of alternatives to imprisonment, arguing that 
they would be less costly and more productive. 
Calls for restraint accelerated in the 1980s, largely reflecting the frustration of 
reformers anxious to translate the theoretical construct of restraint into policy directives 
and ultimately a reduction in Canada’s reliance on imprisonment. This began with the 
release of a federal government policy paper in 1984 that provocatively referred to 
sentencing as “the climax of the criminal justice process,” underlining its pivotal role as 
one of the “gatekeepers” of prison admissions at that time, and establishing it as the 
 
44 Doob, A. N., & Webster, C. M. (2018). Penal optimism: Understanding American mass 
imprisonment from a Canadian perspective. In K. R. Reitz (Ed.), American exceptionalism in 
crime and punishment. Oxford University Press, at p. 159. 
45 MacGuigan Report. (1977). Report to Parliament by the Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary 
System in Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada. 
46 Ibid at p. 2. 
47 Ibid at p. 35. 
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principal field upon which the rhetorical debate would occur.48 The policy statement 
embraced restraint in the use of imprisonment, clearly noting only three scenarios that 
might justify incarceration: “separation of offenders posing a threat to life and personal 
security; denunciation of conduct so reprehensible that lesser punishment would be 
inappropriate; and last resort coercion of offenders who wilfully refuse to comply with 
other sanctions.”49 
The 1980s were a busy decade for sentencing reformists, with two substantive 
reports being released: the Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission in 198750 
(herein the CSC) and the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and 
Solicitor General in 1988 (herein the Daubney Report).51 Similar to previous reports, the 
problems identified by the CSC included an absence of policy from Parliament on 
guiding principles for sentencing, and an over-reliance on imprisonment as a sanction.52 
The CSC contributed to the debate by arguing that part of achieving greater restraint in 
the use of imprisonment required a reconsideration of how we visualize punishment. 
Specifically, that the traditional dichotomy between custody and all other sanctions must 
be replaced with, instead, a continuum which runs from minimal coercion (e.g., 
discharge) to extreme coercion (e.g., incarceration). Within such a view community-
 
48 Government of Canada. (1984). Sentencing. Ottawa; ON, at p.1. The imprisonment debate, 
until recently, has focused on sentencing. More recently, the target of decarcerative efforts has 
largely shifted to focus on the remand population (i.e., accused persons held in custody as a 
result of being (formally or informally) detained until trial). This change likely coincided with the 
point in time at which the remand population overtook the sentenced population.  
49 Ibid at p. 38. This language essentially echoed the position taken by the Law Reform 
Commission in their recommendation that the use of prison be restricted to three kinds of cases: 
“(1) for offenders too dangerous to leave at large; (2) for offenders for which, as things are now, 
no other adequate denunciation presently exists; and (3) for offenders willfully refusing to submit 
to other punishments.” Law Reform Commission of Canada. (1976). Our Criminal Law. Ottawa, at 
p. 25.  
50 CSC, supra note 38. 
51 The Daubney Report endorsed providing opportunities for offender “habilitation,” and focused 
on offender accountability (taking responsibility), reparations to victims and/or the community and 
victim-offender reconciliation. 
House of Commons, Canada. (1988). Taking Responsibility. Report of the Standing Committee 
on Justice and Solicitor General on its review of sentencing, conditional release and related 
aspects of corrections. David Daubney, Chair. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada.  
52 CSC, supra note 38 at p. xxii. 
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based sanctions can be seen, not as lesser responses, but as appropriate and 
proportional ones.53  
And yet the CSC acknowledged that more would be required. The debate on 
penal policy occurring in the mid-1980s was complicated by the larger philosophical 
discussion that questioned the motivation of governments seeking to “de-
institutionalize.”54 As a result, the CSC spent considerable time addressing concerns that 
community sanctions often act to increase, rather than decrease, the number of 
offenders subject to control (a phenomenon generally referred to as net-widening).55 
This can occur when a new sanction—one that is intended to be used in place of a more 
severe option—is, instead, used as an “add-on” to the severe sentence, or, more likely, 
is used in place of a sanction that would have been less severe.56 To lessen the 
likelihood of either form of net-widening, the CSC suggested that explicit direction be 
given to judges and that community-based options be developed as independent 
sanctions, rather than as alternatives to imprisonment.  
It is notable that both the CSC and Daubney Report recognized that providing 
community-based options alone would not necessarily lead to a change in sentencing 
trends; if the goal was a principled reduction in the use of imprisonment, sentencing 
guidelines would also be required. Specifically, in terms of promoting guidance intended 
 
53 Ibid at p. 347. 
54 The CSC referenced Stanley Cohen (1985), making it clear that they were aware of (and 
concerned about) the tendency of strategies for prison reduction to, at best, have no impact—at 
worst, to make things worse. Cohen, S. (1985). Visions of social control: Crime, punishment, and 
classification. Polity Press, at p. 48. 
55 CSC, supra note 38 at p. 367. 
56 An example of the former (an “add-on”) could include community work service (or restitution) 
being added as an obligation in addition to a term of imprisonment (i.e., conditions of a probation 
order made to follow imprisonment). The second net-widening scenario could include an offender 
being sentenced to a conditional sentence instead of suspended sentence or fine (not instead of 
a term of imprisonment).  
While not directly associated with sentencing, an additional form of net-widening is that which 
occurs when offenders who would not otherwise be brought into the formal justice system (e.g., 
candidates for diversion or alternative measures), are charged and processed, often with 
benevolent intentions. In a recent interview, for instance, the police Chief for a location that 
reported disproportionately high charge rates for simple drug possession (relative to other more 
populated jurisdictions) explained that his officers view processing charges through the formal 
court system as another tool in their toolbox, one that can be used to facilitate, or even mandate, 
treatment that might otherwise be unavailable. Griffiths, N. (2020, December 27). Drug 
possession charges vary by force. The Province, at p. 6. 
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to restrict the use of imprisonment, the CSC proposed the introduction of presumptive 
“out” of custody designations for most offences.57 For example, the report proposed 
presumptive “out” of custody dispositions for essentially all summary offences. This 
would include common assault, drug possession, theft, possession of stolen property, 
false pretenses, or fraud under $1,000 (an unqualified out of custody presumption), and 
failing to appear in court or comply with release conditions, or breach of probation (a 
qualified out of custody disposition58).  
As one might expect from a Parliamentary Committee that was formed, at least in 
part, in response to eroding public confidence in the justice system,59 the Daubney 
Report was more outwardly consultative.60 Perhaps as a result, it took a less 
controversial approach, supporting, for instance, only advisory guidelines, though it 
endorsed the CSC’s recommendation that a permanent sentencing commission be 
created. The Daubney Report is relevant to the narrative of restraint for two reasons. 
First, it extended the golden thread that had run through earlier reports, framing restraint 
as a well-established sentencing principle in Canada, noting that: 
Not surprisingly, then, the Sentencing Commission, following the leads of 
the Ouimet Committee and the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
recommended that sentences of imprisonment be used with restraint and 
that they be reserved normally for the most serious offences, particularly 
those involving violence.61 
 
57 CSC, supra note 38 at p. 302. 
58 Ibid at p. 509-514. For qualified out of custody presumptions “the offender is not to be 
incarcerated unless both of the following conditions are met: the offence is serious AND the 
offender has a relevant record” (at p. 312).  
The inclusion of the “administration of justice” offences (e.g., failing to comply with conditions, 
breach of probation) in such a scheme is noteworthy, given that such offences often receive 
custodial dispositions. In a 2006 study of short jail terms, Marinos found that administration of 
justice offences accounted for the greatest proportion (46.8%) of jail sentences of 30 days or less. 
See Marinos, V. (2006). The meaning of “short” sentences of imprisonment and offences against 
the administration of justice: A perspective from the Court. Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 
21(2), 143 (at p. 151). 
59 Daubney Report, supra note 51 at p. 1. 
60 The terms of reference tasked the Daubney Committee with considering the report of the CSC 
(and others) and inviting “the expression of views from all participants in the criminal justice 
system, both governmental and nongovernmental, federal and provincial, including, but not 
restricted to, the judiciary, crown prosecutors, defence lawyers, police forces, victims, inmates, 
aftercare agencies, advocacy groups and academic researchers.” Ibid at p. 269. 
61 Ibid at p. 50. 
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Second, like the CSC, the Daubney Report endorsed the increased use of 
community sanctions and was critical of the pursuit of utilitarian objectives through the 
use of custody. “The Committee further believes that, except where to do so would place 
the community at undue risk, the ‘correction’ of the offender should take place in the 
community and imprisonment should be used with restraint.”62 What is notable, however, 
is the rhetorical shift between the two reports. While both anchor the principle of restraint 
as distanced from the notion of punishment,63 the Daubney Report takes a noticeably 
more optimistic (politically attractive) view of the capacity of sentencing to achieve 
positive results. It accepts public protection as a goal of sentencing,64 rejects the notion 
that “nothing works,”65 and emphasizes more attainable sentencing objectives through 
the incorporation of restorative justice concepts—e.g., accepting responsibility, being 
held accountable, victim-offender reconciliation, making reparations, acknowledging 
harm to victims and the community, etc.  
It is unclear why the federal government of the day failed to act upon receipt of 
the Daubney Report in 1988. There was consensus on the primary issues, including the 
need for parliamentary direction through the codification of the purpose and principles of 
sentencing, and the creation of a permanent sentencing commission. Yet, instead of 
seizing this opportunity for fundamental and principled reform, the government issued a 
set of three discussion papers in 1990.66 Directions for Reform: Sentencing was 
released under the signature of the (Conservative) Minister of Justice at the time, Kim 
Campbell. The document included a proposed statement of the purposes and principles 
of sentencing that was essentially an amalgam of those recommended by the CSC and 
the Daubney Report and adopted the recommendation that a permanent Sentencing and 
Parole Commission be created.67  
 
62 Ibid at p. 54.  
63 CSC supra note 38 at p. 365; Daubney Report, supra note 51 at p. 53. 
64 Daubney Report, ibid at p. 45. 
65 Ibid at p. 52. 
66 The three government publications issued in 1990 included: Directions for reform: Sentencing; 
Directions for reform: Corrections & conditional release; and Directions for reform: A framework 
for sentencing, corrections & conditional release. 
67 Government of Canada. (1990). Directions for reform: Sentencing. Ottawa: Solicitor General of 
Canada at p. 10.  
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If nothing else, this compendium of discussion papers served not only to further 
reaffirm restraint as a central feature of criminal justice policy over time, but also to 
highlight that this message traversed party lines. Indeed, the proposal made in 1990 by 
the Conservative Minister of Justice codified the principle of restraint, stating that “a 
sentence should be the least onerous alternative appropriate in the circumstances.”68 
The phrase “appropriate in the circumstances” was expanded in provisions that 
introduced presumptive limits on the use of imprisonment, using wording similar to that 
used in the Liberal policy document produced in 1984.69 More broadly, Doob and 
Webster make the same point in 2015 when discussing restraint as “a dominant leitmotif” 
throughout Canadian criminal justice history. Specifically, they highlight that this theme 
emerges across both major national political parties (at least until 2006). As the most 
obvious illustration, they note that the 1982 Liberal document (described as a statement 
of the policy of the government on the purpose and principles of criminal law) was re-
released by the Conservative government in 1989, with only the Preface containing the 
Liberal Justice Minister’s signature removed.70 
Despite this broad and longstanding political consensus surrounding the need for 
restraint in the use of criminal law generally, and imprisonment in particular, its actual 
legislative translation was less ambitious than the one repeatedly endorsed by official 
statements across the prior decades. Notably, two years after the 1990 discussion 
papers, Kim Campbell (still Minister of Justice) introduced a sentencing reform bill (Bill 
C-90). While it included a statement of the purpose and principles of sentencing it did not 
mention a sentencing commission.71 Further, the broad language that had been 
 
One of the objectives of the Commission would be to develop sentencing guidelines following the 
model set out in the report of the CSC; another was to encourage and promote judicial training on 
aspects such as “the impact of sentencing alternatives” (at p.11). 
68 Ibid at p. 8. 
69 The proposal suggested that imprisonment should only be imposed: 1) to protect the public 
from crimes of violence; 2) where any other sanction would not sufficiently reflect the gravity of 
the offence or the repetitive nature of the criminal conduct of an offender, or adequately protect 
the public or the integrity of the administration of justice; or 3) to penalize an offender for wilful 
non-compliance with the terms of any other sentence that has been imposed on the offender 
where no other sanction appears adequate to compel compliance. Ibid at p. 8. 
Notably, this is the same wording proposed by the CSC, supra note 38 at p. 154. 
70 Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2015). US punitiveness “Canadian style”? Cultural values and 
Canadian punishment policy. Punishment & Society, 17(3), 299–321 at pp. 304 and 306. 
71 Bill C-90, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sentencing). First Reading June 23, 1992 in the 
Third Session, 34th Parliament. 
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proposed in the 1990 discussion paper was replaced by a more restrictive form of 
restraint that focused on the use of imprisonment. As a case in point, instead of requiring 
that “a sentence should be the least onerous alternative appropriate in the 
circumstances,” the principle of restraint was reflected in requirements that the court not 
deprive offenders of their liberty if less restrictive alternatives may be appropriate, and 
that all available alternatives to imprisonment be considered, particularly when dealing 
with Aboriginal offenders.72 
Although Bill C-90 died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved later 
that year, its concerns regarding the overuse of incarceration were repeated in the 
sentencing provisions enacted through Bill C-41 in 1996.73 The principle of restraint was 
successfully codified, for the first time, in the Criminal Code. Using essentially the same 
language as that proposed in Bill C-90, sections 718.2(d) and (e) directed sentencing 
judges that “an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions 
may be appropriate in the circumstances;” and that “all available sanctions, other than 
imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances74 should be considered for all 
offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.” 
Notably, the codification of the principle of restraint was uncontroversial. This 
may have reflected—at least in part—political pressure to address the national 
embarrassment posed by our relatively high adult incarceration rate.75 When introducing 
Bill C-41 at second reading, the Minister of Justice noted that: 
It is worthwhile to remind the House that Canada's incarceration rate is 
extremely high compared with other industrialized countries. Furthermore, 
studies show that for minor and first-time offenders, incarceration is not 
 
72 The more restrictive wording used in Bill C-90 (and ultimately Bill C-41) represented a change 
from the Department of Justice discussion paper (1990), which endorsed the exact wording of the 
statement proposed by the CSC. See DOJ discussion paper, supra note 67 at p. 8, and CSC, 
supra note 38 at p. 154. 
73 Bill C-41, supra note 10. 
74 Section 718.2(e) was amended to add and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the 
community by the Victims Bill of Rights Act, S.C. 2015, c.13, s.23. 
75 Reductions in the youth imprisonment rate, for example, have been linked to Canada’s 
“shameful” youth incarceration rates in the mid-1990s. See Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2019). 
The will to change: Lessons from Canada’s successful decarceration of youth. Law & Society 
Review, 53(4), 1092. 
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very useful or effective and may even be harmful if the goal is to turn the 
person into a law-abiding citizen.76 
Alternatively, it could simply be an acknowledgement of where public sentiment 
was at the time, which might be characterized as a common-sense acceptance of the 
restraint principle, at least as it relates to certain offenders. This appears to be what the 
Minister of Justice was reflecting in the House of Commons, saying that “a general 
principle that runs throughout Bill C-41 is that jails should be reserved for those who 
should be there. Alternatives should be put in place for those who commit offences but 
who do not need or merit incarceration.”77 Presumably the references to “those who 
should be [in jail]” and those “who do not need or merit incarceration” were intended to 
capture first-time, low risk, or non-violent offenders (that would, for some reason, 
otherwise go to jail?).78 
One of the sustained narratives of Bill C-41 is that it was intended to reduce the 
use of imprisonment. Importantly, this goal was to be accomplished not only through the 
encouragement of judicial restraint in the newly codified principles of sentencing and the 
introduction of alternative measures (diversion) for adult offenders. It was also the 
underlying justification for the creation of the conditional sentence of imprisonment. 
1.2 Foundations for our longstanding belief in restraint 
In some ways, the rhetoric supporting our commitment to the principle of restraint 
reflects what Ericson (1987) described as the “discourse of the conventional reform 
trinity—cost, effectiveness, and humaneness.”79 This “trifecta” has also been taken up 
and largely expanded by Doob and Webster.80 While using slightly different language, 
 
76 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, September 20, 1994: Allan Rock (Minister of Justice 
and Attorney General of Canada) at 5872. 
77 Ibid at 5873.  
78 Alternatively (and perhaps pessimistically), it could signal a recognition that the principle, as 
drafted, had been so diminished through decades of consultation, that it was seen as being more 
symbolic than instrumental, and not expected to have much of a real-world impact. 
79 Ericson, R. (1987) “The state and criminal justice reform.” In State Control, edited by Ratner 
and McMullan, Ch. 2, (Vancouver: UBC Press), at p.21. 
80 The links between the principle of restraint and issues of crime reduction, social values, and 
cost, have been developed extensively in a series of articles published by Doob and Webster. 
These include a) Doob, A. N., & Webster, C. M. (2006). Countering Punitiveness: Understanding 
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they argue that these reform drivers—cost, effectiveness, and humaneness—constitute 
the primary foundations for our belief in restraint. They will be discussed under the 
headings of “crime reduction”, “social values”, and “cost.”  
 The ineffectiveness of prison as a crime reduction strategy 
Doob and Webster (2018) suggest that one of the central roots of Canada’s 
commitment to restraint can be found in what they describe as “penal pessimism.” 
Simply put, this expression refers to “the lack of strong faith in the ability of sentencing 
and imprisonment to serve utilitarian goals such as rehabilitation, incapacitation, and 
deterrence.” This rejection of the belief that prison can reduce crime (either through its 
ability to ‘cure’, ‘confine’, or ‘dissuade’ criminals), the authors argue, has been a 
dominant theme in Canada since its confederation in 1867.81 More importantly for the 
current discussion, this longstanding recognition of the ineffectiveness of imprisonment 
in reducing crime undermines one of the strongest arguments put forward by 
governments generally to justify their continuing recourse to incarceration.  
The government reports reviewed earlier certainly support the consensus that 
prison is more a “school of crime” than an effective tool of crime reduction. Indeed, the 
explicit statement of the 1977 MacGuigan Report that prison has failed to provide long-
term protection for society (either through rehabilitation or deterrence/incapacitation) 
leaves little doubt surrounding this committee’s view of incarceration as an ineffective 
mechanism to reduce criminal activity. This recognition of the failure of prison to solve 
the problem of crime only becomes stronger over time. 
 
Stability in Canada’s Imprisonment Rate. Law & Society Review, 40(2), 325–368; b) Doob, A.N., 
& Webster, C. M. (2015). The Harper revolution in criminal justice policy...and what comes next. 
Policy Options, 36(May), 24–31; c) Doob, A. N., & Webster, C. M. (2016). Weathering the Storm? 
Testing Long-Standing Canadian Sentencing Policy in the Twenty-First Century. Crime & Justice, 
45(1), 359–418; d) Doob, A.N. & Webster, C. M. (2015). The promise ahead: Using the past to 
guide reforms of Canada’s criminal justice system. Justice Report, 30(4), 6–9; e) Doob, A. N., & 
Webster, C. M. (2020). The real divide: When Alberta’s criminal justice policy is more progressive 
than that of the Trudeau government. Justice Report, 35(2); f) Webster & Doob, supra note 70; 
and g) Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2018). Penal optimism: Understanding American mass 
imprisonment from a Canadian perspective. In K. R. Reitz (Ed.), American exceptionalism in 
crime and punishment. Oxford University Press. 
81 Doob & Webster, supra note 44 at p. 151. 
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In fact, during the 1980s, the CSC made a deliberate effort to distance penal 
policy from the notion that judges could, through sentencing, protect citizens from illicit 
behaviour. In assessing the traditional utilitarian justifications for sentencing 
(rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation), the Commission concluded that “the only 
assertion about the current utilitarian goals that was not undermined by the results of 
research was relative to the existence of some general effect of deterrence and 
incapacitation, the magnitude of which could not be precisely estimated.”82 However, 
arguably the strongest statement regarding the ineffectiveness of prison as a crime 
reduction strategy was delivered in 1993 by a House of Commons Standing Committee 
when it noted that “If locking up those who violate the law contributed to safer societies, 
then the United States should be the safest country in the world. In fact, the United 
States affords a glaring example of the limited impact that criminal justice responses 
may have on crime.”83 
And, in fact, the empirical evidence on the ineffectiveness of utilitarian objectives 
at sentencing in reducing crime provides a solid foundation for Canada’s penal 
pessimism. In terms of offender rehabilitation, for instance, Canadians—in contrast to 
Americans—were not shocked by Martinson’s declaration that “nothing works,”84 in 
terms of the rehabilitative potential of imprisonment. Indeed, Canada has long accepted 
that prison was more likely to de-socialize than re-socialize inmates. Specifically, there 
has been a general acceptance that the experience of imprisonment is not conducive to 
social reintegration, and a widely shared recognition that any positive effects that might 
be associated with program delivery in prison are likely counteracted by the negative 
impact of incarceration itself (e.g., social isolation, loss of employment, damage to family 
relationships).  
 
82 CSC, supra note 38 at p. 144. 
83 Government of Canada. (1993). Crime prevention in Canada: Toward a national strategy (12th 
Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (3rd session, 34th 
Parliament) at p. 2. 
84 Martinson, R. (1974). What works? Questions and answers about prison reform. The Public 
Interest, 35, 22–54. 
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And the research supporting such a pessimistic conclusion regarding the unlikely 
success of sentencing an offender to prison for rehabilitation is long and consistent.85 In 
fact, this general statement would also apply to rehabilitative programs delivered in the 
community. Empirical evidence suggests that none are consistently associated with 
positive outcomes. While some non-custodial programs have been shown to reduce 
reoffending to a limited extent, others have demonstrated no impact, and some have 
made matters worse by increasing crime.86   
Having said this, while Canada has generally shown little faith in the ability of 
judges to rehabilitate offenders through sentencing, it continues to support rehabilitative 
programming while offenders are in prison. That is, we continue to leave space for the 
possibility that while incarcerated, offenders might take advantage of correctional 
programming that assists them in making life changes, and that those changes may 
reduce the likelihood of re-offending. In fact, Canada is well known for its empirical 
research on the rehabilitative possibilities of correctional programs.87 Of course, we 
continue to maintain—even within the correctional environment—a very cautious hope 
(some might say ‘leap of faith’) in (very) modest positive effects in limited situations. In 
other words, some programs may work with some offenders, under some circumstances.  
And deterrence-based strategies—which include both general and specific 
deterrence—do not fare much better when applied to sentencing. General deterrence 
 
85 See, for instance: Palmer, T. (1992). The re-emergence of correctional intervention. Sage 
Publications; Finn, P. (1998). Job Placement for Offenders in Relation to Recidivism. Journal of 
Offender Rehabilitation, 28(1/2):89-106; Bouffard, J. A., MacKenzie, D. L., & Hickman, L. J. 
(2000). Effectiveness of vocational educational and employment programs for adult offenders: A 
methodology-based analysis of the literature. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 31, 1–41; Cecil, 
D. K., Drapkin, D. A., MacKenzie, D. L., & Hickman, L. J. (2000). The effectiveness of adult basic 
education and life-skills programs in reducing recidivism: A review and assessment of the 
research. Journal of Correctional Education, 51, 207–226; Miethe, T. D., Lu, H., & Reese, E. 
(2000). Reintegrative shaming and recidivism risks in drug court: Explanations for some 
unexpected findings. Crime & Delinquency, 46, 522–541; Dugan, L., Nagin, D. S., & Rosenfeld, 
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intimate-partner homicide. Law & Society Review, 37, 169–198; Visher, C. A., & Travis, J. (2003). 
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Sociology, 29(1), 89–113.  
86 Webster, C. M. (2004). Limits of Justice: The role of the criminal justice system in reducing 
crime. In B. Kidd & J. Phillips (Eds.), Enforcement and Prevention to Civic Engagement: 
Research on community safety. University of Toronto. 
87 See, for instance, Andrews, D. A., Zinger, I., Hoge, R. D., Bonta, J., Gendreau, P., & Cullen, F. 
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attempts to discourage potential offenders (from offending) through the (harsh) 
punishment of others; specific deterrence attempts to discourage the actual offender 
through (harsh) punishment from re-offending. Both assume offenders act as rational 
actors, weighing the costs and benefits of crime prior to taking action.88 The theory is 
simple: sentences deter by making the consequences of crime punitive enough to 
outweigh potential benefits; increased punishments, using this logic, should result in 
increased deterrence (decreased crime).  
Given its punitive nature, deterrence through increased sentence severity is 
generally associated with sentences of imprisonment, and much of the research in this 
area has focused on the impact of longer, or mandatory, prison sentences. However, 
efforts to evaluate the effect of increased penalties on criminal activity have identified 
several weaknesses inherent in theories of general deterrence. As a case in point, this 
crime reduction model assumes that people: are aware of the penalties for specific 
offences; always weigh the costs and benefits of their actions (as opposed to acting on 
impulse); and will perceive a reasonable likelihood of apprehension.89 Yet empirical 
research has failed to find consistent or compelling support for any of these necessary 
conditions. Perhaps not surprisingly, an evaluation of early deterrence literature led the 
CSC to conclude in 1987 that “deterrence cannot be used, with empirical justification, to 
guide the imposition of sentences.”90 Since then, a vast body of literature has been 
developed in the area of deterrence, and a number of comprehensive summaries have 
been produced.91 When dealing with general deterrence, the consensus within the 
academic community is that little to no empirical support has been found for the belief 
that harsher sentences deter crime.92   
 
88 Ibid at p. 8. 
89 Webster, supra note 86 at pp. 10-11. 
90 CSC, supra note 38 at p. xxviii. 
91 Doob, A. N., & Webster, C. M. (2003). “Sentence severity and crime: Accepting the null 
hypothesis.” In M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and Justice: A review of research (Vol. 30, pp. 143–195). 
University of Chicago Press; and Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2012). Searching for Sasquatch: 
Deterrence of crime through sentence severity. In J. Petersilla & K. R. Reitz (Eds.), Oxford 
handbook on sentencing and corrections (pp. 173–195). Oxford University Press. 
92 Doob & Webster, ibid at p. 188. Note: While the severity of punishment is not associated with a 
reduction in crime, there is some suggestion that the certainty of apprehension (and punishment) 
may have some impact. See Easton, S., & Piper, C. (2012). Sentencing and punishment: The 
quest for justice (Third). Oxford University Press, at p. 115-118. 
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Research examining specific deterrence suggests similar (or worse) results, 
especially when related to the use of imprisonment. Studies on the impact of 
imprisonment on reoffending suggest, for instance, that imprisonment—at best—has no 
effect on the likelihood an offender will reoffend, and—at worse—that it increases the 
likelihood of reoffending.93 Other studies have reported similar discouraging outcomes, 
including the following: 
• Imprisoned offenders are at least as likely to reoffend as those who receive 
non-custodial dispositions.94 
•  Sentence duration (in prison) is not related to the likelihood of reoffending.95 
• Offenders who are imprisoned for the first time are more likely to reoffend than 
similar offenders who receive non-custodial dispositions.96 
• Drug offenders who are imprisoned are more likely to reoffend than those who 
are not.97 
Not only is there no compelling or consistent evidence to suggest that offenders are 
deterred from committing further offences as a result of harsh penalties, there is also a 
growing acknowledgment that the negative “collateral” effects of imprisonment extend to 
an offender’s immediate family, and possibly their community more generally.98 
 
93 Nagin, D. S., Cullen, F. T., & Jonson, C. L. (2009). Imprisonment and reoffending. In Crime and 
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94 Weatherburn, D. (2010). The effect of prison on adult re-offending. Crime and Justice Bulletin 
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D., and Bartels, L. (2009). The recidivism of offenders given suspended sentences: A comparison 
with full-time imprisonment. Crime and Justice Bulletin, 136; Mears, D. P., Cochran, J.C., and 
Bales, W.D. (2012). Gender differences in the effects of prison on recidivism. Journal of Criminal 
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95 Snodgrass, G. M., Arjan A. J., Blokland, A. H., Nieuwbeerta, P., and Nagin, D. S. (2011). Does 
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97 Spohn, C., & Holleran, D. (2002). The effect of imprisonment on recidivism rates of felony 
offenders: A focus on drug offenders. Criminology, 40, 329–357. 
98 For instance, the incarceration of a mother or father has a negative impact on their children. 
See Van de Rakt, M., Murray, J., & Nieuwbeerta, P. (2012). The long-term effects of paternal 
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Like other sentencing objectives, incapacitation has a common-sense appeal as 
a strategy of crime reduction. After all, when offenders are in prison, they are not 
committing offences in the community. Aside from the questionable ethics of imprisoning 
people for what they may do in the future, this logic is faulty for several reasons. First, 
the offender will eventually get out, and will often be more likely to reoffend at that point. 
This longer-term effect can outweigh any “benefit” gained during their incarceration. 
Second, for many offence types (e.g., drug production or trafficking), it is likely that the 
incarcerated offender would simply be replaced in the community, eliminating any 
reduced criminal activity. Finally, current risk assessment models do not reliably predict 
future offending rates. By relying on past behaviour, offenders are likely to be predicted 
to be at risk for future offending later in life precisely when their offending rate is often 
declining.99 Put another way,  
While seductive in its simplistic elegance, this criminal justice strategy is 
predicated on the [erroneous] belief that high-rate offenders can be 
prospectively identified and incarcerated sufficiently early in their careers 
to reap the incapacitative benefit of crime reduction.100 
In brief, Canada’s longstanding penal pessimism appears to be well founded. 
Despite decades of empirical research, no credible and consistent body of empirical 
evidence has been found to support the use of imprisonment as an effective crime 
reduction strategy (either through rehabilitation, deterrence, or incapacitation). In fact, 
the CSC was so concerned about the codification of such unrealistic sentencing 
objectives (at least in terms of reducing criminal activity), that it elected to distinguish 
between the goals of sentencing and the broader goals of the criminal justice system. 
The overall goal of the criminal justice system, it recommended, should be the protection 
of society; the purpose of sentencing should be much narrower: “to preserve the 
authority of and promote respect for the law through the imposition of just sanctions.”101 
While utilitarian objectives were not dismissed, the CSC recommended that primacy be 
given to the principle of proportionality. 
 
99 Bersani, B. E., Nieuwbeerta, P., & Laub, J. H. (2009). Predicting trajectories of offending over 
the life course: Findings from a Dutch conviction cohort. Journal of Research in Crime & 
Delinquency, 46(4), 468–494. 
100 Webster, supra note 86 at p. 5. 
101 CSC, supra note 38 at p. 151 (Rec #6.1) 
   
27 
 By the 1990s, this notion of penal pessimism was firmly established in Canadian 
formal reports. Some might argue that it became even more clearly articulated in the last 
decade of the 20th century. As a case in point, one of the government discussion papers 
made the following admission: 
We do not at present have the means or the knowledge to drastically 
reduce crime or rehabilitate all offenders. We can, however, seek to reduce 
or mitigate the social costs of crime, punish offenders, and create 
programs, opportunities and incentives for treatment for those we think 
might respond so that they are not an ongoing burden to society.102 
Similarly, Webster and Doob (2018) affirm—based on a review of government reports 
from the 1980s and 1990s—that Canada’s overall position on sentencing during this era 
acknowledged the criminal justice system’s limited ability to solve crime. Specifically, 
“[p]olicies related to sentencing and imprisonment had, at that point in Canada’s history, 
been successfully separated from crime prevention.”103 
Of course, there is always the exception to the rule. Between 2006 and 2015 
criminal justice policy in Canada took a decidedly punitive turn. Stephen Harper’s 
Conservative government reversed decades of belief in the ineffectiveness of prison as a 
crime reduction strategy. Up until then, an over-reliance on incarceration was seen as a 
“Bad Thing.”104 During this more recent period, we witnessed a virtual “punishment 
tsunami” of harsh crime bills that explicitly endorsed the effectiveness of incapacitation 
and deterrence.105 Pragmatic concerns around the need to reduce the use of 
imprisonment were replaced by a rhetoric of punishment that was more emotionally 
satisfying to a willing public. The number of mandatory minimum penalties increased, 
and significant restrictions were placed on the use of conditional sentences. Indeed, 
after decades of criminal justice policies that promoted restraint, the new message—at 
least for the better part of a decade in Canada—was that “prison works in reducing 
 
102 Government of Canada. (1990). Directions for reform: A framework for sentencing, corrections 
and conditional release (p. 32). Solicitor General of Canada, at p. 8. 
103 Doob & Webster, supra note 44 at p. 163. 
104 Tonry, M. (2011). Making peace, not a desert. Criminology & Public Policy, 10(3), at p. 647. 
105 Webster & Doob, supra note 40 at p. 361. 
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crime…. [whereby] [r]estraint was largely replaced with excess; moderation with 
severity.”106  
While the current Liberal government has clearly distanced itself from this type of 
punitive rhetoric, it has yet to take any decisive action to reverse much of the harsh 
legislation introduced by the Harper government. What has changed—one might 
argue—is that the current government has demonstrated a (timid) return to Canada’s 
longstanding penal pessimism. More importantly for our current purposes though, the 
Harper era reminds us that while Canada has largely heeded the empirical evidence 
regarding the ineffectiveness of utilitarian sentencing objectives in reducing crime, the 
intuitive appeal of crime reduction through rehabilitation, deterrence, or incapacitation is 
never far from the surface. Indeed, these sentencing objectives are so ingrained in our 
collective psyches that they have always remained part of the discourse on sentencing. 
Symptomatically, it was recognition of the emotional role played by these goals that led 
the CSC to not eliminate them from their proposed purposes and principles of 
sentencing. As this Commission astutely recognized, 
Even if punishment cannot ultimately be justified, it apparently satisfies a 
strong desire, seated both in moral thinking and human emotions, and it 
cannot be renounced. There is consequently a natural tendency to 
compensate for the limits of retributivism by attributing to penal sanctions 
an efficiency in preventing crime which they do not really possess.107 
 The incongruence of an over-reliance on imprisonment with 
Canadian social values 
Not only have Canadians been generally skeptical of the effectiveness of punitive 
sanctions in reducing crime, they tend to lack—on an individual level—“the moral taste 
for harshness.”108 Studies have repeatedly suggested that the Canadian public, 
especially when provided with details of criminal cases, are quite accepting of non-
 
106 Webster & Doob, supra note 70 at p. 312. More recently, Doob & Webster have suggested 
that 2006 represented a policy shift whose first harbingers were apparent as early as 1996. See 
Webster & Doob, ibid at p. 356. 
107 CSC, supra note 38 at p. 145. 
108 Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2007). Punitive Trends and Stable Imprisonment Rates in 
Canada. Crime & Justice, 36, 297–369 at p. 348. 
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custodial sanctions, including for less serious cases of violence.109 It is possible that this 
reflects underlying cultural and/or social values that promote tolerance and compassion. 
Certainly, this explanation would be consistent with government and public support for 
the development and expansion of “problem-solving” courts in Canada.110 In a recent 
National Survey (2017), participant responses suggested a thoughtful approach to the 
issue of sentencing: 
At the same time, most participants felt that the best approach to prevent 
crime is to address root causes, particularly during impressionable stages 
of an individual’s life, through means such as social programs and support 
systems. Stronger sentences and punishment were not viewed by most 
focus group participants as an effective way to dissuade individuals from 
committing crime.111 
In focus groups conducted after the survey, there was strong support for the criminal 
justice system taking mental illness and intellectual challenges into consideration. 
Participants also identified “a need for a more integrated system that increases options 
for health and social support for offenders with these challenges.”112  
As Webster and Doob (2015) point out, criminal justice policy sets the tone and 
provides a normative framework; the criminal law, especially, acts to underline values 
that are important to society. Until at least 2006, crime was seen as being socially 
determined, and “there was broad consensus…about those underlying values. 
…compassion, inclusion, reintegration, restraint, rehabilitation, and moderation.”113 The 
 
109 Research suggests that the more the public knows about specific issues or sentence results, 
the more positive their attitudes regarding the outcome. See, generally, Doob, A. N. (2000). 
Transforming the punishment environment: Understanding public views of what should be 
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acceptance of such communitarian values, and the idea that crime is a community (not 
individual) concern, also informed beliefs regarding the root causes of crime, and by 
extension, their remedies. Giving the keynote address at a 1995 conference, the Minister 
of Justice made the following public comments on the issue of crime and public 
perceptions:  
Making streets safer has as much to do with literacy as it does with the law; 
with the strength of families as with the length of sentences; and with early 
intervention as with mandatory supervision. If crime prevention is going to 
be effective, it has to be based on linkages between law enforcement and 
social agencies, between the educational system and families, and 
between community workers and health care professionals.114  
And, in fact, there appears to be some—albeit speculative—empirical support for 
the link between Canadians’ longstanding belief in restraint in the use of imprisonment 
and wider cultural values. This may be tied, at least in part, to our tendency to shun 
attempts to follow the United States in our approach to criminal justice. Indeed, Webster 
and Doob (2007) identify the rejection of “Americanized models” as an important feature 
in Canada’s cultural identity, though they argue that it would be simplistic to suggest that 
Canadian culture is defined only as that which is in opposition to the United States.115 
Relying upon research that incorporated extensive polling data, Webster and Doob 
suggest that the core values of Canadians and Americans differ in fundamental ways, 
and that the underlying values of the two groups can be linked to their respective 
imprisonment rates.116  
Specifically, values deemed to be “most Canadian” were captured under the 
heading of “idealism and autonomy.” These included a greater tolerance for non-
traditional views, a level of comfort with adapting to change, and a tendency not to feel 
threatened by social change. Americans (or “least Canadian”), on the other hand, were 
more likely to be associated with values reflecting “status and security”—for example, 
the belief that rules should be followed, immigrants should blend it, and people get what 
 
114 The Honourable Allan Rock. (1996). Keynote address: Crime, punishment and public 
expectations. Public Perceptions of the Administration of Justice—Papers presented at the CIAJ 
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they deserve as a result of the decisions they make. When different American regions 
are compared in terms of their use of imprisonment and the degree to which they are 
more or less “Canadian-like”, the states that were more like Canada in terms of 
social/cultural values had lower imprisonment rates than those that were less like 
Canada.117 This finding provides some level of support for the notion that imprisonment 
rates reflect, in part, the underlying values of the jurisdiction. Indeed, as Webster and 
Doob note, “Canadian culture appears to be largely rooted in more nonviolent, 
communitarian values that may not be supportive of increasing punitive responses to 
criminal behavior.”118  
During the Harper decade (2006-2015), the underlying belief in the social causes 
of crime was challenged by suggestions that crime was the result, instead, of rational 
choices made by individuals. Certainly, in terms of the political rhetoric, it would appear 
that “compassion for offenders [was] replaced by ambivalence.”119 However, even in this 
case, it is not clear whether this punitive rhetoric was intended to actually change the 
core values held by most Canadians. As Adams (2014) points out, Harper’s harsher 
policies may not have been intended to sway moderates or progressives but, rather, to 
take advantage of an aggrieved and bitter (minority) voting block for political gain.120 
Using language not unfamiliar to any who have followed the rise of right-wing political 
movements in recent years, Adams reminds us that “Conservatives are happy to nurture 
the resentments that decades of multi-party elite consensus [have] sown, to judiciously 
dole out politically incorrect red meat and to reap the political rewards.”121 And, in fact, it 
is important to note is that there is no evidence that Canadian core values (e.g., 
moderation, compassion, inclusion, etc.) actually changed as a result of the Harper 
era.122 It is possible that at least part of the explanation resides in the fact that, at most, 
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the voting block targeted by the punitive rhetoric—and receptive to it—represented a 
relatively small minority of Canadians. 
 The financial cost of imprisonment 
In the post-recession 1990s, all levels of government in Canada were dealing 
with the need for fiscal restraint. Demands on budgets in many areas were increasing, 
budgets were not. This included justice spending (police, courts, corrections, legal aid, 
prosecutions), which saw a 13% constant dollar increase between 1988 and 1995.123 In 
1994/1995 the average daily count of adult offenders in either provincial or federal 
custody was 33,759.124 Of the $10 billion allocated to justice spending in that fiscal year, 
approximately 15% ($1.5 billion) funded adult correctional (in custody) populations.125 
The cost of keeping inmates behind bars has always been substantial. In the mid-1990s 
the average cost of housing a federal inmate was $121 per day; at the 
provincial/territorial level the cost was $107 per day.126 Even at the lower amount, in 
1994/1995 this represented a cost (borne by the provinces/territories) of $39,055 per 
year for each inmate. 
 
sentencing reforms made over the (Harper) decade “to assess the changes, ensure that we are 
increasing the safety of our communities, getting value for money, addressing gaps and ensuring 
that current provisions are aligned with the objectives of the criminal justice system.” The Prime 
Minister made specific mention of his interest in outcomes that increased the use of restorative 
justice processes “and other initiatives to reduce the rate of incarceration amongst Indigenous 
Canadians.” See Mandate Letter, supra note  26. 
123 Statistics Canada. (1997). Justice Spending in Canada 1994/1995 (Juristat: Canadian Centre 
for Justice Statistics No. 85-002-XPE no. 3). Statistics Canada, at p. 4. Note: Constant dollar 
calculations used 1986 as the base year (at p. 3). 
124 Statistics Canada. (1997). Adult correctional services in Canada, 1995-96, by M. Reed & P. 
Morrison, in Juristat:17:4, No. 85-002-XPE. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), at p. 4. 
125 Statistics Canada, supra note 123 at p. 9 (Table 1).  
126 More recent (2017/2018) estimates of the financial cost of holding an offender in custody 
report an average of $330 per day for each inmate in federal custody, and an average of $233 
per day per inmate in provincial/territorial custody. See Statistics Canada. (2019). Adult and youth 
correctional statistics in Canada, 2017/2018, by Jamil Malakieh, in Juristat: Canadian Centre for 
Justice Statistics No. 85-002–X; p. 26. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada) at p. 22.  
In contrast, costs for supervising offenders in the community are extremely low, with a reported 
rate for Ontario of $5.81 per day cost for 2014/15 (source: Office of the Auditor General of 
Ontario. (2014). Annual Report of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, at 67). BC reports 
an average of $7.25 per day per offender for 2016/17 (source: Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General. (2017). A Profile of BC Corrections: Reduce Reoffending, Protect Communities 
– 2017, at 3).  
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Not surprisingly, the mid-1990s saw rising concerns about increasing correctional 
caseloads (with their associated funding requirements). Between 1990 and 1996, the 
average actual custodial count in Canada saw increases each year at both the federal 
and provincial/territorial levels, with a 15.6% increase overall. This represented a 10.6% 
overall increase in the number of custodial admissions (from 212,242 in 1990/1991 to 
234,732 in 1995/1996).127 While cost-saving measures were put in place in many 
provinces/territories (e.g., the “double-bunking” of adult inmates, privatization of certain 
services, staff reductions through the use of technology, and facility sharing agreements 
between levels of government), they were simply insufficient.  
Importantly, the economic solution was not to reduce the average cost of housing 
each inmate. Rather, it was to reduce the number of inmates housed (prison 
reduction).128 Indeed, when the federal, provincial, and territorial Justice Ministers (and 
others) met in 1995 to discuss concerns around growing prison populations, cost issues 
were clearly front of mind: “most jurisdictions were experiencing growing correctional 
populations and concern was expressed that this growth threatened to outstrip available 
capacity and resources during a time when government resources continue to 
decline.”129 And so, while humanitarian or utilitarian concerns may have been 
considerations, they were not the only pressures being responded to at that point. 
It is worth noting that the 11 recommendations released by the 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial ministers (in the 1997 report) reflected an uncharacteristic 
level of unanimity, given the broad range of political parties represented. Their shared 
interest in prison reduction efforts can be seen in recommendations that endorsed: 
making greater use of diversion programs and other alternatives measures; “de-
incarcerating” low-risk offenders; and increasing the use of restorative justice and 
mediation approaches. The clear link between efforts to reduce the use of imprisonment 
and the need to reduce (or not increase) financial costs is apparent in the fourth (and 
final) report in this series.  
 
127 Public Safety Canada. (1997). Corrections population growth: First report on progress for 
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers Responsible for Justice. Public Safety Canada, at p. 5 
(Annex B- Table 3). 
128 Statistics Canada, supra note 123 at p. 8. 
129 Public Safety Canada, supra note 127 at p. 1. 
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The working group recognized that incarceration is appropriate for many 
offenders, but for others it is unnecessary and ineffective, even 
counterproductive. Being the most expensive of correctional programs, it 
was recognized that less expensive and at least equally effective measures 
were necessary to allow increased resources to be concentrated on the 
most serious offenders.130 
The province of Alberta—the most Conservative jurisdiction in Canada—offers an 
instructive lesson on the ability of economic pressure to obtain meaningful change in the 
use of imprisonment. In the mid-1990s, the Conservative premier cut expenditures quite 
drastically to balance the budget, as he had promised to do. This included substantial 
reductions in the justice ministry, which resulted in policy changes that had the effect of 
reducing, by almost 32% in four years (1993-1997), the number of offenders 
incarcerated in provincial institutions.131 As it turned out, pursuing decarceration as a 
political solution would appear—at least in this case—to be more effective than efforts to 
achieve decarceration as a policy-based solution, linked to criminal justice goals. 
Notably, key to the successful prison reduction in Alberta was the lack of political 
or public opposition to the plan. This was in part due to the attention being paid to more 
controversial cuts made in health and education. Faced with a 21% budget reduction in 
the first two years, and 31% in the second two years (1997/1998), civil servants in 
Justice were given considerable latitude when designing cost reduction strategies.132 
While the goal was economical (cost cutting), it is notable that the decarceration that 
resulted was also largely consistent with established (and often progressive) criminal 
justice policy goals. “The combination of this ‘freedom’ to craft policy and the liberal 
orientation of the civil servants was central in decreasing Alberta’s prison population.”133 
The changes introduced included closing prisons and encouraging, whenever possible, 
the use of non-custodial options. Focusing on restraint in the use of imprisonment as a 
cost-cutting strategy had the effect of reducing financial costs and reducing actual 
 
130 Public Safety Canada. (2000). Corrections population report: Fourth edition [Final]. Public 
Safety Canada, at p.2. It is notable that the final report signals a shift in concern—from sentenced 
custody to remand admissions. “In addition, Provincial and Territorial remand populations 
continue to rise. Recently efforts have been made to better understand these dynamics” (at p. 2). 
131 Webster & Doob, supra note 7 at p. 5. 
132 Ibid at p. 17. 
133 Ibid at p. 18. 
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imprisonment. Though not driven by policy goals, specific programs and outcomes were 
generally consistent with criminological theory, nonetheless. 
1.3 Manifestations of restraint and trends of imprisonment 
Despite the historically entrenched commitment to restraint that has guided 
criminal justice policy through the 20th century, Canada has been unable to reduce its 
overall adult imprisonment rate in any meaningful way. Rather, these rates have 
demonstrated relative stability over time in spite of a lack of faith in the ability of 
imprisonment, in particular, to serve utilitarian goals. Moreover, it has ensued 
notwithstanding long-held social and cultural values of communitarianism as well as 
concerns—particularly at the provincial/territorial level—with the high financial costs 
associated with incarceration. In fact, Canada’s overall imprisonment rates have 
remained relatively stable for (at least)134 half a century (see Figure 1-1). Notably though, 
there have clearly been some fluctuations over time—with a low of 92 per 100,000 
population in 1980/1981 and a high of 116 in 1994/1995. 
 
134 Webster & Doob extend Canada’s stable imprisonment rate back as far as the early 1950s. 
See Webster & Doob, supra note 40 at p. 360 (Figure 17.2). 
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Figure 1-1  Canadian imprisonment rates: Total, federal, and 
provincial/territorial adult imprisonment rates per 100,000 population 
(1978/79 to 2016/17)135 
 
While one might be tempted to conclude that Canada has failed to honour its 
longstanding principle of restraint, it is possible that this lack of change can, itself, be 
viewed as evidence of restraint. Two arguments are offered in support of this position. 
On the one hand, one needs to evaluate this stability within the wider context of 
increases in the use of imprisonment in other countries. On the other hand, one also 
needs to evaluate it within the context of internal policy changes that were expected to 
increase the use of imprisonment in Canada. In either case, Canadian stability is notable 
in that it reflects the system’s resistance to wider (external or internal) forces promoting 
policies that are inconsistent with the notion of restraint. 
Indeed, from an international perspective, we have seen rising imprisonment 
rates in other comparative nations. In fact, Canadian levels of incarceration have been 
 
135 Data for this figure come from: Statistics Canada, Canadian Socio-Economic Information 
Management System (CANSIM): Average counts of adults in provincial and territorial correctional 
programs, Table 35-10-0154-01 (formerly CANSIM 251-0005); Average counts of offenders in 
federal programs, Canada, Table 35-10-0155-01 (formerly CANSIM 251-0006); and Population 
estimates, Table 17-0005-01 (formerly CANSIM 051-0001). 
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described as a notable anomaly, particularly within English-speaking nations.136 One 
would need only to compare the change in imprisonment rates between 2000 and 2015 
in England/Wales (124 to 148), Scotland (116 to 144), Australia (114 to 152), and New 
Zealand (148-192), to that of Canada (115-114) to make the point.137 For a more 
dramatic effect, consider Canadian rates alongside those of its closest neighbour, the 
United States. As Webster and Doob (2018) note, both countries showed relative 
stability in their imprisonment rates from 1930 to 1970, but then began to diverge 
substantially in the mid-1970s. While Canada’s levels remained relatively stable, the 
American rate “skyrocketed” from approximately 170 per 100,000 residents in 1975 to 
over 700 in 2010.138 
But even from a national perspective, the (one might say unexpected) stability of 
Canadian imprisonment rates—particularly between 2006 and 2015—suggests that the 
sentencing culture was largely able to resist the tough-on-crime policies that 
characterized the early 21st century.139 The Conservative push towards punitiveness 
included legislative reforms, certainly, but also a rhetorical shift that promoted harsh 
penalties as effective strategies for crime reduction. In fact, mathematical modelling at 
the time warned of “very high costs in financial, social and human terms,” suggesting 
that the tough-on-crime agenda would result in “the lengthy incarceration of thousands of 
additional offenders under harsh conditions.”140  
 
136 Doob & Webster, supra note 80(a) at p. 326; More recently, see Doob & Webster, supra note 
70 at p. 300. 
137 Walmsley, R. (2018). World prison population list (12th ed) (p. 19). Institute for criminal policy 
research (ICPR). Rates per 100,000 population. 
https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/wppl_12.pdf 
138 Webster & Doob, supra note 44 at pp. 122-123 (Figure 3.1).  
139 The Conservative government enacted 42 crime bills while in power—all directed towards a 
greater punitiveness. For details, see Doob & Webster, supra note 80(c) at p. 385 (Table 1). 
Many of the policies pursued by the Harper Conservative government between 2006 and 2015 
were consistent with developments in other countries---for example, increased use of mandatory 
minimum sentences, restrictions on the availability of non-custodial sanctions, reduced eligibility 
for parole or credit for time served, etc.  
140 Mallea, P. (2010). The fear factor: Stephen Harper’s “Touch on crime” agenda (p. 58). 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), at p. 24. Notably, part of this predicted increase 
was believed to come from the 2006 restrictions on conditional sentencing. Specifically, the report 
of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) suggested that if the restrictions were applied to the 
2008/2009 national caseload, the result would have been an additional 3,818 offenders 
incarcerated, for an estimated 858,679 days (an average of 225 days per offender). See Yalkin, 
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Notwithstanding such predictions, the Canadian adult imprisonment rate 
remained essentially unchanged throughout this period (see above Figure 1-1).141 Doob 
and Webster (2016) speculate on a number of possible explanations for the relative 
stability of imprisonment rates over these years. Perhaps one of the most intriguing 
within the context of the current study is that judges may have moderated some of the 
more punitive impacts through the development of practices intended to circumvent what 
were seen as “unjustifiably harsh or unfair laws.” Three possible strategies are identified: 
1) judges can find laws to be unconstitutional; 2) they can interpret law benevolently, to 
the advantage of the offender; or 3) they can ignore parliamentary intention and 
compensate in other ways.142 More broadly, this proposed explanation highlights the 
critical role of the judiciary in shaping sentencing policy. 
Another contribution to the relative stability of Canada’s imprisonment rates 
between 2006 and 2015 may be found in the belief that the tough-on-crime reforms were 
more symbolic than instrumental. While some of the new legislative provisions had a 
small impact on a lot of people, most of the reforms with “large impacts” (e.g., mandatory 
minimum jail terms or the restrictions on conditional sentences) affected a relatively 
small group of offenders.143 In fact, Doob and Webster suggest that the goal might not 
have been to actually increase punishment severity. Rather, the Harper government may 
simply have wanted to look tough, without being particularly concerned with “how 
coherent, principled, or harsh the criminal justice system actually was.”144 Nonetheless, 
there clearly were some punitive policies that resulted in the imprisonment of offenders 
 
T. R., & Kirk, M. (2012). The fiscal impact of changes to eligibility for conditional sentences of 
imprisonment in Canada (p. 89). Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, at p. 54. 
141 In fact, the only dramatic change observed in Canadian imprisonment rates occurred in the 
wake of the 2002 enactment of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), legislation that included 
“clear operational principles designed to screen cases away from court and to restrict the use of 
custody.” The youth imprisonment rate went from 192 per 100,000 youths in 1997, to 51 per 
100,000 in 2015, representing a 73% reduction. See Webster & Doob, supra note 75 at p. 1107.  
142 Doob & Webster, supra note 80(c) at p. 403. 
143 Ibid at p. 391. 
144 Ibid at p. 410. The darker interpretation of this explanation is that the intention was not to 
make the system more punitive but, rather, to change public values—e.g., to change the social 
welfare orientation held by many Canadians. “Canadian Conservatives may have been using 
crime policy as a mechanism to reinforce conservative values related to individual responsibility in 
all aspects of life” (at p. 411).  
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who otherwise would have received a non-custodial disposition, even if there were fewer 
than anticipated.145  
Regardless, the authors optimistically predict that “the Harper era in sentencing 
policy in the end may have been a short-term blip in an otherwise historically entrenched 
commitment to restraint in the use of imprisonment.”146 So far, it would appear that they 
were right, at least to the extent that the Harper policies generally do not seem to have 
resulted in sustained rhetorical or actual changes in criminal justice policy. What is 
perhaps less certain, is whether any of the specific criminal justice reforms that this past 
government introduced (e.g., mandatory minimum penalties) will have a continuing 
impact. Certainly, this possibility is raised within the context of the significant restrictions 
the Harper government placed on the use of conditional sentences.  
While it is unclear whether the current government has an appetite to reverse the 
specific constraints on conditional sentences, it would seem that the judiciary may have 
an interest in doing so.147 In R. v. Sharma, the Ontario Court of Appeal responded to the 
limits placed on judicial discretion by effectively removing the restrictions.148 At this point, 
it is difficult to predict what might be in store for conditional sentences as we move 
forward. Will the limitations that effectively neutered the sanction be upheld by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, or will we go back to a time when conditional sentences were 
available for more serious offences? If it is the latter, with no other changes, should we 
 
145 In its assessment of the impact of the conditional sentencing restrictions alone (not including 
MMPs), the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) estimated that in 2008/2009, 4,468 cases that 
received conditional sentences would no longer be eligible for that sanction. Even allowing for the 
estimated 650 acquittals (after trial), this would presumably represent 3,818 “new” terms of 
imprisonment. See Yalkin & Kirk, supra note 140 at p. 36. 
146 Doob & Webster, supra note 80(c) at p. 415. While Harper’s Conservative government took 
punitive policies the furthest, it is important to note that past Liberal governments had pursued 
similar strategies—e.g., Bill C-70, legislation that did not pass, but which would have made many 
categories of offences ineligible for conditional sentences unless the court was “satisfied that it is 
in the interests of justice to do so because of exceptional circumstances. Bill C-70, An Act to 
amend the Criminal Code (conditional sentence of imprisonment). First reading October 27, 2005 
(Canada, 38th Parl., 1st Sess.).  
More importantly, as Webster and Doob point out, all three national parties supported tough-on-
crime platforms during the 2006 and 2008 elections. Similarly, opposition parties either failed to 
moderate, or explicitly supported, harsh sentencing policies during the Conservative minority 
government (2006-2011). See Webster & Doob, supra note 70. 
147 It would be consistent with the appellate courts’ willingness to address other Conservative 
tough-on-crime policies—e.g., MMPs, victim surcharges, credit for time served, etc. 
148 Sharma, supra note 4. 
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expect a different outcome? Indeed, Einstein’s definition of insanity as “doing the same 
thing over and over again and expecting different results” comes to mind. 
If nothing else, these questions underline the need to re-visit the conditional 
sentence as one of the central strategies adopted to reduce Canada’s reliance on 
imprisonment as a criminal sanction. However, this exercise cannot simply be focused 
on where we are now. Rather, it also demands an understanding of history. To borrow 
from a well-known civil rights activist, “You can’t really know where you are going until 
you know where you have been” (Angelou, n.d.). To this end, we need to have a much 
better appreciation of, as well as insight into, the history of the conditional sentence in 
Canada. 
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2 The rise (and fall) of the conditional sentence 
Chapter 1 introduced restraint as a core principle entrenched within Canadian 
criminal justice policy, one that was elevated by its codification in 1996. Bill C-41, the 
legislation that established restraint as one of the principles of sentencing, also created 
the conditional sentence—a non-custodial sanction that allows offenders to serve terms 
of imprisonment (of less than two years) in the community. The clear purpose of the 
sanction was to reduce the use of traditional incarceration in Canada.149 Indeed, this new 
sentencing option can be seen as a natural extension or concrete translation of our 
longstanding belief in restraint in the use of imprisonment. There was a sense of 
optimism in the sanction’s early days, as reflected in Roberts’ observation (in 1997) that 
conditional sentences had already shown themselves to be popular with the judiciary, 
and  “[had] the potential to make a significant contribution to reducing Canada’s reliance 
on incarceration as a sanction.”150 At the same time, however, there were a number of 
known (or anticipated) challenges that would have to be addressed if the sanction was to 
be an effective mechanism for prison reduction.151  
The following section explores the conditional sentence within the context of 
restraint, and as influenced by the political events and judicial decisions of the past 
twenty-plus years. The first part (2.1) focuses on the creation of conditional sentences 
 
149 See, generally, the early literature on conditional sentencing in Canada: a) Gemmell, J. (1997). 
The new conditional sentencing regime. Criminal Law Quarterly, 39, 334–361; b) Manson, A. 
(1997a). Finding a place for conditional sentences. Criminal Reports (5th), 3, 283–300; c) 
Manson, A. (1997). The appeal of conditional sentences of imprisonment. Criminal Reports (5th), 
5, 279–290; d) Manson, A. (1997). Canada’s new conditional sentence: Will it replace 
incarceration or probation? Federal Sentencing Reporter, 9(5), 250–255; e) Roberts, J. V., & von 
Hirsch, A. (1998). Conditional sentences of imprisonment and the fundamental principle of 
proportionality in sentencing. Criminal Reports (5th), 10, 222–231.  
150 Roberts, J. V. (1997). Conditional sentencing: Sword of Damocles or Pandora’s Box? 
Canadian Criminal Law Review, 2, 183–204, at p. 184. The sanction’s potential to achieve 
substantive reductions in the use of imprisonment was linked to the fact that, at the time, the two-
year ceiling for conditional sentences made it available, not just for summary offences but, rather, 
for almost all offences, including many that would have likely attracted prison sentences in the 
past. Prior to the 1996 reforms, for example, 89% of the prison sentences imposed for sexual 
assault were for periods under two years. Similar patterns were evident for assault with a 
weapon, break and enter, and drug trafficking, with over 95% of the prison terms imposed on 
these offences being for terms of less than two years (and therefore eligible for conditional 
sentences post Bill C-41); see Appendix A at p. 205 “Use of incarceration, nine jurisdictions, 1993 
& 1994.” 
151 Ibid at p. 185. 
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within the broader legislative agenda captured by Bill C-41. Notably, even as it emerged 
from the parliamentary womb, the sanction was burdened by concerns regarding its 
unfortunate construction that threatened to effectively neutralize conditional sentences 
as tools for prison reduction. To use a driving metaphor, the warning light on the 
dashboard was blinking yellow.  
The early years of conditional sentencing were characterized by a sense of 
hesitancy and inconsistency in terms of the sanction’s appropriate application. Indeed, it 
is difficult to imagine the continued functioning of conditional sentences but for the 
Supreme Court’s efforts to salvage the sanction in 2000. The second part of this section 
(2.2) considers the post-Proulx challenges of conditional sentencing, suggesting that 
while the decision may have saved conditional sentences in the short-term, it arguably 
did considerable (unintended) damage in the longer-term. The warning light transitioned 
from yellow to red, signalling a serious problem or imminent failure, one that led directly 
to the diminishment of conditional sentencing (2.3). The 2007 and 2012 legislated 
restrictions, most notably as established through Bill C-10, are framed as a foreseeable 
response to the unresolved challenges of conditional sentencing (see Appendix A for 
timeline of key events). Finally, this section concludes with a review of two recent studies 
that have assessed the conditional sentence in terms of its impact on Canada’s 
imprisonment rate. Implications of their (disappointing) findings are considered in the 
context of the current research project.  
2.1 The beginning: The emergence of the conditional 
sentence as a strategy for prison reduction  
The initial (formative) years of conditional sentencing span the time between its 
introduction and the release of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Proulx 
(2000). Given the lack of guidance provided on the appropriate application of conditional 
sentencing, it is not surprising that the narrative of the sanction’s early years reflects a 
considerable degree of uncertainty, as judges were left to find an appropriate niche for 
the new sanction on their own.152 In considering this period, the focus is on clarifying the 
sanction’s initial goal(s) and identifying challenges as they relate to its primary purpose, 
that being the reduction in Canada of the recourse to imprisonment. Research 
 
152 See, generally, Manson, supra note 149(b). 
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conducted at the time provides a critical window into utilization patterns, judicial thinking, 
and early public reactions. The following section incorporates this work into its 
exploration of the early challenges and formative years of conditional sentencing.  
 Bill C-41 and the creation of conditional sentences 
When the Minister of Justice introduced Bill C-41 for second reading, he referred 
to it as part of the government’s balanced approach to crime, making it clear that the 
legislation was intended to reduce the use of imprisonment, in part by promoting the use 
of community-based sanctions. Specifically, he explained that: “[t]his bill creates an 
environment which encourages community sanctions and the rehabilitation of offenders 
together with reparation to victims and promoting in criminals a sense of accountability 
for what they have done.”153 Speaking explicitly about conditional sentences the 
following year, the Minister framed the new sanction as one that would allow offenders to 
serve jail terms in the community under strict conditions and “[i]n a manner which is less 
costly to the state and more likely to result in a positive outcome.”154 Indeed, a 1996 
news release form the Department of Justice engaged all three elements of the reform 
trifecta (cost, effectiveness, and humaneness): 
[Conditional sentences] mean that lower-risk offenders who otherwise 
would be in jail may, under tight controls, serve their sentences in the 
community. This promotes protection of the public by seeking to separate 
more serious offenders from the community while providing less-serious 
offenders with effective, community-based alternatives. It will mean that 
scarce funds can be used for incarcerating and treating more-serious 
offenders. … These amendments will bring greater consistency and 
fairness to the sentencing process.155 
 
153 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, September 20, 1994: Allan Rock (Minister of Justice 
and Attorney General of Canada) at 5873. The legislation was framed as the “product of over 14 
years of effort to achieve comprehensive reform in the sentencing process,” and its provisions 
were tied directly to the recommendations made by the CSC and Daubney Report (at 5870).  
154 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, June 15, 1995: Allan Rock (Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General of Canada) at 1520. It is not clear whether the reference to “positive outcomes” 
referred to the anticipated effect of non-custodial programming (rehabilitation) or to the mere 
absence of the negative effects associated with incarceration. Given the acknowledgement in 
official documents that custodial sanctions were not reliably effective in crime reduction, it is likely 
the latter.  
155 Department of Justice. (1996). News release: Chapter 22 of the Statutes of Canada (formerly 
Bill C-41). Government of Canada, at p. 5. 
   
44 
What was unmistakably clear was that the new sanction was intended to replace 
prison terms of less than two years, meaning that the target was provincial prison 
populations (not those in federal institutions). In fact, given that most of the provisions of 
Bill C-41 had provincial or territorial impacts, the legislation can be seen as the federal 
government’s response to increasing provincial concerns regarding correctional 
populations that threatened (in the mid-1990s) to outstrip institutional capacity. The 
Corrections Population Reports produced between 1997 and 2000, in fact, can be read 
as documentation of the extent to which the federal government responded to their 
concerns. Indeed, the final progress report (2000) adopted a somewhat political “mission 
accomplished” tone,156 stating that “[t]hese figures are encouraging as we attempt to 
reduce our reliance on incarceration and promote diversion, restorative approaches, and 
community-based alternatives.”157 
Notwithstanding the initial (positive) spin placed on Bill C-41 in terms of its 
potential to achieve meaningful prison reduction, many remained skeptical. For example, 
some critics argued that instead of offering a coherent and principled approach to 
sentencing, Bill C-41 normalized policymaking by “ad hoc-ery.”158 In addition, the 
legislation reflected multiple, sometimes inconsistent, policy positions, drawing upon the 
rhetoric of restraint and prison reduction,159 while at the same time incorporating 
 
156 The final report notes that Canada’s incarceration rate dropped by 4.7% between 1997 and 
2000, though the reduction was not attributed to any specific change. See Public Safety Canada, 
supra note 130 at p. 1. Webster & Doob note that incarceration rates peaked in 1994 and began 
declining steadily, at least until the beginning of the 21st century. See Webster & Doob, supra 
note 1 at p. 169. On this point, see also Statistics Canada. (1999). Adult correctional services in 
Canada, 1997-98, by M. Reed & J. V. Roberts, in Juristat: 19:4, No. 85-002-XIE. (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada), at p. 4. 
157 The incarceration rate cited went from 129 per 100,000 total population in 1997 to 123 per 
100,000 in 2000 (a 4.7% reduction). Public Safety Canada, ibid at p.1.  
158 Brodeur suggests that instead of an integrated approach to sentencing that is consistent and 
principled, Canadian law since 1987 “has been enacted strictly on an ad hoc basis, as it always 
has been.” Brodeur, J.P. (1999). Sentencing reform: Ten years after the Canadian Sentencing 
Commission. In J. V. Roberts & D. P. Cole (Eds.), Making sense of sentencing (pp. 332–348). 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, at pp. 343-344.  
159 Jull, Kenneth. (1999). “Reserving rooms in jail: A principled approach.” Criminal Law Quarterly, 
42(1), pp. 73-76.  
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language that reflected tenets of both retributive justice,160 and restorative justice.161 In 
retrospect, Bill C-41 operated somewhat as a Rorschach test on sentencing policy, in 
that it allowed people to see what they wanted to see.162  
An additional concern related to what the legislation did not include. Despite 
repeated (and arguably disingenuous) efforts to link the new sentencing provisions to the 
recommendations contained in the Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission and 
the Daubney Report, the government had “cherry-picked” from these publications. Most 
notably, it ignored elements thought to be critical to achieving a principled reduction in 
the use of imprisonment—the introduction of sentencing guidelines and the creation of 
an independent sentencing commission. In hindsight, the legacy of Bill C-41 may be that 
it was, in fact, more timid than adventurous,163 representing an effort to establish some 
form of limited control over sentencing policy without making the hard (and often 
unpopular) decisions necessary to provide clarity and direction to sentencing judges.164  
 
160 Roberts, J. V. & von Hirsch, A. (1999). Legislating the purpose and principles of sentencing. In 
J. V. Roberts, & D. P. Cole (Eds.), Making sense of sentencing (pp. 48-62). Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, at p.53. 
161 See, for instance, Roach, K. (2000). Changing punishment at the turn of the century: 
Restorative justice on the rise. Canadian Journal of Criminology, July, 249-280; and Stephens, M. 
(2007). Lessons from the front lines in Canada’s restorative justice experiment: The experience of 
sentencing judges. Queen’s Law Journal, 33(1), 19. 
162 Progressives and abolitionists saw restraint, adult diversion, and a new non-custodial sanction; 
retributivists saw the fundamental principle of proportionality and references to “just sanctions”; 
utilitarians saw the familiar sentencing objectives of rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation; 
and restorative justice proponents saw explicit recognition of reparations, notions of harm and 
community, and offender accountability. Some might be tempted to suggest—ironically—that 
there was something for everyone—unless, or course, you were a judge looking for clear 
guidance on how, when, and in what circumstances, the new conditional sentence should be 
used. 
163 This is in response to the question posed in 1999 by two of the drafters of Bill C-41: “Whether 
(Bill C-41) is too adventurous or too timid is an issue that will be grist for the mill of the next 
generation of sentencing reformers.” Daubney, D., & Parry, G. (1999). An Overview of Bill C-41 
(The Sentencing Reform Act). In J. V. Roberts & D. P. Cole (Eds.), Making Sense of Sentencing 
(pp. 31–47). University of Toronto Press, at p. 45.  
164 One of the three objectives of Bill C-41 was “to implement a system of sentencing policy and 
process approved by Parliament.” Daubney & Parry, ibid at p. 33; see also Doob, A. N. (1999). 
Sentencing reform: Where are we now? In J. V. Roberts & D. P. Cole (Eds.), Making Sense of 
Sentencing (pp. 349–363). University of Toronto Press, at p. 362 – “The first task is to decide 
whose challenge sentencing is. We have accomplished that in Canada: Parliament has accepted 
the challenge. It will be interesting to see how, having taken the first step, Parliament will decide 
to move.” 
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Importantly in terms of its attempts to reduce Canada’s reliance on incarceration, 
this legislation did not restrict the use of imprisonment for any offences, nor did it provide 
guidance to judges in terms of which (of the smorgasbord of) sentencing objectives 
should apply in which cases. Instead, a decision was made to place faith in judicial 
discretion and the capacity of appellate courts to supervise and provide direction.165 As 
Doob (2011) observed, by avoiding the difficult decisions about the purpose and 
principles that should guide sentencing, the door was left open for “unprincipled changes 
to occur when the political times were right.”166  
Conditional sentence orders – s. 742.1 
Nowhere are the limitations of Bill C-41 clearer than in the creation of conditional 
sentences, a new sanction that quickly became the “symbolic focal point of the new 
legislation.”167 Conditional sentences allow judges to order that certain terms of 
imprisonment be served in the community. That is, after determining that a jail sentence 
is the most appropriate sanction, a judge can go on to decide whether that term should 
be served in a traditional institution, or in the community under prescribed conditions. As 
originally enacted, there were few restrictions on their use and judges enjoyed 
considerable discretion in their application. Their creation, statutorily, is found in section 
742.1 of the amended Code (original text): 
Where a person is convicted of an offence, except an offence that is 
punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment, and the court 
(a) imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, and 
(b) is satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would not 
endanger the safety of the community  
the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in 
the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the 
community, subject to the offender’s complying with the conditions of a 
conditional sentence order made under section 742.3.  
 
165 Daubney & Parry, ibid at p. 45.  
166 Doob, A. N. (2011). The Unfinished Work of the Canadian Sentencing Commission. Canadian 
Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 53(3), 279–297, at p. 287. 
167 Jull, supra note 159 at p. 68. 
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A key difference between this sanction and earlier attempts to offer non-custodial 
options was in the sanction’s construction not as an alternative to jail but, rather, as an 
alternate form of jail–-imprisonment without incarceration (see Appendix B for full text, 
including amendments made 1996-2015).168 
 False starts: Yellow lights on the dashboard 
Conditional sentences were controversial from the start, raising conceptual and 
operational issues in terms of their form and function. Given that these challenges 
represented very real threats to the sanction’s effectiveness as a tool for prison 
reduction, the following section includes a brief description of each. These theoretical 
and practical concerns are important for two reasons. First, it is likely that some or all of 
these (completely foreseeable) early challenges are responsible for conditional 
sentencing’s “rocky” start and, quite possibly, later diminishment. Second, these 
 
168 Earlier efforts to reduce the use of imprisonment through the introduction of sentencing 
“alternatives” have used the term more literally—i.e., a sanction that can be chosen instead of 
imprisonment. For example, a report conducted for the CSC on this issue identified several 
programs that have been historically regarded as alternatives to imprisonment, including fines, 
and a variety of requirements that could be imposed as conditions of a probation order (e.g., 
community work service, restitution, and/or attendance programs offering counselling or skills 
training). See Jackson, M. (1988). A profile of Canadian alternative sentencing programmes: A 
national review of policy issues (p. 252) [Report prepared for the CSC]. Minister of Justice and 
Attorney General of Canada, at p. 4. 
It is also worth noting that there were two earlier (prior to Bill C-41) proposals that sought to 
create a new sanction called a conditional sentence. In both cases the conditional sentence acted 
as a replacement for the existing suspended sentence and could be characterized as a sanction 
imposed as an alternative to imprisonment. The term first appeared in Bill C-19, legislation 
introduced by Pierre Trudeau’s Liberal party, which died on the order paper when Parliament was 
dissolved in 1984. That conditional sentence involved suspending sentence for a term, with the 
only requirement being that the offender not be found guilty of an offence during the period of 
suspension. If the offender completed the term without further offences, the order would be 
considered successfully completed; if not, the offender would be returned to court and the 
sentence originally suspended could be imposed. See Bill C-19. First reading February 7, 1984 in 
the 2nd session, 32nd Parliament; see also Government of Canada, supra note 48 at pp. 45-46. 
A second attempt to create a conditional sentence can be seen in the 1991 DOJ proposals 
regarding intermediate sanctions, one of which included a conditional sentence as an alternative 
to the suspended sentence. In this incarnation the court would specify the sentence, but its 
execution would be suspended for the term of the order, during which time the offender would be 
bound to comply with reasonable conditions. In the event of a new offence or a failure to comply 
was alleged, the offender would be returned to court. The breach hearing would involve a 
reduced evidentiary burden (less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt) and would not require 
conviction on a new offence. If a breach was proven, the court would be required to impose the 
sentence originally specified but until then suspended. See Department of Justice, Sentencing 
Team, Policy Programs and Research Sector. (1991). Intermediate Sanctions “Consultation 
letter.” 
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challenges provide necessary context for any discussion of the sanction’s success, or 
lack thereof. Notably, this includes understanding the remedial actions proposed to 
salvage conditional sentences, which were largely ignored.  
2.1.2.1 Theoretical/conceptual [birth] defects and growing pains 
Penal paradox 
The “original sin” of conditional sentencing may be in its construction as an 
alternate form of imprisonment.169 By most lay-persons’ reading, this is an obvious 
contradiction in terms-–a jail sentence served in the community or, put more simply, a 
sentence of imprisonment that does not involve incarceration. In sentencing an offender 
to a conditional sentence, a judge must initially consider the purposes and principles of 
sentencing, including the principle of restraint and the admonition to consider all 
available sanctions other than imprisonment. Subsequently, he/she must decide that 
imprisonment is necessary; that is, that no less restrictive sanction would be appropriate. 
It is only after reaching this point that the judge can consider whether the prison 
sentence can be served in the community under a conditional sentence order. Said 
differently, the judge must decide that imprisonment is necessary, but incarceration is 
not. While accurately described by Gemmell as a “penological paradox”,170 this ‘fiction’ 
must be accepted if the conditional sentence is going to reduce prison populations.  
Early reactions to conditional sentencing focused on the challenges posed by its 
statutory construction. At best, the sanction did not make sense; at worst, it appeared to 
be dishonest, defying common sense and violating notions of truth in sentencing.171 
Notwithstanding later efforts to promote conditional sentences as a form of “community 
imprisonment,” the legitimacy of the sanction was clearly undermined in the eyes of the 
 
169 Webster & Doob refer to the name—conditional sentence of imprisonment—as “almost 
certainly a serious mistake” (supra note 1 at p. 171). Reid & Roberts agree that the name is 
problematic in terms of public acceptance, suggesting, instead, a “re-branding” to something that 
more literally reflects the nature of the sanction—e.g., “house arrest” or “community confinement” 
(supra note 1 at p. 36). 
170 Gemmell, supra note 149(a) at p. 336. 
171 In his consideration of the purposes of sentencing, Doob suggests two basic premises: 1) they 
must make sense; and 2) they must be honest. To the extent that these requirements could be 
argued to apply equally to individual sanctions, conditional sentences fail both tests – see Doob, 
A. N. (2016). A values and evidence approach to sentencing purposes and principles. Research 
and Statistics Division; Department of Justice Canada, at p. 10. 
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public.172 It should have surprised no one that there was public pushback, or that many 
saw conditional sentences as yet another example of the system either coddling 
offenders or putting the offender’s interests above those of the victim or community.173 
More importantly in terms of application, the apparent paradox impacted judicial 
confidence in the sanction and created confusion for at least some judges.174 
Distinguishing between conditional sentences and suspended sentences  
Prior to the introduction of the conditional sentence, judges had the option of 
suspending the passage of sentence and placing an offender on probation for a fixed 
period of time, with conditions.175 Suspending sentence gave judges a non-custodial 
option that allowed for the supervision of offenders in the community for up to three 
years, and judges had considerable latitude when crafting probation orders.176 Notably, 
aside from limited mandatory conditions,177 the Code explicitly contemplates the 
inclusion of potentially onerous probation conditions, including the performance of 
community service, the payment of restitution, and (with an offender’s agreement) active 
participation in a treatment program.178 In terms of enforcement mechanisms, offenders 
 
172 See, for instance, Roberts, J. V. (2004). The virtual prison: Community custody and the 
evolution of imprisonment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, at pp. 132-33. 
173 Ibid at pp. 132-33. 
174 See, for instance, Roberts, et al., supra note 13. 
175 Section 731(1)(a) allows the court to suspend the passing of sentence (if no minimum 
punishment is prescribed) and direct the offender be released on the conditions set out in a 
probation order. 
176 Sentencing judges could also attach probation to a term of provincial imprisonment (i.e., for a 
term under two years), which some saw as useful given the limited use of provincial parole. See 
Manson, A., Healy, P., Trotter, G., Roberts, J. V., & Ives, D. (2016). Sentencing and penal policy 
in Canada: Cases, materials, and commentary (Third). Emond Montgomery Publications (Ch. 9 
Probation). 
177 Section 732.1(2) requires that all probation orders include requirements that the offender: keep 
the peace and be of good behaviour, appear before court when required, and notify the court (or 
probation officer) of any changes to their address or employment.  
178 See s.732.1(3) for the optional conditions of a probation order. In addition to the itemized list, 
s. 732.3(h) provides for the imposition of “such other reasonable conditions as the court considers 
desirable…for protecting society and for facilitating the offender’s successful reintegration into the 
community.” 
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convicted of new charges (including a breach of probation) can be brought back to court 
for sentencing on the original charge.179  
One might be forgiven for asking why—if we already had a sentencing option that 
involved an offender’s supervision in the community—we needed another. The answer 
may lie in the enforcement challenges related to the suspended sentence. As noted 
above, in cases involving a new offence the sentence originally suspended could still be 
passed. In theory this makes the threat of imprisonment appear very real; in practice 
though, the threat of revocation (of the suspension) appears to be an empty one. Once a 
sentence is suspended it is rarely passed, a fact that Gemmell suggests made 
suspended sentences “toothless remedies.”180  
Notably, the enforcement challenges of suspended sentences were an issue 
addressed before the Daubney Committee.181 Probation officers made a number of 
recommendations to the committee in an effort to improve enforceability, including: the 
elimination of the offence of breach of probation; the implementation of a breach 
“hearing” procedure with less stringent requirements (e.g., satisfactory proof of a breach, 
not proof beyond a reasonable doubt); and the “tolling” of probation orders so that they 
would not continue running once a breach has been alleged.182 While not acted upon at 
the time, it could be argued that the enforcement “fixes” suggested above did find their 
way into legislation, not as improvements to the suspended sentence scheme but, 
rather, as the breach mechanisms designed for the conditional sentence (of 
imprisonment).  
In contrast to suspended sentences, conditional sentences involve the service of 
the sentence (not its suspension). Drafted to act as an alternate form of imprisonment, 
 
179 When an offender who is bound by a probation order made under s. 731(1)(a) (the suspended 
sentence provisions) is convicted of a new offence, including a breach of that probation order, in 
addition to any other penalty they may be facing, the court can revoke the suspended sentence 
and “impose any sentence that could have been imposed if the passing of sentence had not been 
suspended” (s. 732.2(5)). 
180 Gemmell, J. (1999). Conditional sentences. In J. V. Roberts & D. P. Cole (Eds.), Making sense 
of sentencing (pp. 63–76). University of Toronto Press, at p.69. 
181 See Daubney Report, supra note 51 at pp. 102-104. Aasen relied upon his own research on 
this issue, estimating the revocation rate on suspended sentences to be “a small fraction of one 
percent.” See Aasen, J. (1985). Enforcement of probation in British Columbia (unpublished MA 
Thesis). Simon Fraser University, at p. 364. 
182 Aasen, ibid at pp. 397-398. 
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the challenge, at the start, was twofold. On the one hand, a conditional sentence looked 
nothing like what most people would commonly understand to be a prison sentence—
i.e., there was no requirement that an offender be confined to any location. On the other 
hand, a conditional sentence could look a lot like a “new and improved” suspended 
sentence with probation. In short, one was not necessarily more onerous than the other. 
In terms of the impact on an offender’s liberty or day-to-day life, both orders are 
effectively defined by the conditions imposed and the consequence of breaches, two 
areas in which judges enjoy considerable discretion.183 Indeed, early research that 
compared the conditions imposed on conditional sentences to those imposed on 
probation orders suggested that patterns of optional conditions were not dissimilar 
between the two orders.184 
In La Prairie’s (1999) report on the first three years of conditional sentencing, 
seven jurisdictions provided information about the optional conditions attached to the 
orders. The most frequently imposed conditions were treatment (27.8%), community 
work service (11.3%) and a curfew (11.4%). House arrest accounted for only 4.9% of the 
12,041 optional conditions reviewed.185 The average number of optional conditions 
imposed per order in five jurisdictions was 1.6.186 
Early confusion between suspended sentences and conditional sentences was 
problematic, especially to the extent that it resulted in prosecutors or judges viewing 
conditional sentences as a form of robust probation. Certainly, if conditional sentences 
 
183 The conditional sentencing provisions provided little direction to judges regarding appropriate 
conditions, and the breach mechanism, though facilitated, provided non-custodial options even 
upon proven breach. In an early article, Roberts (1997) suggests that the threatened 
consequences of a conditional sentence breach are “no more certain or severe than [a breach of] 
a probation order.” Roberts, supra note 150 at p. 186.  
184 Roberts, J. V., Antonowicz, D., & Sanders, T. (2000). Conditional sentences of imprisonment: 
An empirical analysis of optional conditions (p. 14). Department of Justice Canada. In this study 
the researchers reviewed the conditions imposed on 700 conditional sentences and 700 
suspended sentences imposed in Ontario (1997-1998). 
185 La Prairie, C. (1999). Conditional sentence orders by province and territory—Final Report 
(September 6, 1996—September 30, 1999). Department of Justice Canada, at Table VIII. Based 
on information obtained from seven jurisdictions. Percentages reflect the use of that condition as 
a percentage of all optional conditions imposed (not as a percentage of orders). While limitations 
in either the coding scheme used or the presentation of the data resulted in many conditions 
(33.2%) being coded as “other”, the information that was provided is interesting, nonetheless. 
186 Ibid at p. 6. This includes Newfoundland, New Brunswick, PEI, Saskatchewan and NWT. 
Optional conditions exclude the mandatory conditions as set out in section 742.1. 
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were to result in a meaningful reduction in the use of imprisonment, it was imperative 
that they be used in place of what would otherwise have been jail, not probation. 
The 1998 National Survey (of judges) approached this issue in several ways. 
First, judges were asked whether a conditional sentence could be as effective as a 
prison term in achieving various sentencing objectives.187 While most (71.7%) judges 
believed conditional sentences could usually or always be as effective as imprisonment 
in achieving rehabilitation, the numbers were reversed when it came to denunciation 
(35.3%) and deterrence (34.7%). More importantly, given the critical role that these 
objectives would later take (e.g., in Proulx), one-quarter (24.4%) of judges were of the 
opinion that a conditional sentence would almost never or never be as effective as a 
term of traditional imprisonment in achieving deterrence; almost one-third (31.7%) took 
the same position when it came to denunciation.188 
It is possible (if not likely) that the lack of confidence expressed in the ability of a 
conditional sentence to satisfy the objectives of deterrence and denunciation is related to 
its resemblance to a suspended sentence with probation. To get at this issue, the survey 
asked judges whether they thought a conditional sentence had a different impact on an 
offender than a probation order with the same conditions. Again, to succeed as a prison 
alternative, a conditional sentence should be clearly distinguishable from a probation 
order. Notably, only one judge in five (21%) indicated that a conditional sentence would 
definitely have a different impact on an offender; approximately one-third (34%) of the 
responding judges believed that a conditional sentence definitely or probably would not 
have a different impact on an offender than a probation order.189 
Net-widening  
The difficulties in terms of distinguishing between conditional and suspended 
sentences elevated concerns around net-widening from mere speculation to what was, 
in effect, a practical certainty. Net-widening is a phenomenon that occurs most often 
when a sanction introduced in lieu of another which is more severe is, instead, used in 
 
187 It is notable that the question implies that a term of imprisonment can be (or is) effective in 
achieving each of the sentencing objectives. 
188 Roberts, et al., supra note 185 at p. 6 (Table 2.5). 
189 Ibid at p. 7 (Table 2.6). 
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lieu of an existing sanction which is less severe. The net-widening tendencies of 
sanctions introduced as prison alternatives were well documented by the mid-1990s, 
having been a focus of the CSC, the Daubney Report, and the DOJ consultation 
papers.190 Indeed, net-widening is generally recognized as a common cause for failure in 
prison reduction strategies that rely upon the introduction of non-custodial alternatives. 
Notably, a cautionary tale was provided by the introduction of the suspended sentence in 
Britain.191 The British suspended sentence failed, at least in part due to estimates that 
less than half (40% to 50%) of those whose sentence was suspended were otherwise 
facing sentences of imprisonment. In terms of the British experience, Bottoms (1981) 
argued that it was the judges’ inappropriate use of the suspended sentence that 
defeated the purpose behind the legislation. He offered the following explanation: 
It is, quite simply, that while the official legislative intention of the 1967 Act 
was based on the ‘avoiding prison theory’, many judges and magistrates, 
on the contrary, were inclined to have a strong commitment to the 
suspended sentence on the alternative ‘special deterrent theory’, which as 
we have seen actually invited them to use the suspended sentence in place 
of some cases of fines and probation.192  
And so, in the absence of a sentencing commission or sentencing guidelines, the 
first challenge for conditional sentencing was convincing judges to use the sanction as a 
term of imprisonment; the second was to prevent them from using it as a form of robust 
probation (i.e., as a “special deterrent”). Put another way, Parliament created a non-
custodial sanction that looked like enforceable probation but told judges that they could 
only use it in place of jail. The likelihood of surmounting these challenges and, by 
extension, achieving a reduction in the use of imprisonment, would likely require more 
than a simple legislative change. As Gemmell (1997) observed, it would not be easy to 
shift the judiciary away from its historical reliance on prison sentences. That concern, in 
conjunction with the British experience with its suspended sentence, led him to conclude 
 
190 See CSC, supra note 38 at p. 367 and the Daubney Report, supra note 51 at p. 76. See also 
McMahon, M. (1990). “Net-widening”: Vagaries in the use of a concept. British Journal of 
Criminology, 30(2), 121–149; and Morris, N., & Tonry, M. (1990). Intermediate sanctions: 
Between prison and probation. Oxford University Press, at p. 47. 
191 The English sanction involved suspending the execution of any jail sentence of up to and 
including two years, for a period between one and three years. The sentence was to be activated 
in full upon conviction of an offence punishable by imprisonment during the operational period. 
See Bottoms, A.E. (1981) The suspended sentence in England, 1967 - 1978. British Journal of 
Criminology, 21(1) at p.2. 
192 Ibid at p.9. 
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that conditional sentences were a “very risky solution” to the problem of over-
incarceration in Canada.193 
In an effort to avoid net-widening, the legislation required that a judge first decide 
to impose a term of imprisonment (of less than two years).194 Theoretically, it was only at 
this point that a judge could consider a conditional sentence. In practice, it would appear 
that this obstacle to net-widening was more illusion than real. Indeed, early empirical 
studies would seem to support a net-widening effect whereby an increase in the use of 
conditional sentences did not, in fact, result in an equivalent reduction in the use of 
imprisonment. 
As a case in point, correctional admissions data were collected every six months 
over a two-year period beginning April 1, 1996, in five provinces and one territory in an 
effort to monitor the impact of conditional sentences on sentenced admissions to prison. 
It was expected that, if conditional sentences were being used in place of custodial 
sentences, there would be a negative relationship between the number of conditional 
sentences imposed and sentenced admissions. Analysis of the data, however, showed 
that this was not the case. The number of offenders given conditional sentences was 
considerably higher than the relatively slight decreases noted in custodial admissions. 
From April 1996 to April 1998, for instance, 12,531 offenders were placed on conditional 
sentences; during the same period sentenced admissions to custody decreased by only 
1,337 (see Table 2-1).  
 
193 Gemmell, supra note 170 at p. 334. 
194 Section 742.1 requires “that the court first impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than two 
years” before considering whether to make the sentence conditional. This two-step methodology 
was later confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Proulx. The Court instructs that judges 
should first reject both a penitentiary term and probation. “Having determined that the appropriate 
range of sentence is a term of imprisonment of less than two years, the judge should then 
consider whether it is appropriate for the offender to serve his or her sentence in the community.” 
Proulx, supra note 14 at para 127. 
   
55 
Table 2-1  Impact of CSOs on sentenced admissions to custody (1996 to 1998) 
 # conditional sentences imposed Impact on sentenced admissions 
BC 3,000 -184 
Alberta 2,091 -636 
Saskatchewan 1,200 +32 
Manitoba 440 -239 
Ontario 5,800 -310 
Total 12,531 -1,337 
 
In addition, trends observed in other data suggest similar patterns. For instance, 
in the year prior to the introduction of conditional sentences, 35% of provincial court 
sentences consisted of a term of custody. Two years later, by which time over 22,000 
conditional sentences had been imposed, the proportion of sentences involving actual 
imprisonment remained at 35%.195 It is difficult to reconcile these findings with the results 
of the 1998 National Survey that explored judicial perspectives on conditional 
sentencing. In response to a question regarding the effect the sanction had on provincial 
admissions to custody, most judges (75%) indicated that they believed conditional 
sentences had reduced the number of offenders sent into custody in their court.196 
Finally, early research conducted in Quebec also substantiates a net-widening 
effect. Data from this study suggested that the offences attracting conditional sentences 
were more like those that historically resulted in probation rather than imprisonment. 
Specifically, it warned that: 
[t]he type of offence recorded [which resulted in a conditional sentence] is 
more similar to the type that commonly occurs on probation …it may 
therefore be suggested that if conditional sentencing had not been 
available, a good number of persons on whom it was imposed would have 
received a probation sentence.197 
 
195 Roberts, J. V. (1999). Recent correctional trends: Good and bad news. Justice Report, 14(2), 
at p.10; Reed & Roberts, supra note 156 at p. 9. 
196 Roberts, et al., supra note 13 at p. 16. “Definitely yes” 38.7%; “probably yes” 36.4%. 
197 Roberts, J. V. “The hunt for the paper tiger: Conditional sentencing after Brady.” (1999), 
42(May) C.L.Q., at p.61 - quoting C. d’Auteil, Implementation of Conditional Sentencing in 
Quebec (Quebec Correctional Services Headquarters, 1998), at p.3. 
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Despite an awareness of the net-widening issue, the sanction was likely being imposed 
(at least in part) in place of less onerous options, not in place of prison.198  
Taken together, the early research suggests that conditional sentences got off to 
a rocky start as a mechanism for prison reduction. While judges were clearly willing to 
experiment with this new sentencing option, it would appear that it was often employed 
incorrectly, undermining its primary goal. Most obviously, its substitution for a suspended 
sentence rather than for a prison sentence would make no contribution to the reduction 
of the use of imprisonment. Less obviously, this tendency toward net-widening could—
ironically—increase the very metric that it was intended to reduce. This unintended net-
widening effect may result through two distinct mechanisms. 
In the short-term, it could occur when an offender who otherwise would not have 
been sentenced to imprisonment was placed on a conditional sentence, and then taken 
into custody upon breaching that order.199 Long-term impacts are related, though more 
nuanced, involving the gradual “up-tariffing” of sentences in order to bring conditional 
sentences into the range of available options for a specific case. The most likely 
scenario in which this could occur is when judges—who want to impose a conditional 
sentence for an offence that would generally only merit a community sanction—begin to 
conceptualize the crime as actually deserving of a provincial prison term. In this case, 
they can “justifiably” impose a conditional sentence in its place. As a result, the sentence 
range for that offence may be unintentionally shifted upwards (towards the more 
punitive). While this practice may not represent an immediate threat to prison reduction 
 
198 This is consistent with the findings of an early research project conducted in the Toronto courts 
where judges indicated that they liked conditional sentences because “it gave them another 
sentencing option.” The fact that this factor seemed to take precedence over having an option to 
replace custody, the authors suggested, reflected a general lack of clarity regarding sentencing 
needs and the primary objective of conditional sentences. 
La Prairie, C. and Koegl, C. (1998). “Conditional Sentences: Exploratory Research into Opinions 
and Perceptions of Judges in Select Urban Courts.” Research Report. (Ottawa: Department of 
Justice), at p. 3. 
199 Section 742.6 (9). It could be argued that two additional precautions were taken to ensure that, 
even if the sanction were to be used inappropriately (i.e., in place of a less severe sanction), it 
would not act to increase prison populations. First, since an offender serving a conditional 
sentence is given credit for time served in the community, in the event of a breach, the most an 
offender can be ordered to serve is the remainder of the sentence. Second, judges are given 
several options in terms of responding to breaches. They can take no action, change optional 
conditions, or have the offender serve all or part of the remaining sentence in custody. 
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(if the orders are not breached), “up-tariffing” concerns can arise in the event that the 
use of conditional sentences is restricted at a later date (foreshadowing things to come).  
2.1.2.2 Practical/operational challenges 
Implementation and education 
In addition to the theoretical and conceptual obstacles identified above, practical 
or operational challenges (that threatened the sanction’s ability to achieve prison 
reduction goals) also emerged in the early years. Indeed, even in terms of the logistics of 
implementation, it became almost immediately apparent that the conditional sentencing 
provisions were not well thought out.200 A notable example is the failure to include a 
statutory provision to stop the “running of the clock” on a conditional sentence when a 
breach was alleged. In the absence of this common-sense safeguard, orders could be 
completed before the offender was brought back before the court, in which case judges 
had no ability to impose any consequence for non-compliance.201  
Upon implementation, there was also considerable confusion in terms of which 
offences the conditional sentence was intended for, again reflecting a lack of 
thoughtfulness on the part of government. Indeed, there was nothing in the original 
legislation to restricts its application to all offences that met the minimal requirements. 
The notion that conditional sentences were never meant for serious or violent offences is 
indicated, not by the legislation, but by comments made in the House of Commons202 
 
200 A likely culprit for this lack of careful consideration resides in the fact that much of the debate 
around Bill C-41 focused on the controversial proposal to add sexual orientation as an 
aggravating circumstance in hate crimes (s.718.2 (a)(i)). Little to no time was spent debating the 
creation of conditional sentences or the directive that sentencing judges consider sanctions other 
than imprisonment for all offenders, “with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal 
offenders” (s. 718.2(e)). Reflecting back decades later, the Minister of Justice responsible for Bill 
C-41 spoke of his surprise at the focus on “sexual orientation” and the lack of debate or 
discussion around the package as a whole: 
Those boneheads didn’t spend a moment talking about the policy of conditional sentences, 
didn’t talk even about the…provisions for recognizing the [special] circumstances of 
Aboriginal [people in sentencing] which I thought was daring at the time. I expected to have 
the roof fall in on me over that. They focused on those two words. Doob & Webster, supra 
note 80(c) at p. 373. 
201 See Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 170. See also Appendix B for amendments made to 
the conditional sentencing provisions (s. 742.1). 
202 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, September 20, 1994: Allan Rock (Minister of Justice 
and Attorney General of Canada) at 5873: 
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and government communication, both of which repeatedly assured the public that the 
sanction would be targeted only at “less serious and first time offenders who would 
otherwise be in jail.”203 A senior Justice official addressed both the lack of planning and 
the scope of application issues, framing the inclusion of the conditional sentence of 
imprisonment as a drafting “afterthought” that was added “in an effort to bolster the 
alternatives to incarceration available to sentencing judges for non-violent property 
related offences.”204 
The lack of clarity regarding the goal(s) of conditional sentencing was reflected in 
the judicial responses to the 1998 National Survey. After all, more than a year into the 
new sentencing regime, one might expect that judges at least had a shared 
understanding of the sanction’s primary objective. When asked about this, however, just 
over half of the judges surveyed (56.4%) identified reducing imprisonment (or providing a 
more cost-effective alternative to prison) as the sanction’s primary objective.205 
Promoting offender rehabilitation, reintegration, employment, etc. was identified by over 
one-quarter (27.3%) of judges and providing another intermediate sanction by 10.7% 
(the remaining 5.7% were coded as “other”).  
That there was not a clear consensus on the primary goal of the conditional 
sentence is troubling for several reasons. First it suggests either an ambivalence in the 
legislation (i.e., no clear goal established), or a lack of communication around the 
sanction’s principal objective. Either way it allows (or invites) judges to adopt differing 
interpretations based on their own opinions regarding what is needed. Second, any effort 
to assess or measure a sanction’s effectiveness presupposes that we have a shared 
understanding of its primary goal. This is particularly important when (possibly 
 
It seems to me that such an approach [referring to conditional sentence orders] would 
promote the protection of the public by seeking to separate the most serious offenders from 
the community while providing that less serious offenders can remain among other 
members of society with effective community-based alternatives while still adhering to 
appropriate conditions. 
203 A DOJ ‘News Release’ on Bill C-41 highlighted provisions that would: “give the courts more 
options to distinguish between violent, serious crimes that require jail and less-serious crimes that 
can be dealt with more effectively in the community;” and “add a new type of sentence to the 
Criminal Code, called a ‘conditional sentence,’ that will allow more offenders guilty of less-serious 
crimes to serve their sentences in the community under greater control.” Department of Justice, 
supra note 155 at p.1.  
204 Mosley, R. (2014). Canadian sentencing policy - A look back. Paper presented at ISRCL 
Conference, June 2014, Vancouver, BC. 1-20, at p. 15.  
205 Roberts, et al., supra note 13 at p. 5 (Table 2.3).  
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conflicting) secondary goals develop and gain value. Finally, the lack of consensus in 
this critical area appears to have extended to the way in which conditional sentences 
were implemented.  
Implementation challenges surrounding conditional sentences were not restricted 
to their intended use by the judiciary. Rather, they extend as well to the public. 
Specifically, the conditional sentence was introduced without any type of sustained 
public education campaign. As noted, there is empirical support for the notion that an 
informed public may be more accepting of community sanctions, including for less 
serious cases of violence.206 Notably though, and as McLellan (2011) observes, there 
was no apparent effort made by the government to explain the new sanction or to seek 
support for its usage.207 This, despite the recognition that the public would not easily 
understand (or accept) the notion of imprisonment without incarceration.  
When this issue was canvassed through the 1998 National Survey, responses 
suggested that most judges believed that the public did not, in fact, understand the new 
disposition.208 When asked whether the public could be made to understand the 
difference between a conditional sentence and a probation order, most judges 
expressed the belief that they could (63.4%).209 Whether the public understands 
conditional sentences, and can distinguish them from probation, is important given that 
79.6% of the judges surveyed reported taking the impact a conditional sentence might 
have on public opinion into account when passing sentence.210 When introducing the 
 
206 Research suggests that the more the public knows about specific issues or sentence results, 
the more positive their attitudes regarding the outcome. See, generally, Doob, A. N. (2000). 
Transforming the punishment environment: Understanding public views of what should be 
accomplished at sentencing. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 42(3), 323-340; Roberts, J. V., 
Crutcher, N., & Verbrugge, P. (2007). Public attitudes to sentencing in Canada: Exploring recent 
findings. Canadian Journal of Criminology & Criminal Justice, 49(1), 75-107; Varma & Marinos, 
supra note 109. 
207 McLellan, M. F. (2011). The prospective devitalization of conditional sentences. Criminal Law 
Quarterly, 57 (June), at p. 274. See also Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at pp. 172-73. 
208 When asked whether they thought the general public understood the nature of conditional 
sentences, 78% responded either “no, none of the public” or “only a few of the public.” Roberts, et 
al., supra note 13 at p. 17 (Table 2.23). 
209 The complexity and counter-intuitive nature of the sanction was reflected in the fact that more 
than one-third (36.6%) of the judges thought that the public could not be made to understand it. 
The response breakdown was as follows: “yes, all or most” (35.5%), “yes, some” (27.9%), and 
“only a few or none” (36.6%). Ibid at p. 18 (Table 2.25). 
210 Only 20.4% of the judges responded “no, never” on this question. Ibid at p. 20 (Table 2.28). 
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new sanction, however, the government opted to take the simpler path. Instead of 
persuading the public to embrace the spirit of what were arguably intended as 
transformative changes, press releases of the day focused on assuring the public that 
the sanction would be used only for less-serious and non-violent offences.211 
And so, it should not have surprised anyone to find that the public did not 
understand, broadly, the changes introduced by Bill C-41, or more specifically, the 
nature of conditional sentences (including how they most certainly are not probation 
orders). This is reflected in the limited public opinion research that was conducted at the 
time regarding the introduction of conditional sentences, which was not encouraging. A 
survey conducted in 1999 suggested “widespread public ignorance” regarding the new 
sentencing option.212 Roberts and La Prairie (2000) summarized early public opinion 
polling as follows: 
Canadians still do not have a clear idea of the nature of the new sanction. 
It is likely that some people confuse the conditional term of imprisonment 
with a sentence of probation or a period of supervision on parole.213  
This lack of clarity was troubling given the importance of public support for sentencing 
and early concerns about the construction of conditional sentences. The researchers 
noted that almost all of the information provided to the public about conditional 
sentencing came through the news media, and that media coverage of conditional 
sentencing had tended to focus on the sanction’s leniency, or its resemblance to a term 
of probation.214  
 
211 Aside from the fact that the legislation contained no such restrictions, the difficulty with these 
assurances was that they did not make sense. In the absence of lengthy criminal histories or 
breach convictions, such (less serious, non-violent) offenders would rarely be destined for jail. 
Conditional sentences can only be effective in prison reduction if they are imposed in cases that 
would otherwise have attracted jail terms, presumably for either chronic petty offenders who are 
poor candidates for community supervision, or for low-risk offenders convicted of serious 
offences. The former invites non-compliance and high breach rates while the latter can lead to 
public outcries of leniency, sentiments stoked by displeasure expressed by police, prosecutors, 
and victim advocates. See North, D. (2001). The "Catch 22" of conditional sentencing. Criminal 
Law Quarterly, 44(3), 342, at p. 353. 
212 Sanders, T., & Roberts, J. V. (2000). Public attitudes toward conditional sentencing: Results of 
a national survey. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science. 32(4), 199–207, at p. 199. 
213 Roberts, J. V., & La Prairie, C. (2000). Conditional sentencing in Canada: An overview of 
research findings (No. RR2000-6e; p. 45). Department of Justice Canada, at p. 31. 
214 Ibid at pp. 25-26. 
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Resourcing 
When the federal government created a sanction that allowed offenders 
otherwise destined for jail to serve terms of imprisonment in the community, there was 
an assumption that this offender group would have enhanced risks and needs and that 
they would be subject to tight controls in the community.215 However, the provincial 
governments are responsible for providing and funding such resources, and there were 
no guarantees that funds would be allocated for the support and supervision of these 
offenders. If anything, there was a stated expectation that no increased funding would be 
made available at either the federal or provincial levels of government.216 
Several scholarly and government publications have stressed the need to have 
well-run and adequately funded resources in place to support the use of community-
based sanctions.217 Insufficient resources for offender supervision and support can 
create additional challenges for non-custodial sanctions. A recent national survey 
suggests that public concerns about the use of community-based sanctions in Canada 
are often related to perceptions that adequate resources are not being provided to 
 
215 See comments of The Honourable Allan Rock when introducing Bill C-41 for second reading 
and speaking specifically about the (new) conditional sentence Hansard 20 Sept 1994, at p.5873. 
“This sanction is obviously aimed at offenders who would otherwise be in jail but who could be in 
the community under tight controls” (emphasis added). 
216 Certainly the 1990 government discussion papers were alive to the issue of costs. In 
Directions for Reform: Sentencing, the report identified concerns with program funding through 
provincial governments: 
It is crucial to develop a series of measures that will serve both the interests of the provinces 
and those of the federal government in the area of intermediate sanctions. We cannot 
impose requirements on the provinces that will have as their result major program 
expenditure, without close consultation (Directions for Reform, supra note 67 at p. 20). 
In 1991, the Department of Justice followed up on the Directions for Reform publications by 
circulating a series of proposals regarding intermediate sanctions. The consultation letter that 
accompanied the proposals made it clear that one of the most important policy issues facing the 
Department of Justice at the time was cost: 
It must be said again, however, that the [sentencing] reforms must be effected in a way that 
increases efficiency, not cost. Most “players” in the area of Intermediate Sanctions have no 
expectation of increased funding. This applies equally at the federal and the provincial levels 
of government (DOJ Consultation letter, supra note 168 at p. 5). 
217 The CSC recommended that “…the federal and provincial governments provide the necessary 
resources and financial support to ensure that community programs are made available and to 
encourage their greater use” – CSC, supra note 38 at p. 561. The Daubney Report included 
similar wording in recommendation 38(a) – “That federal and provincial authorities develop, 
support and evaluate alternatives to incarceration and intermediate sanctions,” supra note 51 at 
p. 256. See also Doob, supra note  2. 
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monitor offenders in the community.218 This can raise concerns around public safety as 
well as perceptions of leniency, both of which can reduce confidence and support for the 
sentencing process.  
Notably, the requirement that community-based sanctions be tightly monitored 
and rigorously enforced is also relevant to judicial perceptions of their effectiveness, and, 
by extension, the likelihood that they will be used in place of traditional terms of 
imprisonment.219 There is a sense that offenders are more likely to comply with 
conditions if the consequences for breaching the order are known, severe, and regularly 
imposed.220 In terms of drawing from the custodial population, judges are more likely to 
use community-based sanctions appropriately if they believe their orders will be 
monitored and enforced. For instance, in the 1998 National Survey, 80.2% of judges 
indicated that they would be inclined to use conditional sentences more frequently if 
there were more community and supervisory resources provided.221 Concerns regarding 
levels of supervision were expressed by more than one-quarter (27.4%) of the judges, 
with less than half (40%) indicating that conditional sentences were adequately 
supervised (some, most, or all of the time) in their area.222 As was the case with 
resources generally, judges who believed conditional sentences were adequately 
supervised were more likely to impose a conditional sentence.223 
La Prairie (1999) identified two areas thought to be crucial in determining the 
future success (or failure) of conditional sentences. The first was ensuring that the 
sanction was being appropriately targeted at offenders who would otherwise be facing 
terms of imprisonment—i.e., avoiding net-widening. The second related to the provision 
of adequate resources:  
If the resources are not in place (either through dedicated allocation or 
reallocation of moneys or resources) criminal justice responses, such as 
 
218 National Survey, supra note 111 at p. ix. 
219 Doob, supra note 2 at p. 423. 
220 Wasik, M. (1994). Sentencing guidelines: The problem of conditional sentences. Criminal 
Justice Ethics, 50–57, at p. 53. 
221 See Roberts et al., supra note 13 at p. 9 (Table 2.9).  
222 Ibid at p. 10 (Table 2.11). Almost one-third (32.5%) of judges indicated that they did not know 
whether conditional sentences were adequately supervised in their area.  
223 Ibid at p. 10 (Table 2.12). 
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alternative measures, restorative justice and conditional sentences, 
predicated on community involvement would seem doomed to failure.224  
And so, we can see even at this early stage, that the seeds of potential failure 
had been sown. Indeed, as we approached “the end of the beginning” in the late-1990s, 
we had a new sanction that appeared to be failing in its express purpose of reducing the 
use of imprisonment. Despite efforts taken to avoid the inappropriate application of 
conditional sentences, early evidence suggests that judges were not restricting their use 
of the sanction to cases in which they would otherwise be imposing prison terms. It was 
unclear, at that point, what the problem was—in other words, why conditional sentences 
were not being used as an alternate form of imprisonment. Was it the sanction’s 
unfortunate construction, confusion over its primary goal, or resemblance to probation? 
Alternatively, was the problem related to the lack of resources provided for offender 
monitoring, or the public’s lack of acceptance of non-custodial sentences for more 
serious offences or habitual offenders? In an ironic twist, it appeared that a sanction 
created as a mechanism of restraint might ultimately have acted to increase the use of 
imprisonment in some cases (e.g., as a result of offenders who were not otherwise 
facing custodial sentences breaching conditional sentence orders). Put another way, the 
beginning was a time of more questions than answers.  
2.2 The end of the beginning: The Supreme Court of Canada 
steps in 
Despite the many challenges associated with conditional sentences, judges were 
using the sanction in the early years. Between September 6, 1996 and September 30, 
1999 there were 42,941 conditional sentence orders imposed in Canada—31.3% of 
these were for offences against the person; 38.7% for offences against property; and 
11.0% for drug offences.225 Notably, there was considerable variation across 
provinces/territories. Of the three jurisdictions which provided information on conditional 
sentences as a percentage of all admissions to correctional supervision (most serious 
sentence), Saskatchewan showed the highest ranking (11.7%), followed by BC (7.9%), 
 
224 La Prairie, C. (1999). Some reflections on new criminal justice policies in Canada: Restorative 
justice, alternative measures and conditional sentences. Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology, 32(2), 139–152, at p. 149. 
225 La Prairie, supra note 185 at p. 2. The remaining 19% was accounted for by driving offences, 
administration of justice offences, and “other.” 
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and Ontario (5.3%).226 No doubt the variability noted across provinces/territories 
reflected, at least in part, the different interpretations of section 742.1 offered by the 
various appellate courts.227 
 Conflicting interpretations at the appellate court level 
The provincial appellate courts disagreed on fundamental points related to the 
new sentencing provisions. The conservative approach was represented by the Alberta 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Brady which expressed considerable skepticism regarding 
the new sanction, suggesting that “it [the conditional sentence] fills a small gap which 
previously existed.”228 The Court questioned the underlying fiction of conditional 
sentences: “saying that such a conditional sentence is tantamount to imprisonment does 
not make it so,”229 and questioned the distinction between conditional sentences and 
suspended sentences in terms of restrictiveness.230 The applicability of the Sword of 
Damocles metaphor was explicitly rejected: 
Even if a conditional sentence could be equated to a sword, it does not 
hang by a thread, but by a rope.  And the only way that this rope can break 
is if the offender himself cuts it…. And with each passing day of the 
sentence, the “sword” shrinks until finally it becomes a butter knife.231 
The Court in Brady did not see conditional sentences as appropriate for crimes which 
carry a presumption of incarceration (based on the need for general deterrence and 
denunciation),232 and expressed concern that the sanction would undermine respect for 
the law.233  
 
226 Ibid at p 3. 
227 See discussion in Manson, supra note 16. 
228 R. v. Brady, 1998 ABCA 7, at para 16. 
229 Ibid at para 48. 
230 “In reality…conditional sentences are either virtually identical in terms and effect to a 
suspended sentence or only marginally more restrictive.” Ibid at para 36. 
231 Ibid at para 46. 
232 “For crimes [carrying a presumption of incarceration], conditional sentences will not be 
appropriate in the usual case” ibid at para 32. 
233 “Such respect [for the law] is endangered where the community sees that wrongdoers are not 
receiving their just deserts for their crimes” ibid at para 59. 
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The liberal position, on the other hand, took Parliament at its word by seeking to 
use conditional sentences as true alternatives to incarceration.234 This view was 
represented by the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Wismayer.235 The judgment 
distinguished conditional sentences from suspended sentences primarily on the basis of 
the breach mechanism, noting that “the procedure under s.742.6 appears to be more 
straightforward than the little-used procedure for revoking probation.”236 It was the 
sanction’s enforceability and the real threat of incarceration that led the court to accept 
the fiction of conditional sentences as terms of imprisonment served in the community.237  
Unlike Brady, the Court in Wismayer accepted the Sword of Damocles metaphor, 
noting that the offender is under the “constant threat of imprisonment…[and] the 
conditional sentence order can be a much heavier sentence than a brief sentence of 
imprisonment from which the offender will be paroled.”238 Notably, the Court refers to the 
highly restrictive nature of conditional sentences, suggesting that offenders will “often” be 
subject to house arrest.239 It was their onerousness and restrictive nature, in fact, that led 
the Court to conclude that conditional sentences could achieve the sentencing objectives 
of general deterrence240 and denunciation.241   
The decisions in Brady and Wismayer are broadly representative of the early 
legal debate that occurred in Canada around the appropriate role of conditional 
sentences. The wonderful thing about this debate, according to Healy, was that 
“according to Part XXIII itself [sentencing provisions], nobody [was] really or 
 
234 Gemmell, supra note 180 at p. 71. 
235 R. v. Wismayer, 1997 CarswellOnt 969 (ONCA). 
236 Ibid at para 40.  The court goes on to add that “it is also easier than proof of breach of 
probation which, being a criminal offence, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
237 “This procedure [for breach] …reinforces the point that this is a sentence of imprisonment that 
the offender is permitted to serve in the community.” Ibid at para 41.   
238 Ibid at para 56. 
239 Ibid at para. 56. As noted, the data on the early use of conditional sentences did not support 
this conclusion. In a study that reviewed 700 conditional sentences imposed in Ontario between 
1997 and 1998 house arrest was ordered in just under 3% of conditional sentences. Roberts, et 
al., supra note 184 at p. 18. 
240 “The objective of general deterrence can be achieved through the conditional sentence of 
imprisonment.” Ibid at para 53. 
241 “I cannot accept that a conditional sentence of imprisonment is unavailable where the 
paramount consideration is denunciation of the offender’s conduct.” Ibid at para 56. 
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demonstrably wrong.”242 And so, after less than three years in existence, the future of 
conditional sentencing was very much uncertain. Potentially misapplied, certainly 
misunderstood and under-resourced, the sanction teetered on the brink of failure in 
terms of its primary goal. In addition, the ambiguity of the legislation led to conflicting 
decisions amongst provincial appellate courts, raising yet another potential risk for the 
young sanction. There was great need for further clarification, either from Parliament or 
the Supreme Court, and Parliament took a pass. This is the context within which the 
Supreme Court of Canada entered the debate.  
 Settling the immediate conflict: The Proulx decision 
In January of 2000, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified the intent, scope, and 
application of s.742.1 in a set of cases represented by R. v. Proulx.243 In its unanimous 
decision, the Court started by unambiguously declaring conditional sentences to be a 
direct response to the overuse of imprisonment: 
By passing [Bill C-41], Parliament has sent a clear message to all Canadian 
judges that too many people are being sent to prison. In an attempt to 
remedy the problem of overincarceration, Parliament has introduced a new 
form of sentence, the conditional sentence of imprisonment.244 
Establishing the principles meant to govern the new sanction required that the Court 
situate conditional sentences on the scale of existing sanctions and distinguish the 
sanction from the suspended sentence. Implicit in the Proulx decision was the opinion 
 
242 Healy, P. (1999). Questions and answers on conditional sentencing in the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Criminal Law Quarterly, 42(May), 12–37, at p.16. Healy suggests that the problem 
relates to points of ambiguity within the conditional sentencing provisions, set against the 
ambiguity of ss. 718 through 718.3. How can any court, he asks, discern Parliament’s intention “in 
the thicket of riddles and buzz-phrases found in Part XXIII?” (at p. 16)  
243 Proulx, supra note 14. The accused in Proulx entered guilty pleas to one count of dangerous 
driving causing death and one of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The judge concluded 
that a conditional sentence would not satisfy the objectives of denunciation and deterrence in this 
case and imposed a sentence of 18 months incarceration. This decision was overturned by the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal and a conditional sentence was substituted for the jail term. 
Proulx was one of five cases related to conditional sentences heard by the Court in 1999; 
judgment was pronounced on all five cases on the same day. Proulx and two others (R. v. RNS, 
2000 SCC 7; R. v. RAR, 2000 SCC 8) had sentences of imprisonment restored; conditional 
sentences were maintained in only two (R. v. Bunn, 2000 SCC 9; R. v. LFW, 200 SCC 6). 
244 Proulx, supra note 14 at 1. 
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that conditional sentences up to that point had been insufficiently onerous and not 
adequately distinguished from probation.  
Some have framed Proulx as the high court’s effort to salvage or breathe life into 
the struggling sanction.245 Indeed, the decision went a long way in ensuring that 
conditional sentences had some penal “bite” to them. First, in recognition of the relative 
leniency of the conditional sentence, the Court encouraged judges to make them longer 
than the terms of incarceration they were meant to replace.246 Second, the Court 
suggested that onerous conditions (including curfews and house arrest) should be the 
norm.247 Finally, the Court stressed that there should be a presumption of incarceration 
in cases of proven breach. Dealing sternly with non-compliance was necessary to 
confirm their punitive nature, promote compliance, and further distinguish conditional 
sentences from suspended sentences. 
In Proulx, the Court established a two-step methodology designed to limit 
inappropriate application of the new sanction (net-widening). The first step required a 
decision that the offender would otherwise have been sentenced to a term of traditional 
imprisonment for a period of less than two years. The sentencing judge must explicitly 
consider and reject any form of non-institutional sanction (e.g., a fine or suspended 
sentence) as well as the necessity of a penitentiary term (more than two years 
imprisonment). Having discarded the “low-ball and high-ball” options, the second step 
required judges to consider whether serving the term of imprisonment in the community 
 
245 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 173. 
246 Extending the term of conditional sentences also maintains the fundamental principle of 
proportionality. Proulx, supra note 14 at para 54. 
247 The imposition of onerous conditions was necessary to: distinguish conditional sentences from 
suspended sentences with probation; achieve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence; and 
ensure that offenders do not avoid punishment. Ibid at paras 35-39. 
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would endanger community safety;248 and be consistent with the purposes and principles 
of sentencing as set out in ss. 718 to 718.2.249 
The Court chose not to restrict judicial discretion in terms of eligible offences, 
confirming that a conditional sentence is available for any offence that satisfies the 
minimal statutory requirements, and left it to lower court judges to determine whether the 
objectives of deterrence and denunciation could be adequately addressed in any specific 
case.250 As Roberts and Gabor (2004) noted, at the time (i.e., prior to restrictions) the 
two-year ceiling effectively made conditional sentences available for a broad range of 
offences considered to be serious or violent by most members of the public (e.g., 
robbery, sexual assault, trafficking in narcotics and manslaughter).251 Like Parliament, 
the Court appeared unwilling to make difficult decisions that might limit judicial discretion. 
 The ‘red lights’ of post-Proulx challenges (2000-2012) 
Manson (2001) questioned the appropriateness of having the Supreme Court 
assume the role of sentencing reformer, while acknowledging that the Court had no 
choice given the enigmatic statutory framework: “the Supreme Court has crafted a new 
intermediate sanction. While many people have argued that we needed one, I doubt if 
anyone expected the Supreme Court to be its designer.”252 Such sentiments reflect the 
fundamental (and ongoing) debate regarding which agency is best suited to establish 
broad sentencing policy in Canada. In that sense, the tension between government and 
the judiciary continued throughout the next decade. More importantly, instead of 
 
248 In terms of assessing whether community safety would be endangered by having an offender 
serve his/her sentence by way of a conditional sentence order, the Court placed the onus on the 
sentencing judge to know, or be made aware of, the level of supervision available in the 
community, suggesting that in cases where “the level of supervision available in the community is 
not sufficient to ensure safety of the community, the judge should impose a sentence of 
incarceration.” Proulx, supra note 14 at para 73. 
249 Manson, A. (2001). The Conditional Sentence: A Canadian approach to sentencing reform, or 
doing the time warp again. Criminal Law Quarterly, 44(3), 375, at p. 381. 
250 “No offences are excluded from the conditional sentencing regime except those with a 
minimum term of imprisonment, nor should there be presumptions in favour of or against a 
conditional sentence for specific offences.” Proulx, supra note 14 at para 127. 
251 Roberts & Gabor, supra note 30 at p. 98. 
252 Manson, supra note 249 at p. 377. 
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resolving early warning signs, the yellow light regarding conditional sentences gradually 
begins to turn red. 
2.2.3.1 Proulx’s double-edged sword 
Punitive goals—widening the net on the custodial side  
The decision in Proulx both salvaged a struggling sanction and set the stage for it 
to fail in the future. Optimistically, by framing conditional sentences as punitive sanctions 
capable of satisfying the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, the Court gave 
sentencing judges the practical guidance, methodology and language they needed. 
More importantly, by confirming that conditional sentences could be imposed for any 
offence that satisfied the minimal requirements, the Court implicitly encouraged their use 
in more serious cases, increasing the likelihood that the sentences represented true 
diversions from prison.  
And, in fact, researchers of the era would appear to agree. By 2002, academics 
were reporting a 13% drop in the rate of admissions to custody and crediting conditional 
sentences for “a reduction in the use of custody on a scale unparalleled in western 
nations.”253 Equally notable, Roberts and Gabor examined the net-widening 
phenomenon in studies published in 2003 and 2004. Using correctional admissions data 
that spanned the period between 1993 and 2001, the authors estimated that only 5,399 
of the 53,990 diversions from custody represented offenders who would have been 
sentenced to a non-custodial option prior to 1996.254 They offered a rather benign 
interpretation, suggesting that a limited amount of net-widening may be the price to pay 
for substantial reductions in sentenced admissions to custody. Upon the release of these 
findings, the academic debate on net-widening effectively ended, notwithstanding issues 
raised by their analysis.255 Indeed, their optimistic conclusions were revisited years later 
 
253 Roberts references a 13% reduction in the rate of admissions to custody between 1997 and 
2001. Roberts, supra note 2020 at p. 268. 
254 Roberts, J. V., & Gabor, T. (2003). The impact of conditional sentencing: Decarceration and 
widening of the net. Canadian Criminal Law Review, 8(June), 33–49, at p. 40. Using the same 
data, the authors refer to net-widening at 1%. See Roberts & Gabor, supra note 30 at p. 102. 
255 The Roberts & Gabor study raised several methodological issues. First, the decision to 
calculate average rates per 10,000 charged over four years ignores variations between years and 
the impact of prosecutorial charge approval in some, but not all provinces. Second, it is unclear 
whether offenders admitted to terms of imprisonment after conditional sentence orders were 
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as part of the analysis conducted by Reid and Roberts in 2019. In hindsight, the authors 
note, overall gains (in the reduced use of imprisonment) attributed to the introduction of 
conditional sentences masked large provincial variations.256    
In brief, conditional sentence utilization is generally believed to have increased in 
the wake of the Proulx decision.257 Not only did we see more conditional sentence 
orders, there was evidence that they were being applied to more serious offences, that 
sentence lengths were being extended, and more onerous conditions (house arrest and 
curfew) were being imposed.258 More pessimistically though, while supporters of 
conditional sentencing saw such increases as positive, some warned that the Court may 
go too far in widening the net on the custodial side.259 While it may seem counter-
intuitive to warn of a decarcerative strategy being too effective, the concern was that 
raising the ceiling on offence seriousness (e.g., to include violent offences) might attract 
negative public or community comment, especially in higher profile cases. And, in fact, 
precisely by making it more likely that conditional sentences would be capturing 
offenders who would otherwise be facing imprisonment (e.g., on serous offences), this 
decision ultimately provoked public resistance and established the conditions necessary 
for the success of the Conservative Party’s tough-on-crime rhetoric in later years. 
Restorative goals – the devil in disguise  
The second “double-edged” outcome of Proulx involves the decision’s broad 
definition of “restorative” sentencing objectives and explicit application to conditional 
 
terminated were being counted as the former or the latter (or both). More importantly, the data 
only allows the authors to look at the impact conditional sentences had on prison admissions; no 
information is provided regarding the impact of conditional sentences on the specific use of 
suspended sentences (or fines). See also Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at pp. 180-182. 
256 Reid & Roberts, supra note 1 at p. 8.  
257 There was a reported 8% increase in conditional sentence utilization nationally between 
2000/2001 and 2003/2004 - based on admissions to correctional supervision, by type. See 
Statistics Canada. (2006). Adult correctional services in Canada, 2004/2005, by K. Beattie, in 
Juristat: 26:5, No. 85-002-XIE. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), at p. 12.  
258 Roberts, supra note 20. In a BC study that compared 614 pre-Proulx and 647 post-Proulx 
conditional sentences, curfews and house arrest requirements increased from 14.7% and 7.3% 
pre-Proulx to 50.2% and 10.7% post-Proulx. See North, D. M. (2002). Imprisonment without 
incarceration: Bill C-41, the Supreme Court, and the challenges of conditional sentencing 
(unpublished MA Thesis, Simon Fraser University), at pp. 75—76. 
259 “While Lamer C.J.C. was concerned in Proulx with ensuring that the conditional sentence did 
not widen the net by moving into an area previously occupied by non-custodial sanctions, the 
resulting sanction may have widened the net at the other end.” Manson, supra note 249 at p. 396. 
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sentencing. Having earlier defined conditional sentences as punitive tools for prison 
reduction, the Court complicated things when elaborating on the nature of the sanction 
by introducing a second (and possibly conflicting) goal. Specifically, it affirmed that:  
Two of the main objectives underlying [Bill C-41] were to reduce the use of 
incarceration as a sanction and to give greater prominence to the principle 
of restorative justice in sentencing—the objectives of rehabilitation, 
reparation to the victim and the community, and the promotion of a sense 
of responsibility in the offender. 
The conditional sentence facilitates the achievement of both of 
Parliament’s objectives.260 
Prioritizing prison reduction promotes the appropriate application of conditional 
sentences as a punitive response and, by extension, reduces the likelihood of net-
widening. By incorporating restorative objectives, especially offender rehabilitation, the 
Court practically invites judges to use conditional sentences in place of probation 
orders—i.e., as special deterrents.261 After all, if you are a judge who believes that doing 
something (e.g., completing a drug treatment program) will achieve a positive outcome 
(e.g., reduced recidivism), would you not choose to attach those conditions to an order 
that is supported by an effective compliance mechanism? Not only did the re-branding of 
conditional sentences (as rehabilitative tools) “muddy the water” in terms of the reason 
for which the sanction was created (prison reduction), it also enabled judges to use it 
under a special deterrent theory of sentencing, thereby increasing the likelihood of net-
widening in its application. 
2.2.3.2 The cost of inadequate resourcing – credibility and public support 
Monitoring and supervision: Tight controls or paper tigers? 
In Proulx, the court emphasized the need for community resources, including 
those necessary for adequate monitoring and supervision of offenders: 
Hence, the judge must know or be made aware of the supervision available 
in the community by the supervision officer or by counsel. If the level of 
 
260 Proulx, supra note 14 at paras 99-100. In summarizing the decision, the Court suggests that 
“Where a combination of both punitive and restorative objectives may be achieved, a conditional 
sentence will likely be more appropriate than incarceration” (at para 113). 
261 For a discussion of restorative justice, net-widening, and Proulx, see Roach, supra note 161. 
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supervision available in the community is not sufficient to ensure safety of 
the community, the judge should impose a sentence of incarceration.262 
However, subsequent jurisprudence from provincial appellate courts effectively neutered 
this requirement.263 In 2002, the Ontario Court of Appeal adopted the position taken 
earlier (2000) by the Manitoba Court of Appeal on the issue of resourcing, declaring that 
“it cannot be up to the will of any province to effectively preclude the imposition of 
conditional sentences by failing to provide sufficient supervisory resources.”264  
This position, of course, raises more problems than it solves. On the one hand, it 
prevents funding limitations from getting in the way of what would otherwise be a non-
custodial (conditional) sentence. This will either motivate provincial governments to find 
funds or to live with the consequences of not doing so. On the other hand, those 
consequences include not monitoring the very conditions (i.e., house arrest, curfews) 
that the Supreme Court of Canada has deemed necessary to confirm the punitive nature 
of the sanction, support its ability to satisfy the sentencing objectives of deterrence and 
denunciation, distinguish conditional sentences from probation orders, and promote 
public confidence in sentencing decisions.265 As the court in Brady concluded, imposing 
a conditional sentence which would likely not be complied with is a waste of time and 
money, and unlikely to produce the desired outcomes. More importantly perhaps, “the 
sentence will suggest to the offender and to those around him, that the law and the 
courts are a paper tiger.”266 
In the post-Proulx era, the lack of systematic monitoring continued to be raised 
by justice system participants, undermining conditional sentences as credible sanctions. 
For example, arguing against a conditional sentence for a manslaughter conviction, one 
prosecutor in BC advised the court that, at most, house arrest conditions would only be 
 
262 Proulx, supra note 14 at para 73. 
263 For an early review of this issue, see Mazey, E. (2002). Conditional sentence under house 
arrest. Criminal Law Quarterly, 46(2), 246. 
264 R. v. Nault, 2002 CarswellOnt 1693 at para 17; R. v. Makar, 2000 MBCA 69. 
265 On this point, see also Roberts, supra 197. 
266 Brady, supra note 228 at paras 129-130. It should be noted that the Court in Brady was 
dealing with the enforceability of conditions and did not specifically address the lack of 
enforcement (i.e., monitoring) issue. 
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supervised during daytime business hours, Mondays through Fridays.267 The lack of 
monitoring was confirmed days later by a spokesman for Correctional Services (BC) who 
explained that no added funding was provided to the service when the new sanction was 
introduced in 1996.268 And so we see, yet again, the system failing to support efforts to 
monitor offenders serving prison terms in the community—hardly what the public was 
told to expect by a government that repeatedly promised “tight controls” for such 
offenders.269  
Public confidence—public resistance 
Public concern around sentencing practices in the decade following Proulx 
brought growing tensions, with Parliament and the Courts each struggling to assert 
control in this area of law. As sentencing judges extended the application of conditional 
sentences post-Proulx to more serious offences, the public became increasingly 
sensitized to perceived leniency.270 In the context of conditional sentencing, this was 
promoted by provocative media headlines that focused primarily on the practical impacts 
of the order (i.e., that it is not jail) without providing necessary detail about the nature of 
(and rationales for) conditional sentences.271 In that sense, the new sanction engaged 
concerns around “truth in sentencing” and being “soft on crime,” both of which are 
relevant to maintaining public confidence in the decisions made. Consider, for instance, 
the following post-Proulx headlines on conditional sentence cases in British Columbia:  
• Man convicted in fatal shooting of his pal won’t serve any time in jail.272   
 
267. Bellett, G. (2000, Aug 29). House arrest monitored only 9-5, prosecutor says. Vancouver Sun, 
B4. 
268 Furguson, D. (2000, Sept 3). Breaches of house arrest “very high.” Tri-City News, p. 13. 
269 See comments of Minister of Justice, supra note 215; and DOJ News release, supra note 155. 
270 Roberts, J. V. (1999). Sentencing trends and sentencing disparity. In J. V. Roberts & D. P. 
Cole (Eds.), Making sense of sentencing (pp. 137–159). University of Toronto Press, at p.137; 
Doob, A. N., & Webster, C. M. (2008). Concern with leniency: An examination of sentencing 
patterns in British Columbia. (University of Toronto and the University of Ottawa). 
271 According to Roberts the media has consistently promoted the view that conditional sentences 
are tantamount to ‘get out of jail’ free cards, with offenders facing virtually no consequences. 
Roberts, supra note 172 at p. 137. 
272 Canadian Press. (2000, Feb 17). Man convicted in fatal shooting of his pal won’t serve any 
time in jail. Vancouver Sun, A13. 
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• No jail for driver who killed two.273   
• Repeat sex offender’s victim angry at community sentence. 274   
• Put this thug away, frustrated cop pleads in letter to Crown.275  
Not only did the media take every opportunity to comment on individual cases in 
which conditional sentences had been imposed on serious offences, it also weighed in 
generally on the sanction.276 An editorial appearing in the National Post (2000) 
hyperbolically suggested that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Proulx had 
effectively severed any connection between crime and punishment. Critical of what it 
described as “judicial ad hoc-ery,” the editorial focused primarily on the issue of 
discretion in sentencing, arguing that what the court rejects as “rigidity” the public 
expects as “consistency.” The editorial included an implicit condemnation of the use of 
conditional sentences for more serious offences: 
Since 1996, judges have handed down 23,000 conditional sentences 
across Canada, including one to a woman who stabbed her husband as he 
slept. Such sentences have been purchased at the price of increasing 
public disquiet over the criminal justice system. Parliament would be wise 
to amend the law. Justice should be done consistently, not conditionally.277 
Statements made by judges and former judges over the years have reflected and 
perpetuated the media narrative on conditional sentences.278 As one Ontario judge put it: 
“I think offenders think it’s a joke. I see it as ‘fake jail.’ I have a close friend who is a 
probation officer and have heard stories about people laughing when they are given a 
conditional sentence. They see it as getting off.”279 The notion that offenders react 
 
273 Clark, G. (2000, June 7). No jail for driver who killed two. Vancouver Province, A12. 
274 Canadian Press. (2000, December 10). Repeat sex offender’s victim angry at community 
sentence. Vancouver Province, A36. 
275 Dawson, F. (2000, June 23). Put this thug away, frustrated cop pleads in letter to Crown. 
Vancouver Province, A3. 
276 General reporting on conditional sentencing tended to be similarly negative: 1) Skelton, C. 
(2000, February 1). Sex offenders eligible for house arrest. Vancouver Sun, A6; 2) Blanchfield, M. 
(2000, February 1). Violent offenders eligible for conditional sentences. National Post, A19; 3) 
Austin, I. (2000, April 25). Send ’em to jail, say B.C. and Ontario. Vancouver Province, A12. 
277 Editorial. (2000, February 1). Conditional justice. National Post, A19. 
278 See, for instance: 1) Kerans, Roger, “Go to your room!” The Globe and Mail, February 3, 2000 
at u/k (Roger Kerans was appointed to the Alberta Court of Appeal in 1980 and retired in 1997); 
and 2) Craig, Wallace, “Conditional sentences are judicial cop-outs”, North Shore News, October 
20, 2004, p. 7 (Wallace Craig was a Provincial Court Judge in BC from 1975 to 2001). 
279 Stephens, supra note 161 at p. 46. 
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positively–-even celebrate–-being sentenced to serve a conditional sentence suggests 
that the sanction is not being experienced as a true punishment. Take, for instance, the 
2007 BC case of Tuan Nguyen, an offender who was placed on a 20-month conditional 
sentence for his role in an attack that left the victim a quadriplegic.280 The decision not to 
incarcerate him was already controversial; when the media aired footage of Mr. Nguyen 
and his friends laughing as they entered an elevator to leave the court, this quickly 
turned to outrage.281 While the conditional sentence in the Nguyen case was set aside 
by the BC Court of Appeal six months later, in many ways the damage to the reputation 
of the justice system had already been done.282 
2.3 The beginning of the end: A totally predictable and 
completely foreseeable outcome 
 Yet more efforts to salvage CSOs – bites and caps  
Perhaps recognizing the threat that growing public opposition posed to the new 
sanction and, by extension, its effectiveness in reducing the use of imprisonment, 
reformers stepped in with recommendations designed to promote public acceptance of 
conditional sentencing. These proposals focused either on the need to make the 
sanction more clearly and consistently punitive, or on restricting sentence length to 
indirectly remove conditional sentences as an option for more serious offences (which 
would generally be expected to attract longer terms).  
Increasing penal bite 
Notwithstanding the references in Proulx that encourage judges to include 
punitive conditions, there is no requirement that they do so,283 nor is there a requirement 
that provincial authorities actively monitor and enforce the conditions that are imposed. 
 
280 R. v. Nguyen, 2007 BCPC 386. 
281 Mason, G. (2008, February 14). B.C. Judges: Compassionate, or lenient beyond reason? 
Globe and Mail. Retrieved from https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/bc-judges-
compassionate-or-lenient-beyond-reason/article718136/ 
282 R. v. Nguyen, 2008 BCCA 252. 
283 The Ontario Court of Appeal went further, holding that a “…conditional sentence must carry 
with it some form of punitive terms such as house arrest and/or a curfew.” R. v. Chartier, 2007 
ONCA 706 at para 5. 
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Given that conditional sentences are largely defined by their optional conditions, the 
continued deference to judicial discretion is problematic in that it frustrates attempts to 
locate the sanction on a scale of penal severity. Conditional sentences can be very 
restrictive and tightly monitored, with proven breaches resulting in swift incarceration; 
they can also be minimally restrictive, with no proactive monitoring or meaningful 
response to proven breaches. One is not the same as the other. 
In response, Renwick (2008) proposes that onerous conditions on conditional 
sentences be legislatively mandated, warning that “until courts can impose appropriate 
conditions and clearly explain their rationale for avoiding incarceration, offenders lucky 
enough to receive a conditional sentence will sense that they have dodged a penal bullet 
while their victims will believe that they have caught one.”284 Drawing on the work of 
Roberts, Renwick proposes mandatory conditions that would replicate carceral impacts 
at all levels–-physical, social, psychological and impersonal285 (e.g., house arrest, no 
guests, no driving or internet). Compliance with these conditions would be maintained 
through proactive monitoring, and proven non-compliance (breach) would result in the 
order being terminated and the balance of the term being served in prison. 
Seeking to make conditional sentences more like prison terms may address 
proportionality issues or partially satisfy public concerns that offenders are not being 
adequately punished (i.e., not simply sitting around “watching TV”). However, in addition 
to increased breach rates, the danger inherent in the “penal equivalency” strategy is that 
for some serious or violent offences it is unlikely that sanctions that do not involve actual 
custody will ever be accepted by the public as true equivalents. In such cases, Bottoms 
(2017) warns of the possibility of “infinite escalation,” with community penalties being 
 
284 Renwick, G. P. (2008). Conditional acceptance of the conditional sentence. Canadian Criminal 
Law Review, 12(Sept), 227, at p. 243. Renwick’s recommendations raise several practical 
challenges. First, as the onerousness of conditions increases, we can reasonably expect 
corresponding increases in non-compliance. If incidences of breach increase and if incarceration 
is mandated upon proven breach, any gains in terms of prison reduction would be largely 
negated. Second, the invasiveness of some recommended conditions raises issues around 
privacy and collateral impacts, both for the offender and for others who may reside in the same 
residence. Finally, the costs of proactive monitoring of restrictive conditions, which has arguably 
not occurred in any systematic way since their introduction, could be prohibitive and would be 
borne by the provincial, not federal, governments.  
285 “Impersonal” impacts are intended to remind the offender that they are serving a term of 
imprisonment, for example by restricting “personal luxuries” like cellphones or the internet. Ibid at 
pp. 239-243. Renwick’s proposal draws upon Roberts’ table of differences between institutional 
and community custody. See Roberts, supra note 172 at p. 44. 
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repeatedly made more punitive to address calls for tougher responses.286 As the Ouimet 
Report warned: 
The offender must be protected against rehabilitative measures that go 
beyond the bounds of the concept of justice. …Treatment is not more 
humane than punishment if it imposes more pain, restricts freedom for 
longer periods, or produces no results regarded as desirable by the 
individual concerned.287 
Reduced scope 
Sentencing theorists have recognized from the beginning that one of the greatest 
threats to the success of conditional sentencing (particularly in reducing the use of 
imprisonment) would be their use in cases involving serious offences. Julian Roberts, 
who has written prolifically on this issue, suggested as early as 1997 (pre-Proulx) that 
Parliament resolve the problem by considering legislative restrictions that would limit the 
sanction’s scope and application. Two such suggestions included either restricting 
conditional sentences to identified offences (e.g., non-violent offences) or offenders 
(e.g., first time offenders); or lowering the sentence length ceiling from two years to 
one.288 In the wake of Proulx, Roberts and Gabor (2004) focused, instead, on the 
proposal to cap conditional sentences at 12 months, suggesting that this would avoid 
much of the controversy without significantly impacting the gains achieved in terms of 
reduced incarceration.289 Subsequent suggestions have included a cap on conditional 
sentences for serious offences at 12 months while leaving the existing “two years less 
one day” cap for all other offences.290 More recently, Reid and Roberts (2019) suggest 
the ceiling should be lowered, perhaps in conjunction with a greater focus on expanding 
 
286 Bottoms, A. (2017). “Punishment” in non-custodial sentences: A critical analysis. Criminal Law 
Forum, 28(3), 563–587, at p. 584. See also CSC, supra note 38 at p. 371 “…community 
sanctions should not attempt to resemble incarceration by attracting conditions which are so 
arduous that they approximate the degree of constraint implied by custody.”  
287 Ouimet Report, supra note 41 at p. 16. 
288 Roberts, supra note 150 at p. 199. Other proposals designed to promote conditional sentences 
have included: increasing their penal “bite”; developing penal equivalences; and allowing split 
sentences (traditional imprisonment followed by community imprisonment).  
289 Roberts & Gabor, supra note 30 at p. 101. The majority of conditional sentences are for terms 
of less than 12 months; the authors estimate that setting the ceiling at 12 months would reduce 
usage by only 14% (at p. 101). 
290 Roberts, J. V. (2006). Reforming conditional sentencing: Evaluating recent legislative 
proposals. Criminal Law Quarterly, 52, 18–27, at pp. 32-33. 
   
78 
the use of conditional sentences for offences that would otherwise have received 
relatively short terms of incarceration (e.g., less than three months).291  
The argument against legislative restrictions 
While Roberts initially raised the possibility of restricting conditional sentences to 
identified offences or offenders in 1997, by 2004 he was arguing against such proposals, 
raising concerns around statutory exclusions. In terms of offender-specific exclusions 
(e.g., non-violent, or first-time offenders), there could be instances in which a conditional 
sentence may nonetheless offer the most appropriate response. Roberts (2004) refers, 
for instance, to “special needs offenders” who would either benefit the most from a 
treatment-oriented community disposition (e.g., those dealing with drug addictions), or 
for whom the court has been directed to make extra efforts to craft non-custodial 
sentences (e.g., Indigenous offenders).292 
Offence-specific restrictions are equally, if not more, problematic. First, as 
Roberts points out, excluding certain offences prejudges relative offence seriousness, 
thereby raising proportionality concerns, given the broad spectrum of severity within 
each offence category.293 Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code does not limit the 
proportionality requirement to offence gravity; it envisions an assessment of offender 
culpability as well.294 
Second, the identification of categories of offences for exclusion lends itself to 
political manipulation, allowing politicians to legislate restrictions in response to public 
concerns that may or may not be consistent with principled public policy. Lists of 
restricted offences are rarely reduced. On the contrary, they are often extended, 
 
291 Reid & Roberts, supra note 1 at p. 18. The authors note that approximately 80% of jail 
sentences in 2014/2015 were for periods of three months or less. 
292 Roberts, supra note 172 at p. 167. 
293 Ibid at p. 165. 
294 718.1 of the Criminal Code states that “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the 
offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender” (emphasis added). 
Paciocco and Roberts (2005) make this point in their argument against excluding conditional 
sentences for charges of impaired driving causing death or bodily harm, suggesting that judges 
should retain discretion in order to address difficult cases in which mitigating factors make a 
conditional sentence an appropriate disposition. See Paciocco, D. M., & Roberts, J. V. (2005). 
Sentencing in cases of impaired driving causing bodily harm or impaired driving causing death, 
with a particular emphasis on conditional sentencing. Ottawa: Canada Safety Council, at p.2. 
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especially by governments open to establishing sentencing policy based on notions of 
popular punitiveness as opposed to principle or empirical evidence. Sentencing 
becomes a political resource and the serious issues identified by the Canadian 
Sentencing Commission in 1987 remain unresolved. 
Finally, and most relevant to the focus of this research, simply excluding offences 
without a thorough consideration of the larger sentencing framework could result in the 
anomaly of having offenders who are not eligible for a conditional sentence be eligible 
for other non-custodial options, including suspended sentences.295 Should Parliament 
address this by restricting all less severe penalties as well, then they will effectively 
create additional mandatory minimum jail terms, with all of their associated challenges. 
 Growing pressure to introduce legislative restrictions 
Theorists debate the extent to which public opinion should drive sentence policy, 
but they no longer debate whether or not it does.296 It is clear from the above that Proulx 
did not resolve all of the issues raised by the introduction of the new sanction, 
particularly those related to public confidence. Indeed, in 2003, a group of five provincial 
Attorneys General released a position paper proclaiming their support for the “true” intent 
of Parliament, which was to make conditional sentences available for only minor (not 
serious) crimes.297 The proposal advocated prohibitions (or presumptions) against the 
use of conditional sentences for a series of serious offences, including offences involving 
serious violence, sexual assault, and driving offences involving death or serious bodily 
harm. Alternatively, it suggested that the ceiling on sentence length be lowered to one 
year, effectively eliminating it as an option for most serious offences.298 Though there 
have been no apparent efforts to shorten sentence terms, there have been several 
 
295 Roberts, supra note 172 at p. 165. 
296 Ryberg, J. & Roberts, J.V. (2014). Exploring the normative significance of public opinion for 
state punishment. In J. Ryberg & J. V. Roberts (Eds.), Popular punishment: On the normative 
significance of public opinion. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, at p. 1. 
297 Alberta Justice and Attorney General. The conditional sentence of imprisonment: The need for 
amendment (Paper submitted to Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights) (Alberta 
Justice and Attorney General, 2003). The five provinces represented include: Alberta, British 
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. 
298 Ibid at pp. 18-19. 
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legislative efforts to restrict the use of conditional sentences for certain offences or 
categories of offences.299  
Most notably, the incoming Conservative minority government led by Stephen 
Harper had run on a populist tough-on-crime platform that promised more mandatory 
minimum penalties and fewer conditional sentences. In May of 2006, they introduced Bill 
C-9, legislation that would exclude conditional sentences for all offences that carried a 
statutory maximum penalty of ten years or more, and that were prosecuted by way of 
indictment.300 The Standing Committee that considered the bill ultimately restricted it, 
excluding only serious personal injury offences as defined in section 752, terrorism 
offences or criminal organization offences prosecuted by way of indictment.301 As 
Roberts noted, “the marriage of politics and criminal policy-making seldom produces 
healthy offspring. Bill C-9 [is] no exception to this rule.”302 Passed in 2007, the 
amendment created confusion in terms of the meaning of a “serious personal injury 
offence.”303 
 
299 One notable effort—that ultimately failed—was introduced in October 2005 by a Liberal 
minority government. Bill C-70 would have made many categories of offences ineligible for 
conditional sentences unless the court was “satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so 
because of exceptional circumstances.” See Bill C-70, supra note 146. This legislation would 
have excluded conditional sentences for the specific offences of impaired driving causing bodily 
harm or death and the general categories of offences captured by: serious personal injury 
offences (per s. 752); terrorism or criminal organization offences; and any offence “in respect of 
which, on the basis of the nature and circumstances of the offence, the expression of society’s 
denunciation should take precedence over any other sentencing objectives” (Bill C-70 proposed 
wording of s. 742.1 (2)(d)). 
Bill C-70 died on the order paper when the Liberals lost the election. Its introduction is 
nonetheless interesting in that it confirms that no party is immune to the politics of populism. As 
Doob and Webster (2016) point out, during the Conservative reign from 2006 to 2015 there was 
no consistent or sustained opposition to the party’s tough-on-crime sentencing reforms (Doob & 
Webster, supra note 80(c) at p. 380). There was a public perception that violent crime was rising 
and that existing responses were ineffective. This is important context for Bill C-70 and the view 
that it was a “harbinger of what was to come” with the Conservatives. As Doob observed in 2011, 
“politics is stronger than evidence” (Doob, supra note 166 at p. 287). 
300 An editorial in the National Post entitled “Harper’s plan for a safer Canada” welcomed the 
philosophical shift towards harsher punishment that the legislation reflected, assuring its readers 
that “the Tories’ new crime strategy will make all of us safer.” See Editorial. (2006, May 9). 
Harper’s plan for a safer Canada. National Post, A16. 
301 See Appendix B (s.742.1). 
302 Roberts, supra note 290 at p. 34. 
303 See Manson, et al., supra note 176 at p. 510. 
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The passage of Bill C-9 signalled the beginning of amendments designed to limit 
judicial discretion in the application of conditional sentences. In the context of a more 
general shift towards increased punitiveness in sentencing, many saw Bill C-9 as 
exemplifying crime policy that played well with the public.304 Importantly though, while 
Harper’s Conservative government took punitive policies the furthest, all three national 
parties supported tough-on-crime platforms during the 2006 and 2008 elections, and 
during the Conservative minority government (2006-2011), opposition parties either 
failed to moderate, or explicitly supported, harsh sentencing policies.305 
With a minority government (2006-2011), the Conservatives sought broader 
legislative restrictions on the use of conditional sentence orders, first through Bill C-42 
(2009)306 and then through Bill C-16 (2010).307 Similar to the original drafting of Bill C-9, 
both bills sought to exclude all offences in which there was a maximum term of 
imprisonment of 14 years or life, and for specified offences prosecuted by indictment in 
which there was a maximum term of 10 years.308 When introduced in the House of 
Commons in May of 2010, there was a focus on the original intent of s.742.1, namely the 
need to provide parliamentary direction on sentencing policy and an interest in 
responding to public criticisms.309 
 
304 On penal populism see, for example Roberts, J. V., & Bebbington, H. H. (2013). Sentencing 
reform in Canada: Promoting a return to principles and evidenced-based policy. Canadian 
Criminal Law Review, 17(3), at p. 334; Ryberg & Roberts, supra note 296.  
305 See a) Doob, A. N., & Webster, C. M. (2013). The “Truth in Sentencing”, Act: The Triumph of 
Form over Substance. Canadian Criminal Law Review, 17(3), 365–392; and b) Webster & Doob, 
supra note 70. 
306 Bill C-42, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Ending Conditional Sentences for Property and 
Other Serious Crimes Act) (Canada, 40th Parl., 2nd Sess.). This amendment sought to end 
conditional sentences for serious property and violent crimes. Introduced in June 2009 it died on 
the order paper when Parliament was prorogued.  
307 Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Ending House Arrest for Property and Other 
Serious Crimes by Serious and Violent Offenders Act) (Canada, 40th Parl., 3rd Sess.). This 
amendment basically re-created the language found in Bill C-42 (as above). Introduced in April 
2010 it died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved in March 2011.  
308 For a full list of the offences that would have been affected by Bill C-16, see McLellan, supra 
note 207, footnotes 51 & 52. 
309 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 40th Parl., 3rd Sess., Second Reading, 
May 3, 2010: Mr. Brent Rathgeber (Edmonton-St. Albert, CPC), at 1553-1555: 
Bill C-16 proposes amendments to the Criminal Code to ensure that conditional sentences 
are never available for serious and violent offenders, and serious property offences which 
were never intended to be eligible for a conditional sentence in the first place. 
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Bill C-16 died on the order paper when Parliament was dissolved in March of 
2011. Notably, the failure of the Conservatives to get their law-and-order legislation 
passed when sitting as a minority government led to an election platform that focused 
heavily on a crime control agenda. Re-elected with a majority in May of 2011, the 
Conservatives wasted no time in reintroducing conditional sentencing restrictions as part 
of a larger package of amendments known as Bill C-10 – The Safe Streets and 
Communities Act (short title). 
 The Safe Streets and Communities Act (2012) - Bill C-10 
Introduced in September of 2011, Bill C-10 grouped together nine bills that had 
been dealt with separately (and not passed) in the prior Parliament. Among other things, 
the legislation tightened rules around conditional release, imposed or increased 
mandatory minimum sentences, and greatly expanded restrictions on the use of 
conditional sentences.310 In terms of the latter, the restrictions mirrored the language of 
Bill C-16, significantly broadening the offences now ineligible for conditional sentences, 
including any offence against the person, and most offences against property, when 
prosecuted by indictment (see Appendix B). When announced in 2012, the Minister of 
Justice framed the overall legislation as a promise kept, saying that “Our Government 
received a strong mandate from Canadians to keep our streets and communities safe. 
We promised to pass the measures contained in our Safe Streets and Communities Act 
within the first 100 sitting days of Parliament and we have delivered.”311 
 
The court [in Proulx] said, however, that it was open for Parliament to introduce such 
limitations. Unfortunately, sentencing courts have interpreted the availability of conditional 
sentences in an inconsistent fashion because of the lack of clear parameters, allowing in 
some instances violent and serious offenders to serve their sentences under a conditional 
sentence of imprisonment. 
This unfortunately has resulted in criticism of the sanction and a loss of public confidence 
in the administration of justice and, I would submit, in the justice system overall. 
310 Benedet argues that some of the shorter mandatory minimums introduced by Bill C-10 were 
intended to block the imposition of conditional sentences; in the context of sexual offences 
committed against children and youth, the resulting trend has been to replace long conditional 
sentences by very short terms of imprisonment, often served intermittently. See Benedet, J. 
(2019). Sentencing for sexual offences against children and youth: Mandatory minimums, 
proportionality and unintended consequences. Queen’s Law Journal, 44 (Spring), 284.  
311 The Honourable Rob Nicholson, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, 
Department of Justice News Release (June 25, 2012) online at: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2012/06/government-canada-announces-dates-coming-
into-force-key-components-safe-streets-communities-act.html 
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The conditional sentencing restrictions took effect in November of 2012. As one 
trial judge noted, “as a drafting exercise, it would have been more efficient to simply 
repeal section 742.1 and enumerate the few situations in which a conditional sentence is 
available.”312 The legislative summary describing the changes justified them primarily as 
being responsive to concerns expressed over their use for serious offences.313 
Objections to the restrictions placed on conditional sentencing and the increased 
use of mandatory minimum sentences314 were immediate. The removal of non-custodial 
options consistent with the principle of restraint were of primary concern, both generally 
and with regards to Aboriginal offenders as per 718.2(e). Additional concerns included 
possible conflicts with the fundamental principle of proportionality and an inflexibility that 
does not allow judges to account for mitigating or exceptional circumstances.315  
There were neither apparent efforts made to support the restrictive amendments 
based on an enhanced deterrence argument, nor were there any explanations offered 
regarding how increased severity would promote public safety. The rhetoric focused on 
the responsiveness of government in delivering on its law and order mandate, with one 
member describing Bill C-10 as legislation that would protect the public by “increasing 
penalties for organized drug crime, and preventing serious criminals from serving their 
 
312 Pomerance, supra note 3 at p. 310. 
313 Parliamentary Information and Research Service. (2012 (revised)). Legislative summary of Bill 
C-10 No. 41-1-C10-E). Ottawa, Canada: Library of Parliament: 
At the time of their introduction, conditional sentences were generally seen as an 
appropriate mechanism to divert minor offences and offenders away from the prison 
system…. In practice, however, [they] are sometimes viewed in a negative light when used 
in cases of very serious crime (at p. 59). 
It has been suggested that a refusal to incarcerate a serious offender can bring the entire 
conditional sentencing regime, and hence the criminal justice system, into disrepute. In 
other words, it is not the existence of conditional sentences that is problematic, but rather 
their use in cases that appear to justify incarceration (at p. 60).  
314 Parkes identifies 84 MMPs in the Criminal Code and 14 in the CDSA post Bill C-10. See 
Parkes, D. (2012). From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s minimal impact on mandatory minimum 
sentences. Supreme Court Law Review (2d), 57, 149–172. For a review of case law relating to 
mandatory minimum penalties for drug offences, see MacAlister, D., & Barkase, K. (2018). 
Mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offences in Canada. Criminal Law Quarterly, 66, 161–
194. See also Rangefindr database online at: https://mms.watch/  
315 See Healy, P. (2013). Sentencing from there to here and from then to now. Canadian Criminal 
Law Review, 17(3); Roberts & Bebbington, supra note 304; and Pomerance, supra note 3. Much 
of the opposition to Bill C-10 focused on mandatory minimum sentences. See, generally, Cairns 
Way, R. (2015). A disappointing silence: Mandatory minimums and substantive equality. Criminal 
Reports, 18(7th), 297; and Vandersteen, L. (2016). Building a safety valve for mandatory 
minimums: How to construct a statutory exemption scheme. Criminal Reports, 27, 249. 
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sentences in the comfort of their own living rooms by ending house arrest for serious 
crimes.”316  
Bill C-10 lacked a principled or coherent strategy, failed to connect initiatives to 
empirical research, and was unapologetic in its disregard of advice from experts on 
sentencing policy. Indeed, the legislation can be seen as evidence of the ongoing 
politicization of crime policy in Canada. It represents a substantive shift towards 
increased punitiveness and conservatism, with government setting policy based on what 
it selectively hears from the public and law enforcement agencies, leaving little room for 
contrary voices, analysis, research, or debate.317 In a principled sentencing regime, such 
significant policy shifts should require more, not less, public education, transparency, 
and research on (informed) public responses to criminal sanctions. 
2.4 The end?: Bill C-10 and the mystery of continued 
stability in Canada’s imprisonment rates 
It is tempting to dismiss the sentencing restrictions introduced by Bill C-10 as 
political pandering or “penal populism,” which they no doubt were. To those who were 
paying attention, however, it should not have been surprising. It was not surprising that 
judges tested the boundaries of their sentencing discretion post Proulx and imposed 
conditional sentences for a variety of serious offences, including manslaughter, sexual 
assault, and drug trafficking. It was not surprising that the media reported on these cases 
or that the public and many victim advocacy groups were unable to accept community-
based dispositions as terms of imprisonment for serious offences. And so, it was not 
surprising that a political party exploited this issue, or that they largely succeeded by 
running on a tough-on-crime platform.  
The components of Bill C-10 that relate to conditional sentencing came into effect 
on November 20, 2012, and applied only to offences committed after that date. The 
restrictions were important for several reasons. First, as seen through the lens of prison 
reduction, the restrictions effectively removed the offences that (post Proulx) most likely 
 
316 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 41st Parl., 1st Sess., Second Reading, 
September 28, 2011: Mr. Scott Armstrong (Cumberland-Colchester-Musquodoboit Valley, CPC), 
1735. 
317 Webster & Doob, supra note 70 at p. 309. 
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represented actual prison alternatives (not net-widening). In addition, the choice to link 
eligibility to the maximum sentence available for any given offence resulted in restrictions 
that were overly broad, no doubt capturing offences that would not have engaged public 
pushback.318 Finally, by drastically reducing judicial discretion without first establishing a 
principled policy or evidence-based rationale, the restrictions signalled a distrust of the 
judiciary that was not well received (by judges). This, in turn, may have impacted strict 
compliance with the restrictions.  
The history of conditional sentencing in Canada has been tied to two defining 
events that are inextricably linked to prison reduction. The first was their introduction in 
1996 (via Bill C-41), which was expected to result in a substantial decrease in the use of 
traditional imprisonment; the second was their selective or partial withdrawal in 2012 (via 
Bill C-10), which was expected to considerably reduce any decarcerative effects that 
might be occurring. In other words, imprisonment rates should have started decreasing 
after 1996, and then increasing after 2012. Any hope of gaining a realistic “warts and all” 
understanding of conditional sentences, therefore, must start with a frank assessment of 
these two impacts.  
 Recent evaluations: Expected and unexpected findings  
More than 20 years after their introduction, the critical question remains—what 
impact have conditional sentences had on the use of imprisonment in Canada? Two 
recent (2019) studies have attempted to answer this question.319 In some ways the “gist” 
 
318 The restrictions placed on conditional sentencing by Bill C-10 went far beyond the offences 
specified in the proposal submitted by the group of five provincial Attorneys General in 2003 (see 
note 297). 
319 Both studies acknowledge the challenges of conducting this type of research. Webster & Doob 
point to four fundamental challenges to longitudinal assessments that attempt to empirically 
assess the impact that the creation of conditional sentences had on the use of other sanctions in 
Canada: 1) Given that conditional sentences were implemented simultaneously across the 
country, there are no areas that could act as an effective control group; 2) Conditional sentences 
came in as part of a legislative package that included other strategies designed to reduce the use 
of imprisonment (e.g., the introduction of alternative measures for adults, and the codification of 
the principles of proportionality and restraint); 3) Conditional sentences were introduced shortly 
after crime rates peaked in 1994; thereafter both overall and violent crime rates in Canada started 
declining (“crime drop”); and 4) Pre/post analyses assume a stability in sentencing trends that 
does not exist. Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 179. 
Similarly, Reid & Roberts acknowledge the limitations of using admissions data from the Adult 
Correctional Services (ACS) survey. In particular, they highlight that: 1) limited sanction 
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of their conclusions are telegraphed in the language chosen to frame their efforts; one 
speaks of a “post-mortem” (suggesting the sanction is already dead), the other of 
conditional sentences that are an “endangered species” (suggesting a sanction that is at 
risk of soon being dead).320 Both efforts address the impacts of conditional sentencing 
through an exploration of data surrounding their introduction (in 1996) and subsequent 
restriction (primarily in 2012).  
As is the case with so many legislated reforms, these studies report both 
expected and unexpected outcomes. On the one hand, in terms of the use of 
imprisonment, both identify an expected reduction following the 1996 reforms, and an 
expected increase following the 2012 restrictions. Notably, both studies corroborate 
earlier findings that had failed to find a direct relationship between the number of 
offenders on conditional sentences and any decreases in the use of imprisonment.321 On 
the other hand, the studies differ in their assessment of the degree of each change (i.e., 
effect size) which is, in each instance, unexpectedly low. Put another way, the dramatic 
changes expected in the wake of both Bill C-41 and Bill C-10 failed to materialize for 
some reason, suggesting that other forces are at play.   
Introducing conditional sentences—disappointing outcomes  
While Webster and Doob acknowledge the obvious—that for some offenders the 
imposition of a conditional sentence was a genuine diversion from what would otherwise 
have been a custodial sentence322—their primary conclusions were that the sanction 
 
categories (sentenced custody [jail], conditional sentence, probation) provide no information 
about the use of absolute discharges and fines; 2) multiple admissions are likely counted (an 
offender given a conditional sentence followed by probation who breaches his/her conditional 
sentence would likely be counted at least once, and possibly more, in each category); and 3) the 
probation category does not distinguish between probation required as part of a conditional 
discharge or suspended sentence, and probation attached to another stand-alone sentencing 
option-–e.g., jail, conditional sentence, fine. Reid & Roberts, supra note 1 at pp. 10-11. 
320 “Missed opportunities: A post-mortem on Canada’s experience with the conditional sentence,” 
Webster & Doob, supra note 1; “Revisiting the conditional sentence of imprisonment after 20 
years: Is community custody now an endangered species?”, Reid & Roberts, supra note 1. 
321 See, for example, La Prairie, supra note 185. 
322 The question is not whether conditional sentences reduced imprisonment at all, but whether 
they had an “important” impact on incarceration rates, and whether that empirical question can 
even be answered with available data. The authors point to several competing explanations for 
any observed reduction in imprisonment rates or counts, including: 1) the pressure to reduce the 
use of incarceration by any means (e.g., codification of the principle of restraint); 2) declining 
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was never a “significant tool” for judges,323 and that its introduction had no “measurable 
impact” on the use of imprisonment in Canada.324 Judges did use the new sanction, 
though not consistently across provinces/territories, and arguably not to the extent that 
had been hoped for (with some exceptions).325 Findings, in BC perhaps more than other 
provinces, suggest that the sanction’s lack of impact is linked to net-widening. In this 
province, for instance, 86% of the correctional population was serving a community-
based sentence in 1995, prior to the introduction of the conditional sentence order. The 
percentage of offenders serving a conditional sentence increased from 0% in 1995 to 
13.6% in 2005, notwithstanding a net decrease in the overall percentage of offenders 
serving sentences in the community (from 86.0% in 1995 to 84.2% in 2005).326 
In their analysis of correctional trends from 1996 to 2016, Reid and Roberts 
(2019) report only slightly more optimistic outcomes.327 Their findings suggest modest 
improvements in most, but not all, provinces/territories. Overall, 21 years of conditional 
sentencing contributed to a 7.65% decrease in the percent of correctional admissions 
 
overall and violent crime rates; 3) instability in prison admission rates; and 4) the growth of 
remand populations. Ibid at pp. 179-181. 
323 The suggestion that conditional sentences never really caught on in Canada is supported by 
national court data (2006 to 2015) that estimate conditional sentences represented only 4.2% of 
sentences (most serious sentence [MSS]) prior to restrictions, and even less (3.6%) after. While 
the relatively low national rate is disappointing, considerable provincial variations are noted. In 
BC, for instance, conditional sentences represented 8.9% of sentences prior to restrictions, and 
5.8% after (p. 183). Overall, the authors conclude that conditional sentences were never a 
significant tool for sentencing judges based on findings that the sanction: 1) never represented a 
large proportion of sentences imposed; and 2) does not appear to have found a stable niche in 
terms of overall application (by province) or offence type. Ibid at pp. 182-183. 
324 In assessing impact, Webster and Doob also reviewed correctional data showing the 
percentage of offenders serving conditional sentences relative to the percentage of offenders 
serving a sentence in the community more broadly, theorizing that the introduction of conditional 
sentencing should have resulted in an increase in the percentage of offenders serving community 
sentences in 2005. Using correctional data from four provinces (Ontario, Quebec, BC, Alberta) 
over three time periods: 1995 (prior to CSOs); 2005 (prior to CSO restrictions); and 2015 (post 
CSO restrictions), Webster and Doob conclude that the introduction of conditional sentencing 
resulted in an increase in the percentage of offenders serving community sentences in only one 
province out of four (Alberta). Ibid at pp. 190-191. 
325 For example, Webster & Doob note that in 2005 over one-fifth (20.4%) of the correctional 
population in Quebec was serving a conditional sentence. Ibid at p. 190. 
326 Ibid at p. 191. 
327 Reid & Roberts, supra note 1. Note: Analyses did not include Alberta, Northwest Territories, or 
Nunavut. 
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that result in a custodial sentence (jail).328 There was considerable variation across 
provinces, with Saskatchewan being the most positively impacted (14.23% reduction), 
and the two largest jurisdictions experiencing more modest effects (Ontario saw a -
7.13% CSI impact on custody and a -5.45% net-narrowing effect while Quebec 
witnessed impacts of -10.37% and -23.88% respectively).  
Notably, the findings of this study confirm the disappointing performance of 
conditional sentences in BC, as first suggested by Webster and Doob.329 Reid and 
Roberts report a -3.7% decarceration effect for BC in 1996; after which only 2009 had 
more than a -1% change. In one-third (7/21) of the years reviewed, decarceration effects 
were mitigated by custodial increases. Overall, the introduction of conditional sentences 
contributed to a .65% increase (not decrease) in the use of custody. In what can only be 
described as an unintended (and unexpected) consequence, Reid and Roberts note that 
admissions to prison over the 21-year period expanded by almost 15% in BC: 
In other words, not only was the CSI found to have contributed to an 
increase in custody [in BC] during the 21-year period but there was also 
evidence that a large proportion of cases that would have previously 
received a probation order were admitted to either custody or a CSI.330 
And so, it becomes clear that the application of conditional sentencing, not only in 
terms of how often it was used, but also in what (offence/offender) circumstances, is key 
to understanding its failure as a tool of prison reduction. 
Restricting conditional sentences—unforeseen outcomes  
As expected, both studies point to a substantially reduced role for conditional 
sentences since 2012. Reid and Roberts observe that three of the last four years (2014-
2016) are among the worst performing years for the conditional sentence in their year-
over-year analyses.331 Webster and Doob identify similar impacts, noting that the 
restrictions appear to have had the greatest effect in Quebec, a province in which the 
 
328 The authors also note a -5.4% “narrowing of the net” (reduction in the overall use of 
imprisonment). “Narrowing of the net” occurs if a proportion of the caseload that otherwise would 
have received custody or a CSI is given the less severe option of probation. Ibid at p. 15. Note: 
Reid & Roberts use the acronym CSI (conditional sentence of imprisonment). 
329 Ibid at p. 22. 
330 Ibid at p. 27. 
331 Ibid at p. 29. 
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proportion of offenders serving conditional sentences between 2005 and 2015 dropped 
from 20.4% to 10.5% (though the proportion serving community sentences only dropped 
by 4.4%). In BC, the restrictions decreased the proportion of offenders serving 
conditional sentences from 13.6% to 8.0% (a 5.6% drop between 2005 and 2015), while 
the proportion of offenders serving community sentences only dropped by 2.1%.332 
Notably, however, overall imprisonment rates have remained largely stable, despite the 
fact that fewer conditional sentences have been imposed.333  
Summary 
When conditional sentences were introduced, we expected to see their use 
matched by a corresponding reduction in the use of prison. In light of that common 
sense expectation, the observed overall effects of conditional sentences have been 
disappointing, notwithstanding the considerable variation that is evident across 
provinces/territories. At best, we can say that there were modest successes over certain 
time periods, in some provinces. Similarly, when restrictions were introduced in 2012, we 
expected to see both a drop in the use of conditional sentences, and a corresponding 
increase in the use of prison.334 The fact that we see the former, but not the latter, 
suggests that other factors are at play, in some, but not all, provinces/territories.  Reid 
and Roberts argue that the variation across provinces/territories suggests that the 
sanction has the potential to reduce prison admissions more significantly (and 
 
332 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at pp. 190-191. Another notable finding arose from a detailed 
review of Ontario data, which identified decreases in the proportionate use of conditional 
sentences in four out of the five offence categories. Indeed, the use of conditional sentences 
overall dropped, as expected, from 5.7% in 2011 to 4.2% in 2015. Unexpectedly though, the use 
of custody also dropped, from 35.7% in 2011 to 34.8% in 2015 (at p. 185). When offences were 
broken down by category, the only substantial effect was observed with drug offences. In 2011 
(pre-C-10), 25.7% of drug offences resulted in jail terms, and 26.8% resulted in conditional 
sentences. In 2015 (post C-10), the imposition of jail increased only slightly, to 29.1%, while the 
use of conditional sentences dropped dramatically, representing only 8.9% of outcomes that year 
(at p. 185). 
333 Webster & Doob, supra note 40 at p. 360. 
334 It should be noted that there were many elements of Bill C-10 that were expected to increase 
the use of custody—e.g., more mandatory minimum prison terms. While not specifically 
addressed in this project, it is possible that the explanations for stability (in the imprisonment rate) 
may apply equally to these groups. 
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consistently) than it has. The key question then becomes why—why did conditional 
sentences appear to succeed in some provinces/territories, but fail in others?335  
 A way forward: Other ways of gaining knowledge 
The findings outlined above are perplexing and suggest that the impact of 
conditional sentences may be considerably more complex than originally thought. 
Certainly, these outcomes raise as many questions as they answer. At the front-end, it 
would be helpful to understand the processes or rationales that are associated with the 
imposition of conditional sentences in cases in which the offender is not otherwise facing 
a prison term (net-widening). Surely judges do not intentionally undermine the intent of 
the legislation, so what need is being met by a conditional sentence that could not be 
met by some other non-custodial sentencing option? In other words, what are judges 
telling us through their decisions? 
The judicial response to the restrictions introduced in 2012 is also provocative. If 
conditional sentences are no longer being imposed for serious offences, but we do not 
see a corresponding increase in the imprisonment rate, what does that mean? While it 
intuitively makes sense to substitute one non-custodial option with another, the 
construction of conditional sentences as an alternate form of imprisonment makes that 
problematic. When imposing a conditional sentence, a judge declares that imprisonment 
is both necessary and consistent with the principles and purposes of sentencing. Can 
the fact that a conditional sentence is no longer available for a specific offence mean 
that imprisonment is no longer necessary?  If so, was it ever? 
It is worth noting that the historical (pre Bill C-10) use of conditional sentences in 
place of other non-custodial options (net-widening) may have created a new dilemma for 
sentencing judges post Bill C-10. That is, such practices of net-widening can have the 
effect of “up-tariffing” or shifting the sentencing range for a given offence upwards, to 
something more punitive than it otherwise would have been.336 In such cases, do judges 
now imprison offenders who they otherwise would have placed on a conditional 
sentence? Or do they use a non-custodial sanction (e.g., probation) that now appears 
 
335 Reid & Roberts, supra note 1 at p. 30. 
336 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 195. 
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overly lenient, given that the sentences for the offence have been up-tariffed to prison 
terms through the use of conditional sentences of imprisonment while they were 
available? Webster and Doob (2019) frame it this way: “while introducing a new sanction 
into the mix of community sanctions may not have reduced imprisonment, taking it away 
may have increased incarceration.”337 
Until now, empirical studies on conditional sentencing have focused primarily on 
quantitative analyses in which the emphasis has been, for example, on counting how 
often each sanction is used or how many offenders are imprisoned. While clearly 
valuable in giving a broad picture of the correctional reality as impacted by conditional 
sentences, this type of research is largely unable to capture the day-to-day lived 
experiences of those “on the ground.” In particular, it would seem fundamental—for 
those interested in better understanding the impact of conditional sentences on 
imprisonment rates—to include the voice of judges, the most immediate gatekeepers of 
this sentencing option. While the national survey of judges conducted in 1998 provided 
valuable insights, with notable exceptions338 little-to-no recent attention has been given 
to following up with this group of decision-makers—e.g., exploring how judges have 
understood and used conditional sentences over time. What is needed now is a more 
nuanced and comprehensive examination of sentencing, especially in light of the 
unexpected findings identified above. More detailed micro data—both quantitative and 
qualitative—are needed to begin to unravel the many mysteries of conditional 
sentencing.  
Given the striking inter-provincial variability noted, a methodologist would 
immediately recognize the unique research opportunities inherent in interjurisdictional 
differences. Perhaps most notably, it would be particularly interesting to explore 
conditional sentencing in a province that is seen either as an unqualified success in 
terms of utilizing conditional sentences to achieve prison reduction, or an unmitigated 
failure as an effective means of better identifying (and understanding) the principal 
contributing factors. Given that both studies assessed British Columbia as having most 
clearly failed in its use of conditional sentences (as mechanisms for prison reduction), 
 
337 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 194. 
338 For example, Stephens, supra note 161. See also Stephens, M. (2006). Lessons from the front 
lines in Canada’s restorative justice experiment: The experience of sentencing judges [LLM]. 
Columbia Law School. 
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gaining a more in-depth understanding of what happened in this province would appear 
to be a good start to understanding the performance of the sanction more broadly. After 
all, conditional sentences still exist and are still being used. More importantly, given the 
recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Sharma,339 they may be more at a 
crossroads now than they have ever been. 
 
 
339 Sharma, supra note 4. Leave to appeal granted January 14, 2021 (SCC Docket #39346). 
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3 Methodology  
Conditional sentences were introduced specifically to reduce the use of 
incarceration in Canada. Notably, recent evaluations suggest that, at best, the sanction 
has been modestly effective for a short time in some provinces/territories, and 
completely ineffective in others, including British Columbia. This study seeks to 
understand why a sanction that should have resulted in meaningful prison reduction, did 
not. What were the mechanisms of failure—and how can they (or should they) inform 
sentencing policy moving forward? More importantly given recent case law, is there a 
future for conditional sentencing in Canada? If there is, what should it look like and what 
could be done to improve its performance as a decarcerative strategy? If there is not, are 
there other reforms that should be considered to promote the use of non-custodial 
options?  
3.1 Research design 
This study employs a mixed-methods approach to explore conditional 
sentencing. The research design incorporates three data sources, including detailed 
court sentencing data, as well as a survey and interviews with Provincial Court judges. 
While the original design envisioned a sequential progression through the various 
sources, there was ultimately considerable overlap in terms of both data collection and 
analysis. The decision to employ both quantitative and qualitative methods was informed 
by three considerations. First, it was important to get a sense of how judges in BC had 
been using conditional sentences—e.g., how often they were imposed and for which 
offences. There was also an interest in developing a more in-depth understanding of the 
sanction through the analysis of increasingly detailed quantitative data—e.g., sentence 
length and combinations, responses to breaches, optional conditions imposed, etc. 
The second consideration recognizes that we cannot hope to understand the 
complexities of a sanction simply by counting how many times it has been used. 
Especially by incorporating the views of trial court judges (through a survey and 
interviews), this project offers a richer and more contextualized understanding of how 
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conditional sentences have been applied over time.340 After all, decisions about the use 
of any sanction are made by judges, not by law-makers; any opportunity to better 
understand the assumptions and beliefs underlying this practice should be explored. 
This is especially important given the traditional lack of criminological research 
incorporating judicial interview data—almost certainly a reflection of the general 
reluctance of judges in Canada to express their personal views on sentencing issues 
and/or policy.341 
Finally, an anticipated benefit of incorporating the perspective of trial court 
judges, especially through the interviews, was that doing so may act to bridge the divide 
that exists between academia and the legal world. To that end, efforts were made 
throughout the project to consult informally with a variety of criminal justice participants 
(e.g., prosecutors, defence counsel, administrators). This included, for instance, seeking 
broad input on this project to ensure that its focus held “real-world” value and was both 
interesting and relevant to practitioners. This approach is consistent with the “lessons for 
scholars” that have guided much of this research project: “if you want to be heard, learn 
to listen; if you want to be heard, answer real problems; if you want your answers to be 
followed, make them realistic.”342  
Research setting 
The decision to focus on one province (BC) was informed by both strategic and 
pragmatic considerations. First, as noted earlier, BC appears to have had the least 
success (or, inversely, greatest failure) in using conditional sentences as tools of prison 
reduction. As such, the province offers unique opportunities to those seeking to identify 
and better understand the factors that have produced this unintended result. Indeed, we 
would expect such mechanisms of failure to be much more apparent in a province that 
 
340 Trahan, A., & Stewart, D. M. (2013). Toward a Pragmatic Framework for Mixed-Methods 
Research in Criminal Justice and Criminology. Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice, 9(1), at 
p.63. On the overall benefits of a mixed methods approach see Maruna, S. (2010). Mixed Method 
Research in Criminology: Why Not Go Both Ways? In A. R. Piquero & D. Weisburd (Eds.), 
Handbook of Quantitative Criminology (pp. 123–140). New York, NY: Springer New York. 
341 Doob & Webster, supra note 80(a) at p. 354. 
342 Miller, M. L., & Chanenson, S. L. (2009). Shaping Modern Sentencing: Three Giants. Federal 
Sentencing Reporter, 21, 227–234, at p. 229.  
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saw no sustained decreases in the use of imprisonment, as opposed to one that 
experienced even modest success.  
The second reason for focusing on a single province was that doing so allowed 
for a more meaningful, in-depth analysis of multiple data sources. Put another way, 
given the choice between a more superficial review of sentencing practices in several 
provinces, or a deeper dive into a single province employing multiple measures, the 
preference was for the latter. The goal was not to replicate other empirical studies that 
have examined the use of conditional sentences but, rather, to extend their findings by 
offering (at least partial) explanations for the overall patterns they identify. Finally, 
practical considerations, including my familiarity with BC processes and justice system 
personnel, as well as physical proximity to British Columbia’s highest volume 
courthouses (which facilitated in-person interviews), favoured the selection of this 
province over other Canadian jurisdictions.  
In terms of defining methodological approaches, this project is largely descriptive 
in nature. Further, it would loosely fit within the category of a non-experimental design in 
the sense that it does not include the explicit or direct manipulation of variables, nor 
does it include the random assignment of participants. The quantitative element, 
involving the collection and analysis of court data, was largely inductive. The original 
intention was to cast as broad a net as possible, using a longitudinal design and asking 
essentially “how have judges in BC used conditional sentences and how has that 
changed over the years, particularly in light of subsequent legislative and judicial 
decisions?”  
While this broad research question resulted in the collection of a large amount of 
material, it also allowed for the exploration of multiple interests as the research focus 
was progressively narrowed. As is often the case, the data existed as answers awaiting 
the formation of questions. That changed with the serendipitous publication in 2019 of 
the two studies that assessed the impact of conditional sentencing on the use of 
imprisonment in Canada, and the disappointing results noted for BC.343 Indeed, at that 
point the research question materialized so quickly that it was as if it had been waiting 
 
343 Webster & Doob, supra note 1; Reid & Roberts, supra note 1. 
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there all along. That is, why did the introduction (and use) of an explicit prison alternative 
not result in meaningful reductions in imprisonment rates nationally and provincially? 
3.2 Data sources 
 Adult court sentencing data (BC) – sentences – breaches – 
conditions  
Up until this point, conditional sentences have generally been discussed in terms 
of their impact either on sentenced admissions to prison, or on imprisonment rates 
overall. These have been appropriate metrics given the initial broad focus on sentencing 
policy as viewed through the lenses of imprisonment and restraint. Indeed, Webster and 
Doob (2020) suggest that imprisonment rates are the most relevant metric when 
assessing the impact of reforms intended to reduce the use of incarceration. The primary 
rationale for using imprisonment rates rather than sentencing-based measures in such 
instances is that doing so acknowledges the fact that we are unable to disentangle the 
use of pretrial detention (remand) from the sentencing decisions reflected in court and 
corrections data.344  
For our current purposes, however, we shift from the macro to the micro, 
concerned less with the broad impacts of sentencing writ large, and more with the 
detailed, case specific decisions made by individual judges. The shift in focus requires a 
corresponding shift in data. Accordingly, instead of calculating imprisonment rates (or 
using correctional counts), sentencing patterns will be determined through the analysis 
of micro-level data provided by BC courts, the most direct reflection of judicial decision-
making.  
Quantitative data for this project were drawn from the JUSTIN database, an 
information management system maintained by the Court Services Branch (CSB) under 
the direction of the judiciary.345 The decision to create a unique database was informed 
by the particular needs of this project and the realization that existing data publicly 
 
344 Webster & Doob, supra note 40 at pp. 342-45.  
345 Source: Court Services Branch (Victoria, B.C.) Strategic Information and Business 
Applications (SIBA), Criminal Business Information database. All data relate to adult files 
concluded in either the Provincial Court or Supreme Court during the specified calendar year. 
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available through CCJS346 would not provide the necessary detail.347 These included an 
interest in exploring sentence patterns of specific offences not captured in the standard 
CCJS aggregated groupings, the use of suspended sentences, changes in sentence 
length or combinations, the incidence of (and response to) breaches, and the use of 
optional conditions, over time.  
Given the complexity of sentence decision-making and the organization of these 
data, three separate requests were made and satisfied (see Table 3-1).348  
Table 3-1 Description of BC court datasets (3) 
Dataset                      Years Description 
 1 – single charge cases 
2006 to 2017 
All adult single charge cases dealing with federal offences (CCC, 
CDSA) sentenced in criminal courts (BC)*  
 2 – CSO breaches 
2011 to 2016 
All conditional sentences (CCC, CDSA) that include a CSO breach 
allegation 
 3 – CSO & SS conditions 
2011 & 2017 
All conditions imposed on conditional and suspended sentences for 
drug trafficking offences (5(1) & (2) CDSA) 
*Not including offences relating to impaired driving349  
 
346 The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) provides court and corrections data for 
Juristat publications and tables available via Statistics Canada (CANSIM). 
347 This is consistent with other recent research that has relied upon JUSTIN/CSB data due to the 
inability of CCJS data to provide information regarding conditions and breaches. See Sylvestre, 
M.-E., Blomley, N., Damon, W., & Bellot, C. (2017). Red zones and Other Spatial Conditions of 
Release Imposed on Marginalized People in Vancouver. While much of the JUSTIN/CSB data 
would be similar to that which is supplied to CCJS (e.g., the sentence outcome data), it is 
organized differently. 
Deficiencies in the Integrated Criminal Court Survey (ICCS) include the following: data that are 
reported by broad offence categories only (e.g., ‘theft’ without the ability to break it down into 
‘theft under’ and ‘theft over $5,000’); no information regarding the use of suspended sentences or 
discharges (currently coded as “other”); no detail provided regarding exact sentence length or the 
practice of combining sanctions (e.g., prison plus probation); no reporting on CSO breaches in 
terms of incidence and judicial response; and a lack of information regarding optional conditions 
imposed on conditional and suspended sentences. 
348 The time period for each dataset reflects the following considerations: 1) the availability of 
accurate and reliable data; 2) an interest in minimizing requests to allow for timely processing and 
analysis; and 3) rational linkages to the research questions being addressed. 
349 Early analysis uncovered a distortion in sentencing patterns that coincided with the 
introduction of immediate roadside prohibitions (IRPs) in BC in 2010, and the drastic drop in 
charges of impaired driving that followed.  
Impaired driving charges represented 11.5% of all sentenced charges concluded in 2006; this 
dropped to 9.9% in 2011 and to 2.8% by 2014. The most common sentence (85-90%) for 
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The ability to isolate suspended sentences and compare their use (to that of 
conditional sentences) was critical given that no other report had attempted to do so. 
After all, if suspended sentences are the outcomes most vulnerable to net-widening, it is 
crucial to know whether their use went down with the introduction of conditional 
sentencing, or up with the restrictions imposed by Bill C-10. The database created for 
this study allows for such analyses, especially given the more recent concerns that post 
Bill C-10 judges may be using suspended sentences in place of conditional sentences, 
at least in some cases.  
There are additional advantages to having disaggregated data (as opposed to 
receiving summarized reports). These include providing the ability to: 
• Validate outcomes or explore anomalies at the case level.350 
• Ensure that sentencing trends involving specific offences are limited to 
instances in which offenders were sentenced on the offence charged (e.g., 
trends on drug trafficking do not include cases in which the charge was 
trafficking, but the plea was entered to simple possession). 
• Conduct more detailed coding of offences (e.g., theft under $5,000 was coded 
separately from theft over $5,000, instead of the single “theft” offence coded 
by CCJS).351  
 
offences related to impaired driving was a fine (note: between 2006 and 2010, 21.7% of such 
charges resulted in a sentence imposed for a lesser offence under the Motor Vehicle Act). 
A decision was made to remove impaired driving related charges so that extreme fluctuations in 
the use of fines (rooted in the administrative change in the sentencing for this offence) would not 
impact calculations of relative sanction use over time. This included charges under s. 253(a) 
impaired driving, s. 253(b) driving ‘over .08’, and s. 254 refusing to provide a breath sample. 
350 For example, the original dataset included 498 charges in which the outcome was a 
suspended sentence with probation, in addition to either a small fine or a one-day jail term. Given 
that these combinations are not lawful (for instance, you cannot suspend sentence and impose 
sentence at the same time; see R. v. Polywjanyj (1982), 1 C.C.C. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.)), queries 
were made through Court Services. The most likely explanation was that victim surcharges were 
being erroneously entered as fines. This was supported by the fact that the fines were low ($50 or 
$100), and no mandatory surcharge was entered on these files (as required). For files showing 
suspended sentences, probation, and jail, the jail terms on those files that were checked were for 
one-day and the victim surcharge was payable forthwith. This suggests that the jail term 
represented default time for the victim surcharge (on one-day terms, the offender is not physically 
taken into custody). In such cases the fine or jail term was removed. 
Another issue involved sentences of “time served” (only) or “jail zero days”; these were reviewed 
and updated to one-day jail sentences in light of case law that confirms that a sentence cannot be 
discharged before it is imposed. See R. v. Lea, 2010 MBCA 37, at para 26. 
351 This allowed for the identification of specific offences impacted by the Bill C-41 restrictions on 
conditional sentencing. 
   
99 
Concerns regarding the validity of this newly created dataset were largely 
addressed through an exercise that compared specific outcomes to those obtained when 
the same query was run through the CANSIM portal of CCJS.352 Though not strictly 
comparable, results for the three matched sanctions (jail, conditional sentences, fines) 
suggest considerable consistency in terms of overall counts. The overlay for fines is 
particularly consistent—e.g., dataset 1 (this project) recorded 1005 fines imposed on 
single charge cases in the 2016 calendar year, while a matched CANSIM dataset 
recorded 1019 in the 2016/2017 fiscal calendar year (see Appendix C for comparisons). 
These results suggest that dataset 1 is counting the same number of cases as are being 
counted through the CANSIM portal of CCJS. 
3.2.1.1 Sentence outcomes - dataset 1 – single charge cases 
Dataset 1 is the largest dataset received. It originally provided file level data 
relating to all 486,087 sentenced charges on adult criminal files concluded in BC 
Provincial Court or BC Supreme Court between January 1, 2006 and Dec 31, 2017 
(inclusive).353 This included all (88) court locations and all offences under either the 
Criminal Code of Canada or the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.354 The value of 
dataset 1 was twofold. First, it provided a broad sense of the general usage of 
conditional sentences, relative to other sanctions, over a lengthy period (11 years). 
Second, and more critically, it allowed for the exploration of sentencing patterns for 
specific offences, both before and after the restrictions brought in by Bill C-10.  
 
352 To validate the single charge dataset (1), a relatively comparable dataset was created through 
the manipulation of preferences in the ICCS database available through Statistics Canada 
(CANSIM)—see below. See Statistics Canada. Table 35-10-0030-01 (formerly CANSIM 252-
0056) “Adult criminal courts, guilty cases by type of sentence.” MSO & MSS; preferences were 
set to select only cases that met the following criteria: 2005/06 to 2016/17; BC; single guilty 
finding; statutes - CC (without traffic), CC traffic (without impaired), CDSA drug possession, 
CDSA other drug offences. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510003001 
353 The term “file level” refers to raw data (e.g., file number, count number, offender ID, charge 
section, sentence codes, etc.) and is used to distinguish the dataset from one populated by data 
compiled and summarized by another agency. It should be noted that data are organized by 
calendar year and are therefore not directly comparable with data that are reported on a fiscal 
year basis—a characteristic of CCJS datasets. 
354 These inclusion criteria are consistent with other sentencing research conducted in Canada, 
which generally focuses on CCC and CDSA offences, notwithstanding the fact that it also reports 
on “other” federal statutes. Cases relating to youth were not requested given the different 
sentencing regime governing this population. 
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The initial dataset was subsequently reduced to include only single charge cases 
for two related reasons. First, given that conditional sentencing restrictions applied only 
to more serious offences, assessing the impact of the restrictions required the analysis 
of sentence trends over time as they relate to those specific offences only. This would 
not be possible with cases involving multiple charges as there would be no way of 
knowing which parts of the sentence relate to which charge. Second, there was also an 
interest in isolating specific sentences (e.g., “long” conditional sentences) and then, 
working backwards, identifying their associated offence. Again, this would not be 
possible when sentences covered multiple offences. This methodological challenge was 
resolved through the removal of sentences imposed on multiple charges. Accordingly, 
the dataset was reduced to include only the 169,456 single charge cases.355 This 
strategy (of including only single charge cases) is consistent with the approach adopted 
by other researchers interested in exploring sentencing patterns for specific offences.356 
Proposing a different approach – primary sentences and probation 
Traditionally, sentencing research has relied upon court data accessible via 
Statistics Canada (CCJS/ICCS) and has been limited by that agency’s recording and 
reporting decisions. The ICCS, for instance, offers six possible sentence categories: 
custody (jail); conditional sentence; probation; fine; restitution; and other.357 Reports by 
 
355 The practice of imposing “global” sentences covering multiple charges has decreased as a 
result of jurisprudence that encourages judges to impose a sentence for each count – see, for 
instance, R. v. Taylor, 2010, MBCA 103 at para 10; R. v. Ivanic, 2011 BCCA, 158 at para 9; R. v. 
Lavellee, 2011 BCCA 531 at para 34; and R. v. Hanna, 2013 ABCA 134 at para 5. 
Sentences on lesser or included offences were also excluded. For charges of aggravated assault, 
the overall “guilty/lesser” rate was 30.3%; for charges of theft over $5,000, 6.5%; and for drug 
trafficking, 11.1%. All cases in which the sentence was imposed on a lesser charge (n=8,217) 
were excluded to ensure that they would not be captured when analyzing sentence trends for the 
more serious “parent” offences. Doing so ensured that the sentencing pattern discerned for each 
of these “serious” offences was not compromised or contaminated by the inclusion of sentences 
imposed on the lesser (summary) offences.  
356 See, for instance, Roberts, J. V., & Birkenmayer, A. (1997). Sentencing in Canada: Recent 
statistical trends. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 39(4), 459–482; Marinos, supra note 58; 
Reid, A. A. (2014). Revisiting Leniency: An Intra-Provincial Study of Sentencing Variation in 
British Columbia. Canadian Criminal Law Review, 18(1), 39–56; Reid, A. A., & MacAlister, D. 
(2018). Extending a Geographical Perspective to the Study of Jurisdictional Consistency in 
Sentencing Outcomes. The British Journal of Criminology, 58(5), 1147–1170.  
357 The “other” category includes discharges, suspended sentences, community service orders, 
and prohibition orders, amongst others. Source: Statistics Canada. ICCS – sentence 
classification & definition: 
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type of sentence358 count multiple sentence outcomes against a single most serious 
offence (MSO); reports by most serious sentence359 count only the most serious 
sentence (MSS) against the MSO based on the following ranking: custody (jail); 
conditional sentence; probation; fine; and other (restitution, absolute or conditional 
discharge, suspended sentence, other). While both methods provide information 
regarding select sanction usage, both arguably misrepresent sentence decision-making 
by treating (and counting) probation as a sentence instead of as a sanction attached to a 
sentencing decision. 
Treating probation as a sentence can distort our understanding of outcomes by 
over-emphasizing its use and/or misrepresenting its meaning. In terms of the first 
concern, given that probation is necessarily attached to a conditional discharge or a 
suspended sentence, and often attached to other sentences (prison, conditional 
sentence, fine), reports that count multiple sentence outcomes can give a misleading 
impression of sentencing patterns.360 For instance, probation is consistently referenced 
in some reports as the most frequent sentence type—e.g., accounting for approximately 
44% of guilty cases in 2016/2017.361 It would be misleading to suggest that in 44% of all 
guilty cases, the judge decided that the fit and proportionate sentence was probation. It 
would be more appropriate to say that of all sentences imposed in 2016/2017, 44% 
included probation.  
Indeed, knowing that an offender was placed on probation is not particularly 
helpful if what you are interested in is the decision made on sentence. If I were to tell 
someone interested in sentencing decisions that the most common sentence for offence 




358 Statistics Canada. Table 35-10-0030-01 (formerly CANSIM 252-0056) Adult criminal courts, 
guilty cases by type of sentence; DOI: https://doi.org/10.25318/3510003001-eng  
359 Statistics Canada. Table 35-10-0031-01 (formerly CANSIM 252-0057) Adult criminal courts, 
guilty cases by most serious sentence; DOI: https://doi.org/10.25318/3510003101-eng 
360 Reports that focus on the most serious sentence (only) are less likely to distort the use of 
probation by over-emphasizing its use, though they still do so to a limited extent by virtue of the 
sanction rankings, which count suspended sentences, conditional discharges, and fines with 
probation—all as probation.   
361 Statistics Canada. (2019). Adult Criminal and Youth Court Statistics in Canada, 2016/2017, by 
Zoran Miladinovic, in Juristat: No. 85-002–X. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada), at p. 8. 
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not saying much. If, however, I tell this same person that the sentencing pattern for 
offence X suggests that prison, conditional sentences, and suspended sentences each 
account for 30% of the outcomes, and that overall, 60% of these sentences include 
probation, I am providing more useful information.362 
In this way, treating probation as a secondary sanction recognizes its status. As 
Edgar (1999) notes “[p]robation cannot be used as a stand-alone tool; it must be 
accompanied by a conditional discharge, suspended sentence, fine, or imprisonment.”363 
References in the literature to probation being imposed “on its own”364 presumably refer 
to one of the first two situations (conditional discharge or suspended sentence), in which 
the probation order is, in effect, the only tangible outcome or practical consequence.  
It is the second form of distortion—misrepresentation—that is problematic for the 
current project. Even if only the MSS is used, collapsing three distinct sentence 
outcomes into a single category of “probation” misrepresents (or fails to accurately 
represent) the meaning of each. A conditional discharge is not the same as a suspended 
sentence, and neither of them is the same as a fine with probation. For the purposes of 
this project, these nuances matter. Not only was there an interest in accurately reporting 
the relative use of each sentencing option, but there was also a desire to speak more 
authoritatively on changes in the use of suspended sentences. This required more detail 
than is generally available. 
Accordingly, the operationalization of “sentence” for this project differs from that 
traditionally used by researchers. The focus is on the decision made by the judge at the 
conclusion of the sentence hearing, recognizing that we currently do not have a stand-
 
362 Ideally, I would also be able to speak to sentence lengths and combinations for prison and 
conditional sentences (i.e., how long they are and whether they are combined with probation), as 
well as something about the optional conditions imposed on the conditional and suspended 
sentences.  
363 Edgar, A. (1999). Sentencing options in Canada. In J. V. Roberts & D. P. Cole (Eds.), Making 
Sense of Sentencing (pp. 112–136). University of Toronto Press, at p. 122. See also the decision 
of the Quebec Court of Appeal - F.J. c. R., [2007] No. 3027 – “From a simple reading of section 
731, it is clear that a probation order is not a sentencing alternative to be ordered on a stand-
alone basis; rather, it is authorized only in addition to a suspended sentence or some other 
punishment” (at para 83). 
364 See, for instance, Manson, et al., supra note 176 at p. 325. 
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alone probation order for adults (as we do for youths).365 First, the term “primary 
sentence” is used to identify the following six options: jail, conditional sentence, fine, 
suspended sentence, conditional discharge, and absolute discharge. Second, probation 
is counted but treated as a secondary or attached sanction. This distinction avoids any 
potential distortion that may result from its treatment as a sentence. Probation is not 
ignored; it is simply put in its place. Finally, collateral orders that arise from legislation 
(e.g., restitution or prohibitions) are not counted, notwithstanding the fact that they can 
impose significant obligations or restrictions on an offender.366  
Tracking the primary sentence allows for an assessment of the use of all possible 
outcomes over time, including the quantification of the various sentence combinations 
(see Table 3-2).367  
Table 3-2   JUSTIN codes – primary sentence and coding options 
RESULT CODE DESCRIPTION Coding options 
J jail alone or with probation (optional)* 
CS conditional sentence alone or with probation (optional) 
F fine alone or with probation (optional) 
SS suspended sentence with probation (mandatory) 
CND conditional discharge with probation (mandatory) 
ABD absolute discharge  
* Combinations of ‘jail plus fine’ and ‘jail plus fine and probation’ were counted but not included. In addition to being 
rare, the primary interest was in the use of probation as a secondary sanction, not fines. 
 
365 The Youth Criminal Justice Act contemplates the imposition of probation with or without any 
other sanction (s. 42(2)(k) YCJA). 
In addition, treating probation as a meaningful sentence category ignores the fact that probation 
orders are imposed for all sorts of reasons—for instance, to facilitate rehabilitation, to protect a 
victim, to ensure compliance with positive obligations, and are not intended to reflect a 
proportionate response. Notably in Proulx, Lamer, C.J. quoted approvingly from a 1997 decision 
of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal on that issue, noting that “[probation] seeks to secure “the 
good conduct” of the offender and to deter him from committing the same or other offences. It 
does not particularly seek to reflect the seriousness of the offence or the offender’s degree of 
culpability.” Proulx, supra note 14 at para 32 – quoting Bayda, C.J.S. in R. v. Taylor (1997), 122 
C.C.C. (3d) 376 at p. 394. 
366 For a discussion of collateral orders see Manson et al., supra note 176 (Ch.13). The decision 
to exclude collateral orders was informed by two primary considerations. The first was an interest 
in simplifying the analysis of sentencing data by focusing on the primary sentence, with or without 
probation; the second reflected a desire to prioritize judicial sentencing decisions in which judges 
exercised some discretion, and the recognition that many collateral orders were mandatory (e.g., 
victim fine surcharge, offence-related prohibitions, etc.).  
367 Suspended sentences and discharges are included, notwithstanding the fact that they quite 
literally are not sentences. Their inclusion is consistent with the general practice in sentencing 
research and the recognition that these responses are generally treated as final outcomes. 
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The decision to focus on the primary sentence and sentence combinations 
allowed for a more accurate calibration of the relative use of the various sanctions over 
time. Doing so also facilitated comparisons of sentencing patterns on specific offences 
over time (e.g., pre/post Bill C-10 restrictions).368 Finally, tracking primary sentences (as 
listed above) limited the need to rank sanctions relative to each other. This provided 
more room for detailed queries. For example, one might query what the relative 
distribution, by count and percentage, was of primary sentences for each identified 
offence over time (by calendar year). Where this query exposed a discontinuity in 
sentencing patterns pre/post Bill C-10, a more detailed follow-up might examine 
sentence lengths (for jail and conditional sentences), or sentence combinations (jail or 
conditional sentences followed by probation), over time.  
3.2.1.2 CSO breaches - dataset 2   
Much of the conditional sentencing literature and jurisprudence has highlighted 
the importance of the sanction’s breach provisions. Indeed, their facilitated processes 
and lower standard of proof were referenced in Proulx as factors that emphasized the 
punitive nature of conditional sentences and served to distinguish them from suspended 
sentences. Notably, the Court went so far as to create a presumption of incarceration 
(for the remainder of the term) in cases in which an offender breached a condition 
without a reasonable excuse. Specifically, “[t]his constant threat of incarceration will help 
to ensure that the offender complies with the conditions imposed…it also assists in 
distinguishing the conditional sentence from probation by making the consequences of a 
breach of condition more severe.”369 
Given their importance, it is critical that we understand how judges are 
responding to proven breaches on conditional sentences. Since section 742.6 provides 
for both custodial and non-custodial responses, we cannot simply assume that offenders 
 
368 There was an interest in finding out how sentencing patterns changed once an offence was no 
longer eligible for a conditional sentence. If what would have otherwise been a conditional 
sentence pre Bill C-10 became a traditional jail term post Bill C-10, this change would suggest 
that conditional sentences for that offence has likely been used as prison alternatives. If, on the 
other hand, they became suspended sentences with probation (or short jail terms with probation), 
this change might suggest that conditional sentences pre Bill C-10 were being used in place of 
more lenient options (net-widening). 
369 Proulx, supra note 14 at para 39. 
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are facing harsh (or any) consequences for non-compliance.370 Notwithstanding the 
importance of the breach provisions in terms of the value and impact of conditional 
sentences, this is an under-studied area. Notably, this project addresses this gap by 
reporting on the proportion of orders alleged to have been breached, as well as on the 
judicial response to proven breaches. Given the focus of this project, knowledge in these 
areas is critical for two reasons. On the one hand, a high breach rate followed by a high 
termination rate may explain the sanction’s lack of success as a tool for prison reduction. 
The sanction is applied appropriately; the issue is non-compliance. On the other hand, to 
the extent that responses to proven breaches are non-custodial, that outcome could be 
taken as support for the existence of net-widening (also relevant to failed prison 
reduction). Indeed, if an offender is not incarcerated for having breached a conditional 
sentence, it is more difficult to argue that this conditional sentence represented a true 
diversion from prison in the first place.371 
The breach dataset (2) contained three layers of integrated information, 
identifying all conditional sentences imposed between 2011 and 2016, and flagging all 
instances in which a breach allegation had been initiated.372 This captured 14,658 
conditional sentences, 5,336 of which had breach allegations attached. Notably, this 
dataset provided information regarding the judicial response recorded against proven 
breaches (n=4,994). The outcome codes used reflected the four options judges have 
under s. 742.6(9) when dealing with an admitted or proven conditional sentence breach 
(see Table 3-3).373 
 
370 Section 742.6 provides four options upon proven breach. The judge can: 1) order that the 
original sentence applies; 2) change the optional conditions attached to the conditional sentence; 
3) suspend the conditional sentence and have the offender serve a portion of the remaining term 
in custody; or 4) terminate the conditional sentence and have the offender serve the balance of 
the term in custody. 
371 While the fact that s.742.6 provides for non-custodial responses might suggest otherwise, the 
Court in Proulx was clear in its guidance on this issue. Specifically, it suggested that “where an 
offender breaches a condition without reasonable excuse, there should be a presumption that the 
offender serve the remainder of his or her sentence in jail” (Proulx, supra note 14 at para 39). 
372 When an allegation of breach is made in relation to a conditional sentence, the business 
practice within courts (BC) is to open a subsequent file with an “S” suffix. These cases were then 
cross-referenced with conditional sentence breach outcome codes. 
373 This query captured all alleged breaches, whether subsequently proven or not. Unproven 
breaches included outstanding warrants, withdrawn allegations, or situations in which disputed 
breaches were declared “not proven” (reasonable grounds not satisfied).  
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Table 3-3 JUSTIN codes - conditional sentence breach outcomes 
RESULT CODE DESCRIPTION 
OSA original sentence applies 
CCO change of conditions due to a breach of conditional sentence order 
CSS conditional sentence order suspended (x days to be served in custody) 
XCJ CSO terminated (balance of sentence served in custody) 
 
Validation of dataset 2 
Dataset 2 was validated by comparing its count of conditional sentences with the 
count reported by Corrections through surveys374 submitted to the Canadian Centre for 
Justice Statistics.375 Although not directly comparable,376 the results suggest that the 
counts reflected in dataset 2 are essentially the same as those reflected in the official 
count (see Figure 3-1 ). In 2015, for instance, dataset 2 counted 1,909 conditional 
sentence orders, while the 2015/2016 Corrections count was 1,933. Data regarding 
conditional sentence breaches (incidence of and judicial response to) could not be 
validated against an existing dataset as none currently exist. As will be discussed in a 
later section, however, the breach data were consistent with the findings of other 
projects that have examined non-compliance on a smaller scale.    
 
374 For example, the Adult Correctional Services (ACS) Survey and the Integrated Correctional 
Services Survey (ICSS). 
375 Statistics Canada. Table 35-10-0014-01 (formerly CANSIM 251-0020) “Adult admissions to 
correctional services.” Preferences set to display admissions (count) to conditional sentencing in 
BC between 2010/11 and 2017/18. 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510001401 
376 Dataset 2 is organized by calendar year; the CANSIM dataset is organized by fiscal calendar 
year. For the sake of comparison 2011/12 is compared to the calendar year 2011. 
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Figure 3-1 Dataset 2 vs CANSIM/CORRECTIONS–conditional sentence count  
 
3.2.1.3 Optional conditions - dataset 3 – conditional sentences vs 
suspended sentences  
One of the most interesting post Bill C-10 questions is whether judges are using 
suspended sentences in cases in which they would have imposed a conditional 
sentence, had it been available. This is relevant to the issue of net-widening since the 
failure to convert conditional sentences into traditional terms of imprisonment (in the 
case that conditional sentences are no longer available) suggests that the conditional 
sentences previously imposed did not represent true prison alternatives. Indeed, to the 
extent that judges choose, instead, to suspend sentence, it could be argued that they 
are employing circumvention strategies (i.e., creating disguised conditional sentences) to 
avoid the consequences of earlier (pre Bill C-10) “up-tariffing” of sentence ranges on 
certain offences.  
Like dataset 1, dataset 3 takes advantage of a natural experiment in that it 
adopts a pre/post Bill C-10 research design, in this instance to look at changes, over 
time, between suspended and conditional sentences. Notably, it includes all cases 
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(n=736)377 that involved either sanction when imposed on at least one drug trafficking 
offence378 in either 2011 (pre Bill C-10) or 2017 (post Bill C-10). Information obtained 
includes: the type of order, sentence length, and optional conditions imposed. Through 
the analysis of this detailed information, this study is able to comment on a practice that 
has, until now, been primarily a topic of academic speculation379 or legal argument.380  
 Survey and interviews with Provincial Court Judges (BC) 
3.2.2.1 Survey (40 participants) 
This study uses a judicial questionnaire (survey) as one of the key data collection 
techniques (see Appendix D for a text copy of the online survey). On the one hand, 
surveys can be an inexpensive way to collect a large amount of standardized data in a 
relatively short period of time. On the other hand, response rates can be a challenge, 
and by design the format of a survey does not allow for follow-up questions that might 
promote a more in-depth understanding of the issue being explored. Both concerns were 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that the survey was not the sole data source and that 
critical issues could be further explored through the planned interviews.  
 
377 Of these, 76.8% (565/736) involve a single trafficking offence; 23.2% (171/736) involve more 
than one trafficking offence. It is evident from the conditions imposed that some orders covered 
other charges as well; upon review, these tended to be associated possession and/or breach 
offences. While dataset 1 isolated ‘single charge’ cases, that step was not deemed necessary 
with this dataset since drug trafficking would be the most serious offence in almost all cases.  
378 The decision to focus on drug trafficking offences is informed by the following considerations: 
1) drug trafficking offences regularly attracted conditional sentences prior to Bill C-10; 2) The 
restrictions introduced by Bill C-10 had the result of making most drug trafficking charges 
ineligible for conditional sentences, and in most cases, no mandatory minimum sentences are 
prescribed; and 3) The BCCA decisions which addressed the use of suspended sentences for 
offences no longer eligible for conditional sentences arose from appeals on drug trafficking 
charges. 
379 Most notably, Webster & Doob (2019) discuss the post Bill C-10 appearance of the “new” 
suspended sentence, one that is more punitive and “bears substantial similarities to the 
conditional sentence,” supra note 1 at p. 195.   
380 For instance, in Bankay, the Ontario Court of Appeal referenced such efforts as “disguised 
conditional sentence[s],” holding that it was an error in law to “impose a sentence that 
circumvented Parliament’s decision to exclude conditional sentences for this offence” – R. v. 
Bankay, 2010 ONCA 799, at para 2. 
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The decision to survey Provincial Court judges,381 as opposed to another group 
(e.g., prosecutors), was informed by the following considerations. First, as noted 
elsewhere, not many studies have included the voices of these key decision-makers. 
Particularly when interested in sentencing decisions, the inclusion of this criminal justice 
actor can provide much needed context regarding the goals being pursued as part of the 
sentencing exercise and the value placed on the various available sanctions. Second, a 
national survey of judges had been done in 1998. As such, the judicial survey permitted 
an exploration of how judicial perspectives on conditional sentencing had evolved since 
then, especially given that the earlier survey was conducted shortly after the sanction 
was introduced, and prior to the decision in Proulx (2000).382  
A secure survey application (WebSurvey) provided by Simon Fraser University 
was used to minimize security issues and address concerns associated with storage of 
data outside of Canada.383 Providing only an online option to complete the survey 
eliminated concerns about confidentiality as responses were anonymous and only non-
identifying background information was collected.384 The link to the online survey was 
distributed to judges through the Office of the Chief Judge (OCJ). Survey responses 
were accepted between February 20, 2018 and July 24, 2018, with a total of 40 
responses received by that date.385 
 
381 A study conducted with appellate court judges suggested that further research should 
incorporate the views of trial court judges. Roberts, J. V., & Manson, A. (2004). The future of 
conditional sentencing: Perspectives of appellate judges. Dept. of Justice Canada, Research and 
Statistics, at p. 21. Given that most sentence decisions (95-98%) occur in the Provincial Court, as 
opposed to the Supreme Court, it made sense to focus on this group of judges.  
382 The 1998 National Survey collected responses from 461 judges across Canada. See Roberts, 
et al., supra note 13 at p.2. Although many who participated had limited experience with 
conditional sentences at the time, the results were informative as they provided insight into the 
early perspectives of sentencing judges. Responses specific to the 51 British Columbia judges 
who participated in the 1998 survey were provided to me for the purpose of comparative analysis.  
383 Using the WebSurvey tool provided by Simon Fraser University ensured that no data would be 
stored outside of Canada—a practice that often occurs with other survey tools. 
384 All data collected through the WebSurvey application were securely stored on SFU servers 
controlled by the University’s privacy policies regarding personal data; original responses were 
deleted once the survey was closed, and results were downloaded. 
385 The online questionnaire was drafted in consultation with the Office of the Chief Judge (BC). 
The survey link was distributed as follows: to sitting judges on February 20, 2018; and to a small 
group of recently retired judges on March 20, 2018. Notably, no reminders were sent out, 
although the judges did receive one “notice of extended deadline.” 
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The survey included 20 questions (several of which were deliberately repeated 
from the 1998 National Survey) and allowed for a variety of response options. For 
instance, eight of the questions were open-ended and eight provided a scaled list of 
responses to choose from—e.g., always, usually, sometimes, almost never, never. The 
remaining four were variations of yes/no questions, two of which allowed for expansion—
i.e., why, or why not? Participating judges were asked for limited demographic 
information, including their status (full-time or part-time), assigned region, and the 
number of years he/she had been on the bench. This information was collected solely for 
the purpose of assessing representation of the various groups, not for purposes of 
comparative analysis between judges.  
3.2.2.2 Interviews (24 participants) 
As part of the survey, judges were invited to contact me by email if they were 
interested in participating in a brief follow-up interview. While this process was self-
selecting, it was also likely to attract those judges most interested in sentencing issues, 
which was seen as an advantage. Additional participants were recruited internally, either 
by participating judges who encouraged colleagues to contact me (i.e., snowball 
sampling), or by informal contacts I made while participating in other court-related events 
in an unofficial capacity. Judges who expressed interest in participating were provided 
with additional information about the research project that addressed issues of 
voluntariness, anonymity, and confidentiality (see Appendix E for Form B). A total of 28 
judges expressed interest in participating; 24 interviews were conducted between May 
and October 2018.386  
Interviews were semi-structured in nature. In some cases, questions allowed for 
a follow-up on issues raised in the survey—e.g., clarifying the goals of conditional 
sentencing. More often, they reflected issues raised in the literature or jurisprudence. 
Several questions, for instance, asked judges to address the distinctions between 
conditional and suspended sentences (see Appendix F for interview schedule). While all 
participants were asked to consider the same broad “starting point” queries, unscripted 
follow-up questions were used to clarify responses. The lack of a rigid structure allowed 
 
386 Three judges elected not to participate after reviewing the Form B provided; one withdrew after 
the Form B was reviewed in person, but prior to the commencement of the interview.  
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participants to talk about issues in which they had a particular interest, which may have 
put them at ease and resulted in longer responses.  
The average interview was 52 minutes; the range was from 22 minutes to one 
hour and 40 minutes.387 All but one interview was conducted in person; one was done by 
telephone at the request of the participant. Most interviews took place in offices located 
within courthouses; three took place in public spaces. With each participant’s 
permission, interviews were audio-recorded for accuracy and transcribed (by me) within 
one week of the interview.388 De-identified transcripts were sent to each of the 
participants for review and comment on content prior to the transcript being finalized. All 
24 participants accepted the transcripts as accurate, four of them after minor 
grammatical edits were made. 
3.3 Data analysis 
 Court datasets – sentences – breaches – conditions 
There were three separate court datasets, each created to respond to a different 
issue: sentence outcomes or details (1), breach allegations and outcomes (2), and 
optional conditions imposed (3). Each of the three datasets were imported into SPSS389 
and analyzed using the accompanying software package. The methodological approach 
was quantitative, relying exclusively on descriptive metrics. Comparative or longitudinal 
analyses were done where there was an interest in exploring change over time. The 
sentence outcome dataset (1), for instance, was subjected to longitudinal analysis to 
ascertain the impact that sentencing restrictions had on the use of conditional 
sentences.  
 
387 The two shortest interviews (22 and 25 minutes) were conducted over court breaks and were 
limited by pre-declared time constraints. 
As was the case with the survey, the list of initial questions was developed in consultation with 
the Office of the Chief Judge. Participants were told they would not be identified as part of the 
study and no records that disclose identifying information would be retained.  
388 Questions and answers were typed out verbatim, with only slight grammatical changes made 
to ensure that responses were accurate but understandable. Case specific details were not 
transcribed, nor were responses that were unrelated to the topic of sentencing. 
389 SPSS is the abbreviation for Statistical Package for Social Sciences, one of the most widely 
used software to perform statistical analysis. 
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Sentence outcomes – dataset 1 
For dataset 1, the unit of analysis is a sentence recorded against a single charge 
or count, which essentially conforms to the traditional “case” definition in that it 
represents all charges dealt with by an offender that received a final disposition 
(sentence) on the same date.390 This dataset was used for two purposes. First, it 
provided general descriptive information regarding the cases captured. This included 
identifying offences, sentences imposed (primary sentence as well as any 
combinations), and sentence length. Aside from these limited general analyses, dataset 
1 allowed for pre/post analyses of sentencing patterns for three offences that were 
clearly impacted by the legislative restrictions enacted under the Harper government: 
aggravated assault, theft over $5,000, and drug trafficking (see Table 3-4). Selecting a 
violent (person) offence, a property offence, and a drug offence, allowed for a more 
thorough exploration of the circumvention phenomenon. To be clear, there was an 
interest in determining whether circumvention occurred but, perhaps more importantly, 
there was also an interest in understanding whether judges employed the strategy 
discriminately (and on what basis). 
Table 3-4  Specific offences selected for analysis 
Offence Description Rationale for inclusion 
aggravated assault s. 268 CC – indictable 
no restrictions prior to Bill C-9 
post Bill C-9 personal injury offence 
post Bill C-10 not eligible for a CSO 
theft over $5,000 s. 334(a) CC – indictable no restrictions prior to Bill C-10 post Bill C-10 not eligible for a CSO 
drug trafficking 
s. 5(1) & (2) CDSA – 
indictable if Schedule I or II 
substance391 
no restrictions prior to Bill C-10 
post Bill C-10 not eligible for a CSO 
 
 
390 This definition is identical to that adopted by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS). 
Specifically, it defines a case as “one or more charges against an accused person or company, 
which were processed by the courts at the same time (date of offence, date of initiation, date of 
first appearance, or date of decision), and received a final decision.” Source: Statistics Canada. 
Table 35-10-0031-01 Adult criminal courts, guilty cases by most serious sentence - Footnote 2 - 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510003101 
391 Schedule I includes most so-called “hard drugs” e.g., heroin, cocaine, fentanyl, etc. Schedule 
II includes, amongst other things, cannabis, its preparations, and derivatives. Limited exceptions 
include trafficking in marihuana under 3 kilograms which remains eligible for conditional 
sentencing; MMPs can apply in certain circumstances, as set out in s. 5(3)(a) CDSA. 
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Counts, rates, percentages 
The complexity of sentencing requires a number of measures, and, whenever 
possible, researchers should provide multiple mechanisms by which patterns and 
changes can be assessed.392 It is helpful, for example, to know what percentage of 
cases result in terms of imprisonment as opposed to conditional sentences. It is equally 
important, however, to gather details regarding sentence length and, in the case of non-
custodial options, conditions imposed. In addition to collecting this type of detailed 
information, the current study employs three descriptive statistics: counts (raw numbers), 
rates (per 100,000 population) and percentages (sanction use relative to all sanctions). 
Though simple, these basic descriptors can answer many questions surrounding 
sentencing patterns and have been relied upon for the bulk of criminal justice research 
to date.  
 Count information is valuable in that it gives a sense of the scale of impacts and 
can reflect changes over time (e.g., how many charges resulted in conditional sentences 
in any given year). Counts, however, do not work well when the overall volume is 
changing, as has been the case over the last decade with the much discussed “crime 
drop.”393 Similarly, knowing how many conditional sentences (count) were imposed in a 
given year tells us nothing about their use relative to other sanctions. The latter point is 
critical given that we cannot assume that every conditional sentence replaces a term of 
imprisonment. 
Calculating rates per 100,000 (population) offers another perspective on 
sentencing data by assessing the use of each sanction (count) as a function of the 
 
392 Webster, C. M. (2006). Understanding the Provincial criminal courts in Ontario: Methodological 
suggestions. Report to the Court Services Division, Ministry of the Attorney General, at p. 10. 
393 For example, imagine that you are curious about the utilization of conditional sentences in a 
location where the only sentencing options available to a judge are jail, conditional sentences, or 
suspended sentences with probation. If you are told that in year #1 there were 30 conditional 
sentences imposed, and in year #2 there were 15, that would tell you nothing about the use of 
conditional sentences relative to jail or suspended sentences. You might be tempted to conclude 
that there has been a substantial drop in the use of conditional sentences (from 30 to 15), but you 
would not know whether that was because there were fewer cases overall, or whether judges 
were imposing jail or suspending sentence instead. If you were told that in the second year there 
were only half as many cases being sentenced, then conditional sentence utilization would 
appropriately be described as stable (relative to the use of other options).   
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population.394 Rates are the conventional measure in research that seeks to measure 
change over time, given that they allow for the standardization of the denominator 
(population size).  Rates, however, are very sensitive to small occurrences or fluctuating 
populations. In the biblical story of Cain and Abel, for instance, the killing of Abel 
increased the homicide rate from 0/100,000 to 1/100,000.395 
The third method of analysis focuses on percentages, reporting on the use of 
each sanction as a percentage of all primary sanctions. This measure controls for 
changes in overall volume, which is especially important when making comparisons over 
time. Including percentages allows descriptive data to be framed from multiple 
perspectives. For instance, while it is helpful to know that in 2006 there were 5,000 
charges in BC that resulted in conditional sentences, it is more helpful to know that 
conditional sentences accounted for approximately 10% of the sentences imposed that 
year. This strategy assumes a general stability in the relative utilization of sanctions over 
time, which can be a limitation when there are substantial changes in the use of other 
sanctions.396 
While most calculations used all three measures (counts, rates, and 
percentages), results are generally reported using percentages, for several reasons. 
First, this calculation controls for changes in overall volume (i.e., it is less skewed by the 
crime drop). Second, it is the most relevant measure when discussing the choice made 
(by a judge) to use any one sentence relative to all available sentence options. Put 
another way, the interest is not only in knowing how often judges impose conditional 
sentences (count), but also in knowing how often conditional sentences are imposed 
 
394 In this study, rates for each sanction were calculated based on Census Canada data. 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1710000501  
395 In a situation in which there has been a substantial reduction in the number of cases, all 
sanctions may appear to be trending downwards, notwithstanding the fact that the use of one, 
relative to the others, has increased. In terms of population increases, if you are told that 
conditional sentence utilization in year #1 was 30 per 1,000 population, but in year #2 it was only 
15 per 1,000 population, you might think that judges were displeased with conditional sentences 
and were consequently choosing to use other options. However, if you were then told that due to 
an employment boom in City A, the population had doubled between year #1 and year #2 (from 
1,000 to 2,000), then conditional sentence utilization relative to other options could be stable.  
396 For example, consider a small rural village of 1,000 people in which 100 thefts occurred in 
2019, producing a theft rate of 1,000 per 100,000 population. If, in 2020, only 80 thefts are 
counted, it would appear that thefts are decreasing. If, however, the population had also 
decreased (from 1,000 people to 800), then the theft rate is unchanged. 
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relative to other available sentencing options. Finally, the use of percentages is familiar 
to criminal justice personnel and is consistent with the language generally used in official 
reports.397 
CSO breaches – dataset 2 
When exploring conditional sentencing, it is important to include an assessment 
of the proportion of orders that include breach allegations, as well as the judicial 
responses to proven breaches. Knowledge in both areas is critical given the framing of 
conditional sentences as punitive responses and the related interest in dealing severely 
with offenders who fail to comply with conditions imposed (including by committing 
further offences). Put another way, if the argument is that offenders will be more likely to 
comply with conditions because they know non-compliance will be dealt with harshly (the 
Sword of Damocles argument), then knowledge regarding breaches and the judicial 
response to proven breaches is required.  
Conditional sentence breaches are presented as counts and percentages. The 
focus is on establishing the proportion of orders breached and exploring the judicial 
response to proven breaches. Given that breach reports are collapsed into a single 
breach per order, sentenced charges are similarly collapsed to the case level. In other 
words, even if a conditional sentence covers multiple charges (and/or files) it is treated 
as a single order for the purposes of the breach calculation. This mirrors the standard 
“case” definition (all charges disposed of by the same offender on the same date), 
except that it is being applied to a dataset that includes only conditional sentence data. 
The offence related to the order (and the breach) is not necessarily the “most serious 
offence,” as generally defined. 
Notably, the original breach dataset identified breaches on conditional sentences 
imposed between 2010 and 2017, inclusive. However, two modifications were made. 
First, given the length of the orders, it was not unusual to have a conditional sentence 
imposed in one year but breached in the following year. As such, orders made in 2017 
were eliminated. Indeed, this calendar year included many orders that, at the time of 
 
397 A recent Juristat publication, for instance, speaks of 63% of cases resulting in a guilty finding 
and 38% of guilty adult cases resulting in a custodial sentence. See Statistics Canada, supra note 
361 at p. 3. 
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analysis, were still running. Second, orders made in 2010 were also removed due to 
anomalous results.398 Within this context, the final dataset included all conditional 
sentences imposed between January 1, 2011, and December 31, 2016 (six calendar 
years), all breach allegations associated with these orders, and the judicial response to 
proven breaches. 
Optional conditions – dataset 3 
For dataset 3, a “case” is defined as a sentenced outcome (either a suspended 
sentence or conditional sentence order) on one or more drug trafficking offences 
disposed of in court on the same day by the same person. Again, this approaches the 
standard “case” definition (all charges disposed of by the same offender on the same 
date), except that it is being applied to a dataset that includes only conditional and 
suspended sentences.399 Variables of interest for this dataset include relative utilization 
patterns for each sanction pre and post Bill C-10, sentence length, and the number and 
nature of conditions imposed.  
Conditions were provided in text fields that were manually coded (e.g., #1 house 
arrest, #2 curfew, #3 community work service, etc.). These coded entries were 
subsequently imported into SPSS for analysis. In light of the focus in the case law on the 
rehabilitative nature of probation (as contrasted with the punitive nature of conditional 
sentences), the primary focus in terms of optional conditions was on the inclusion of 
curfew, house arrest, or community service requirements on either order. However, all 
other conditions were also coded and recorded, resulting in a total of 20 optional 
conditions.400 
Given the interest in determining whether judges were effectively reconstructing 
suspended sentences as disguised conditional sentences, efforts were made to rule out 
 
398 The reason for these results is unknown.  
399 The focus is on the conditions attached to suspended sentences or conditional sentences 
imposed on drug trafficking charges in the two calendar years (2011 and 2017). While each case 
includes at least one drug trafficking offence, it is possible that the sentence imposed also covers 
other offences. Cases in which drug trafficking was charged, but a plea was entered to an 
included or lesser offence (e.g., drug possession) were excluded from this analysis. 
400 A category identified as “other” captured any condition that did not otherwise fit into an existing 
group. In terms of detail, where an order included a community service work requirement, the 
number of hours ordered was also collected.  
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alternative explanations for any pre/post findings. The clear shift from conditional 
sentences to suspended sentences on drug trafficking offences, for instance, could 
arguably be linked, not to the Bill C-10 restrictions but, rather, to the nature of the 
substance involved,401 or to the offender having served time on remand awaiting 
sentencing.402 These possibilities were ruled out through the manual collection of 
additional information on the files included in this dataset. 
 Survey  
Given that the survey included both closed (yes/no; multiple choice) and open-
ended questions, two tools were used during the analysis. For the 12 closed questions, 
each response option was assigned a numerical code and SPSS was used to analyze 
frequencies for reporting purposes. Responses to the remaining eight open-ended 
questions were imported into NVivo to allow for the thematic coding and categorization 
of responses. Where appropriate for presentation purposes, coding categories were 
created from the data to allow for a quasi-quantitative analysis. For example, question 12 
asked: When imposing house arrest on a conditional sentence do you regularly include 
electronic monitoring? (yes/no; why or why not?) The first round of coding for this 
question captured the yes or no response, noting that almost three-quarters (74.4%) of 
the judges surveyed answered “no” or “never” to this question. In terms of the “why not” 
follow-up, the 29 judges who indicated that they did not regularly use electronic 
 
401 The substance involved (e.g., marihuana, cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, etc.) is relevant to the 
sentencing decision since some charges involving marihuana are considered to be less serious 
and remain eligible for conditional sentences post Bill C-10; on the other hand, offences involving 
fentanyl are treated as more serious (than other Schedule I drugs) and should be subject to 
longer terms of imprisonment. In Smith, the court establishes a higher range for trafficking in 
fentanyl (18 to 36 months imprisonment) than for trafficking in other Schedule I substances (6 to 
12 months imprisonment, e.g., cocaine or heroin). See R. v. Smith, 2017 BCCA 112. BUT see 
also R. v. Schneider, 2019 BCCA 310—in which the Court upholds a suspended sentence for 
trafficking in fentanyl. 
Note: The substance was determined for the 2017 files only. The 2011 files had been archived 
and as such, this information was not readily accessible. 
402 Credit given for time served on remand can skew sentencing data by giving the appearance of 
leniency when, in fact, the sentence reflects unrecorded time already served in pre-trial custody 
as a result of the offence. It can be difficult to ascertain the impact of time served when an 
offender is given a non-custodial sentence, unlike terms of imprisonment, where judges, since 
2010, have been required to specify time credited for the record (s. 719(3.3)). 
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monitoring provided 45 explanatory responses,403 which were ultimately collapsed into 
six categories (see Table 3-5). 
Table 3-5  Example - coding survey responses  
Response to “why not” use electronic monitoring? (Q#12) Frequency Percentage 
Cost or insufficient resources 16 35.6 
I did not know it was available or it was not requested 11 24.4 
Offender not suitable (e.g., no telephone) 7 15.6 
The technology is unreliable/ police checks are better 4 8.9 
If the offender is that high risk or untrustworthy, he/she should be in jail 4 8.9 
other 3 6.7 
 Total 29 judges* 45 100.0 
*Judges provided multiple responses (29 judges provided 45 responses) 
In many cases, particularly when dealing with the open-ended questions, direct 
quotes are also referenced to emphasize the views expressed. For example, when 
responding to a survey question that asked judges whether they believe that they 
receive adequate guidance from the appellate courts on the use of conditional 
sentencing (Q8), Judge #14 responded “no.”  When responding to the follow-up “why 
not” question, this judge’s response was coded as “other” inasmuch as it did not fit into 
any thematic category linked to views on the appellate courts. What the judge said, 
however, was provocative and certainly relevant to a consideration of why judges might 
not have used conditional sentences in place of prison sentences—and so it was flagged 
for use in a later section that explores this issue. Each survey response set was given a 
unique identifier for this purpose (e.g., Judge #1, Judge #2, and so on).404 
 Interviews 
The interviews provide a rich source of descriptive data regarding judicial 
perspectives on conditional sentencing, allowing for a more contextualized 
understanding of how (or why) the sanction may have failed as a mechanism for prison 
reduction. Interview transcripts were subject to thematic content analysis for this 
purpose. This involved the classification (into nodes and sub-nodes) of content relating 
 
403 Where survey questions asked for a single or primary response, only the first response was 
counted. This is consistent with the practice employed as part of the 1998 National Survey, 
Roberts, et al., supra note 13 at p. 55. 
404 Survey participants are identified by number (e.g., Judge # 1), whereas interview participants 
are identified by letter (e.g., Judge A). 
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both to topics raised by the interviewer, and those raised by the participating judges. 
Given the semi-structured nature of the interviews, it was not unusual to have judges 
introduce and develop themes of their own and, in many cases, these offered invaluable 
insights into how judges thought of, and used, conditional sentences. The challenge, of 
course, was finding a way to sort their comments into meaningful and manageable bites, 
and to arrange (and rearrange) concepts as I continued working through the transcripts. 
To this end, each transcript was imported into NVivo. The first round of coding 
captured responses most directly related to the questions posed. This initially included 
the creation of nodes for broad categories with expected themes—e.g., “CSO goals”, 
“CSO breach provisions”, and “CSO vs SS.” Subsequent reviews led to the creation of 
additional nodes which represented additional content or issues raised during the 
interviews. Examples of these (unexpected) thematic nodes include “comments on 
Proulx,” “resource/monitoring issues,” or “creative responses to restrictions.” In effect, 
the original concepts were expanded as additional themes emerged from the data. 
Once satisfied that the relevant themes had been flagged through the initial 
coding process, sub-nodes were added so that additional detail could be mined and 
captured within each node. In some cases, this allowed for a loose form of quasi-
quantitative analysis, notwithstanding the intent being simply to organize content around 
different positions. For example, judges were asked to describe the goals of conditional 
sentencing. In the first round of coding, the response was captured in the node “CSO 
goals.” During a subsequent review of content within that node, two clear categories 
emerged (reduce use of prison, reduce reoffending); these formed sub-nodes for later 
analysis. 
Given the diverse backgrounds and experiences of the judges, it was not 
surprising to find that their views on conditional sentencing were not uniform. Notably, 
however, the interviews revealed several areas in which there was consensus, at least in 
terms of identifying an issue or concern, regardless of the position then taken. For 
example, there was general acknowledgement that the sanction’s construction as an 
alternate form of imprisonment was problematic. For judges that accepted this premise, 
the challenge was convincing the public that conditional sentences were terms of 
imprisonment; for judges who rejected or struggled with the concept of community 
imprisonment, the bar was higher. In either event, it became evident that the 
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construction of conditional sentences was relevant to their application (i.e., the likelihood 
they were used as true prison alternatives), and so such content was coded as part of 
the thematic analysis.  
3.4 Limitations – the perfect is the enemy of the good 
Court datasets 
The most substantive limitation of the court data used in this project is that they 
are not directly comparable to other existing (or available) datasets.405 Notably, however, 
matched sanctions from datasets 1 and 2 were consistent with those reported by CCJS 
through the CANSIM portal (see Appendix C for more detailed information regarding 
validation), suggesting that the data are reliable despite being organized differently. It is 
also important to remember that the primary value of the project datasets is in their 
ability to identify changes over time through longitudinal analysis within the same dataset 
(apples to apples). Put another way, these datasets were never intended to be used as 
part of a comparative analysis with another dataset.406  
There are two other research design decisions that must be mentioned. While 
each presents a limitation, the value gained was thought to justify the choice made. First, 
this study was limited to a single province (BC). Given the variability amongst 
provinces/territories when it comes to sentencing, results cannot be generalized beyond 
BC. Theoretical and pragmatic considerations, however, made BC the best province 
within which to conduct a more in-depth analysis of conditional sentencing. Second, the 
decision to focus on single charge cases in dataset 1 meant that comparisons could not 
be made with results obtained in other studies that included multi-charge cases. The 
benefit, however, was that it allowed for a more meaningful exploration of sentencing 
patterns on a category of specific offences (single charge cases). While findings could 
not be generalized beyond the single charge population, the focus was less on 
 
405 Differences between the data used and those available through Statistics Canada (CANSIM) 
include: time period (calendar year versus fiscal year); unit of analysis (“sentenced charge” 
versus “case” [before reducing to single charge cases]); statutes included (CCC [without 
impaired] & CDSA versus all federal statutes); definition of “primary” sentence (J, CSO, F, SS, 
CND, ABD versus “MSS” - J, CSO, P, F, other); probation treated as a secondary sanction versus 
as a primary sanction; no “other” category versus a broad “other” category. 
406 In addition, a dissertation would seem to be an appropriate place within which to explore the 
utility of looking at things from a different perspective. 
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establishing overall sentencing patterns, and more on identifying evidence of 
discontinuity in the application of conditional sentences (and other sanctions) post Bill C-
10. 
Survey and interviews  
The response rate for the survey was 25% (40/160). This is consistent with the 
27% response rate reported in 2006 for a survey of BC judges,407 but low when 
compared with the 1998 National Survey which reported an overall response rate of 
36%.408 There is reason to believe that online surveys, though certainly accessible and 
efficient, present their own challenges in terms of response rates.409 Indeed, as the use 
of such survey tools has increased, response rates have decreased.410 In this project, 
strategies designed to improve response rates (e.g., sending reminders) were not 
available. While a higher response rate for the survey would have been preferable, the 
number of judges who agreed to participate in interviews exceeded expectations.  
The qualitative design of this study and the relatively small number of 
participating judges resulted in findings that are not highly generalizable. Notably, 
however, participants represented diverse backgrounds and demographics, including 
gender, status (full-time, part-time, retired), and years sitting as a judge. Each of the five 
geographic regions was represented by at least one participant, though overall, the 
number of judges from lower mainland locations (Vancouver and Fraser regions) was 
disproportionately high. Regardless, it is important to keep in mind that the intent of this 
study was never to produce results that would be generalized to all of Canada, or even 
to all of BC.  
Rather, the goal in conducting the survey and interviews—and, for that matter, 
the court datasets as well—was to capture a snapshot of judicial perspectives on the 
evolution of conditional sentencing since their inception, in order to unravel some of the 
 
407 Edgar, A., & Roberts, J. (2006). Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing: Judicial experiences 
and perceptions. Canada Department of Justice, at p. xii. 
408 Roberts, et al., supra note 13 at p. 2. 
409 These include too many emails overall and too many online surveys. Sue, V., & Ritter, L. 
(2018). Conducting Online Surveys (2nd ed.), Sage Publications, at p. 2. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781506335186 
410 Ye, J. (2006). Overcoming challenges to conducting online surveys. 83–89, at p. 84. 
https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-59140-792-8.ch008 
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complexities of this sentencing option as it relates to incarceration rates. Indeed, this 
mixed methodology adds a valuable dimension to our current understanding of the 
impact of conditional sentences of imprisonment. By focusing on the day-to-day 
experiences of judges and capturing them in a variety of different ways, we see how this 
sanction has been understood and used over time. By extension, such findings can shed 
new light on the unexpected failure of conditional sentences in terms of prison reduction.       
.   
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4 Results – making sense of it all 
As Clayton Ruby observed more than two decades ago, sentencing law is 
increasingly complex, though rarely improved.411 While the task of making sense of 
sentencing is daunting, that does not mean we should not try. How else can we hope to 
understand this critical, and most public-facing area of the criminal law? How do we 
explain, for instance, why the introduction of conditional sentences did not have a more 
meaningful impact on overall imprisonment rates, or why there has been so much 
variability across provinces/territories? Where the sanction has clearly failed, what 
happened? What can we learn from its disappointing performance—and how can that 
knowledge assist us as we move forward?  
While there are no simple answers, there are concepts that can help us better 
understand the dynamics at play, and that can at least partially account for the 
unexpected results. In the context of conditional sentences, these include net-widening, 
up-tariffing, and circumvention, each of which is relevant to the narrative that has 
emerged around conditional sentencing in BC. Net-widening as the most likely 
explanation for the sanction’s failure to demonstrate any important or sustained 
reduction in prison populations, up-tariffing as the device which—in part—enabled net-
widening, and circumvention as the judicial response to sentencing restrictions seen as 
being unduly harsh (in part due to up-tariffing). The following sections use these 
concepts to frame this project’s principal findings. In most instances, this will include the 
integration of results obtained from the various data sources. A brief description of each 
follows.   
4.1 Descriptive presentation and analyses 
 Court datasets 
The following sections provides a descriptive overview of the three court datasets 
developed for this project: sentence outcomes (1), breaches (2), and conditions (3). 
 
411 Ruby, C. C. (1999). Foreword. In J. V. Roberts & D. P. Cole (Eds.), Making sense of 
sentencing (pp. vii–viii). University of Toronto Press. 
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4.1.1.1 BC sentence trends 2006-2017 (dataset 1)  
Of the 169,456 cases in this dataset, almost all (98%) were concluded at the 
Provincial Court level. In terms of the distribution of charges by statute, most sentences 
were for offences under the Criminal Code (90.2%) rather than the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (9.8%). The single charge cases captured by dataset 1 represented 
approximately one-third (35%) of all sentenced charges (not cases) concluded in BC in 
the calendar years 2006 through 2017 inclusive.412 The crime drop was evident when the 
number of cases was broken down by calendar year (see Table 4-1). Overall, between 
2006 and 2017 the number of single charge cases dropped by 21.6%. 
Table 4-1  Number of cases by calendar year (2006 to 2017) - dataset 1 
Year Cases Change Year Cases Change 
  Number Percent   Number Percent 
2006 15,012   2012 14,042 -417 -2.9% 
2007 16,149 1,137 7.6% 2013 13,307 -735 -5.2% 
2008 16,221 72 0.4% 2014 12,560 -747 -5.6% 
2009 16,128 -93 -0.6% 2015 12,185 -375 -3.0% 
2010 15,299 -829 -5.1% 2016 12,327 142 1.2% 
2011 14,459 -840 -5.5% 2017 11,767 -560 -4.5% 
                                                                                  Total 169,456  
 
Offence profiles – overall – primarily summary offences 
While the media tends to focus on serious, high profile offences, we are 
reminded that the bulk of criminal offending occurs at the lower end of the seriousness 
scale. Indeed, the most common offences overall were breach of probation (18.5%), 
theft under $5,000 (17.8%), common assault (12.1%), and failing to either appear in 
court or comply with release conditions (7.5%). Together these offences accounted for 
over half (55.9%) of the cases included in the 2006 to 2017 single charge dataset. 
Notably, the top ten offences accounted for over three-quarters (75.7%) of the case 
volume; of these only drug trafficking and possibly breaking and entering (if prosecuted 
by indictment) are reasonably expected to have been impacted by Bill C-10 restrictions 
 
412 Single charge cases represent, at a minimum, over half (51.7%) of all cases (based on a 
conservative calculation that assumes all charges that are not single charges include only two 
charges). Given that cases with multiple charges (e.g., four or more) were not unusual, it is likely 
that the single charge cases represent a substantial portion of the BC criminal court caseload. In 
their analysis of sentence patterns, for instance, Roberts & Birkenmayer described their single 
charge dataset as accounting for 79% of all cases (supra note 356 at p. 464). 
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(see Table 4-2 below). This breakdown is consistent with national figures which suggest 
that the bulk of the adult criminal court caseload continues to be summary offences.413   
Table 4-2  Top ten offences (single charge cases) – dataset 1 
 Offence Frequency Percent 
1 Breach of probation 31,277 18.5 
2 Theft under $5,000 30,242 17.8 
3 Common assault  20,512 12.1 
4 Fail to appear/Breach release 12,762 7.5 
5 Drug possession  7,801 4.6 
6 Drug trafficking  6,986 4.1 
7 Criminal harassment/utter threats 6,164 3.6 
8 Mischief - under $5,000 5,554 3.3 
9 Break & enter 3,875 2.3 
10 Possession of stolen property - under $5,000 3,213 1.9 
 Total 128,386 75.7% 
 
Sentence patterns – the relative use of primary sentences 
The value of focusing on primary sentences, and treating probation as an 
attached sanction, is evident when considering the relative use of each of the six 
available sentencing options (see Figure 4-1). The most common sentence for cases 
concluded between 2006 and 2017 was prison (overall representing 43.4% of primary 
sentences), with 41.4% of prison sentences including probation to follow. In terms of 
sentence length, both the median and mode prison term was 30 days.414 Conditional 
sentences accounted for 9.2% of sentences, with almost half (47.6%) followed by 
probation. Substantially longer than traditional prison terms, the median and mode for 
conditional sentences were 180 days (six months). Fines remained relatively popular at 
12.3%; conditional discharges and suspended sentences, together, accounted for 
approximately one-third (32.7%) of recorded outcomes. Relatively few cases (2.5%) 
resulted in absolute discharges. 
 
413 Indeed, the breakdown in Table 4-2 largely mirrors national findings that regularly identify theft 
under $5,000, failure to comply with a court order (almost always related to bail conditions), 
common assault, and breach of probation as four of the most common offences. See Statistics 
Canada, supra note 397 at p. 6. 
414 These calculations exclude one-day jail sentences which would otherwise be the mode.  
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When broken down by calendar year, we see both change and stability. For 
instance, the use of imprisonment was essentially stable between 2006 and 2012 
(approximately 40% on average) but then increases, from 43.1% of sentences in 2013 to 
53.1% in 2017 (post Bill C-10).415 Notably, conditional sentences represented 
approximately 10% (+/- 1 %) of sentences between 2006 and 2012; their use then 
dropped each year thereafter, reaching a low of 6.4% in 2017 (see Figure 4-2 below).416  
Figure 4-2 Single charge cases by primary sentence (n=169,456) 
 
 
415 It is important to note that an increase in the proportion of cases subject to prison sentences is 
only indirectly connected to what we normally discuss as imprisonment rates. It is possible, for 
instance, that the proportion of offenders sentenced to prison increased while, at the same time, 
sentence terms were substantially decreased. This would not necessarily result in any increase to 
the imprisonment rate, which considers average offender counts (not admissions or sentences). It 
is equally important to recall that this dataset only captures single-charge cases. 
416 The decrease in the use of conditional sentences reflects at least two categories of Bill C-10 
reforms. The first is the focus of this project and includes the restrictions introduced specifically 
on the use of this sanction for specific offences (as per the updated wording of s.742.1). The 
second includes the expanded list of offences for which mandatory minimum penalties were 
introduced. While not the focus of this study, offences subject to MMPs are also no longer eligible 
for conditional sentences. Benedet (2019) suggests that for some offences, MMPs were 
introduced with the intention of blocking the availability of conditional sentences (supra note 310). 
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Sentence length – short terms – one-day jail 
As noted, prison sentences were generally short; excluding one-day terms, the 
median and mode were both 30 days.417 Consistent with earlier research, almost half 
(48.5%) of short prison terms (less than 31 days) were imposed on administration of 
justice offences.418 The only other offence that regularly received a short prison term was 
theft under $5,000, which accounted for 18.5% of such sentences overall. Notably, there 
were proportionately more short prison terms post Bill C-10. For example, between 2006 
and 2012 approximately three-quarters (74.6%) of the prison terms imposed were for 
less than 31 days; between 2013 and 2017, at a time when the use of prison was 
increasing, the relative use of shorter terms was also increasing, with 79.2% of the terms 
in those years being for less than 31 days (or 80.5% if 2013 is treated as a transition 
year). 
While the issue of credit for time served was outside of the scope for this project, 
the proportion of cases with sentences of one-day prison was remarkable, accounting for 
almost half (48.2%) of all prison terms imposed.419 Of all cases included in this database, 
one in five involved a sentence of one-day prison (20.9%).420 Notably, the use of single 
 
417 As noted earlier, all calculations of prison sentence lengths excluded the one-day terms. Doing 
so eliminated the downward skewing of average lengths and was thought to be a more 
meaningful assessment of sentence length. The latter consideration reflects the fact that one-day 
jail terms generally represent sentences of “time served” (length unknown or not easily 
determined) rather than time to be served.  
418 Administration of justice offences include breach of probation, failing to attend court, and 
failing to comply with release conditions. This result is consistent with the findings of Marinos, 
supra note 58. 
419 While credit for time served can be a part of any sentencing decision, one-day jail terms are 
the clearest indication we currently have for identifying this practice. In Lea, the MBCA set out the 
rationale as follows: 
I must point out that “time served” is not a sentencing option available to a sentencing judge 
under the Code. The amount of time served can inform a decision to impose a sentence of 
one-day when warranted by the circumstances, but it does not permit such a sentence to in 
fact be equivalent to the amount of time actually served (Lea, supra note 350 at para 26). 
On the prevalence of one-day jail sentence terms, see also Kinney, J. B. (2005). Court 
sentencing patterns (PhD thesis, Burnaby B.C.: Simon Fraser University). 
http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/handle/1892/2367, at pp. 162-163. 
420 One-day jail terms represented 48.2% of all jail terms (35,435/73,476) and 20.9% of all 
sentences (35,435/169,456). 
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day terms increased in the post Bill C-10 years.421 When cases involving sentences of 
one-day prison were isolated, an interesting pattern emerged. That is, up until 2013 most 
one-day jail terms (60-67%) did not include probation to follow. This starts changing in 
2013, and by 2017 most (57.4%) of the one-day sentences are followed by terms of 
probation.  
Sentence detail – the use of probation 
Pursuant to sections 731(1) and 731(2), probation was assumed to form part of 
conditional discharges and suspended sentences; it was also recorded when attached to 
“stand-alone” sanctions—jail, conditional sentence, and fine. Overall, over half (57.8%) 
of the sentences imposed between 2006 and 2017 included a term of probation, most 
often tied to a discharge or suspended sentence.422 The remaining probation orders 
(43.5%) were associated with fines (4.8%), conditional sentences (7.6%), or terms of 
imprisonment (31.1%) (see Figure 4-3).  
 
421 For the calendar years 2006 through 2012, one-day jail terms represented 45.9% of all jail 
terms; from 2013 through 2017, they increase to 51.1%. This change was incremental over the 
post Bill C-10 years, starting at 43.2% in 2013 and increasing to 58.2% in 2017. 
422 Of the 169,456 cases, 97,930 (57.8%) included probation. Conditional discharges and 
suspended sentences, combined, accounted for 56.5% of all probation orders (55,324/97,930). 
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Figure 4-3 Distribution of probation 2006 to 2017 (n=97,930) 
 
 
During analysis, some discontinuity in the use of probation over the years 
emerged. Notably, the percentage of both jail and conditional sentences that included 
probation to follow started increasing in 2012/2013 (post Bill C-10). Probation attached 
to fines remained stable, with approximately 20% of fines having attached probation 
orders throughout the years under study. In 2012, however, only 38.5% of jail sentences 
and 43.3% of conditional sentences were followed by probation; by 2017 this had 
increased to 50.3% and 68.3% respectively (see Figure 4-4).  
And so, sentencing patterns post Bill C-10 changed in several ways that might be 
logically connected to the restrictions placed on the use of conditional sentences. First, 
to nobody’s surprise, the use of conditional sentences decreased; it would have been 
surprising had it not. Second, judges started imposing more, but shorter, jail terms, 
including more one-day terms, and these shorter jail terms were more likely to have 
probation orders attached. 
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Conditional sentencing – utilization 
Of the 169,456 cases concluded between 2006 and 2017, 9.2% (n=15,616) 
resulted in conditional sentences. Even with the inclusion of summary offences, Bill C-10 
impacts were apparent.423 Conditional sentences dropped from 10.1% of all primary 
sentences in 2012 to 6.4% in 2017 (see Figure 4-5). This reduction is consistent with 
earlier findings (e.g., Webster and Doob, 2019; Reid and Roberts, 2019) which have 
noted the impact of the Bill C-10 restrictions. 
 
423 Summary offences were included in this dataset for two reasons. The first was operational, 
reflecting an interest in gaining a sense of overall utilization patterns for conditional sentences. 
The second was practical, arising from an inability to determine whether an offence had been 
prosecuted summarily or by indictment. Given the prevalence of hybrid offences, it was only by 
pulling out specific (indictable) offences that analysis could be done on those charges known to 
have been impacted by the Bill C-10 restrictions.  
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Figure 4-5 Conditional sentence utilization 2006 to 2017 (n=15,616) 
 
 
Conditional sentences – sentence length 
Conditional sentences were consistently longer than the jail terms imposed 
during the same period (2006 to 2017). Both the overall median and mode for 
conditional sentences were 180 days (6 months); for terms of imprisonment, both were 
30 days. Notably, not only did the use of conditional sentences relative to other 
sanctions drop considerably after 2013, but those still imposed were shorter, going from 
a median of 180 days in 2013 to 90 days in 2017. Until 2013, conditional sentences of 
less than one month were rare (<8%) and conditional sentences of more than one year 
were not (almost 15% in 2012). By 2017, this pattern had reversed, with 19.9% of 
conditional sentence orders being for a term of one month or less, and only 5.4% for a 
term of more than one year. Fewer (and shorter) conditional sentences make sense 
given that the orders were effectively restricted to less serious offences after 2012.  
Given public concerns around the use of conditional sentences for serious 
offences, the longest orders imposed (defined as more than one year in length) were 
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identified for further analysis.424 Overall, almost 2,000 (1,999) “long” conditional 
sentences were captured, representing 12.8% of all conditional sentences. Notably, 
these orders were imposed for the more serious offences: drug trafficking/production, 
serious assaults, robbery, causing harm or death as a result of impaired or criminally 
negligent driving, and more serious property offences (e.g., theft over $5,000 and 
breaking and entering). Fully two-thirds (67.5%) of the long conditional sentences were 
imposed in the six-year period between 2006 and 2011; less than one-third (32.5%) 
were imposed in the six-year period between 2012 and 2017.425 The imposition of fewer 
long conditional sentences post Bill C-10 makes sense given that it was the serious 
offences that were targeted. Indeed, any other outcome would have been unexpected. 
More importantly, these results confirm earlier research that suggests “capping” 
conditional sentences at one year would not impact most of the orders made.426 Indeed, 
in the years immediately preceding the sentencing restrictions (i.e., 2011, 2012), almost 
exactly 15% of the conditional sentences imposed were for terms exceeding one year 
(see Table 4-3). 
 
424 It was reasonably assumed that the longest conditional sentences would be imposed on the 
more serious offences.  
425 The fact that serious offences received conditional sentences post Bill C-10 likely reflects one 
of the following scenarios: 1) offences that pre-dated the November 2012 enactment date of the 
conditional sentencing restrictions; or 2) offences in which the prosecution either proceeded 
summarily or, where they proceeded by indictment, the maximum penalty provided was less than 
14 years imprisonment. 
426 Roberts & Gabor (2004) suggested that 86% of conditional sentences would fit within a one-
year cap (i.e., capping conditional sentences at 12 months would only reduce the volume of 
orders made by 14%), supra note 30 at p. 101. 
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Table 4-3 Conditional sentences – sentence length (n=15,591) 
 less than 1 month 1 to 6 months 6 months to 1 year 1 to 2 years Total 
 count % count % count % count %  
2006 70 4.7% 737 49.1% 477 31.8% 217 14.5% 1501 
2007 67 4.3% 810 51.7% 471 30.0% 220 14.0% 1568 
2008 88 5.7% 762 49.3% 441 28.5% 255 16.5% 1546 
2009 94 5.3% 924 52.4% 498 28.2% 249 14.1% 1765 
2010 81 5.4% 831 55.0% 405 26.8% 194 12.8% 1511 
2011 112 7.7% 772 53.2% 353 24.3% 215 14.8% 1452 
2012 77 5.4% 785 55.5% 348 24.6% 205 14.5% 1415 
2013 110 8.0% 780 56.5% 310 22.4% 181 13.1% 1381 
2014 104 10.0% 616 59.0% 202 19.3% 122 11.7% 1044 
2015 124 14.6% 547 64.4% 121 14.2% 58 6.8% 850 
2016 118 14.7% 542 67.5% 102 12.7% 41 5.1% 803 
2017 150 19.9% 487 64.5% 77 10.2% 41 5.4% 755 
Total 1,195  8,593  3,805  1,998  15,591 
Note: 25 cases had no CSO duration entered (attributed to clerk/registry error). 
Conditional sentences - offences 
When looking only at the 15,616 conditional sentences imposed between 2006 
and 2017, there were several shifts in offence profile. Overall, drug trafficking accounted 
for the largest proportion (19%; 2,968/15,616) of conditional sentences imposed; 
offences of theft under $5,000 were second, accounting for 15% (2,338/15,616). These 
offences, when combined with drug production/cultivation, common assault, and breach 
of probation, accounted for more than half (57.4%) of the conditional sentences 
imposed. Notably, both drug trafficking and drug production were effectively made 
ineligible for conditional sentences by Bill C-10. When looking only at conditional 
sentences imposed in 2017, the new (post Bill C-10) schedule of offences includes 
charges of theft under $5,000 (accounting for 23% of conditional sentences), followed by 
common assault (11.1%), assault causing bodily harm (8.2%), breach of probation 
(7.4%), and breaking and entering (4.8%).427 Together, these five offences accounted for 
54.5% of the conditional sentences imposed in 2017.428   
 
427 Presumably both the offences of assault causing bodily harm and breaking and entering were 
prosecuted summarily.  
428 The decision to look specifically at orders made in 2017, as opposed to a range generally used 
for post Bill C-10 analysis (e.g., 2013 to 2017) reflected an interest in capturing only offences that 
occurred after the November 2012 enactment of the sentencing restrictions. 
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4.1.1.2 CSO breaches (2011 – 2016) – dataset 2 
Proportion of conditional sentence orders breached  
Overall, 36.4% of the conditional sentences imposed between 2011 and 2016 
were alleged to have been breached (5,336/14,658; see Table 4-4). This is consistent 
with the 37.6% rate estimated for 1998 cases429 and the 37.4% more recently suggested 
for Vancouver and the Downtown Community Court.430 The calculations in Table 4-4 
count only the first proven breach on any given conditional sentence order; it was not 
unusual to find orders that had been breached on multiple occasions.431 Of the breach 
allegations filed, 92.6% (4,942/5,336) were either admitted or proven, resulting in a 
judicial response; the remaining 394 orders were either disputed and unproven, 
withdrawn, or not yet dealt with (e.g., due to an outstanding warrant).432 When broken 
down by calendar year, the findings suggest that post Bill C-10 conditional sentences 
may have been slightly more likely to be breached.433  
Table 4-4  Conditional sentences & breaches by year 2011 to 2016 
 Number of CSOs Number of CSO breaches Percent 
2011 2,993 1,021 34.1% 
2012 2,883 992 34.4% 
2013 2,717 946 34.8% 
2014 2,254 835 37.0% 
2015 1,909 768 40.2% 
2016 1,902 774 40.7% 




429 North, supra note 258 at p. 81. The breach rate (breaches as a percentage of orders made) for 
conditional sentences imposed in 1998 was 37.6% (BC; select locations). 
430 Sylvestre, et al., supra note 347 at p. 42. The percentage of orders breached was calculated 
for conditional sentences that were concluded in the calendar years of 2005 to 2012 (inclusive). 
431 In the 2011 to 2016 dataset, there were examples of a second, third, and even fourth proven 
breach allegation on a single conditional sentence.  
432 In a study that reviewed conditional sentence breaches pre/post Proulx in three BC court 
locations, most breaches were admitted (1998= 92.6%; 2000= 94.5%). See North, supra note 
258 at p. 82. 
433 One possible explanation for an increase in the percentage of orders breached relates to the 
loss of conditional sentences imposed on serious offences committed by lower risk offenders. 
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Judicial response to proven breaches (2011 to 2016) 
When dealing with an admitted or proven breach of a conditional sentence, a 
judge has four options under section 742.6(9): 1) direct that the original sentence 
applies; 2) change the conditions of the conditional sentence; 3) suspend a portion of the 
order and direct that the accused serve a specific number of days in custody; or 4) 
terminate the conditional sentence and have the offender serve the balance of the term 
in custody.  
The judicial response to breach is of interest for several reasons. First, it is an 
under-researched area, which is unfortunate given the direction in Proulx that proven 
breaches should be dealt with harshly, in part to distinguish conditional sentences from 
suspended sentences. Second, any effort to understand the relationship between 
conditional sentences and the use of imprisonment should, logically, include some 
consideration of the extent to which these initially non-custodial orders may transition 
into custodial orders. Finally, how a judge responds to a proven breach reveals 
something about his/her views on conditional sentencing and how he/she uses the 
sanction.  
Of the 4,942 proven breaches in dataset 2, most (61.1%) resulted in the offender 
serving part (or all) of the remaining sentence in custody; in approximately 39% of the 
cases, the judicial response was to direct that the original conditional sentence would still 
apply, with or without amendment (see Table 4-5 below).434 Of course, the challenge is 
in determining what other consequences may have been in play. For example, an 
offender might be held in custody for days or weeks awaiting the breach hearing. If the 
judge then decides to release an offender on the original order, it would arguably not be 
fair to say that there was no custodial consequence. 
 
434 Most (3020/4942; 61.1%) of the (first breach) outcomes involved either the suspension or 
termination of the conditional sentence; 1922/4942 (38.9%) of the (first breach) outcomes 
involved either the original sentence continuing to apply, or a change to court order (conditional 
sentence amended).  
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Table 4-5 Judicial response to admitted or proven CSO breach  
2011 to 2016 Number Percentage 
Original sentence applies (OSA) 715 14.5% 
Change to court order (CCO) 1,207 24.4% 
CSO suspended (CSS) 1,305 26.4% 
CSO terminated (XCJ) 1,715 34.7% 
Total 4,942 100.0% 
 
Notably, the judicial response to proven breach did not appear to change in any 
meaningful way post Bill C-10. The two non-custodial options (OSA, CCO) consistently 
accounted for approximately 39% (+/-1.5) of responses in each calendar year; similarly, 
the two custodial options (CCS, XCJ) consistently accounted for approximately 61.5% 
(+/- 1.5). In terms of offence profile, the offences associated with conditional sentences 
that were breached essentially match those identified as the most common offences 
overall. Indeed, the top five offences identified in Table 4-2  (offence profile for dataset 1 
cases) are also the top five offences for breached conditional sentences (theft under 
$5,000, breach of probation, break and enter, drug trafficking, and common assault).  
4.1.1.3 Optional conditions – dataset 3 - CSO vs SS (2011 vs 2017)  
In the wake of the Bill C-10 restrictions, there were concerns expressed that 
judges may be inappropriately using suspended sentences as disguised conditional 
sentences, primarily through the imposition of what had up until then been considered 
punitive conditions (i.e., curfews or house arrest). Dataset 3 was created to explore this 
issue. It included all cases resulting in a suspended or conditional sentence imposed on 
at least one drug trafficking offence in either 2011 (pre Bill C-10) or 2017 (post Bill C-10 
and post R. v. Voong435). Cases in this dataset included information on the type of order, 
sentence length, and the optional conditions imposed. Capturing this information was 
critical to any assessment of the potential reconstruction of suspended sentences as 
some form of disguised conditional sentence.  
 
435 Voong, supra note 34. 
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In one of the few recent efforts to explore the use of conditions (in Vancouver), 
Sylvestre, Blomley, Damon, and Bellot (2017) identified the following “most common 
conditions” for conditional sentences and probation orders (Table 4-6): 
Table 4-6  Red Zone study – conditions - CSOs & probation (2005 to 2012)436 
  Conditional sentences437 Probation438 
Conditions Number Percent Number Percent 
no go 5,164 23.6% 24,559 36.4% 
other 4,289 19.6% 7,913 11.7% 
treatment 3,485 15.9% 12,563 18.6% 
curfew 2,432 11.1% 273 0.4% 
no drugs/alcohol 2,125 9.7% 1,734 2.6% 
no weapons 1,280 5.9% 7,258 10.8% 
area restrictions 957 4.4% 4,232 6.3% 
house arrest 955 4.4% 95 0.1% 
no contact 909 4.2% 7,837 11.6% 
no motor vehicles 261 1.2% 1,004 1.5% 
Total 21,857 100.0% 67,468 100.0% 
 
The “Red Zone” data are relevant to this study given that the project relied upon 
the same data source as the current project (JUSTIN data administered by the Court 
Services Branch [CSB] of the BC Ministry of Justice). Specific types of conditions were 
calculated as a percentage of all conditions imposed (not as a percentage of orders). For 
example, curfew requirements represented 11.1% of all conditions coded for conditional 
sentences, and 0.4% for probation. The key take-away from this work is that while 
treatment conditions formed an important part of both conditional sentences (15.9%) and 
 
436 Sylvestre, et al., supra note 347; table created from data pp. 40-42 (2005-2012 data - 
Vancouver); given that the primary interest was in assessing judicial decision-making in terms of 
the imposition of optional (discretionary) conditions, those that are mandatory on conditional 
sentences are not included for either order (e.g., reporting and residency requirements). If 
conditions that are mandatory on conditional sentences are counted as optional conditions when 
imposed on probation orders, the latter could be misrepresented as being more onerous (than the 
former).  
437 In the context of the Red Zone study, the conditional sentence category included 7,042 cases 
in which a conditional sentence was imposed (ibid at p. 36). 
438 Similarly, the probation category included 31,915 cases in which probation was imposed, 
regardless of whether it formed part of a discharge or suspended sentence, or was attached to a 
term of imprisonment, a fine, or a conditional sentence (ibid at p.36).  
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probation orders (18.6%), curfews and house arrest were common in the former (15.5%) 
but rare in the latter (0.5%).  
BC Court data – conditional vs suspended sentences 
Dataset 3 contained a total of 736 cases: 555 from 2011 and 181 from 2017. The 
breakdown by year and sanction is shown below in Table 4-7.  
Table 4-7 Conditional sentences vs suspended sentences (n=736) 
2011 files (n=555) 2017 files (n=181) 
Conditional sentences Suspended sentences Conditional sentences Suspended sentences 
500 (90.1%) 55 (9.9%) 28 (15.5%) 153 (84.5%) 
 
The data clearly support the obvious—that making almost all drug trafficking 
offences ineligible for conditional sentences greatly reduced the use of that sanction for 
this offence. Indeed, if anything was odd, it was that in 2017 there were still 28 
conditional sentences imposed. It is also apparent that the use of suspended sentences 
increased quite dramatically, though we cannot automatically assume that those would 
have otherwise been conditional sentences. It may be, for instance, that the 2017 
suspended sentences represent cases in which offenders had spent considerable 
remand time in custody prior to sentencing—or in which the substance involved was a 
Schedule II drug (e.g., marihuana).  
These alternative explanations for non-custodial outcomes were eliminated 
through the manual collection of additional information. This included whether an 
offender was in or out of custody at the time of sentencing and the specific substance to 
which the trafficking charge related. In terms of the former, an offender who has been 
held in custody is generally given credit for time served. This can complicate efforts to 
analyze sentencing patterns to the extent that these decisions are not transparent or 
clearly documented.439 Notably though, the review of offender custody status at the point 
 
439 Since 2010, judges have been required to review the time served calculations made for the 
court record. See section 719; see also Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (limiting 
credit for time spent in pre-sentencing custody), 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, proclaimed into force 
on February 22, 2010. Short title - Truth in Sentencing Act, S.C. 2009, c.29. For added context 
see Doob & Webster, supra note 305(a). 
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of sentencing suggests that relatively few offenders are held in remand custody on drug 
trafficking offences. Of the 2017 files (181 cases), none of the offenders were in custody 
when sentenced. Of the 2011 files (555 cases), one of the offenders who received a 
suspended sentence (out of 55) was in custody; the estimate for the remaining (500) 
files was that approximately 6% (30/500) were in custody.440 In summary, time spent in 
custody awaiting sentencing can be largely disregarded as an alternative explanation for 
the non-institutional sentences in question. 
However, the dramatic increase in the use of suspended sentences in the 2017 
data could still be explained by the predominance of a Schedule II drug. In terms of this 
latter alternative explanation, sentences available (or required) under the CDSA are 
partially determined by the type of substance involved, as set out in a series of attached 
“Schedules.” The bulk of drug trafficking offences involve Schedules I and II substances. 
Schedule I includes the so-called “hard drugs” (e.g., heroin, cocaine, fentanyl); trafficking 
is an indictable offence, and the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. Schedule II 
includes cannabis/marihuana offences; trafficking is an indictable offence, but if the 
amount is less than three kilograms, then conditional sentences remain available. The 
distinctions are important in that trafficking offences involving marihuana could offer an 
alternative explanation for the imposition of suspended sentences post Bill C-10 for such 
charges.441 
In terms of the (28) files in which conditional sentences were imposed in 2017, 
most (19/28) involved trafficking in less than three kilograms of marihuana; six involved 
Schedule I substances with offence dates that pre-date November 2012 (Bill C-10); two 
were unavailable; and one involved a Schedule IV substance (hybrid). And so, the 
review confirmed that for at least 25 of the 28 cases reviewed, conditional sentences 
 
While a notation of credit given is made when a custodial sentence is imposed, when a judge 
gives credit for time served that transforms a custodial sentence into a non-custodial one, the 
time served is generally referenced as a mitigating factor that is not otherwise documented. In the 
context of this project, time served could offer an “alternative explanation” for the imposition of 
what would otherwise be an overly lenient sentence for drug trafficking (suspending sentence).  
440 To determine custody status for the 500 (2011) CSO files, it is important to note that a random 
sample of fifty (50) was drawn (every tenth file). Out of those 50, there were three in which the 
offender was in custody (3/50 or 6%). Extrapolating to the larger population produced the 
estimate that 30 out of 500 of the offenders were in custody at the time of sentencing. 
441 The file review regarding substance was limited to the (181) 2017 files. The 2011 files had 
been archived and were no longer readily accessible to court staff. They were not requested as 
the nature of the substance was most at issue for the 2017 orders.  
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remained available due to either the nature (and amount) of the substance involved, or 
to the fact that the offence occurred prior to the enactment of the Bill C-10 restrictions. 
Of the 153 files in which sentence was suspended in 2017, most (125/153) 
involved Schedule I substances (e.g., heroin, cocaine, fentanyl). While 13 involved 
trafficking in marihuana, the amount alleged exceeded three kilograms, making the 
offence ineligible for a conditional sentence. For six files (three marihuana, three “GHB”), 
conditional sentences may have been available if the prosecutor elected to proceed 
summarily. For the remaining nine files, no substance information was available. In 
summary, fully 92.1% of the suspended sentence cases involved substances that 
precluded the imposition of a conditional sentence, essentially ruling out substance as 
an alternative explanation. 
Optional conditions imposed 
It is difficult to compare the number of optional conditions imposed over time for 
two reasons. First, conditional sentences have five mandatory conditions while probation 
orders have only three.442 Second, there can be some variability in the pronouncement 
of sentence (i.e., the wording used). One judge might impose three conditions as follows: 
1) you are not to consume alcohol; 2) you are not to consume drugs; and 3) you will take 
specified counselling. Another judge might combine the requirements into a single 
condition: 1) you are not to consume drugs or alcohol and you will take specified 
counselling.443  
 
442 Section 732.1(2) sets out the mandatory conditions for a probation order. Cases involving 
victims or witnesses are subject to an additional mandatory condition under s. 732.1(2) (a.1). 
443 For example, one conditional sentence had a single condition that read: 1) You shall be inside 
your residence at all times except: (a) to go directly to, from and while at (i) appointments with a 
supervisor, counsellor, lawyer, doctor, dentist or other person as directed; (ii) work during times 
as directed; or (iii) for other reasons during times as directed; and (b) Saturdays from 10:00 a.m. 
to 2:00 p.m.; and, you shall (a) not consume or possess alcohol, illegal drugs or drug 
paraphernalia; (b) not have visitors after 10:00 p.m.; and (c) answer the door or telephone to the 
police or a Supervisor. You will be responsible for ensuring you hear the bell, knock or phone. 
The Provincial Court (BC) has recently adopted standardized “picklists” for conditions relating to 
bail, probation, and conditional sentence orders. https://www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/types-of-
cases/criminal-and-youth/links#Q7 
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With those caveats in mind, a comparison was done between optional conditions 
imposed for each of the two sanctions for 2011 and 2017.444 For conditional sentences, 
there were essentially no changes; the average order in both years included 11 optional 
conditions. Suspended sentences, on the other hand, did change. The average order in 
2011 included six optional conditions; in 2017 the average order included nine. 
In terms of the onerousness of optional conditions, there was a specific interest in 
tracking changes in the use of house arrest and/or curfews. In Proulx, the Supreme 
Court indicated that the imposition of such conditions was necessary for several 
reasons, including distinguishing conditional sentences from suspended sentences with 
probation.445 For this project, over 20 conditions or groups of conditions were coded. For 
the purpose of the 2011 to 2017 comparison, the focus was on the imposition of house 
arrest, curfews, and community work service requirements. As can be seen in Table 4-8 
(below), in both 2011 and 2017 conditional sentences were likely to include either a 
curfew or house arrest requirement, or both. Notably, suspended sentences were more 
onerous in 2017; the percentage of orders including house arrest increased from 1.8% in 
2011 to 9.2% in 2017. Curfews were also far more likely in the post Bill C-10 orders, 
increasing from 10.9% in 2011 to almost half (47.7%) in 2017.446  
In terms of community work service (CWS), just over one-third of conditional 
sentences included such a requirement in each year; for suspended sentences this 
increased from 36.4% pre Bill C-10 to 60.1% post Bill C-10. The average number of 
hours required also changed; for conditional sentences, it dropped from 54 to 36 hours, 
while for suspended sentences it almost doubled, from 33 to 61 hours. 
 
444 To make the two orders more comparable, conditions that were mandatory on conditional 
sentences (e.g., reporting and residency requirements) were tracked, but not counted, when 
imposed on probation orders.  
445 Proulx, supra note 14 at para 36. 
446 It was not uncommon to have a single order that included both house arrest and a curfew 
(generally with one following the other). When grouped to include either house arrest or a curfew, 
the punitive shift in suspended sentences remains. In 2011, only 12.7% of the orders included 
either house arrest or a curfew; in 2017 this increased to over half (51%).  
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Table 4-8 Conditional sentences vs suspended sentences – use of house 
arrest, curfew, and community work service (CWS) 
  Suspended sentences (n=208) Conditional sentences (n=528) 
 2011 (n=55) 2017 (n=153) 2011 (n=500) 2017 (n=28) 
 # % # % # % # % 
Report/reside 36 65.5% 142 92.8% all*  all*  
House arrest 1 1.8% 14 9.2% 226 45.2% 15 51.7% 
Curfew 6 10.9% 73 47.7% 362 72.4% 23 79.3% 
CWS – yes/no 20 36.4% 92 60.1% 174 34.8% 10 34.5% 
CWS – hours (avg.) 33  61  54  36  
Counselling 20 36.4% 112 73.2% 255 51.0% 14 48.3% 
Abstain alcohol or 
drugs 15 27.3% 106 69.3% 406 81.2% 21 72.4% 
Present self at door 
(monitoring) 2 3.6% 53 34.6% 261 52.2% 16 55.2% 
No contact/no-go 
(area restriction) 10 18.2% 32 20.9% 113 22.6% 2 6.9% 
Maintain employment 
or attend school 3 5.5% 24 15.7% 65 13.0% 0  
No weapons/knives 5 9.1% 34 22.2% 138 27.6% 8 27.6% 
         
*Represents mandatory conditions under section 742.3. 
In addition to the shifts noted above regarding conditions considered to be the 
most onerous, there were several other areas in which the post Bill C-10 suspended 
sentences changed. Notably, they included requirements that an offender report to a 
probation officer (increasing from 65.5% to 92.8%), attend counselling (increasing from 
36.4% to 73.2%), abstain from the consumption of drugs or alcohol (increasing from 
27.3% to 69.36%), and not be in possession of weapons or knives (increasing from 9.1% 
to 22.2%). In each of these instances, changes were noted in terms of the conditions 
imposed on suspended sentences, while those imposed on conditional sentences 
remained essentially unchanged (or slightly reduced). 
Sentence length – conditional sentences vs suspended sentences 
Conditional sentences were regularly imposed for drug trafficking prior to the Bill 
C-10 restrictions (e.g., 500 in 2011). Given that each of these conditional sentences 
would have required the judge to first decide that a term of imprisonment was necessary, 
the expectation was that post Bill C-10 we would see a sharp decline in the use of 
conditional sentences with a corresponding increase in the use of jail. More importantly, 
while we would expect the few remaining conditional sentences to get shorter (most 
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would involve trafficking in less than 3 kilograms of marihuana), suspended sentences 
should have been unaffected. In terms of sentence length, we see the expected 
decrease for conditional sentences (from a median of 270 days in 2011 to 180 days in 
2017) but an unexpected increase for suspended sentences, whose length doubled from 
a median of 360 days in 2011 to a median of 730 days in 2017. 
Summary of overview – BC court datasets 
The data described above provide necessary context for the broader analysis. 
First, most of the adult criminal caseload continues to be summary offences. Second, 
conditional sentence utilization in BC stabilized between 2006 and 2012 at around 10% 
(of primary sentences imposed) but started dropping post Bill C-10, reaching a low of 
6.4% in 2017 (the last year for which data were available). Notably, there was an 
obvious discontinuity in sentence patterns pre and post Bill C-10 that appears to be 
related to the restrictions placed on the use of conditional sentences. Indeed, as we saw 
fewer conditional sentences, we saw more prison terms, though they were substantially 
shorter and more often followed by probation. There was also a marked increase in the 
use of suspended sentences for drug trafficking offences post Bill C-10. A review of 
sentence patterns for this offence suggests that when conditional sentences were 
restricted, suspended sentences became longer and more onerous (i.e., more like 
conditional sentences). These findings will be revisited in more detail in the following 
chapters. 
 Survey and interview participants 
4.1.2.1 Demographics 
In terms of demographics, survey respondents were primarily full-time judges 
(80%) assigned to lower mainland regions (63%). Almost half (46%) had been sitting for 
ten years or less; 54% for more than ten years. Similarly, the judges who were 
interviewed were primarily full-time judges (79%) assigned to lower mainland regions 
(71%). Most (83%) of the interview participants were male judges and 17% were female. 
Interview participants were slightly more experienced as judges than the survey group; 
almost two-thirds (62%) had more than ten years sitting (see Table 4-9 for details). 
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Table 4-9  Survey and interview participants - status, region, years as a judge  
 Survey participants (n=40) Interview participants (n=24) 
Status (as of 2018): Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Regular/full-time 32 80.0% 19 79.2% 
Senior/part-time 4 10.0% 2 8.3% 
Retired 4 10.0% 3 12.5% 
Total 40  24  
Assigned region:     
Vancouver 14 35.0% 12 50.0% 
Fraser 11 27.5% 5 20.8% 
Interior 4 10.0% 2 8.3% 
Vancouver Island 8 20.0% 4 16.7% 
North 3 7.5% 1 4.2% 
Total 40  24  
Years sitting as a judge:     
0 – 5 7 17.5% 4 16.7% 
6 – 10 11 27.5% 5 20.8% 
11-15 7 17.5% 5 20.8% 
16 - 20 9 22.5% 5 20.8% 
20 + years 6 15.0% 5 20.8% 
Total 40  24  
 
In some ways, the judges in each group were proportionately representative of 
the larger BC judicial complement—for example, 80% of both the survey and interview 
judges were full-time, and 82% of the judicial complement was full-time (in 2018). In 
other ways, the groups diverged. For instance, 63% and 71%, respectively, of survey 
and interview participants were from lower mainland (geographic) regions while, at the 
time, only 54% of the court’s judicial complement was so assigned.447 Similarly, while the 
gender of survey participants was unknown, 83% of the judges interviewed were male, 
while only 56% of the overall complement in 2018 was male; females were notably 
under-represented. 
4.1.2.2 Incorporating survey and interview responses 
There are two caveats worth mentioning with respect to how the survey and 
interview responses were used. The first is an acknowledgment that many (but not all) of 
the judges interviewed also participated in the survey, meaning that there was an 
 
447 Provincial Court of BC Annual Report 2018/2019 (2019), at p. 31. 
https://www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/downloads/pdf/AnnualReport2018-2019.pdf 
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unknown level of overlap between the two groups.448 Put another way, there is no 
suggestion that the 24 judges interviewed were different from the 40 judges who 
participated in the survey. And so, on issues that include the presentation of responses 
from both groups, there may be cases in which the comments of one judge are captured 
twice—once as a survey respondent and then, again, as an interview participant.  
It is also important to note that the judges who participated in the survey and 
interviews were a diverse group who held differing opinions on many issues. They did 
not speak with one voice and there were few topics on which all agreed. When 
presenting their responses, efforts were made (e.g., by coding in NVivo) to ensure that 
positions were fairly reflected. As is often the case in research projects that include 
qualitative data, however, choices were made in terms of identifying the themes that 
would be incorporated into the final product. Given that the focus of this thesis was on 
identifying factors related to the apparent failure of conditional sentences as tools of 
prison reduction, responses that spoke to this issue were elevated, sometimes at the 
expense of equally interesting responses that did not.  
4.2 Thematic Analyses 
 Net-widening  
The most substantive threat to the success of sanctions intended to replace 
imprisonment is that they will be used, instead, as alternatives to a more lenient 
response (e.g., probation). Indeed, prior to the 1996 enactment of Bill C-41, concerns 
around net-widening were repeatedly raised as part of the national debate regarding the 
risks of introducing a new non-custodial sanction. Nonetheless, the government 
persisted, codifying the principle of restraint, and creating a non-custodial form of 
imprisonment. Notably, these reforms were not accompanied by either of the 
mechanisms intended to provide principled direction to judges in terms of their practical 
 
448 Some judges had been recruited through the survey and others volunteered this information 
during the interview. They were not otherwise asked, given the reassurances that they had been 
given in terms of the anonymity of the survey. 
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application—e.g., a sentencing commission or sentencing guidelines. As Doob (1990) 
noted: 
In order to implement a policy of reduced use of imprisonment, two of the 
necessary conditions appear to be the enactment by Parliament of a 
coherent sentencing policy that endorses the use of community sanctions 
and a method of providing authoritative and unambiguous guidance on 
sentencing to judges.449  
And so, it should come as no surprise that evaluations conducted twenty years 
after conditional sentences were introduced either reported disappointing results or were 
quick to raise net-widening as a likely explanation for the sanction’s apparent failure as a 
tool for prison reduction. Reid and Roberts (2019), for instance, refer to the conditional 
sentence as a “parasitical sanction” that has been attached to the probation caseload in 
many cases.450 Similarly, Webster and Doob (2019) speak of judges using conditional 
sentences as more robust probation orders, suggesting that a non-trivial number of 
conditional sentences were imposed on offenders who would otherwise have been 
placed on probation.451 The above-mentioned studies provide helpful context for this 
dissertation and its narrower focus. Indeed, through survey and interview responses, this 
study offers several new insights into the apparent ineffectiveness of conditional 
sentences as prison reduction strategies in BC.  
To be clear, there is no suggestion that judges deliberately or even consciously 
decided to undermine parliamentary intent through the misapplication of conditional 
sentences. Indeed, most judges made it clear that regardless of their own perspectives, 
they use conditional sentences only in cases in which they have already decided a term 
of imprisonment is necessary. Notably, when asked whether, in their opinion, conditional 
sentences had reduced the number of offenders sent to custody in their court, all survey 
participants responded affirmatively.452 However, given the broad sentencing ranges that 
have existed for most offences and the discretion traditionally granted to judges, it is 
 
449 Doob, supra note 2 at p. 415. 
450 Reid & Roberts, supra note 1 at p. 35. 
451 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 194. 
452 In the current survey, 28/40 (70%) of the survey participants indicated that conditional 
sentences had “definitely” reduced the number of offenders sent to custody in their court; 12/40 
(30%) expressed only slightly less confidence, indicating that the sanction “probably” had that 
effect (Q#2).  
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possible, if not likely, that judges may have been unaware that their decisions sometimes 
acted to widen the net of penal control. 
In addressing the net-widening phenomenon as it relates to conditional 
sentences, the following section will be broken down into three main areas. The first 
responds to the question “why did judges not use conditional sentences in place of 
prison?” This will include an exploration of several factors expected to influence whether 
judges saw (or accepted) conditional sentences as credible prison alternatives, including 
their construction, resourcing, and monitoring.  
The second section also focuses on judicial perspectives, though instead of 
exploring the “push” (i.e., identifying the factors that weighed against their use in place of 
prison), it examines the “pull” and seeks to identify the factors that may have encouraged 
their use in place of probation. Finally, the third section examines the ways in which the 
guidance provided in Proulx may have unintentionally contributed to conditional 
sentences that acted to increase (not decrease) imprisonment rates. 
4.2.1.1 The push  
The literature suggests several possible explanations for judicial reluctance to 
use conditional sentences in place of traditional terms of imprisonment. At a conceptual 
level, these include concerns related to the sanction’s construction, skepticism in a non-
custodial sanction’s ability to address deterrence and denunciation, and an awareness of 
public dissatisfaction with its use. At a pragmatic level, these challenges reflect concerns 
tied to the sanction’s “penal bite” and resourcing. Put another way, having a non-
custodial sanction used as a form of “community imprisonment” requires both judicial 
confidence in the sanction and public acceptance of the sanction. These, in turn, are 
linked to appropriate “branding” and the provision of adequate funding. The punitiveness 
(or penal “bite”) of conditional sentences, after all, is tied to the inclusion of onerous 
conditions; implicit in this, is the assumption that such conditions are vigorously 
monitored and regularly enforced. The following sections explore these areas through 
the lens of judicial decision-making.  
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Conditional sentence construction as a legal fiction 
As suggested earlier, the original sin of conditional sentencing may be in the 
decision to construct the sanction as an alternate form of imprisonment. This did little to 
promote public acceptance, especially with a public already sensitized to perceptions of 
leniency in sentencing,453 and arguably set the sanction up to fail by creating (punitive) 
expectations that it could not meet. Clearly, if conditional sentences are not accepted as 
some form of imprisonment, it is unlikely that they will be used as such.  
And, in fact, several judges interviewed recalled having concerns when 
conditional sentences were first introduced. Indeed, of the 16 judges who spoke on this 
issue, most (11/16) recalled having a negative reaction. One judge remembers lawyers 
referring to conditional sentences as “pretend jail” (Judge P). Another reported that when 
conditional sentences were created, “I thought they were an intellectually dishonest 
probation order” (Judge N). Judge “I” had a similar response, wondering - “How can you 
call this jail? This is really probation, and it is really just probation being dressed up in 
different language…. You’re going to sentence him to jail but he’s not going to go to 
jail?.” 
Judges were evenly split between those who reported accepting conditional 
sentences as a form of imprisonment, and those who did not.454 Notably, there were four 
factors repeatedly raised by those who took the position that conditional sentences are a 
form of jail (or are “jail-like”). The first was that the sanction is, quite literally, defined as a 
jail sentence – “that’s a jail sentence no matter how it looks to everybody else—by 
definition” (Judge F). Second, the order is punitive, with the routine inclusion of a curfew 
or house arrest providing penal “weight.” Third, the facilitated breach mechanisms 
promote compliance, and, finally, upon proven breach the offender can be ordered to 
serve the balance of the term in custody. As Judge F observed, “[a conditional sentence] 
has the teeth of a prison sentence because it’s considered a prison sentence. The bite 
comes down if the person breaches and you terminate.” 
 
453 Marinos, V., & Doob, A. N. (1999). Understanding public attitudes toward conditional 
sentences of imprisonment. Criminal Reports (5th), 21, 31–41. 
454 Overall, 16 judges addressed the challenge of defining conditional sentences as terms of 
imprisonment; eight suggested conditional sentences are (or should be) seen as jail terms, and 
eight suggested they are not.  
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Several judges who accepted conditional sentences as prison terms nonetheless 
acknowledged the challenge of communicating that fact to the offender and to the public. 
One judge, for instance, made a practice of having offenders taken into custody in the 
courtroom and having them held in custody until the paperwork had been prepared, 
reviewed, and signed— “[it was] for the benefit of the public, I wanted them to 
understand it is a jail sentence. That was my way of getting at it. That’s a real concern” 
(Judge L). Another stressed the importance of explaining to offenders that they are being 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment notwithstanding the fact that it will be served in the 
community. “I want them to know that it’s not a beefed-up probation order; it’s a jail 
sentence. I’ll say that ‘This is a jail sentence but you’re getting the opportunity to serve it 
in the community.’ I want them to know the seriousness of it” (Judge E).  
Notably, there was implicit recognition that a certain level of public support for 
(and confidence in) sentencing is necessary, and that getting the public to understand 
and accept the notion of imprisonment served “in the community” was particularly 
challenging. Indeed, there was a sense that the government had failed to educate or 
communicate effectively to the public at the time and had made little effort to “sell” the 
new sanction.455 As one interview participant noted with some frustration, “[f]rom the 
government’s perspective, they left the PR component to the judges. We did try to do 
some of that in the early part…[W]e tried to explain that it really was jail, but nobody was 
buying it” (Judge Y). 
Judges who struggled with the notion of conditional sentences as terms of 
imprisonment spoke in terms of legal fictions and the amorphous nature of the sanction. 
Judge U, for instance, was concerned that a failure to treat breaches severely had 
resulted in conditional sentences becoming “a bit of a sham,” one that led to his or her 
belief that “some judges are misleading the public at the sentencing stage, when they 
sound like they’re doing something serious, but in reality, they’re not.” Several judges 
explicitly rejected the notion that there could be a meaningful equivalence between 
conditional sentences and terms of imprisonment. Judge C, for instance, offered the 
following: 
 
455 On this point, see Roberts & Manson, supra note 381 at p. 19; McLellan, supra note 207 at p. 
269; and Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 193. 
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I appreciate that the law is that a conditional sentence is a jail sentence 
served in the community, but the reality of it is that it is served in the 
community. In my view, notwithstanding the actual law, there’s a closer 
affinity between a conditional sentence and probationary sentences. 
Similarly, as Judge G observed, “I don’t see them generally being viewed as jail 
sentences, but rather as glorified suspended sentences with periods of probation.” Two 
of the survey participants also addressed the fiction of conditional sentences as terms of 
imprisonment. One challenged the argument made by some defence counsel that a 
conditional sentence was no different than traditional jail - “If that were so, I often 
wondered why they always argued so strenuously for it” (Judge #33). The other 
questioned the ability of the appellate courts to provide guidance to lower court judges 
on this issue – “Higher courts continue to pretend that conditional sentences are 
somehow as much a form of punishment as jail. Nobody in the general public believes 
that. So long as higher courts continue with this highly suspect notion, they cannot give 
proper guidance” (Judge #14). 
Judge W expressed discomfort at sentencing someone to essentially “spend their 
time at home watching television” and frustration that conditional sentences could not 
easily be ranked on a scale of sanctions. The judge explained that “one CSO could be 
below a suspended sentence in the hierarchy, and another could be as punitive as going 
to the penitentiary.” Notwithstanding these concerns, Judge W saw value in conditional 
sentences, arguing that the legal fiction they represent is beneficial, justifiable, and 
“intellectually sustainable.” This judge suggested that the true problem is that conditional 
sentences are not seen as being sufficiently punitive, arguing that “punishment means 
something specific and CSOs don’t fit within that… [They] don’t fit into our perception of 
punishment, even though we know that [they should].” 
And so, much of the early legal debate focused on the sanction’s unfortunate 
construction, and the implications that it had in terms of both public and judicial 
acceptance. The extent to which judges were unable to see conditional sentences as 
any form of imprisonment likely informed, as we would expect, their use of the sanction 
in cases in which they viewed imprisonment as the appropriate (and necessary) 
response. Indeed, this was particularly evident in discussions of the ability of conditional 
sentences to adequately address the sentencing objectives of denunciation and 
deterrence. 
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Deterrence and denunciation 
In Proulx, the Court implicitly recognized that conditional sentences could only 
succeed as measures of prison reduction if they were able to satisfy (at least in some 
cases) the sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation. Indeed, early research 
drew attention to judicial skepticism in this area. In the 1998 National Survey, judges 
were asked whether a conditional sentence could be as effective as imprisonment in 
achieving various sentencing objectives: denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
reparation, and proportionality. While almost three-quarters (71.7%; n=449) indicated 
that conditional sentences were “always” or “usually” as effective as imprisonment in 
achieving rehabilitation, only approximately one-third of the respondents believed this 
was true for the objectives of denunciation (35.3%) or deterrence (34.7%).456   
When comparing the 1998 and 2018 results for BC judges, we see positive shifts 
on every objective measured. Specifically, most judges (over 60%) in the current survey 
indicated that conditional sentences “always” or “usually” can be as effective as a regular 
sentence of imprisonment in achieving rehabilitation (92.5%) and reparations (65.8%). 
Further, 67.5% indicated that they can “always” or “usually” craft orders that represent 
proportionate responses. Notably, the largest shifts observed were in relation to the 
objectives of denunciation and deterrence. In 1998, only one-quarter of the BC judges 
had confidence in a conditional sentence’s ability to address denunciation; in 2018 over 
one-half responded positively on that measure (53.8%). A similar increase is noted in 
terms of deterrence, with slightly over one-third indicating that a conditional sentence 
could “always” or “usually” address this objective in 1998, as compared to 60% in 2018 
(see Table 4-10 below).  
Notwithstanding the increased confidence expressed by some judges in the 
ability of conditional sentences to address deterrence and denunciation, some 
skepticism remained. Indeed, in the current survey (2018), 40% of the judges indicated 
that conditional sentences were only “sometimes,” “almost never,” or “never” as effective 
as imprisonment in achieving deterrence; 46.1% responded similarly regarding 
denunciation. And so, despite the increased confidence most judges expressed in the 
sanction’s ability to address deterrence and denunciation, a considerable number 
 
456 Roberts, et al., supra note 13 at p.6.  
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remained unconvinced.457 It would be reasonable to assume that judges who held such 
beliefs would be less likely than others to impose a conditional sentence in place of a 
term of imprisonment in a case in which they had concluded that deterrence and 
denunciation were primary considerations. 
Table 4-10 BC survey results - 1998 vs 2018 - sentencing objectives 
Response to: “A CSO can be as effective as imprisonment in achieving…” 
BC only Denunciation Deterrence Rehabilitation Reparation Proportionality 














% 17.9% 25.5% 7.5% 4.0% 0.0% 12.2% 10.5% 17.6% 5.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 n=51 n=39 n=51 n=40 n=50 n-=40 n=49 n=38 n=51 n=40 
 
During the interviews, judges were asked to comment on the apparent increase 
in expressed confidence in the sanction’s ability to deter and denounce. Most (20/24) 
participants suggested that Proulx was the primary factor in this shift.458 Indeed, several 
judges saw the court’s endorsement of the sanction’s ability to address denunciation and 
deterrence as a turning point. Until then, one participant noted, judges were reluctant to 
use conditional sentences for serious offences; once the court said that they do (or can) 
have a denunciatory and deterrent effect, that changed (Judge X). As Judge O 
explained, “Proulx was a jumping off point… [telling us conditional sentences] should be 
used a lot more often than they were back then.” For some, the decision also addressed 
concerns about the relative leniency of conditional sentences. For example, one judge 
noted that “Proulx gave [s.742.1] a little bit of muscle. It was the best thing to happen to 
 
457 Of the judges who commented on the ability of conditional sentences to achieve denunciation 
and deterrence objectives in the interview, several (5/21) saw them as being no better than 
suspended sentences. While 3/5 suggested that neither order would be effective, two believed 
that, to the extent a non-custodial outcome can satisfy these objectives, they were equally able to 
do so. As Judge C explained, “I think it’s all a shell game to be honest.” 
458 Of the four judges who did not respond to this question, two were retired, one was relatively 
new, and one ran out of time. 
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conditional sentencing as far as I was concerned. It just took away that perception that 
we all had, that this is a walk for any accused” (Judge I).  
Notably, for many judges their stated belief that conditional sentences could 
address denunciation and deterrence appeared to be rooted in the Supreme Court’s 
declaration to that effect. As one judge observed, “[judges] will talk about that—that a 
CSO does provide the necessary denunciation and deterrence required to satisfy the 
sentencing principles. I don’t think that a CSO was thought about that way as much 
[before Proulx]” (Judge O). A second judge framed it this way: “[The Proulx decision] 
made it very clear that CSOs can have a denunciatory and deterrent effect. That’s why 
we use them instead of jail, because the Supreme Court of Canada said they have that 
effect…Proulx gave CSOs more teeth” (Judge K). Finally, another judge noted that “the 
Supreme Court of Canada tells us that conditional sentence orders have a deterrent and 
denunciatory aspect to them—I guess we’re supposed to listen to them” (Judge T). For 
these judges, Proulx provides authority on the issue of deterrence and denunciation, 
giving them the language that they need for cases in which they want to use a 
conditional sentence. What it does not necessarily do, however, is increase the 
likelihood that a judge will genuinely believe that a non-custodial outcome is appropriate 
and/or would satisfy these (generally more punitive) objectives. 
Indeed, it is important to note that there is a difference between an authentically 
held belief in the ability of conditional sentences to deter and denounce, and one that is 
the product of jurisprudence (e.g., Proulx). Put another way, many judges take it on faith 
(or doctrine). After all, it is not as if the Supreme Court relied upon a body of research to 
make an informed, evidence-based finding that the sanction could, in fact, act to deter 
future offending and adequately denounce behaviour. On the contrary, it seems that the 
Court simply decided that the sanction would have this impact and, in doing so, implicitly 
directed lower court judges to accept this determination, or at least to act as if they do.  
And so, we see many judges parroting the rhetoric of Proulx (e.g., focusing on 
the sanction’s punitive nature or its enhanced “teeth” or “bite”) in an apparent effort to 
convince the public of its truth and, at times, perhaps to convince even themselves. In 
terms of faith in the ability of conditional sentences to effectively deter and denounce, 
Judge U suggested that this became more important after the Court in Proulx clarified 
that the sanction could be applied to all offences. As he/she explained, “When you do 
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use [CSOs] on a serious case—I don’t know if a sales job is the right word—but you’re 
persuading the public that you’re doing the right thing, so you include words like that.” 
Alternatively, regardless of their opinion, some judges may feel the need to be 
seen to adopt (or at least accept) this belief for the benefit of appellate courts. In the 
context of the increased focus on (and faith in) the ability of conditional sentences to 
deter and denounce, Judge B offered these thoughts: 
So, it doesn’t surprise me at all that we focus more on [deterrence and 
denunciation]. The really interesting thing to me is that we say those words 
in part because I think the Court of Appeal has been very clear in many 
cases that there are certain—I won’t call them magic words—but there are 
certain terms of art that at least if you say them, the Court of Appeal can’t 
say you didn’t turn your mind to them.   
Notably, as part of its reconstruction of conditional sentences as punitive 
sanctions capable of addressing deterrence and denunciation, the Court in Proulx 
repeatedly emphasized the need for community resources, including those necessary for 
adequate monitoring and supervision of offenders. On this issue, Lamer, C.J.C. adopted 
the language used by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Brady – “A conditional sentence 
drafted in the abstract without knowledge of what actual supervision and institutions and 
programs are available and suitable for this offender is often worse than tokenism; it is a 
sham.”459  
Indeed, to the extent that judges do not believe that conditional sentences are 
adequately resourced, vigorously monitored, and regularly enforced, they are unlikely to 
accept them as terms of imprisonment or genuinely believe that they can satisfy 
deterrence and denunciation, regardless of what they may say. This offers some 
explanation for the finding that, while perhaps used more often for some serious 
charges, we did not see a substantial increase in the use of conditional sentences (and 
corresponding decrease in the use of imprisonment) post-Proulx. Arguably, the decision 
resuscitated the sanction but was unable to get it off life support. 
 
459 Proulx, supra note 14 at para 73 (quoting from Brady, supra note 228 at para 135). 
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Resources and monitoring  
Adequate resourcing is relevant in terms of both offender support and 
supervision in the community. The following section explores resourcing as it relates 
specifically to the (punitive) use of curfews and house arrest, and the use of optional 
conditions to create conditional sentences that approach the penal equivalency of the jail 
term being replaced. Such conditions can create tension between the obvious need for 
resourcing and the recognition that program funding through provincial governments has 
been an issue since conditional sentences were introduced. While perhaps not 
determinative on its own, the failure to provide (or apply) adequate resources can be 
seen as the “last straw” for frustrated judges that were already concerned that neither 
the public nor the offender were viewing conditional sentences as penal equivalencies.  
Curfews & house arrest – “has to have some teeth” 
The survey asked judges how often they included house arrest or curfew 
conditions when imposing conditional sentences. Of the 40 responding judges, all but 
one (97.5%) indicated that they include house arrest or curfew conditions “often or 
always.” Given its importance, this issue was further explored in the interviews. Framed 
more broadly, judges were asked whether they had developed optional conditions that 
they tended to impose on conditional sentences. Responses left little doubt that BC 
judges had incorporated the use of curfews and house arrest conditions when crafting 
conditional sentences. Almost all (22/23) mentioned that they generally or always include 
such conditions on their orders, though they were much more likely to impose curfews 
than house arrest.460  
For some judges, restrictive conditions were clearly intended to make the orders 
more punitive for the offenders. Judge G, for instance, stressed the importance of 
conditional sentences holding “weight”, saying - “yes, always a curfew. There has to be 
some bite to them.” The idea that conditional sentences should inflict some level of pain 
was echoed by Judge P, who stressed the sanction’s punitive nature, saying that “it has 
 
460 Two judges provided estimates of their relative usage of house arrest: one said 25% of the 
time (Judge P); the other said 30% of the time (Judge F). 
   
157 
to have some teeth.” For other judges, curfews and house arrest also send a message to 
the public that this is real punishment (Judge N). As Judge J noted, for instance: 
I will sometimes impose a 24-hour house arrest other than being out to 
obtain the necessities of life or for a medical emergency. Again, I think 
that’s part of the court’s role to communicate to the community that this is 
jail in the community; they can’t be wandering the streets.  
The issue of resources came up repeatedly in survey responses. When asked if 
they would use conditional sentences more frequently if there were more community 
and/or supervisory resources provided, most judges (35/40) responded “yes.” When 
asked what more is needed, the most frequently given responses (33/55) related to 
supportive resources (e.g., treatment and training programs).461 Approximately one-
quarter (25.5%) of the responses called attention to the need for additional supervisory 
resources to ensure effective monitoring and enforcement of the orders (see Table 4-11 
below). 
Table 4-11 Survey responses - "what more is needed?" (Q#10) 
Response to "what more is needed?" Frequency Percentage 
alcohol & drug treatment, mental health, 
counselling 25 45.5% 
supervision & enforcement (including electronic 
monitoring) 14 25.5% 
probation staff to support & supervise 5 9.1% 
native cultural programs/ skills training programs 4 7.3% 
housing 4 7.3% 
other 3 5.5% 
Total 35 judges * 55 100.0% 
*Judges provided multiple responses (35 judges provided 55 responses) 
 
461 Concern regarding the perceived lack of supportive resources was expressed with 
considerable specificity and often revolved around mental health and housing issues. As one 
judge argued, “we need considerably more resources for housing, mental health, addictions, 
education, job searches and training and personal skills training” (Judge #16). In terms of 
supportive resources and the decision to impose a conditional sentence, several judges 
connected housing to conditional sentences. As one judge noted, “[a lack of] housing is a huge 
barrier to sentencing an offender to a conditional sentence” (Judge #24). Another observed that 
“the availability of stable and supportive housing should not dictate whether one person [who has 
housing already] gets a CSO and another does not” (Judge #36).  
Several judges expressed frustration regarding the lack of quality programs generally, and the 
almost complete lack of supportive programming in smaller or remote court locations. 
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Supervision – “They are ‘jail’ sentences after all” 
When asked to identify the main challenges of conditional sentencing in an open-
ended survey question, 19% (11/58) of the issues identified related to a lack of 
resources for offender monitoring and supervision.462 The interviews did not follow up on 
the resource issue specifically, though several judges raised it in the course of other 
responses. Some judges expressed concerns regarding the ability of local probation 
offices to deal with the volume. Judge S, for instance, questioned whether offenders 
were being churned through the system – “we’re sending so many people there that you 
kind of wonder how intense their resources are and how much support they can 
provide.” Another suggested that “the poor staff on the corrections side who are trying to 
deal with this are so overworked it’s next to impossible for them to actually monitor this 
sort of stuff” (Judge L).  
Notably, Judge L reported rarely using conditional sentences, in part due to the 
lack of resources provided for offender supervision in the community: 
I was very cynical from the beginning, that there would be adequate 
resources put in place to make this work. As it turned out my cynicism was 
borne out.…We were going through the motions and very quickly that fell 
away as there were no resources put in place to do anything other than 
have the order signed and sent out. So, my cynicism with the operation of 
this is that a judge takes a great deal of effort to contrive these conditions 
and build it and nobody does a thing with it afterwards. As a result, I’d rather 
just put them in jail.  
Judge L’s response (above) speaks directly to one explanation for the sanction’s 
failure in terms of prison reduction—specifically, that some judges refused to use 
conditional sentences due to perceptions that the orders were not sufficiently resourced 
or actively monitored. Notably, this perception also spoke indirectly to the issue of net-
widening. Indeed, one could argue that judges who used conditional sentences 
notwithstanding such concerns were not viewing the sanction as “prison-like” at all. If 
that were the case, one must wonder whether the orders represented diversions from 
custody, or from another non-custodial option.   
 
462 Multiple responses were counted, resulting in a total that is greater than 40 (Q#16). 
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Electronic monitoring 
In terms of concerns regarding levels of supervision, many survey responses 
(8/14) focused on the need for more modern electronic monitoring technology to ensure 
compliance with curfews and house arrest conditions. Other judges wanted consistent 
and frequent home visits, something they did not believe was occurring. As Judge #33 
explained, “often, I found that supervision and curfew checks, for example, were virtually 
non-existent. Most breaches were discovered only when the offender was apprehended 
for committing another crime” (Judge #33).  
It is notable that while approximately one-quarter of the survey responses 
referenced the need for more resources for offender supervision and monitoring, when 
asked whether they order electronic monitoring of curfew or house arrest conditions, 
almost three quarters (29/39; 74.4%) responded “no or never.” When asked why they do 
not include electronic monitoring, the most common response was that it was not 
available in their area due to insufficient resources (16/45; 35.6%); others said they did 
not know whether it was available or that it had not been requested by counsel (11/45; 
24.4%).463 Several responses pointed to the technological requirement for a landline that 
many offenders cannot satisfy (15.6%) while others did not feel the technology was 
reliable (8.9%). Notably, four judges essentially took the position expressed by this judge 
– “If I cannot trust the offender to follow a curfew [without electronic monitoring] then he 
or she should not be on a CSO” (Judge #7). 
The practice of imposing curfews or house arrest conditions without electronic 
monitoring is consistent with statistics collected by BC Corrections that reflect a low (and 
decreasing) utilization of electronic monitoring overall:464 
• 2009/2010 – 172 electronic monitoring cases 
 
463 Multiple responses were coded on the “why not” question; the 29 judges who said “no/never” 
provided 45 responses. 
464 These electronic monitoring utilization statistics include cases in which offenders are 
monitored on bail, conditional sentences, probation, and parole. As such, no denominator is 
provided as the focus was on the use of electronic monitoring equipment overall.  
Source: Sierra Systems. (2014). Report to British Columbia Justice and Public Safety Sector: 
Technical assessment of electronic supervision (Final report), at p. 24.  
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/corrections/reports-
publications/bc-corrections-technical-assessment-of-electronic-supervision.pdf  
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• 2011/2012 – 119 electronic monitoring cases 
• 2013/2014 – 75 electronic monitoring cases  
Given that these counts include electronic monitoring ordered on bail, conditional 
sentences, probation, and parole, it is difficult to assess changes relating specifically to 
any single type of order. Put another way, while the reduction is consistent with a post 
Bill C-10 reduction in the use of conditional sentences, it is just as likely a reflection of 
fewer crimes or an overall judicial frustration with the availability or technological 
requirements of the electronic monitoring program at that time. Regardless, the 
important point is that judges were not using the program regularly. The significance of 
this finding is more obvious when examining the use of electronic monitoring relative to 
the number of offenders subject to conditional sentences.  
Between 2014 and 2018, only 1.1% (123/11,417)465 of conditional sentences 
included electronic monitoring, although it is not clear what percentage of conditional 
sentences included either a house arrest or curfew requirement.466 On the one hand, 
when speaking of potential explanations for the failure of conditional sentences to 
achieve meaningful prison reduction, one could argue that if a judge is not inclined to 
ensure active monitoring of core conditions, it is unlikely that he or she would have 
otherwise imposed a custodial sentence. On the other hand, the lack of enforcement 
also threatens public perceptions of the sanction’s legitimacy. Whether the conditional 
sentence represents a true diversion from custody, or not, is immaterial. Judges must 
 
465 Source: Data prepared by PREv Unit, BC Corrections, May 2019. 
466 It is worth noting that many of the obstacles to using electronic monitoring have arguably been 
addressed within the last two years. BC Corrections has shifted from outdated technology that 
required that the offender have a landline, to new Global Positioning System (GPS) technology 
that does not. Aside from increasing eligibility for the program, the current system gives 
correctional staff the ability to ensure that offenders are where they should be at any given time 
(e.g., in their home); it can also inform staff of instances when offenders are where they should 
not be (e.g., within a restricted “no go” area). Source: Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General. (2017). A Profile of BC Corrections: Reduce Reoffending, Protect Communities—2017, 
at p. 6. Retrieved from Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General website: 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/corrections/reports-
publications/bc-corrections-profile.pdf 
Survey judges reported only recently becoming aware of the availability and facilitated 
requirements of this equipment; several suggested that they would be more likely to order 
electronic monitoring in the future as a result. 
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frame the sentence as some form of imprisonment, and it is difficult to support the penal 
equivalency argument if the conditions restricting an offender’s liberty are not monitored. 
Penal equivalencies – “they shouldn’t be drinking gin and tonics” 
Post Proulx efforts to craft conditional sentences that approached the penal 
equivalencies of custody were most obvious when they involved the use of curfew and 
house arrest requirements, or conditions requiring offenders to abstain from the 
consumption of drugs and/or alcohol (unrelated to the offence). Of the 16 judges who 
spoke on this issue, most (12/16) indicated that they include abstinence conditions 
specifically for the purpose of mimicking conditions of confinement. As one judge 
explained: “I usually require that they not consume alcohol or drugs…because I’m 
seeing it as a punitive sentence. You’re not supposed to be having fun on it” (Judge P). 
Judge F expressed a similar sentiment, saying “it’s a prison sentence so they shouldn’t 
be drinking gin and tonics” (Judge F).  
Several judges reported being concerned that the public may see offenders 
enjoying themselves while on a conditional sentence. This was reflected in the 
comments made by Judge R, for instance, who said: “Generally, right across the board 
we almost always will put in house arrest and curfews…. if we let offenders out to party 
and play 24/7 then how is that similar to jail?” Indeed, optional conditions were used by 
some judges, not only to service the (offender-focused) objectives of sentencing, but 
also the broader (community-focused) purpose of promoting respect for the law. As 
Judge U explained:  
I think I have to try to replicate as much as possible the jail sentence in the 
community. That includes a curfew or house arrest, it includes no alcohol 
or drugs. I don’t care if you are an addict, you’re technically not allowed to 
do drugs or alcohol in jail, and I think it would be a sham to the public to 
say that I’m jailing this person in the community, but they’re allowed to 
consume drugs and alcohol.  
Judges who reported including abstention conditions only in cases in which that 
was relevant to the offence tended to rely on curfew or house arrest requirements for 
punitive bite. As Judge N pointed out, “[the Crown] is worried that the public will see the 
conditional sentence as a slap on the wrist and they want to ‘up’ the optics of it.” Judge 
W was similarly disinclined to layer abstention requirements on top of periods of house 
arrest, indicating that it was the confinement itself that acted as punishment:  
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I don’t like treating people like they are a four-year-old and mommy and 
daddy  say you’re grounded for a week and you can’t watch TV. If the guy 
wants to sit at  home and drink beer all day long, okay fine. As long as 
they’re not out breaking into somebody’s house and as long as you feel the 
effect of the CSO. Sure, I describe it as watching TV, but he’s home and 
he doesn’t like it.  
In addition to Judge W’s comments regarding offenders essentially being 
sentenced to “watch TV,” two judges raised concerns around the inclusion of house 
arrest or curfew conditions. Judge Y questioned the discretionary nature of such 
conditions, asking rhetorically, “If you’re going to say this is a jail sentence, then why 
wouldn’t the house arrest portion be both mandatory and enforced?” The second judge 
(Judge N) challenged the equity of house arrest in terms of impact and eligibility: 
The bad side is that there’s a world of difference between serving a 
conditional sentence order, which typically has a house arrest component, 
if you’re living in the British Properties or if you’re living in an apartment in 
a slum. For a lot of people that have the same cluster of problems that 
might attract you to give that conditional sentence order, they tend not to 
qualify if they don’t have a residence, or even if their living situation is 
marginal. 
On this point, Roberts (2004) suggests that while it would be inequitable to deny 
conditional sentences to either wealthy or homeless offenders, a possible solution could 
involve having both serve their sentences in a residential halfway house.467 
Suspended vs conditional sentences – meaningful distinctions for the offender? 
In addition to concerns that conditional sentences are not objectively “jail-like,” 
there were also issues raised around the subjective experience of offenders. Of the 10 
judges who raised this during the interviews, most (7/10) indicated that they do not 
believe offenders necessarily make a distinction in their own minds between a 
suspended or conditional sentence. Relying on their experiences both as counsel and as 
judges, they spoke of offenders as being more focused on the “bottom line” impacts of 
an order, not on its label. As Judge O observed, “if you’re looking at it from the offender’s 
viewpoint, at the end of the day all they care about is ‘am I going to jail or am I not?’” 
Another judge (Judge I) went so far as to extend the issue to pre-conviction release 
orders as well, saying: 
 
467 Roberts, supra note 172 at p. 166. 
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If they can’t go to the park and they can’t stay out past eight, they don’t care 
if you call it an undertaking or a recognizance or a CSO. All they know is 
that they can’t stay out past eight o’clock.  
Notably, several judges (3/10) suggested that some offenders in certain 
circumstances can be made aware of the distinction between orders. What was 
important for them was the delivery of the message from the bench. As Judge G 
explained, for instance, “I try to make that distinction. I will say things like ‘you 
understand this is a jail term in the community and if you come back before me on a 
breach, I’m not going to be happy–-you’re likely to do some jail time so don’t breach.’” 
Judge J was unsure how often offenders or the public really understood the difference 
between a conditional sentence and a suspended sentence: “I think a lot of it depends 
upon what is said in the context of a particular sentencing hearing to hopefully drive 
home to the offender why they’re being given a conditional sentence rather than a 
suspended sentence or real jail.”  
The challenge of appropriate messaging in the context of conditional sentencing 
is that we have yet to settle on a consistent vocabulary. When describing conditional 
sentences, many judges speak of jail terms served in the community, which can be 
confusing enough. Counsel (and some judges) will contrast conditional sentences of 
imprisonment with jail that is described as being “real,” “institutional,” “traditional,” or 
“custodial.” Judge “I” reported blanching whenever crown or defence talk about a 
conditional sentence as not being real jail, saying: 
I always make a point of saying jail in a correctional institution or 
incarceration in a correctional institution, as opposed to incarceration in the 
community. I always try to make that distinction—not ‘real’ jail. Proulx says 
it is real; it’s just the location that is different. 
Again, for many judges, it is the consequences of non-compliance that 
distinguishes suspended and conditional sentences in the offender’s eyes. As one judge 
explained, “I say that to the offender: ‘this is not a probation order—you’re going to go to 
jail if you breach this.’ I want them to know that it should have a greater impact on them 
[than probation]” (Judge E). Judge G took a similar position, observing that “[offenders] 
know that they’re going to be arrested and in jail, not released on a breach charge; they 
will be in jail.” The challenge, of course, in defining a sanction based on the penalty for 
non-compliance, is that it fails to provide a rationale with which to distinguish the impact 
of the order on the compliant offender. Indeed, it is unclear how either a compliant 
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offender, or a non-compliant offender who is not subject to breach proceedings (e.g., 
due to a lack of monitoring) would experience a conditional sentence as being more 
onerous than a probation (or bail) order with the same terms.  
And so, we continue searching for a narrative that might explain why conditional 
sentences performed so poorly in terms of prison reduction. The preceding review of the 
‘push’ factors tells at least part of the story. Specifically, when conditional sentences 
were introduced, judges were unclear as to how the sanction should be used. In the 
wake of Proulx, however, many made genuine efforts to use conditional sentences as 
prison alternatives. We see this in the sanction’s application to more serious offences 
and in individual judges’ attempts to craft orders that are more clearly punitive and, 
notionally at least, closer to penal equivalences. The challenges of doing so were almost 
immediately apparent and included public (and offender) perceptions of the sanction as 
lenient, resource limitations that impacted offender monitoring, statutory construction 
issues (e.g., “not jail”), and in some cases, the judge’s own skepticism relating to the 
sanction’s ability to achieve certain sentencing objectives.  
As a result, when judges say that they use conditional sentences as a true prison 
alternative, it is probably true in limited and select cases (i.e., in exceptional 
circumstances). Nonetheless, while this offers a partial explanation for the sanction’s 
disappointing performance in terms of prison reduction, it does not provide a complete 
picture. The narrative of conditional sentencing involves more than just a low utilization 
rate for otherwise prison-bound offenders. It is a tale of two sanctions—or at least of one 
sanction used two different ways. After all, the success of conditional sentences requires 
not only that they be used in place of actual imprisonment, but equally that they not be 
used in place of other non-custodial options. As noted earlier, the sanction’s construction 
contributes to this challenge by creating a non-custodial option that looks like (and may 
be experienced as) a more easily enforced form of suspended sentence (i.e., robust 
probation).  
4.2.1.2 The pull  
The preceding section considered “push” factors—those that may discourage 
judges from using conditional sentences in place of traditional terms of imprisonment. 
The following section approaches the issue from the other perspective by focusing on 
“pull” factors—those considerations that may encourage judges to use conditional 
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sentences in place of probation. These include challenges involved in enforcing 
suspended sentences, adequately distinguishing between suspended and conditional 
sentences, and the prioritization of arguably unrealistic (utilitarian) sentencing objectives. 
Bottoms’ notion of judges acting under a “special deterrent” theory of sentencing (as 
opposed to a focus on prison reduction) will form part of this analysis.  
Suspended sentences – “we have no credibility at all” 
The enforcement mechanism for a suspended sentence envisions offenders 
being brought back to court to be sentenced if convicted of further offences, including a 
breach of the probation order, during the term of the suspension.468 As noted earlier, 
these revocation procedures are seen by many as ineffective and have been, in fact, 
rarely used (see 2.1.2.1). This is relevant to the net-widening discussion in that judicial 
frustration with the flawed enforcement mechanism of the suspended sentence could 
make conditional sentences, with their facilitated breach provisions, that much more 
appealing. 
The ineffectiveness of the suspended sentence was reflected in the results 
obtained in this study. It was clear, for instance, from both the interview and survey 
responses, that applications to revoke suspended sentences have never occurred with 
any frequency in BC. Of the 24 judges interviewed, three-quarters (18/24) indicated that 
they had literally never seen an application to revoke a suspended sentence; the 
remaining six said they had seen maybe one or two over the course of their entire career 
(either as counsel or as a judge). Judge T’s response was typical - “I’ve never had a 
revocation application on a suspended sentence–-as a judge or as defence counsel. It 
has never happened.” Similarly, of the survey judges who addressed this issue, most 
(14/24) had never seen one; 10 reported having seen one or two. As one judge noted, 
“suspended sentences are never returned to court; when there is a breach, the accused 
is just charged with a breach instead, whereas CSO breaches come back to us and we 
can take more immediate and effective action” (Judge #21). A similar sentiment was 
expressed by Judge #20 who stated that “[i]t’s a joke really since a suspended sentence 
is never enforced as such if breached.” Finally, Judge S asked, “where’s the deterrence 
if there isn’t really any risk of the sentence being imposed if they’re not following it?” 
 
468 Section 732.2(5)(d). 
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Notably, the judges who did recall having dealt with the odd revocation 
application stated that most had occurred within the last two years. As Judge F recalled, 
“I’ve had two where they’ve applied to have a suspended sentence lifted and I imposed 
conventional jail sentences.… [They were] drug cases. So, [the prosecutor was] 
unhappy that I imposed a suspended sentence but didn’t want to appeal.” Judge X’s 
experience was similar: “I’ve only experienced a revocation of a suspended sentence on 
a federal matter. It was a fentanyl trafficking, and the person received the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ suspended sentence and then didn’t comply in a substantive way.”  
As suggested earlier, the historical practice of not pursuing applications to revoke 
suspended sentences has implications in terms of the creation of conditional sentences. 
As one judge observed:  
A very experienced criminal court judge [from the BC Supreme Court], now 
retired, once commented to me in a parking lot conversation that if the 
Crown would only have used the revocation provisions for suspended 
sentences in the way that Parliament had intended, we wouldn't have 
needed conditional sentences! (Judge #18) 
The suggestion that conditional sentences were needed because suspended 
sentences were not easily enforced is consistent with judges using the former as more 
robust probation, rather than in place of custodial sentences. Indeed, Judge W spoke of 
the value of the conditional sentence relative not to prison but, rather, to the suspended 
sentence: 
Now we could impose conditions that were probably more meaningful, that 
if you don’t do what you’re supposed to do there’s an immediate remedy. 
That is not the case with a suspended sentence with probation. [The 
conditional sentence] made sense in that it was a carrot and a stick. 
Judge C also linked conditional sentences to the enforcement issues of 
suspended sentences, explaining that “[CSOs] sent a stronger message.” Indeed, this 
judge echoed others who held the opinion that conditional sentences would not have 
been needed had the revocation provisions of the suspended sentence been remedied: 
Conditional sentences, in my view were unnecessary when they were 
brought in, but we did need to have a regime for the enforcement of 
suspended sentences, in terms of revoking them. That didn’t exist, at least 
not in BC. 
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While judges were not asked explicitly to comment on the incidence of net-
widening, 19 judges raised the issue in some way while responding to other questions or 
clarifying earlier answers. Of these, most (14/19) reported being aware that there are 
some judges who use conditional sentences in place of other non-custodial options, 
though most were quick to point out that they do not do so themselves. As Judge O 
observed, for instance, “[t]he first thing you have to decide if you’re going to impose a 
CSO is whether a jail sentence is necessary. I think that’s a step a lot [of judges] miss.” 
A similar sentiment was shared by Judge P, who noted that “what happened before [Bill 
C-10] was that judges were using CSOs when they should have been using suspended 
sentences or a probationary sentence; they were over-used.” Finally, Judge A spoke of 
judges who were treating conditional sentences as “the new suspended sentence in a lot 
of cases, just because it had a lot more teeth.” 
In contrast with the suspended sentence, the breach provisions established for 
conditional sentences were generally considered to be both effective and efficient. 
Indeed, their respective enforcement mechanisms were often cited as one of the primary 
distinguishing features between suspended and conditional sentences. Overall, the 
judges interviewed tended to speak favourably of the conditional sentence breach 
provisions, describing them as both timely and rarely contested.469 Notably, having the 
offender before the court quickly was thought to give the judge the opportunity to actively 
manage the offender in the community. There was also a sense, rightly or wrongly, that 
police and probation officers were more likely to monitor and enforce conditional 
sentences, and that prosecutors were more likely to actively pursue breach allegations. 
Several (9) of the judges interviewed referenced the “Sword of Damocles” 
metaphor when discussing the enhanced enforceability of conditional sentences. Judge 
B, for instance, advised that he or she would often give “the Sword of Damocles lecture”, 
advising offenders that should they fail to comply, “the first position the crown is going to 
take is that you should be in prison.” Importantly, Judge W contrasted the conditional 
 
469 Of the 21 judges who commented on the breach provisions, 12 reported positive experiences. 
Of the nine judges who raised concerns, 4/9 related to confusion around the process, 3/9 spoke 
of offenders serving less or more time than they should, one was concerned that other judges did 
not treat breaches seriously, and one felt that the provisions could be hard—on the judge. In 
terms of the latter issue, Judge L explained that the policy of having offenders who breached 
appearing before the original sentencing judge felt like punishment (for the judge) – “it’s like 
cleaning up your own mess. That didn’t feel right—that we should be singling [judges] out for 
punishment because they’d made the wrong sentencing decision, but we did.” 
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sentence breach provisions with the revocation procedures set out for suspended 
sentences, saying:  
You can put a review on a probation order but there’s no Sword of 
Damocles hanging over their head. When they come back on a CSO they 
know damn well they could go in—not with a suspended sentence. On a 
suspended sentence we have no credibility at all.  
Similarly, Judge S spoke of the enhanced enforceability of conditional sentences, noting 
that with suspended sentences the sentence is rarely imposed: “There’s some case law 
that refers to the Sword of Damocles hanging over your head [on suspended 
sentences]—really? It’s kind of a dull sword.” Finally, Judge K described “the beauty of [a 
CSO] is if they breach the conditions, they have to come back before you or another 
judge, so there’s a nice deterrent effect hanging over them all the time.”  
Prioritizing utilitarian sentencing objectives 
Following the language used in Proulx, judges also distinguished suspended and 
conditional sentences according to their nature (punitive versus rehabilitative) and their 
ability to promote specific sentencing objectives. Indeed, another way of approaching the 
net-widening issue is to examine the primary purpose for which the sanction is used. In 
the case of conditional sentences, this could include a focus on reducing the number of 
offenders sentenced to jail, referred to by Bottoms (1981) as the avoiding prison theory. 
It could also include providing a community-based (rehabilitative) sanction with a more 
effective breach mechanism, something described by Bottoms as the special deterrent 
theory.470 As discussed earlier, these goals have been embedded in the judicial rhetoric 
around conditional sentences since their introduction.  
Bottoms (1981) applied this analysis in his review of the English suspended 
sentence, a sanction conceptually like our conditional sentence.471 In terms of the British 
experience, Bottoms argued that it was the inappropriate use of the suspended sentence 
that defeated the purpose behind the legislation, though he suggested that “there is 
 
470 Conditional sentences, according to this theory, are more effective than suspended sentences 
in terms of rehabilitation because offenders are more likely to comply with treatment or 
counselling requirements, and in terms of individual deterrence, because the consequences of re-
offending or non-compliance are known, swift, and (arguably) certain, as opposed to the more 
uncertain and delayed consequences of a breach of probation. 
471 Bottoms, supra note 191. 
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nothing illogical or inconsistent in holding both theories together. One can argue that 
both are appropriate, but for different types of offender.”472 Problems arise, however, 
when legislation focuses on one justification (avoiding prison) and fails to anticipate the 
appeal of the other (special deterrent). This is especially problematic in the case of the 
Canadian conditional sentence since the conditions lend themselves to traditional 
utilitarian aims, and their definition as terms of imprisonment allows judges to feel that 
they are being punitive, yet humane at the same time.  
To the extent that Canadian judges have operated under a special deterrent 
theory, drawn to using conditional sentences as robust probation, the official intent to 
reduce prison populations is undermined. The following section explores this implicit 
form of net-widening through an analysis informed by Bottoms’ special deterrent theory. 
Specific attention is paid to two interview questions. The first asked judges to identify 
what they saw as the goals of conditional sentencing (Q#1); the second asked judges 
what metrics they thought might be relevant to an assessment of the sanction’s 
effectiveness (Q# 2).  
Conditional sentences were thought to incorporate multiple goals. Indeed, most 
of the judges interviewed (21/24) spoke of the sanction’s prison reduction goals,473 and 
all (24/24) mentioned traditional crime reduction (utilitarian) objectives—that is, those 
related to offender deterrence, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Responses provided 
through the survey were consistent in that the bulk of goals identified (56.1%) related to 
utilitarian concerns. While prison reduction was regularly mentioned (representing 29.8% 
of responses), it did not appear to be the priority. Notably, this pattern represented a 
 
472 Ibid at p.3. 
473 The primary advantages of conditional sentences were generally framed as maintaining the 
positive aspects of keeping an offender in the community or avoiding the negative aspects of 
holding an offender in prison, which are essentially two sides of the same “jail is bad” coin. In that 
sense, their responses reflected the rhetoric of restraint, especially the belief that incarceration is 
inherently harmful and, accordingly, should be avoided whenever possible. Judge R spoke of the 
negative impact that imprisonment has on offenders, their families, and the community, saying, 
“prison often makes people worse than when they go in.” Judge A expressed a similar sentiment, 
noting that “[prisons are] basically boarding school for crooks and those become their friends 
when they get out.” Several judges spoke of prisons as being expensive institutions with no 
redeeming values—describing them, for instance, as a “warehousing concept that grows from 
hopelessness” (Judge D). 
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clear shift from the responses given by BC judges as part of the 1998 survey, in which 
prison reduction was the primary objective most often identified (see Figure 4-6). 
Figure 4-6 BC survey results – 1998 (n=58) vs 2018 (n=57) - primary objective of 
conditional sentencing (Q#1) 474 
 
 
And so, the conditional sentence has evolved, from being a sanction initially 
targeting prison reduction, to one with broader, arguably conflicting objectives, including 
crime reduction. In the current project, the prioritization of utilitarian objectives became 
clear when judges were asked what metrics they thought would be relevant in an 
assessment of the effectiveness of conditional sentencing. Given the clear grounding of 
 
474 Though the question asked for a single objective, some judges provided more than one and, in 
such cases, both were coded. The 1998 survey included 58 responses from 51 judges; the 
current (2018) survey included 57 responses from 40 judges. To make responses comparable, 
the 2018 responses were coded using the 20 coding options generated for the 1998 responses. 
Once coded, the 20 options were collapsed into five categories (as above) based on the primary 
focus of each. And so, for instance, responses coded as either “reduce imprisonment”, “reduce 
imprisonment of non-violent offenders”, “reduce negative effects of imprisonment”, “keep low risk 
offenders out of jail”, ‘more cost effective than prison”, or “save jail for worst offenders”, were re-
coded into the group code of “focus on prison reduction.”  
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conditional sentences in the rhetoric of restraint, it was expected that most would include 
some measure of prison reduction or evidence that offenders were in fact being diverted 
from what would otherwise have been prison sentences. Notably, for most of the judges 
interviewed (21/ 24), the primary focus was on short and long-term recidivism measures; 
only three judges initially mentioned measures related to prison reduction, though an 
additional nine judges—when prompted—agreed that this latter response might also be 
a relevant metric.475   
Recidivism – “It’s intended to help you…to change your life” 
Most of the judges interviewed identified recidivism as a relevant metric for 
assessing the effectiveness of conditional sentence orders. Some, like Judge F, focused 
on short term impacts - “you’re going to want to look at recidivism. What’s the rate of 
offending while on a CSO? What’s the rate of breaching while on a CSO?” Judge G was 
similarly focused on the term of the order, saying, “I would want to see how many people 
are completing without incident.…I look more at the short-term goal that they’ve 
successfully completed the order and they look like they’re on the right path.” Other 
judges looked for longer term change, suggesting that the real test is whether behaviour 
changes when the order is over, and the offender has the liberty to make good and bad 
choices (Judge T).  
Many of the responses suggest support for the use of conditional sentences as 
special deterrents. Judge B, for instance, suggested that “if you impose a conditional 
sentence order and the person never comes back before the court system again, then 
that’s been a successful result.” Equating success with law-abidingness was also evident 
in the response of Judge E, who took the position that both breaches and future 
offending should be part of any evaluation. Similarly, Judge S stated that “if they go on to 
reoffend, then you have to really question whether or not the deterrent part of it has been 
given voice by the CSO.”  
 
475 While most (9/12) agreed that prison reduction would be a possible metric, several (3/12) saw 
it as being irrelevant to an assessment of the sanction’s effectiveness. In terms of the minority 
position, one judge indicated that information regarding prison admissions may be influential at 
the bail stage but is not relevant at the sentencing stage (Judge U). Another saw the appropriate 
focus as being on the enhanced rehabilitation opportunities available in the community, 
regardless of what may be happening in the prison population (Judge J). 
   
172 
Of the judges interviewed, two indicated that they did not view recidivism as a 
relevant consideration when assessing the effectiveness of conditional sentences. One 
took the position that the prosecution of breaches could be seen as evidence of the 
effectiveness of the order in that it suggests that conditions are monitored and failures to 
comply are being enforced (Judge W). This view is consistent with Bottoms’ avoiding 
prison theory in which the focus is on having the offender serve the term of imprisonment 
in the community under tight controls. If that is the goal in at least some cases, then 
evidence of monitoring and enforcement can be seen as signs that the order is 
effectively controlling the offender’s behaviour outside of a prison environment. 
The second judge, perhaps the lone strict retributivist within the group, took the 
position that a judge’s task was to assess a proportionate sentence tailored to what the 
offender did, not to craft a sentence designed to affect what the offender might do in the 
future. As this judge (Judge C) explained: 
You always hope that people will commit less crime or no crime, but I don’t 
think that’s a particular goal of mine in imposing any sentence. The 
sentence is tailored to what the offender did. Proportionality for me is the 
biggest—the most important consideration. The sentencing objectives— 
deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation, reparations, etcetera—those are 
objectives, one or more, you can hope to achieve…You’re not sentencing 
the offender for being a bad person. So, I don’t know that [recidivism] really 
factors into it that much for me.  
This is quite a contrast to the position taken by Judge O, who provided the following 
response: 
Everything that we do is with the hope that it will reduce the offending 
behaviour. That’s not just for the community, that’s also for the individual 
themselves. I try to explain that quite often. To say, ‘you may look at this 
as punishment, but it’s intended to help you with your life—to change your 
life.’  
On its face, incorporating utilitarian objectives into the goals of conditional 
sentencing is not necessarily problematic. Indeed, even when this includes drawing 
offenders up into a more severe sanction designed to promote greater compliance, it 
could be argued that this represents benevolent net-mending (of the ineffective 
suspended sentence) rather than malevolent net-widening. Reid and Roberts (2019), for 
instance, argue that government should pay attention when the courts use sanctions in 
unexpected ways. Notably, they suggest that judges may use conditional sentences in 
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place of probation due to insufficient funding for the latter. Indeed, they go so far as to 
frame net-widening as “an understandable judicial reaction to an inadequately resourced 
community sanction.”476 
Notwithstanding good intentions, there is a dark side to up-tariffing sentences in 
order to impose one with more effective compliance mechanisms. Put another way, 
when dealing with an offender who would not otherwise be incarcerated, even an order 
that is designed to enhance his or her motivation to make positive life changes (e.g., 
requiring abstinence, a curfew, or an area restriction), can result in an offender’s 
incarceration if (or when) strict compliance is not possible. Indeed, it could be argued 
that offenders must be protected against such measures, even when imposed for their 
“own good.” This is particularly the case in light of the guidance provided by the SCC in 
Proulx. 
4.2.1.3 ‘The Proulx’  
Proulx had multiple impacts on conditional sentencing in Canada. In the short-
term, the decision arguably salvaged a sanction that was struggling to find a niche. It did 
so by providing judges with a methodology for the application of conditional sentences 
and by re-constructing the sanction as an intermediate sanction capable of achieving 
sentencing objectives that had, up until then, generally been associated primarily with 
custodial outcomes (i.e., denunciation and deterrence). In the longer term, however, the 
guidance provided by the high court arguably resulted in the diminishment of conditional 
sentences (via the restrictions imposed by Bill C-10). More importantly, the court’s 
decision may have acted to reduce the sanction’s effectiveness as a mechanism for 
prison reduction.  
In terms of Proulx’s contribution to the diminishment of conditional sentences, 
precisely by confirming that the sanction was available for all offences that met the 
limited statutory requirements, the Court enabled its use for the types of serious offences 
that would eventually lead to resistance from various Attorneys General, victim advocacy 
groups, and the public (see 2.3.2). Ultimately, the politicization of this issue resulted in 
most serious offences becoming ineligible for conditional sentencing. While this would 
have limited the sanction’s ability to reduce the use of imprisonment in any meaningful 
 
476 Reid & Roberts, supra note 1 at p. 35. 
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way, there were two additional aspects of Proulx that arguably had similar, or greater, 
impacts.  
Conditional sentences as the “do-it-all” sanction 
When initially introduced, conditional sentences were grounded in the rhetoric of 
restraint. Prisons were framed as expensive and inhumane, and offenders, having lost 
their jobs, relationships, and ties to the community, were thought to come out more likely 
to reoffend, not less. Within this model, conditional sentences would reduce the use of 
traditional imprisonment, thereby saving money, treating offenders more humanely, and 
avoiding the negative (criminogenic) influences generally associated with incarceration. 
The goal was straightforward and realistic. As Martinson (1974) so astutely observed 
decades earlier, “if we can’t do more for (and to) offenders, at least we can safely do 
less.”477  
The decision in Proulx complicated this objective by framing conditional 
sentences as sanctions capable of achieving both prison reduction and crime reduction 
objectives. Perhaps more importantly, in doing so it failed to anticipate the appeal (or 
impact) of the latter. As discussed in the preceding section, the elevation of utilitarian 
objectives may have indirectly supported the use of conditional sentences as a form of 
enforceable probation and encouraged judges to impose onerous conditions under the 
guise of offender rehabilitation. Both practices are problematic in terms of prison 
reduction. 
Specifically, the use of conditional sentences for offenders that would not 
otherwise have been imprisoned (net-widening) can increase the use of imprisonment in 
several ways. The first, and most obvious, is that non-compliance with conditions can 
result in the incarceration of an offender who likely would not have been taken into 
custody otherwise. In that sense, the pursuit of utilitarian objectives (e.g., rehabilitation) 
can be problematic, especially when judges are sentencing marginalized offenders who 
may not have many supports, or offenders who may be dealing with poverty, 
homelessness, mental health and/or addiction challenges. Judges may be tempted to 
use conditional sentences for such populations, believing that the orders allow for more 
effective offender management in the community or that more resources will be made 
 
477 Martinson, supra note 84 at p. 48. 
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available—in short, for the offender’s own good. Notwithstanding decades of research 
that suggests limited positive impacts of rehabilitative programming, judges appear to 
remain committed to such objectives. Indeed, as noted earlier, many judges suggested 
that the effectiveness of conditional sentences should be evaluated based on reductions 
in recidivism, as opposed to reductions in the use of imprisonment.  
Notably, many judges implicitly endorsed the view that offenders could be “fixed” 
through the imposition of sentences designed to address specific risks and needs. In 
such a scenario, conditional sentences were particularly well-suited to the task. As 
Judge “I” explained, 
How better to achieve the aim of sentencing? The protection of society, 
respect for the law–-how better to do that than to change somebody from 
being a problem to being a law-abiding stable individual? That’s where 
CSOs kick in.  
Of course, the danger of using criminal sanctions to effect positive change, 
especially when dealing with high-needs populations (e.g., homeless, drug-addicted, 
etc.), is that they may not be able to comply with the more onerous requirements of a 
conditional sentence. It may not be realistic, for instance, to require that such an 
offender abstain absolutely from the consumption of drugs, comply with a strict curfew, 
or stay out of a defined area of the city. Ruby (1999) foreshadows this issue when 
speaking of prison alternatives that become “traps” for users, saying: 
The criminal law is applied with disproportionate efficiency to those who 
have inadequate social abilities, skills, and opportunities…. In this way, use 
of the conditional sentence may well lead to an increase in overall 
imprisonment because its conditions will not be kept.478  
Conditional sentences that are longer and stronger (more punitive) 
In Proulx, the Court directed judges to make conditional sentences longer than 
the prison terms they replace and to include onerous (punitive) conditions, including 
curfews and house arrest. Having endorsed these longer and stronger conditional 
sentences, the Court went on to suggest that adequate resources must be available for 
offender monitoring, and that proven breaches should be met with incarceration. These 
measures were necessary, the Court explained, to distinguish conditional sentences 
 
478 Ruby, supra note 411 at p. viii. 
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from suspended sentences with probation, promote the objectives of denunciation and 
deterrence, and ensure that offenders do not avoid punishment.479 
And so, in attempting to resolve one problem (the relative leniency of conditional 
sentences), the Court may have created another. After all, any effort to understand the 
relationship between conditional sentences and the use of imprisonment must, logically, 
include some consideration of the extent to which these initially non-custodial orders 
may become custodial orders. In the context of conditional sentencing, this transition 
occurs when an offender commits a new offence or fails to comply with a condition 
imposed. Indeed, by making the orders longer (with no remission time granted) and 
including additional (onerous) conditions, the likelihood that one of these situations will 
arise is increased.480  
Breaches that convert conditional sentences from non-custodial to custodial 
orders can be problematic whether net-widening occurs or not. In cases in which the 
order represented a true diversion from traditional imprisonment, this will depend on at 
what point in the sentence the breach occurs, and the degree to which the conditional 
sentence was extended (beyond the prison term that would have otherwise been 
imposed). It is possible, as Judge A noted, that an offender could end up serving more 
time than he/she would have, had a straight prison sentence been imposed to start with: 
[If] they breach up front, what are you going to do? Are you going to ask 
them to serve the rest of that time in custody, when the crown was originally 
asking for a third of what they got on the CSO?481 
In cases in which conditional sentences are used in place of another non-
custodial option (net-widening), the risk of increasing the use of prison is more obvious. 
To the extent that onerous and punitive conditions are included and tightly monitored, 
 
479 Proulx, supra note 14 at paras 35-39. These measures also reflected the perceived relative 
leniency of conditional sentences and were consistent with efforts to recreate the sanction as 
penal equivalencies to the prison terms that they replaced. 
480 In a study of Vancouver courts, the authors suggest that “the number of conditions and the 
length of the orders are the most significant predictors of breaches whether it is at bail, probation 
or in conditional sentence orders.” Sylvestre, et al., supra note 347 at p. 53. 
481 As a remedy to this paradox, one judge recommended that judges adopt the practice of 
specifying the prison term they would have imposed at the time when placing an offender on a 
conditional sentence. It should be noted, however, that this would arguably transform conditional 
sentences into sanctions in which a jail term is imposed but then suspended (sometimes 
referenced as a “true” suspended sentence).  
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breaches will be more likely. If conditional sentences are lengthened, and if proven 
breaches regularly result in the orders being terminated, admissions to custody will 
increase. Indeed, if the intention is to keep an offender out of prison, judges must be 
thoughtful when crafting conditional sentences—making them tough, but not too tough, 
and long, but not too long. Proulx provided no clear guidance in these areas, nor did it 
anticipate the impact of non-compliance with longer and stronger orders, especially 
when associated with up-tariffed conditional sentences. 
 Up-tariffing 
Well-intentioned reforms too often act to bring a greater number of individuals 
into the criminal justice system, widening the net of social control. Notably, the concept 
of net-widening can take many forms. At the front-end (intake), it can be seen when 
police process formal charges so that an offender can gain access to programming or 
resources that would not be available if, for instance, no charges had been laid. At the 
back-end (outcome), we can see net-widening when tighter controls (e.g., electronic 
monitoring) are applied at the parole stage. In the context of conditional sentences, net-
widening has been framed as the application of a more severe sanction (the conditional 
sentence) in place, not of prison, but of a less severe sanction—for instance, a 
suspended sentence with probation.  
Given the statutory requirements of section 742.1, if a judge wishes to impose a 
conditional sentence, he or she must first declare that the offence requires a sentence of 
imprisonment. When doing so for an offence that would not have otherwise been subject 
to imprisonment, the judge is effectively “up-tariffing” the sentence—perhaps ironically 
increasing the severity of the required response in order that a more effective (though 
less severe) sanction can be imposed. Again, while this may represent net-mending, it 
potentially frustrates efforts to reduce the use of imprisonment in several ways.  
In addition to the primary concern—that offenders who were not facing 
imprisonment may be subject to incarceration while on longer and stronger conditional 
sentences, there are two additional, though perhaps more subtle, consequences of 
sentence up-tariffing.  One relates to the impact (on future sentences) of having a 
conditional sentence of imprisonment on an offender’s criminal record. The other arises 
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when the up-tariffed option (e.g., conditional sentence) effectively recalibrates the 
sentencing range for a given offence.  
Conditional sentences and the issue of escalation 
When an offender appears repeatedly before the court, especially for the same or 
a similar offence, there is a tendency to impose progressively more severe sentences. 
While not intended to re-punish for past offences, a moderate increase in penalty 
recognizes that past sentences have been insufficient in deterring the offender.482 In that 
sense, having a criminal record that includes a conditional sentence can impact (i.e., 
escalate) future sentences should that offender be back before the court.483 Indeed, in 
some instances it may take the possibility of receiving a non-custodial option off the 
table. While offenders (and some defence counsel) may not always take that into 
consideration, judges certainly do. As Judge O explained,  
If there is a conditional sentence order made for say six months, and I see 
that on a record, I’ll look at that and think, that was a six-month jail sentence 
that he was allowed to do in the community, but it was a jail sentence…I 
take that into consideration. 
To the extent that a record reflecting a conditional sentence (as opposed to a suspended 
sentence) may influence a judge dealing with a subsequent offence to impose a 
custodial term, the use of imprisonment may be increased. While perhaps not 
immediately obvious, this occurrence could be seen as a “downstream” impact of up-
tariffing. 
The recalibration of sentence ranges 
Up-tariffing, in the context of conditional sentences, involves net-widening that 
effectively increases the punishment threshold for a given offence. Notably, this is not 
necessarily an issue in terms of prison reduction as long as the more severe (up-tariffed) 
 
482 The practice of progressively (but moderately) increasing penalties for the same offence is 
referenced in the jurisprudence as the “step-up” or “jump” principle. See, for example: R. v. Kory, 
2009 BCCA 146 at paras 6-7 or R. v. Calliou, 2019 ABCA 365, at para 8. 
483 The legal implications of being sentenced to a conditional sentence (of imprisonment) can be 
nuanced. In R. v. Tran, 2017 SCC 5, the Court held that conditional sentences are not “terms of 
imprisonment” for the purpose of defining “serious criminality” under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act. Offenders serving conditional sentences also do not earn remission 
time (R. v. Talman, 2005 BCCA 279). And finally, a conditional sentence cannot be imposed 
intermittently or as default time for non-payment of a fine (R. v. Wu, (2003) 3 SCR 530 (SCC)).  
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penalty remains both non-custodial and available.484 Put another way, in the absence of 
non-compliance (breaches), up-tariffed conditional sentences were not overly 
problematic in terms of imprisonment rates until legislative restrictions were imposed that 
made them unavailable for specific offences. Having established that imprisonment 
(conditional or traditional) was required for a given offence (e.g., drug trafficking), judges 
were left in an awkward position when access to the less severe option was blocked. As 
Webster and Doob (2019) observed, while the introduction of conditional sentences may 
not have reduced the use of imprisonment, the “functional removal” of the sanction may 
have increased it. They offered the following speculative (but plausible) explanation for 
such an outcome: 
 [T]he removal of [conditional sentences] may have left a void that has 
potentially been filled by prison. Rather than return to suspended 
sentences for cases which had been previously “up-tariffed” to conditional 
sentences, some judges may have simply upgraded them to prison.485  
In summary, up-tariffing can be viewed as yet another unintended consequence 
of the introduction of the conditional sentence. While clearly related to net-widening—as 
a by-product of this initial phenomenon through its escalation of severity of subsequent 
criminal sanctions as well as its recalibration of sentence ranges—it has its own 
independent effect that extends beyond the simple substitution of a suspended sentence 
for a conditional sentence of imprisonment. Arguably though, up-tariffing’s impact on 
imprisonment rates has been considerably more limited than that resulting from net-
widening. Indeed, its dependence on the commission of subsequent offences (opening 
up the possibility of sentence escalation) or the occurrence of non-compliance with 
conditions linked to the conditional sentence (and the need to respond to such breaches) 
narrows its scope of impact.  
And so, the enactment of sentencing restrictions contained in Bill C-10 (2012) 
had both expected and unexpected impacts. Notably in terms of sentencing, much of the 
focus at the time was on the introduction of additional mandatory minimum sentences 
and the restrictions imposed on the use of conditional sentences. Much in the same way 
 
484 This is not to say that up-tariffing is benign for the compliant offender. Notionally, at least, that 
offender must deal with the stigma of a sentence of imprisonment, and downstream 
consequences of having such a sentence on his or her record.   
485 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at pp. 194-195. 
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as Bill C-41 failed to deliver anticipated reductions in the use of imprisonment, Bill C-10, 
with its tough-on-crime rhetoric, did not result in substantial increases. Put another way, 
whether conditional sentences acted to reduce prison rates, or not, removing them (for 
many offences) was expected to increase the use of traditional imprisonment, which it 
does not appear to have done in any meaningful way. Judges had, after all, established 
conditional sentences of imprisonment as appropriate responses for many indictable 
offences. That these did not all transition into comparable custodial outcomes post Bill C-
10 was…unexpected.  
Within this context, up-tariffing provides an intriguing bridge between net-
widening and other powerful—albeit arguably equally unforeseen—phenomena that 
have emerged in response to the introduction of conditional sentencing. While no doubt 
the result of a complex interaction of factors, the following section explores possible 
explanations for the continued stability in imprisonment rates that was evident even after 
restrictions on the use of conditional sentences had been imposed. Perhaps the most 
provocative of them is the notion that judges may have employed resistance techniques 
(consistent with restraint) to circumvent what were seen as unduly harsh penalties.  
 Circumvention  
Like net-widening, circumvention can occur at various points in the criminal 
justice process. In the context of sentencing, it generally involves strategies by which 
judges find ways to get around legislative intent. Critics of such practices argue that 
circumvention fails to recognize the role of government in establishing sentence policy 
and is inconsistent, therefore, with notions of parliamentary supremacy. Others have 
framed judicial resistance as efforts that are legitimate and, in many cases, completely 
predictable. Paciocco (2015), for instance, suggests the latter when he speaks 
approvingly of judicial efforts to embrace strategies within the rule of law that allow them 
to apply the law in ways that reduce perceived unfairness:   
This [manipulation of the law] can aptly be demonstrated by examining the 
way that courts have worked to ensure that the square pegs of [restrictive] 
sentencing provisions fit within the round holes of the law. That can only be 
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achieved, it seems, by shaving the peg or widening the hole, and the 
preference of judges is to shave the peg.486 
The practice of finding ways to resist reforms seen as being either unfair or 
unduly harsh is consistent with the principle of restraint, and best understood within the 
framework provided by the circumvention literature. And so, in addressing this issue as it 
relates to conditional sentences, the following section is broken down into two main 
areas. The first section presents results from this study in its exploration of circumvention 
as it relates specifically to the restrictions introduced by Bill C-10. This will include a 
review of the politicization of sentence policy and of judicial efforts to find ways around 
the unavailability of conditional sentences for certain offences. The second section 
discusses the implications of enabling jurisprudence that has emerged from the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal on this issue. 
4.2.3.1 Judicial response to Bill C-10: The evidence 
The restrictions introduced in 2012 were generally unpopular with judges487 and 
we should perhaps not be surprised that some found ways to work around them. In the 
current study, the most obvious examples of this approach came from cases in which 
judges chose instead to suspend sentence and place an offender on probation. Notably, 
there were also reports of judges imposing short jail sentences with probation (including 
intermittent terms), to reclaim some form of middle ground. In terms of the themes most 
often associated with such efforts, they included resistance to what was seen as the 
politicization of sentence policy, the challenge of dealing with marginalized or otherwise 
disadvantaged offenders, and an interest in maintaining (or recreating) a non-custodial 
 
486 Paciocco, D. M. (2015). The law of minimum sentences: Judicial responses and 
responsibilities. Canadian Criminal Law Review, 19 (March), 173-229, at p. 207. 
487 Judges were asked how their utilization of conditional sentences was impacted by the 
restrictions introduced in 2012 (Q# 20). Of the 38 judges who responded, the majority (22/38; 
57.9%) indicated that they impose fewer conditional sentences. Interview participants also tended 
to report that their use of conditional sentences had decreased, with most viewing this trend as a 
negative development (14/18).  
Notably, several judges (4/18) mentioned having reduced their use of conditional sentences prior 
to the introduction of restrictions. These judges attributed their reluctance to use the sanction to 
negative experiences—e.g., an offender who committed a serious offence while on a conditional 
sentence, high breach rates, or the realization that the orders were not being enforced or 
supported. As Judge Y explained, “over the years, I became less willing to pretend that, optically 
speaking, it was going to achieve general deterrence or the general aims of sentencing.” 
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option for offences that may have been unintentionally recalibrated as offences requiring 
imprisonment.  
The search for circumvention 
The single charge dataset created as part of this study allowed for the analysis of 
sentence trends by offence. This was important given that the bulk of sentences in adult 
criminal courts are imposed on summary offences that were not impacted by the 
restrictions introduced by either Bill C-9 or Bill C-10. Selecting offences that were eligible 
for conditional sentences prior to the legislated restrictions, but ineligible after their 
enactment, provides a valuable window into the judicial response to the narrowing of 
their discretion. 
Analysis of the specific offences identified focused on two areas. First, it 
examined sentencing patterns over time (2006 to 2017), testing the conventional belief 
that pre Bill C-10 conditional sentences would be replaced by terms of imprisonment 
post Bill C-10. The second focus was on a pre/post comparison of conditional sentences 
and traditional terms of imprisonment in terms of sentence length and the inclusion of 
probation.488 For the purposes of these analyses, the three specific offences selected 
were: 1) aggravated assault; 2) theft over $5,000; and 3) drug trafficking.489 
Aggravated assault (s. 268) 
The offence of aggravated assault was selected because it was expected to be 
impacted by both of the legislative restrictions introduced.490 The Bill C-9 standard of 
serious personal injury offence was almost certainly met,491 and it was clearly captured 
 
488 These variables were of interest considering recent research that suggests that the 
introduction of MMPs resulted in long conditional sentences being replaced by short custodial 
sentences, often to be served intermittently. Benedet, supra note 310 at p. 311. 
489 For a review of selection criteria, see the methodology section—Table 3-4.  
490 Initially, assault causing bodily harm was also included. This offence was excluded when it 
became clear that it was capturing charges in which the prosecutor had proceeded summarily, 
and conditional sentences remained available.  
491 According to s.752, “serious personal injury offence” includes:  
(a) an indictable offence, other than high treason, treason, first degree murder or second degree 
murder, involving 
 (i) the use or attempted use of violence against another person, or 
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by the broader Bill C-10 amendments. Notably, given that the maximum sentence for this 
offence is 14 years imprisonment, the discharge provisions did not apply. Dataset 1, 
which excluded all records associated with multiple charges or lesser offences, included 
517 cases in which an offender had been sentenced on a single charge of aggravated 
assault.492  
Analysis of the sentencing patterns for aggravated assault suggests that the early 
Bill C-9 restrictions rendered this offence essentially ineligible for conditional sentences. 
Between 2006 and 2008, almost one-third of aggravated assault convictions resulted in 
a conditional sentence. This started dropping in 2009, with any offences that survived 
Bill C-9 being captured by Bill C-10 (2012). Indeed, there were no conditional sentences 
imposed for this offence beyond 2014. Suspended sentences on aggravated assault 
charges were rare, possibly due to the involvement of victims and the likelihood that 
such a sentence would attract negative community or media attention. While there was a 
period between 2010 and 2015 in which suspended sentences were used, by 2017 
almost all (over 97%) of these convictions resulted in prison terms (see Figure 4-7 
below). 
 
 (ii) conduct endangering or likely to endanger the life or safety of another person or 
 inflicting or likely to inflict severe psychological damage on another person, 
and for which the offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for ten years or more, or 
(b) an offence or attempt to commit an offence mentioned in section 271 (sexual assault), 272 
(sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm) or 273 (aggravated 
sexual assault).  
492 The original data file included 1,596 “sentenced charges” recorded against aggravated assault 
offences.  
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Figure 4-7 Aggravated assault by primary sentence (n=517) 
 
Note: Discharges are not available for this offence; fines were calculated but not shown (2/517). 
In order to assess the impact of shifting conditional sentences to jail terms, 
sentence lengths for each sanction were calculated.493 As illustrated in Table 4-12 
(below), 2006 to 2008 appear to be the last three years in which conditional sentences 
were used with any regularity for this offence; at that time the orders tended to be long 
(mean and median over one year) and the most common term was for the maximum 
available under s. 742.1—two years less a day (729 days). Mean and median jail terms 
appear to have increased somewhat as they absorbed cases between 2010 and 2014, 
decreasing thereafter until reaching a low of 410 and 400 days, respectively, in 2017. 
The decrease noted in the length of jail terms could be linked to the addition of the less 
serious cases that would otherwise have resulted in conditional sentences. It is also 
consistent with research suggesting that judges may see short jail terms with lengthy 
 
493 To calculate sentence lengths for jail terms, all sentences of “one-day jail” were removed (40 
records were removed; one-day jail represented 9.5% of all jail sentences for this offence). 
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probation as effective substitutes for longer conditional sentences.494 On this point, 
Benedet (2019) refers to comments made by a judge who was sentencing an offender 
on a charge for which a conditional sentence was no longer available: 
Had a longer period of house arrest been available as a sentencing 
alternative, I would have considered it. …. This would have allowed her to 
avail of treatments and programs that may address the underlying causes 
of her crime. Similar goals can be achieved through a short period of 
incarceration followed by supervised probation.495 
Notably, for the last two years examined (2016 and 2017), terms of imprisonment 
on aggravated assault offences had a mode of 90 days. While the data did not include 
flags identifying intermittent jail terms, it is likely that some of the 90-day terms 
represented jail sentences served in this fashion.496 While the numbers were small, there 
were no 90-day jail terms imposed prior to the Bill C-9 restrictions. This suggests that 
some judges may have imposed intermittent sentences to mitigate the harshness of 
regular jail terms, searching for a middle ground that no longer existed within the 
aggravated assault sentencing range. 
Table 4-12  Sentence length - jail vs CSO - aggravated assault (# days) 
 JAIL > 1 DAY CSO 
 # Mean Median Mode # Mean Median Mode 
2006 36 759 730 730 15 586 540 729 
2007 30 575 562 562 19 454 450 729 
2008 18 664 729 729 11 476 540 729 
2009 23 500 498 150 7 499 540 540 
2010 34 606 480 360 6 393 315 729 
2011 31 598 450 180 4 490 480 270 
2012 38 725 540 730 1 180 180 180 
2013 41 708 679 730 1 360 360 360 
2014 36 656 640 730 2 360 360 360 
2015 30 641 393 270 0 0 0 0 
2016 32 544 380 90 0 0 0 0 
2017 32 410 400 90 0 0 0 0 
Total 381    66    
  
 
494 Benedet, supra note 310 at p. 311.  
495 R. v. Merkuratsuk, 2012 NLTD(G) 11 at para 28; cited by Benedet, Ibid at p. 311. 
496 Ninety days is the maximum term of imprisonment that can be served intermittently (s.732).  
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In recent years, sentences on aggravated assault offences were also more likely 
to include probation. From 2006 to 2007, for instance, 44.1% of conditional sentences 
and just over half (51.4%) of jail terms included probation to follow; from 2008 to 2013, 
this increased to 53.3% and 62.1% respectively. Prison terms imposed in the post Bill C-
10 period (2014 to 2017) suggest a further increase, with up to 68.3% including 
probation to follow.  
Theft over $5,000 (s. 334(a)) 
Theft over $5,000 is a strictly indictable offence that became ineligible for 
conditional sentencing as a result of Bill C-10 amendments. Dataset 1, which excluded 
all records associated with multiple charges or lesser offences, included 700 cases in 
which an offender was sentenced on a single charge of theft over $5,000.497 Notably, 
conditional sentences were the most common sentence imposed for this offence from 
2007 until 2014, and then the least common (relative to jail or suspended sentences) by 
2017 (see Figure 4-8 below). The proportion of charges for theft over $5,000 resulting in 
jail sentences increased post Bill C-10, from 18.5% in 2013 to 42.5% in 2017. During 
that same time, conditional sentences were reduced from 50% in 2013 to 12.5% in 
2017.498 Suspended sentences, which fluctuated between 7.4% and almost 15% until 
2012, started increasing in 2013 (18.5%), reaching a high of 25% in 2017. 
 
497 The original data file included 2,062 sentenced charges recorded against theft over $5,000 
offences. 
498 At one point, the expectation was that conditional sentences for this offence would continue 
dropping until eliminated completely (subject to offence date attrition). Notably, this changed with 
the enactment of Bill C-75 (2019), legislation that had the effect of hybridizing the offence of theft 
over $5,000, giving prosecutors the option of proceeding summarily, in which case a conditional 
sentence would remain available.  
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Figure 4-8 Theft over $5,000 by primary sentence (n=700)  
 
Note: Fines & discharges calculated but not shown. 
If all pre Bill C-10 conditional sentences represented instances in which the 
offender would have otherwise been sentenced to jail, then we would have expected the 
vast majority of them to be replaced with jail terms post Bill C-10. Instead, what we see 
between 2012 (pre) and 2017 (post) is a 32.8% reduction in conditional sentences, and 
only a 15.9% increase in the use of jail. The 14.1% increase to suspended sentences 
during this time suggests that some cases that otherwise would have been conditional 
sentences pre Bill C-10, have likely been replaced by suspended sentences post Bill C-
10.499  
 
499 The trend towards the reduced use of conditional sentences accompanied by the increased 
use of both jail and suspended sentences is evident even when the starting year is delayed in 
order that a greater proportion of cases to which the conditional sentencing restrictions would 
apply can be captured (i.e., offence dates past November 2012). Between 2014 and 2017, for 
instance, conditional sentences went from representing 42.5% of outcomes, to 12.5%, while 
terms of imprisonment increased from 30% to 42.5%, and suspended sentences increased from 
representing 15% of outcomes to 25%. 
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Sentence lengths for conditional sentences and jail terms were also calculated.500 
While there was considerable variance due to the low number of cases, conditional 
sentences for this offence tended to be considerably longer than jail terms imposed. Up 
until 2013, for instance, the median conditional sentence term was consistently 1.5 to 2 
times as long as the median jail term. While caution is required, the data suggest that 
(pre Bill C-10) conditional sentences may have been replaced with considerably shorter 
(post Bill C-10) terms of imprisonment.501 The median prison term between 2014 and 
2016, for instance, was well within the 90-day limit for intermittent jail terms (the range 
was 65 to 75 days).502 
Finally, the (shorter) prison terms that likely replaced conditional sentences post 
Bill C-10 were more likely to have probation orders attached. Notably, there was an 
increase, overall, in the percentage of sentences that were followed by probation orders. 
In the 2006 to 2007 period, for instance, approximately 39% of both conditional 
sentences and jail terms included probation to follow; between 2008 and 2013, this 
increased to 50.3% for conditional sentences (jail terms were essentially unchanged at 
40.4%). In the post Bill C-10 period (between 2014 and 2017), almost three-quarters 
(70.7%) of the prison terms imposed on theft over $5,000 offences included probation to 
follow. This trend is consistent with earlier (e.g., aggravated assault) outcomes, and may 
represent an increase in the use of intermittent prison terms (which include mandatory 
probation orders), or instances in which judges are using probation attached to short 
prison terms in place of conditional sentences.503  
 
500 To calculate sentence lengths for jail terms, all sentences of one-day jail were removed (60 
records were removed; one-day jail represented 26.5% of all jail sentences for this offence). 
501 This could reflect the fact that conditional sentences are expected to be longer than the terms 
of imprisonment that they replace, or the possibility that less serious offences (that had previously 
resulted in conditional sentences) are being captured.  
502 In 2013, the median prison term was 180 days (mode 52 days); in the initial post Bill C-10 
period (2014 to 2016), the median prison terms were 65, 72, and 75, respectively. In 2017, the 
median prison term doubled to 150 days (mode 90 days). This discontinuous result may be a 
reflection of the low number of cases that fit the established criteria (from 2013 to 2016 there 
were merely 33 single charge cases that resulted in prison terms of more than one day; in 2017 
there were 14).  
503 A shift to short prison terms followed by probation is consistent with a recent decision of the 
BC Court of Appeal. In Jacobs, the Court accepted a joint submission that an illegal 12 month 
conditional sentence (imposed on an offence no longer eligible) be replaced with a sentence of 
one-day jail followed by 22 months of probation. See R. v. Jacobs, 2020 BCCA 287. 
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Drug trafficking 
Drug trafficking offences provided a relatively large pool of cases that regularly 
attracted conditional sentences prior to Bill C-10 and were generally ineligible after Bill 
C-10. Dataset 1 included 6,987 cases involving sentences on single charges of drug 
trafficking.504 Case volume was not evenly distributed across the years, going from a 
high of 914 cases in 2008 to a low of 279 cases in 2016.505 
In terms of sentencing patterns, the proportion of drug trafficking charges that 
received prison sentences increased substantially post Bill C-10; from less than one-third 
(31.1%) in 2012 to more than half (54.3%) in 2017 (see Figure 4-9 below). At the same 
time, conditional sentences dropped from 56.7% of drug trafficking sentences in 2012 to 
only 7.3% in 2017. The direction of these changes was expected; the quantum was not. 
Put another way, if all pre Bill C-10 conditional sentences represented true diversions 
from prison, then we would expect all of them to transform into prison terms post Bill C-
10. In fact, what we see is a 49.4% drop in conditional sentences, but only a 23.2% 
increase in jail; the balance (26.2%) is almost completely explained by the unexpected 
increase in suspended sentences, which went from representing only 4.9% of drug 
trafficking sentences in 2012 to almost one-third (30.1%) in 2017. 
 
Given that the trend towards the increased use of probation appears to be broad (it is apparent 
beyond the specific offences impacted by Bill C-10; see Figure 4-4), it is likely that other factors 
are also at play. It may be, for instance, that the shift towards the increased use of probation is 
also associated with a more managerial approach within the justice system, one that focuses on 
risk aversion and expanding community-based responses that enable offender surveillance, 
supervision, and control, rather than rehabilitation. See Feeley, M. M., & Simon, J. (1992). The 
new penology: Notes on the emerging strategy of corrections and its implications. Criminology, 
30(4), 449–474.  
For a discussion of the impact of risk aversion in the context of bail, see Deshman, A., & Myers, 
N. (2014). Set up to fail: Bail and the revolving door of pre-trial detention. Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association and Education Trust, at p. 83; Webster, C. M. (2014). “Broken Bail” in Canada: How 
we might go about fixing it. Research and Statistics Division; Department of Justice Canada; and 
Sylvestre, et al., supra note 347.  
504 The original data file included 19,472 sentenced charges recorded against drug trafficking 
offences. 
505 The decrease in drug offences was likely related, at least in part, to changes in the marihuana 
laws.   
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Figure 4-9 Drug trafficking by primary sentence (n=6,987) 
 
Note: fines & discharges were calculated but are not shown 
Sentence lengths for jail506 and conditional sentences pre and post Bill C-10 for 
this offence appear to have changed in 2014 (see Table 4-13 below).507 From 2007 to 
2013, the median conditional sentence for drug trafficking was 270 days (9 months); the 
mode was 180 days (6 months) for all but one of those years. During the same period, 
the median term of imprisonment increased gradually, peaking at 208 days (7 months) in 
2013; the mode was 180 days (6 months) for all but one of those years. Notwithstanding 
the noted use of suspended sentences (from 2014 to 2017), many of the conditional 
sentences were replaced by jail terms. Again, given that Proulx encourages judges to 
extend the length of conditional sentences past the terms of imprisonment they replace, 
it is unsurprising that longer orders appear to have been replaced by shorter jail terms. 
What is notable, however, is that between 2014 and 2017 (post Bill C-10), the most 
 
506 To calculate sentence lengths for jail terms, all sentences of one-day jail were removed (575 
records were removed; one-day jail represented 19.7% of all jail sentences).  
507 While the Bill C-10 changes were effective as of November 2012, delays in case processing 
likely pushed the conclusion of offences committed past this date into 2013 and 2014. This would 
be especially true for drug trafficking given that, unlike charges of aggravated assault and theft 
over $5,000, there are no identifiable victims, and the offender is less likely to be held in custody 
pending case resolution (two factors that expedite case scheduling). 
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imposed jail term (mode) shifted from 180 days (6 months) to 90 days (3 months). As 
observed with aggravated assault and theft over $5,000 sentences, this may signal an 
increase in the use of intermittent jail terms by judges who are looking to “soften the 
harshness of other rules.”508 
Table 4-13 Sentence length - jail vs CSO - drug trafficking (# days) 
 Drug trafficking – sentence length jail >1 day & CSO 
 JAIL > 1 DAY CSO 
 # Mean Median Mode # Mean Median Mode 
2006 239 211 90 90 346 259 240 180 
2007 293 167 120 180 365 289 270 180 
2008 311 181 120 180 385 280 270 180 
2009 264 232 150 90 428 283 270 180 
2010 199 214 128 180 318 298 270 180 
2011 146 365 173 180 302 286 270 270 
2012 155 234 150 180 315 305 270 180 
2013 152 335 208 180 269 304 270 180 
2014 165 226 180 90 128 308 330 360 
2015 166 254 180 90 61 318 270 360 
2016 116 253 150 90 31 380 270 180 
2017 136 297 180 90 20 201 150 90 
Total 2,342    2,968    
     
The findings on drug trafficking sentences (with or without probation) are 
interesting for two reasons. First, the number of cases is large enough that results can 
be interpreted with more confidence. Second, probation rates in this group have tended 
to be relatively low. While we may intuitively link drug trafficking offences with drug 
addicted offenders (that presumably require rehabilitation), as noted by the court in 
Franklin, many dealers are simply attracted by easy money and “the high profits 
available with little effort.”509 For these offenders, probation tends to focus more on area 
restrictions than on traditional rehabilitative requirements (e.g., attending treatment).510 
 Notably, there was a slight change in the use of prison with probation for drug 
trafficking offences (see Table 4-14 below). Indeed, while the use of conditional 
 
508 Paciocco, supra note 486 at p. 176. 
509 R. v. Franklin, 2001 BCSC 706 at para 45. 
510 See generally, Sylvestre, et al., supra note 503 at pp. 40-41. 
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sentences with probation was stable (15-17%), the prison plus probation combination 
was not. Prior to Bill C-10, approximately 28% of the prison terms imposed (overall) 
included probation to follow; post Bill C-10 (2013 to 2017), this increased to 38%.511 
Table 4-14  Drug trafficking – CSO and prison - probation attached 
 CSO (Total) CSO with probation Prison (Total) Prison with probation 
  Number Number  Percentage  Number Number Percentage 
2006-2012 2,458 380 15.5% 2,085 588 28.2% 
2013-2017 510 85 16.7% 832 316 38.0% 
 Total 2,968 465  2,917 904  
 
The increase was more dramatic when short prison terms were isolated. Indeed, 
when the 1,486 cases that resulted in jail terms of under 91 days were analyzed 
separately, a clear discontinuity emerged. Of those imposed prior to Bill C-10 (2006 to 
2012), 33.4% included probation; post Bill C-10 (2013 to 2017) this increased to 
62.6%.512 In terms of possible explanations, these results are consistent with conditional 
sentences being replaced by either intermittent jail terms (with mandatory probation 
orders) or short (less than 91 days) jail terms with probation attached. Both results can 
be seen as a form of judicial circumvention, given that the BC Court of Appeal has 
confirmed a sentencing range of six to twelve months imprisonment for drug trafficking in 
the normal course, or a suspended sentence in cases in which “exceptional 
circumstances” are accepted; no middle ground is provided.513 
 
511 While one-day jail terms were excluded for the purpose of calculating sentence lengths, the 
rationale for doing so (skewing) does not apply to the ‘prison plus probation’ issue explored here. 
Accordingly, as was the case with the aggravated assault and theft over $5,000 cases, one-day 
jail terms were not excluded for these calculations. 
512 A separate analysis was conducted only on the one-day jail sentences, which were found to 
behave similarly. Prior to Bill C-10 (2006 to 2012) 35.8% of such outcomes included probation; 
post Bill C-10 (2013 to 2017) this increased to 60.8%. 
513 The term “exceptional circumstances” refers to a doctrine that allows judges to depart from (in 
this case, meaning “to go below”) the normal sentence range in a specific case, while still 
preserving the sentencing norm for other offenders.  
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Summary  
The review of sentencing patterns for specific offences (e.g., aggravated assault, 
theft over $5,000, and drug trafficking), both pre- and post-sentencing restrictions,514 
suggests that conditional sentences were not always replaced with an equivalent (albeit 
adjusted) term of imprisonment, as would be expected.515 Rather, in many instances 
they also appear to have been replaced either by suspended sentences or short prison 
terms with probation. Indeed, the increased use of suspended sentences for drug 
trafficking offences, and the tendency to make such orders more onerous through the 
imposition of curfew or house arrest requirements (see section 4.1.1.3), suggest that 
judges may be circumventing the restrictions placed on conditional sentences by, 
essentially, reconstructing them as longer and stronger suspended sentences.516 While 
this would clearly be inconsistent with parliamentary intent, there appears to be 
indications—as expressed by the judges who participated in this study—that judges 
may, in fact, be “shaving the peg.” Notably, this circumvention was rooted in a number of 
different rationales.   
4.2.3.2 Judicial response to Bill C-10: The rationales 
Much of the criticism of Bill C-10 focused on the increased number of offences for 
which mandatory terms of imprisonment applied and the restrictions introduced on the 
 
514 Given that these findings relate only to single-charge cases, there was an interest in exploring 
whether similar results would be obtained had multi-charge cases also been included. After all, 
common sense would suggest that offenders being sentenced for multiple offences would likely 
be facing more severe outcomes. To that end, overall sentencing trends for each of the three 
specific offences were also reviewed. To be clear, this included sentences attached to all counts, 
regardless of whether part of a single or multi-charge case. Importantly, the trends (i.e., whether 
the use of a sanction was increasing or decreasing) remained, though the proportion for which 
suspended sentences were used decreased (as one might expect).  
For example, when primary sentences for each of the 19,472 counts of drug trafficking were 
plotted, the results suggested considerable stability between 2009 and 2013 (averaged at 50.1% 
prison, 40.6% conditional sentences, and 4.5% suspended sentences). Notably, after 2013 the 
use of conditional sentences starts decreasing, reaching a low of 4% by 2017. Over the same 
time, the use of prison steadily increases (to 74.1% in 2017), as do suspended sentences (to 
18.6% in 2017).    
515 The term “equivalent term of imprisonment” recognizes that judges had been directed (in 
Proulx) to make conditional sentences longer than the prison terms they replaced. And so, for 
instance, we might expect that a conditional sentence of nine months would be replaced by a 
prison term of six or seven months (but not three months or less). 
516 In Bankay, the ONCA referred to such orders as “disguised conditional sentence[s],” holding 
that it was an error in law to “impose a sentence that circumvented Parliament’s decision to 
exclude conditional sentences for this offence” (supra note 380 at para 2). 
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use of conditional sentencing. While the rationale for Bill C-10 was not specifically raised 
as part of the interviews or survey, 14 judges (12 interviews; two surveys) expressed 
views on the issue. The most referenced rationale was captured as the politicization of 
sentencing policy (eight interview subjects and two survey respondents). 
The politicization of sentencing policy 
Those who saw Bill C-10 restrictions as politically driven expressed frustration 
that judicial discretion had been limited, not because of evidence-based policy 
considerations, but because of “political pandering.” Judge T, when asked to clarify 
whether the “pandering” was to the public, responded by asking, rhetorically, “the 
response to the public outcry that was generated by the government to get the outcry?” 
Judge W also framed Bill C-10 amendments as being both political and ill-informed, 
saying that: 
What Harper was doing was being a political animal, not an animal that, as 
far as I’m concerned, dealt with the realities of the legal world or the 
sentencing process. I don’t blame him for that, that’s what his job was. But 
it has some effect when it filters down to the Provincial Court; there are 
repercussions and accountability. It says to me, that which I’ve done and 
my experience of [20 plus] years doesn’t mean anything. You, who are 
sitting in Ottawa in a political seat know much better because you have 
constituents, the lowest common denominator, to answer to.  
Judge P also challenged the rationale behind the restrictions placed on 
conditional sentencing, suggesting that the primary motivation was political, not 
evidence-based: 
I mean, was there an actual problem that the government was addressing 
in bringing in those bills and restricting CSOs? I don’t think there was. I 
think it was politically motivated–-totally politically motivated. It’s what that 
government thought its support base wanted to hear, without regard to 
whether it was addressing a problem with the sentences.  
Finally, one of the survey respondents (Judge #4) connected the government’s 
motivation in restricting judicial discretion to the type of populism represented in the 
United States by the policies of Donald Trump: 
I view the legislation as largely a matter of political pandering more 
consistent with “Trumpism” than with core Canadian values. It has 
empowered lazy and/or unethical prosecutors to over-charge. It generally 
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screws the poor or disadvantaged defendant without altering the outcome 
that much for well-off or gang-connected defendants. 
Of the judges who spoke on this issue, two made a point of contrasting Bill C-10 
with the 1996 reforms (Bill C-41). Judge D described the government that enacted Bill C-
41 and introduced conditional sentences as having “courage;” Judge T focused on Bill 
C-41 as legislation that was based on sound theory, as opposed to hysterics, saying: 
[The restrictions] were based on absolutely no study–-no data. They were 
based on hysterics, so it doesn’t surprise me that on the one hand, you’ve 
got a sentencing regime coming in in 1996 which was based on sound 
theory.…whereas [the restrictions were] all about bringing in things that are 
politically attractive to a certain group of the demographic but have no 
sound basis in theory. It also kind of plays nicely into this idea of pansy-
assed judges that are giving these ‘get out of jail free cards’, ignoring the 
fact that jail doesn’t actually rehabilitate anyone.  
Judge T was clearly frustrated, as was another judge who spoke of the need for 
“bravery,” suggesting that “it [would require] some political bravery for them to [lift the 
restrictions]. It was far easier to do it the other way around than it will be now” (Judge C). 
Clearly, for at least some judges, the politicization of sentence policy acted to 
delegitimize the reforms introduced in 2012. This in turn served as a form of justification 
for non-compliance with restrictions seen as being unduly harsh (i.e., circumvention). For 
Judge D, for instance, perceived flaws in the legislative process created a “permission 
structure” that allowed for creativity: 
[Suspended and conditional sentences] are really different, and I tried to 
keep conditional sentence orders as prison sentences, but in some cases 
the imposition of a conditional sentence order is prohibited by statute. Now, 
a judge can accept the experience and wisdom of Parliament or ask 
whether or not the legislature even considered the situation being 
addressed. If you come to a negative response on that latter question, then 
you find a conflict between problem-solving and the legislative scheme, and 
that’s when you get creative.  
Notably though, not all judges focused their criticisms at the Harper government. 
Indeed, seven of the judges interviewed gave responses that were broadly categorized 
as “Bill C-10 was a response to how CSOs were being used.” Two of these judges 
suggested that conditional sentences were being used too often, especially post Proulx, 
or that the orders were too similar to probation (Judge O and Judge G). Two other 
judges saw the restrictions as an over-reaction by government to a small number of 
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cases in which people on conditional sentences subsequently offended in a serious way 
(Judge A and Judge B).  
Three participants believed that judges themselves were at least partially 
responsible for the restrictions placed on their discretion. Judge N attributed the 
government response to concerns around disparity, suggesting that “if there had been a 
little bit more uniformity around some of the sentences, maybe we wouldn’t have gotten 
to [CSO restrictions and mandatory minimums].” Judge T’s response goes further, 
drawing a direct connection between the curtailment of discretion and the inappropriate 
application of conditional sentences: 
I think that’s why the past government went to restricting [CSOs]—because 
I think that they looked at it and decided they didn’t think there should be 
CSOs for a certain category of offences. Our anecdotal experience is that 
the judiciary wasn’t focused on what is the appropriate sentence; they were 
focusing on ‘should the person be in or out of jail’. 
Finally, much like Judge T, Judge U tied the restrictions imposed to the use of 
conditional sentences for serious offences that provoked public pushback. Notably, this 
judge makes a direct connection between the use of conditional sentences in certain 
serious cases and a loss of confidence in the judiciary: 
I think a lot of it is the fault of the judiciary—for abusing their function and 
role. I think that’s what got us into this mess—that’s why Parliament has 
taken [CSOs] away. It would have to be so exceptional for me to say that 
somebody who had sexually abused a child should be out on the street, 
and [CSOs] were so frequently imposed for child sex cases…There don’t 
have to be a lot, but you get enough of those cases that the public [reacts 
to] and Parliament just loses confidence in judges generally being able to 
properly apply the law. So, they just take it away.  
Independent of the catalyst for legislative change, the injection of politics into the 
development of sentencing policy seemingly provided some judges with justification to 
circumvent the clear intent of the reforms. As will be discussed in the following sections, 
this issue arose most often when judges spoke of dealing with marginalized offenders or 
with offences that may have been previously up-tariffed to prison terms (so that 
conditional sentences could be imposed). In terms of the former, one Ontario judge 
spoke eloquently of the challenges faced by sentencing judges who operate on the 
frontlines of the court system: 
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I see these people in their worst moments, sometimes shackled, but always 
bowed and humiliated and hurting. Often sick, always in need. It is 
impossible not to be affected by this. One would have to be blind not to see 
the diversity of our communities, and heartless not to crave solutions to 
inequality and excessive use of the criminal law.517 
The sympathetic offender – “the bad and the sad” 
In terms of the marginalized or disadvantaged offender, several judges 
distinguished between the criminal act and the person as a criminal. Judge A, for 
instance, captured this sentiment when explaining that “I think most people are properly 
characterized as human beings who have committed a bad act or series of bad acts.” 
Notably, for some, this was manifested in beliefs that judges must have tools that allow 
them to deal differently with offenders who are “sad” as opposed to those who are “bad.” 
As Judge B explained, 
There are basically two categories of criminal offenders: the bad and the 
sad. The bad are people who are pathologically disturbed or, as a result of 
their upbringing, are so violent or so engaged in a criminal lifestyle that 
they’re probably never going to step away from it until they get too old to 
commit crime.  The sad are the people who never really had a good start in 
life, whether it be as a result of FASD, as a result of a dysfunctional family 
upbringing, as a result of having parents who for a variety of reasons were 
already mentally ill or drug addicted, or alcohol addicted themselves.  
Judges reported considerable frustration when trying to address what they saw 
as root causes. Indeed, as one judge noted, “it’s hard as a judge, on the back end; we 
aren’t social workers. If someone is homeless, there’s not much I can do about that. 
That’s the difficult part” (Judge A). Judge L spoke of “going through the motions,” but 
being limited in terms of his or her ability to engage in meaningful problem-solving:  
We are the residual legacy of all of society’s problems...So, in taking that 
responsibility we should be able to, with professional assistance, identify 
the problems and in most cases, we should be looking at ways to address 
those.  
Concepts of reintegration and the notion of community were a theme for several 
judges. While not directly tied to conditional sentencing, Judge A spoke of the challenge 
 
517 The Honourable Justice David M. Paciocco. Questionnaire for Judicial Appointment (Ontario 
Court of Appeal). Accessed Nov. 7, 2019: https://www.canada.ca/en/department-
justice/news/2017/04/the_honourable_justicedavidmpacioccosquestionnaire.html. 
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of dealing with marginalized populations, and the need to maintain community-based 
solutions: 
Sometimes I’ll tell them a story, just to make them understand. ‘Sometimes 
I walk to work or ride my bike to work, and if I see you on the street and 
you’ve tripped and fallen down on the sidewalk, I’d pick you up. And if I did 
the same thing, you’d be walking the same streets that I am, and you might 
lend a hand and pick me up.’ We’re all part of the same community. It’s not 
like ‘[I am] a judge and you’re just a lowly person who lives in [social 
housing]. You’re part of the same physical environment, where we all help 
each other out. You think that you’re not part of it; well, you are part of it, 
so am I.’ I’m not above this community; I live in it. 
Clearly, for this judge, the restrictions introduced by Bill C-10 frustrated efforts to keep 
offenders in the community. Notably, it was not the conditional sentence order, per se, 
that was valued; it was access to a non-custodial option—one consistent with the 
principle of restraint and, perhaps, the value of compassion. For some judges, this 
resulted in efforts to achieve the same, or similar, outcomes by other means. In other 
words, they got creative. 
Getting creative – finding ways around the restrictions 
Conditional sentences did not have to be perfect to be valued. Many judges used 
the metaphor of tools in a toolbox when expressing their frustration at having their 
discretion to use them restricted. “It’s another tool in the toolbox—it’s a gradation. It 
gives us another option and gives people an opportunity that they can take if they want” 
(Judge X). Even those who rarely imposed conditional sentences took issue with the Bill 
C-10 amendments: “I’m frustrated with Parliament for taking them away. I would say that 
I never imposed a lot of CSOs as a judge, and still don’t…But they have such a valuable 
function for the right circumstance” (Judge U). The sense that there were unique 
offence/offender combinations that lent themselves particularly well to conditional 
sentencing was repeated often, though there was little consensus on what those 
combinations should be. As Judge “I” explained, “the more tools you have, the more it 
can be an individualized process. Even a conceptually odd tool can still serve a purpose 
in terms of message and an individualized sentence.” 
Notably, several judges raised the issue of suspending sentence as a creative or 
pragmatic way of addressing situations in which a conditional sentence would be the 
best fit but was no longer available (14 interview participants; four survey respondents). 
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Aside from one judge who did not believe it happens, the remaining 17 responses 
involved judges either being aware that other judges do this or commenting that they do 
this themselves. The following section reviews their responses in terms of the rationale 
provided and concerns raised. 
“We’re now back to contorting ourselves” 
Judges appeared to be aware that it is problematic to explicitly acknowledge the 
practice of suspending sentence as a way of getting around the conditional sentence 
restrictions. As Judge A explained: 
I know a few judges have gotten into trouble by not saying the right words, 
sort of giving a suspended sentence when they really wanted to give a 
conditional sentence order, but it wasn’t available…You’re not supposed to 
do it; you have to do it the right way. 
Regardless, several judges were quite open about their own practices in this 
regard. As Judge P acknowledged, “yes, I’m using [suspended sentences] in some 
circumstances where it should be a CSO.” Similarly, Judge K reported that “I think I use 
[suspended sentences] a little bit more on the offences where we can’t use conditional 
sentences.” In terms of survey responses, Judge #1 justified this practice by pointing to 
the negative impacts of imprisonment:  
Restricted use of conditional sentences means that I have ended up using 
suspended sentences rather than jail. Doing so has increased the possible 
jeopardy of public safety. I have done so as the alternative of jail is worse.  
Indeed, for several judges the rationale for suspending sentence in such cases 
was linked to perceptions that the restrictions resulted in sentences inconsistent with the 
principle of restraint. As survey judge #13 noted, “occasionally, counsel and the court 
have to be creative to produce a fit sentence, working around the [restrictions].” Indeed, 
Judge X also spoke of the need for flexibility, observing that, “we’re now back to 
contorting ourselves again, to keep someone who shouldn’t go to jail…out of jail.” Put 
another way, when a strict application of the law would lead to the incarceration of an 
offender whom the judge believes “shouldn’t go to jail,” ways can be found to circumvent 
the sentencing provisions set out in the Code. 
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“A slippery way of circumventing Parliament’s intention” 
Other judges expressed concerns regarding the practice of using suspended 
sentences for offences no longer eligible for conditional sentences.518 Judge U, for 
instance, took this perspective: 
I just see it as a slippery way of circumventing Parliament’s intention. I’m a 
firm believer in the rule of law—that we shouldn’t be looking for ways to 
dodge Parliament’s intent. It’s not for us to decide what laws we’re 
supposed to impose. I see that whole argument as being a bit of a way of 
dodging the truth. I understand the motivations, but I just don’t think it’s for 
us to be trying to be creative—to dodge what Parliament really intended. 
For some judges, there was a sense that boundaries were being tested. After all, 
when suspended sentences for offences no longer eligible for conditional sentencing 
emerged, the appellate court response could have been to correct such efforts. In BC, 
however, the appellate court did not condemn the practice, electing instead to give 
sentencing judges the language and methodology they needed to continue doing so. 
Consequently, while some of the judges interviewed had criticized the government for 
having restricted their discretion, others were also critical of the court, presumably 
including the BC Court of Appeal. As Judge G explained: 
Nowadays if you can’t give a CSO, a lot of the court is resorting to 
suspended sentences with probation with the same terms that would be on 
a CSO, so it’s somewhat intellectually dishonest. That’s kind of the way 
they’ve evolved, and the courts have permitted that to occur. 
4.2.3.3 Judicial response to Bill C-10: The imprimatur of the Court of 
Appeal  
Prior to Bill C-10, there was jurisprudence in BC that endorsed the use of 
conditional sentences for offences that would normally attract custodial sentences, most 
often in cases in which exceptional circumstances existed. Voong (2015) is a post Bill C-
10 case that involved four crown appeals of suspended sentences imposed for drug 
trafficking, an offence that would normally attract a custodial sentence, and was no 
 
518 Four responses expressed concern. Three were from interview participants, one from the 
survey. 
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longer eligible for a conditional sentence.519 In this case, the BC Court of Appeal 
extended the exceptional circumstances doctrine that had previously supported a 
conditional sentence, now to justify the suspending of sentence. In doing so, the Court 
was able to reclaim (or restore) a sentencing option more consistent with restraint and 
individualization.520  
Pre Bill C-10 cases - prison vs conditional sentence 
When conditional sentences were still widely available, the bulk of appeals on 
drug trafficking cases involved defence arguments for conditional sentences in place of 
traditional prison terms. This included offences involving dial-a-dope style521 drug 
trafficking in Schedule I offences.522 In Franklin, Henderson J. reviewed a number of 
early post-Proulx cases which addressed the appropriateness of using conditional 
sentences for such offences, concluding that cases in which conditional sentences were 
imposed (or upheld on appeal) should be “viewed as relatively rare instances of cases 
[in which] unusual circumstances have led the court to [conclude] that a conditional 
sentence is appropriate.”523 And so, prior to Bill C-10, the issue was determining the 
limited and rare conditions under which a conditional sentence of imprisonment might be 
a fit sentence for an offender convicted of trafficking in so-called hard drugs.  
 
519 Voong, supra note 34. In Voong, each of the four offenders had entered guilty pleas to 
charges of having either trafficked in Schedule I drugs (cocaine and/or heroin) or having 
possessed them for the purpose of trafficking, all in the context of a dial-a-dope operation. In 
each case the judge suspended sentence and placed the offender on probation, a response that 
signalled a marked departure from the established range for this offence. On appeal, three 
suspended sentences were upheld (though the term of one was lengthened); in one (Taylor), the 
crown appeal was allowed, and a jail term of six months was imposed. 
520 Paciocco suggests that a broad interpretation of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is a legitimate 
legal technique that can be used by judges to “soften the harshness of other rules” (supra note 
486 at p. 176).  
For an intriguing twist on the notion of ‘exceptional circumstances’, see R. v. Summers, 2014 
SCC 26, in which the similar expression of ‘if the circumstances justify it’ in 719(3.1) was 
understood by the Supreme Court in its broadest terms to be able to include virtually all 
offenders. 
521 Dial-a-dope operations allow customers to contact dealers by phone or text to arrange the 
delivery of drugs. Dial-a-dope trafficking is an aggravating feature, adding to the presumption of 
jail upon conviction for such charges. See, for instance, R. v. Franklin, 2001 BCSC 706. 
522 Trafficking in Schedule I substances (so-called “hard drugs” e.g., heroin, cocaine, and 
fentanyl) is prosecuted by indictment, reflecting the seriousness of the offence.  
523 Franklin, supra note 521 at para 43.  
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Post Bill C-10 cases - prison vs suspended sentence 
The restrictions on the use of conditional sentences were expected to effectively 
close the door on non-custodial sanctions for many offences. Though suspended 
sentences remained technically available, the willingness of the Court to apply the more 
lenient option was unexpected. As Healy (2013) observed: 
If a conditional sentence would have otherwise been appropriate, it implies 
that imprisonment would be appropriate. The effect of the amendment will 
be to impose a term of imprisonment in provincial jail in all but rare cases.524 
And so, in the wake of Bill C-10, the Court looked for guidance in their earlier 
decisions, albeit with the added challenge of applying the rationale used to justify 
conditional sentences of imprisonment (punitive sanctions) to arguments around the 
appropriateness of suspended sentences with probation (rehabilitative sanctions). 
Notably, in post Bill C-10 cases the appellate court began blurring the distinction 
between conditional sentences and suspended sentences.525 Indeed, in Oates, the 
Crown argued that “with increasing frequency dial-a-dope trafficking is being met with 
suspended sentences by trial judges now that conditional sentences are no longer 
available for trafficking in these substances.”526  
In Voong, the Crown argued that three of the four sentencing judges had used 
suspended sentences as unlawful substitutes for the (now unavailable) conditional 
sentence.527 Notably, the Court made it clear that substituting a suspended sentence for 
a conditional sentence would be an error, but then reframed the issue as one of 
sentence fitness.528 The focus was on the applicability of exceptional circumstances in 
each case, rather than on whether a conditional sentence would have been imposed, 
 
524 Healy, supra note 315 at p. 298 (footnote 43). 
525 In Carillo, for instance, the BC Court of Appeal framed both suspended and conditional 
sentences as community-based options (R. v. Carillo, 2015 BCCA 192 at para 29). 
526 R. v. Oates, 2015 BCCA 259 at para 2. 
527 Voong, supra note 34 at para 4. “The Crown says that in each case except Voong, the judge 
used the suspended sentence as an unlawful substitute for a conditional sentence order.” 
528 Ibid at para 62. “Thus, while it is an error to simply substitute a suspended sentence for a 
CSO, as they are not governed by the same principles, that does not end the inquiry into whether 
these non-custodial sentences are fit.” 
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had it been available.529 This approach allowed the Court to avoid the issue of sanction 
interchangeability, though efforts were made, nonetheless, to reconcile the decision with 
the guidance provided in Proulx. 
Reconciling Voong and Proulx 
In Proulx, the Supreme Court of Canada went to great lengths to distinguish 
conditional sentences from suspended sentences and to construct the former (but not 
the latter)530 as punitive sanctions which could provide denunciation and deterrence in 
some cases.531 The contortions required to get from a conditional sentence to a 
suspended sentence were considerable. In Voong, the Court (re)framed the suspended 
sentence as a sanction able to denounce and deter and then relied upon exceptional 
circumstances to justify a sentence outside the normal range for this offence.532 While 
Proulx considered house arrest as a liberty restricting condition necessary to define 
conditional sentences as punitive sanctions, in Voong house arrest is envisioned as an 
appropriate probation term for the purpose of maintaining rehabilitation.533 Indeed, this 
 
529 The overall narrative promoted in Voong is that almost all offenders convicted of trafficking in 
hard drugs will face imprisonment for a substantial period of time (six to nine months), that the 
application of exceptional circumstances to this group will be rare, and that sympathetic offenders 
who benefit from this by having their sentences suspended will be subject to harsh consequences 
should they fail to comply with any conditions imposed (ibid at para 59).  
530 On this point, Lamer, C.J. quoted approvingly from a 1997 decision of the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal: 
[Probation] seeks to secure “the good conduct” of the offender and to deter him from 
committing the same or other offences. It does not particularly seek to reflect the 
seriousness of the offence or the offender’s degree of culpability. Nor does it particularly 
seek to fill the need for denunciation of the offence or the general deterrence of others to 
commit the same or other offences (Proulx, supra note 14 at para 32 – quoting Bayda C.J.S. 
in Taylor, supra note 365.  
531  Lamer C.J. stressed that, unlike suspended sentences which are primarily rehabilitative in 
nature, conditional sentences are punitive sanctions which should include liberty restricting 
conditions (e.g., house arrest or curfew). Proulx, supra note 14 at para 30. 
532 In terms of deterrence, Bennett J.A. notes that suspended sentences have been referred to as 
the “Sword of Damocles” and can have a deterrent effect since a breach of the probation order 
can result in the offender being brought back before the court for sentencing on the original 
offence (Voong, supra note 34 at para 39).  
533 Three of the four cases considered in Voong resulted in suspended sentences being upheld, 
one (Galang) after the Court extended the length of the probation order (to 36 months) and added 
a curfew. In one case (Taylor), the offender did not meet the exceptional circumstances test; the 
suspended sentence was replaced with a prison term of six months (plus probation). 
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becomes the mechanism by which suspended sentences are re-constructed as 
sanctions able to achieve deterrence.534  
While noting that the doctrine of exceptional circumstances had come to be 
associated (post Bill C-41) with arguments in favour of conditional sentences, in Voong 
the Court reminds us that before conditional sentences were introduced, exceptional 
circumstances were used to justify suspending sentence on serious offences.535 By 
doing so, the Court unintentionally provides support for the proposition that the regular 
application of conditional sentences in drug trafficking cases was likely the result of up-
tariffing. Such practices were unsustainable post Bill C-10, leaving judges either to admit 
to the inappropriate application of conditional sentences while they were available (i.e., 
saying “we are going back to suspending sentence now”536), or to find a way around the 
restrictions. Voong endorsed the latter course, though some judges have expressed 
discomfort with the practice.537  
The judicial response to Voong 
Earlier sections of this dissertation have suggested that at least part of the 
judicial response to the Bill C-10 restrictions was one of resistance and a shift towards 
the use of suspended sentences (and possibly shorter or intermittent jail terms). In 
Voong, the BC Court of Appeal upheld the practice of suspending sentence for offences 
that arguably would have received conditional sentences, had they been available. In 
doing so, the appellate court provided lower court judges with the language they needed 
 
534 “A condition need not be punitive in nature in order to achieve deterrence or denunciation” 
(Voong, supra note 34 at para 43). 
535 Ibid at para 79. 
536 The sense that at least some post Bill C-10 suspended sentences represent a return to pre-
1996 sentencing practices is reflected in the comments of Judge X, who explained that he or she 
has advised young lawyers not to “fold [their] tent and accept jail,” saying: 
We used to get suspended sentences for robberies. We used to get suspended sentences 
for serious violent offences because the toolbox was so limited. You had to go out of your 
way, and you pitched the three-year suspended sentence; you got your client clean and 
dressed up and everything stitched together. You go into court and you sell that. 
537 For instance, one BC judge observed that: 
Frankly, if the extraordinary circumstances were of the same magnitude as they were to go 
from jail behind bars to a conditional sentence, it would effectively be doing what the Court 
of Appeal has said you cannot do, which is give a suspended sentence as a way to do an 
end run around Parliament. See R. v. Madden (12 Oct 2017), New Westminster 78944-2 
(BC Prov Ct) unreported at para 26. 
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to impose non-custodial sanctions in such cases.538 While some judges welcomed the 
decision, seeing it as the appellate court being responsive to their concerns, others were 
uncomfortable with the subtle dishonesty. This variability in reaction is clearly reflected in 
the survey and interview responses as lower court judges wrestled with the appellate 
court guidance. The following section explores and contextualizes this dilemma.  
“It is like putting lipstick on a pig” 
During the interviews, 10 judges commented on Voong. Most of them (6/10) 
spoke of the decision as being an explicit response by the Court to the restrictions 
introduced by Bill C-10, suggesting that none of the appeals would have happened had 
conditional sentences remained available (the assumption being that all would have 
received conditional sentences). For instance, Judge T took the position that “if the last 
government had not restricted the application of CSOs, we would not have cases like 
Voong. Straight out—we wouldn’t have them.” Similarly, Judge C explained that:   
Voong I’ve already mentioned. The exceptional circumstances…If we still 
had CSOs available for those offences, what do you think would happen? 
That ‘exceptional circumstances’ argument only comes up for offences 
where conditional sentences are no longer available.539  
Several judges (5) acknowledged that in Voong, the BC Court of Appeal “heard” 
the lower court judges and had essentially found a way around the legislative restrictions 
placed on conditional sentences. Reactions ranged from appreciation to frustration to 
discomfort. Judge B, for instance, offered the following: 
Basically, my reading of the Voong case…was that the Court of Appeal 
permitted, allowed—I’m not going to say they encouraged it—but certainly 
they seemed to understand the necessary legal contortions you have to go 
through sometimes to get to the place where in the pre-C-10 era, probably 
70% of those cases would have been [CSOs] right off the bat.   
 
538 To the extent that this is the case, it could be argued that the BCCA heard what lower court 
judges were saying, and, using the language of dialogue, supported their resistance “with a 
raised voice.” See Roberts & Healy, supra note 17 at p. 335. 
539 The notion that the suspended sentences under review in Voong would almost certainly have 
been conditional sentences prior to Bill C-10 is consistent with findings on sentence trends for 
drug trafficking presented in Figure 4-9 and the fact that, pre–Bill C-10, sentence appeals on this 
offence primarily involved defence arguments in support of a conditional sentence when a 
traditional term of imprisonment had been imposed (e.g., R. v. Gill, 2013 BCCA 320, R. v. Amhaz, 
2013 BCCA 348, R. v. Herrell, 2014 BCCA 114, R. v. Gillespie, 2015 BCCA 290).  
   
206 
Judge P framed Voong neutrally (i.e., without attributing positive or negative 
value), not as a response to unjust or unduly harsh outcomes but, rather, as “a judicial 
reaction to judges having their discretion fettered.” Judge G went further, describing the 
decision as one that introduced what was unthinkable until then:  
The courts were trying to find ways around the unavailability of CSOs… 
Generally, no one would think of a suspended sentence with probation for 
drug trafficking, but now it’s occurring regularly in BC, because of our Court 
of Appeal. 
Judge S expressed disappointment that the BC Court of Appeal had effectively 
established a binary choice on sentencing, observing that Voong provided sentencing 
judges with only two choices—a suspended sentence or six-months jail. This judge 
sought a middle ground, asking “what about something in the middle–-like a two-month 
sentence?” Finally, one of the survey responses (Judge #20) suggested a more negative 
take on the efforts of the appellate court to enable circumvention. Generating a 
provocative mental image, this judge explained that: 
I am not a big fan of taking what should be a jail sentence and turning it into 
a suspended sentence and probation. In most circumstances it is like 
putting lipstick on a pig, what you end up with is just a fashionable pig.  
Suspended sentences as “disguised CSOs” 
As noted, one of the Crown arguments in Voong was that sentencing judges 
were using suspended sentences unlawfully, as substitutes for conditional sentences.540 
The Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with a similar issue when the Court in Bankay agreed 
that the trial judge had erred by “imposing what amounted to a disguised conditional 
sentence.”541 This recognition of ‘creative’ sentencing in which judges in some cases 
have used suspended sentences in place of conditional sentences is consistent with 
empirical findings presented in this study. Section 4.2.3 of this chapter, for instance, 
highlights: 1) sentencing trends that suggest an increase in the use of suspended 
sentences for offences for which conditional sentences are no longer available; and 2) 
comments made by judges acknowledging the practice. What is less clear is whether 
judges are intentionally imposing a less severe sanction than they would have otherwise, 
 
540 “The Crown says that in each case, except Voong, the judge used the suspended sentence as 
an unlawful substitute for a conditional sentence order.” Voong, supra note 34 at para 4. 
541 Bankay, supra note 380 at para 2. 
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and, whether they are knowingly reconstructing the lesser sanction (suspended 
sentences) as disguised conditional sentences.  
Five judges addressed this specific issue during their interviews. Judge P was 
open when discussing the practice that some judges have developed in such cases, 
explaining that “[judges] make their suspended sentence look like a conditional 
sentence, including curfew and house arrest conditions. That’s how it’s being 
addressed.” For another judge, the key was in addressing the enforcement issues that 
have plagued suspended sentences, by encouraging prosecutors to return non-
compliant offenders to court. As Judge E acknowledged, “I guess that might be a 
creative way of almost making a suspended sentence into a CSO type sanction. ‘If you 
come back, I’ll re-sentence you and I’ll be considering jail.’ I suppose you can say that.” 
Perhaps one of the most thoughtful responses came from Judge B, who struggled 
somewhat with the notion of longer and stronger suspended sentences, noting that:  
[W]e say ‘okay, you get to have a probation order, but it’s going to be a 
really long one, it’s going to be really strict.’ You put extra things on it…. If 
you’re going to end up with a probation order for somebody that is so 
restrictive that it basically is a conditional sentence order, are you being 
true to the philosophy behind probation orders? But everyone seems to 
want it that way…[T]he whole idea of structuring a probation order so that 
it is almost as strict as a conditional sentence order and making it longer is 
perhaps an unintended déjà vu from the way the Supreme Court of Canada 
originally addressed things in Proulx.  
Further support for the notion that judges are reconstructing suspended 
sentences in certain cases was evident in the pre/post analysis of suspended and 
conditional sentences imposed for drug trafficking offences. Dataset 3 provided detailed 
information on these sentences, including sentence length and optional conditions 
imposed for two calendar years. As set out in section 4.1.1.3, analysis suggests that post 
Bill C-10 suspended sentences looked more like conditional sentences in that they were 
longer and contained more onerous conditions, including curfews, house arrest, and 
community work service. 
4.3 Summary of key findings 
The findings suggest several possible explanations for the failure of conditional 
sentences to achieve meaningful reductions in the use of imprisonment in BC. The first 
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is that, notwithstanding a sentencing culture that embraced restraint, the sanction fell 
short in the sense that it never accounted for a large proportion of sentenced outcomes. 
Traditional imprisonment has consistently remained the most imposed sentence and its 
status, in that regard, has not been threatened in any meaningful way by the introduction 
of conditional sentences.  
Second, there is reason to believe that, even when conditional sentences were 
used, there were at least some cases in which they were applied to offenders who would 
not have been facing custodial sentences otherwise. Given that approximately one-third 
(36.4%) of the orders, overall, were alleged to have been breached, the potential of such 
net-widening to increase imprisonment rates is clear. To complicate matters further, the 
direction (in Proulx) to make conditional sentences longer and stronger, and to terminate 
orders upon proven breach, may also have acted to increase, rather than decrease, the 
use of imprisonment within this offender group.    
Notably, both the relatively low utilization of conditional sentences, and their use 
with offenders who would not otherwise have been subject to imprisonment, can be tied 
to the lack of resources provided for the monitoring of offenders in the community. In 
addition, there is reason to believe that any net-widening that has occurred may be 
linked to identified “push” and “pull” factors. Push factors were those that reduced the 
likelihood that judges would use conditional sentences in place of so-called “real jail.” In 
addition to the resource issue already mentioned, these included the sanction’s 
unfortunate construction as an alternate form of imprisonment, and the (related) lack of 
public support for its use, especially in serious cases. 
Pull factors were those that were thought to increase the likelihood that 
conditional sentences would be used in place of other non-custodial options, primarily 
the suspended sentence. These included, first, a belief that the enforcement 
mechanisms associated with the existing non-custodial option were inadequate in terms 
of encouraging offender compliance. In the context of failures to comply with suspended 
sentences, for instance, few judges recalled ever having seen an offender returned to 
court for the purpose of sentencing on the original charge (as envisioned by s. 
732.2(5)(d) of the Criminal Code). The second factor identified was associated with 
judges who believed both that offenders could be “fixed” and that part of their role in 
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sentencing was to reduce re-offending by imposing sentences that could achieve 
rehabilitative objectives. 
There was also an interest in exploring the finding that Bill C-10 restrictions did 
not appear to result in an (anticipated) increase in overall imprisonment rates. While part 
of the answer may be related to the fact that the Bill C-10 changes had a large impact on 
a small number of cases,542 jurisprudence from the BC Court of Appeal (e.g., Voong) 
suggests that more was at play. Both the analysis of sentencing trends for specific 
offences and the detailed review of optional conditions imposed, are consistent with the 
view that some judges have been using suspended sentences as reconstructed (or 
disguised) conditional sentences. Indeed, this conclusion was explicitly supported by 
several judges. These findings, along with the noted increase in the use of short prison 
sentences with probation, suggest that judges have, to a certain extent, found ways to 
circumvent restrictions that were thought to result in unduly harsh (i.e., inconsistent with 
restraint) sentences.  
 
542 On this point, see Doob & Webster, supra note 80(c) at p. 385. 
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5 Discussion – the circle that cannot be squared 
We say that someone has “squared the circle” when they have brought two 
things together that are so different, it was thought that this could not be done. In the 
context of conditional sentencing, this concept could be applied to attempts at 
reconciling the sanction with traditional notions of imprisonment, which have taken 
several forms. One is language, or semantics—e.g., it is a form of imprisonment 
because the legislation and the courts have said it is so. Another involves attempts to 
shift conditional sentences towards greater punitiveness under a penal equivalence 
argument—e.g., it is a form of imprisonment because it incorporates liberty restricting 
conditions. Finally, the third group captures references to the consequences of non-
compliance—e.g., it is a form of imprisonment because a new offence or non-
compliance may result in actual imprisonment.  
Canada’s experience with the controversial conditional sentence suggests that, 
when it comes to the conditional sentence of imprisonment, we have tried, and failed, to 
square the circle. For that reason, and others, the sanction has struggled as a tool for 
meaningful prison reduction. Perhaps this is tied to poor planning, inadequate 
resourcing, and the lack of guidance provided to sentencing judges; or, perhaps to the 
broader recognition that it is not enough to simply add another non-custodial sanction 
and then hope that its use will reduce imprisonment rates.543 Either way, the sanction is 
at a crossroads and arguably unsustainable in its current form, at least if one’s principal 
intent is to have it function to reduce the use of imprisonment in Canada.  
And so, in terms of the key findings of this project, we start with the ever 
important “so-what” question. In other words, how does the knowledge gained add to our 
understanding of conditional sentencing, and how does it assist us in moving forward? In 
addressing this issue, the following section is organized around three primary themes. 
The first reviews conditional sentences as (fatally) flawed sanctions and considers the 
challenges of creating a non-custodial option that is accepted (and used) as a prison 
alternative. This will include a discussion of similar efforts made in other countries (e.g., 
 
543 See, generally, Doob, supra note 2. 
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Australia) and the development of a basic model intended to apply "lessons learned" to 
future endeavours.  
The second section discusses the Sharma decision out of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal and anticipates the potential impact of the Supreme Court of Canada weighing in 
on this issue, as it is expected to do in 2021. After all, whether the Court endorses or 
removes the restrictions placed on conditional sentences, there is work left to be done. 
Finally, the third section confronts what is perhaps the bigger picture, the continued lack 
of clarity in terms of the purposes and principles of sentencing in Canada. This will 
include an exploration of the potential conflict between calls for “evidence-based” 
sentencing policy and judicial perceptions of their role in reducing crime through their 
sentencing decisions.  
5.1 Are conditional sentences mortally wounded as tools 
for prison reduction, or can they be saved? 
In some ways, the introduction of conditional sentencing in the mid-1990s 
reflected a fundamental misreading of the moment. While there were certainly calls for 
added restraint in the use of incarceration, there were parallel discussions that raised 
legitimate concerns around proposals to create a new non-custodial sanction for this 
purpose. These included, but were not limited to, repeated reminders that there would 
be no financial resources provided for enhanced program needs (at the provincial level), 
an awareness of the tendency of such efforts to increase, not decrease, the use of 
imprisonment (through net-widening), and the need to maintain public support in the 
sentencing regime ultimately put forward.  
 To complicate matters further, discussions regarding potential new sanctions 
overlapped with those relating to the need to address longstanding deficiencies in the 
enforcement provisions of suspended sentences. Several proposals had been 
considered and, in earlier drafts, the conditional sentence had been framed as an 
improved alternative to the suspended sentence. Put another way, there was an interest 
in “fixing” suspended sentences, and there was an interest in creating an intermediate 
sanction that could divert low level offenders from prison. Parliament took a calculated 
risk in addressing the second but not the first, effectively re-branding the fix for 
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suspended sentences as a form of imprisonment, and ignoring the warnings given 
regarding the need for adequate resources and the potential for net-widening. 
And so, conditional sentences as originally enacted, were fatally flawed and likely 
to fail from the start. In the absence of an effective and sustained educational effort, the 
public (and many judges) struggled to rationalize an oxymoron—imprisonment without 
incarceration—and to find a place for it within the existing sentencing structure. In many 
provinces/territories, it became clear early on that the funding necessary for the support 
and supervision of offenders serving conditional sentences of imprisonment in the 
community would not be forthcoming. More importantly, in terms of its lack of success as 
a tool for prison reduction, the precautions taken by the legislators (and further 
developed in Proulx) to ensure that conditional sentences were only considered after a 
judge had decided to impose a jail term proved to be inadequate. 
Conditional sentences looked very much like new and improved suspended 
sentences. The suggestion that the two sanctions were sufficiently distinguished relied 
upon three questionable assumptions. The first was that calling something “jail” could 
transform a non-custodial sanction into some form of imprisonment in the community. 
There is little reason to believe that offenders, most especially the compliant offender, 
experience a difference. As several judges noted, whether dealing with bail or sentence, 
offenders tend to focus almost entirely on whether they will be in, or out, of custody. By 
extension, what the sanction might be called is, for all intents and purposes, also 
irrelevant to them. More importantly, the public did not accept the new sanction as the 
equivalent of a term of imprisonment and responded negatively when it was used for 
serious offences, precisely those offences that would ensure its success as a 
mechanism for prison reduction.  
The second false assumption was that the punitive nature of conditional 
sentences, as defined by the inclusion of house arrest or other liberty-restricting 
conditions, could act as a further separation between the two orders. One of the 
weaknesses of this argument is that conditional sentences are not necessarily more 
onerous than suspended sentences. While conditional sentences are sometimes 
colloquially referred to as “house arrest,” the term is not mandated, and the reality is that 
judges are more likely to impose curfews on conditional sentences, many of which can 
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be seen as simply “mimic[king] the conditions of ordinary life.”544 More notably, we are 
seeing post Voong the use of suspended sentences that also include house arrest or 
curfew conditions, further blurring this distinction.    
The final challenge relates to the lack of dedicated resources for the support and 
supervision of offenders in the community. On the support side, efforts to rehabilitate or 
reintegrate offenders assume that community-based programming is readily available. 
On the supervision side, to the extent that offenders on conditional sentences represent 
those with higher “risks” and “needs” (who would otherwise be incarcerated), there was 
an expectation that vigorous monitoring would be in place. This applies equally to 
offenders who may be at low risk to reoffend, but who have been placed under house 
arrest strictly for the purposes of punishment. Such punitive conditions can only act to 
deter (generally) and denounce to the extent that they are seen as negatively impacting 
an offender’s daily life. Despite this, most judges indicated that they rarely order 
electronic monitoring; it is unclear if this will change with the introduction of enhanced 
technology.  
While academics can argue about the degree to which net-widening has 
occurred, the core question has been answered. Indeed, in the same way that we 
acknowledge that some conditional sentences represented true diversions from 
imprisonment, we must also admit that some (or many) did not. In such cases, the 
imprisonment (upon breach) of offenders bound by longer and stronger conditional 
sentences operated to undermine the sanction’s primary goal. In BC, and possibly in 
other provinces/territories, this has frustrated efforts to prioritize the principle of restraint 
and, ultimately, to reduce overall imprisonment rates. Whether one interprets this as net-
mending or net-widening is a matter of perspective. Certainly, a review of the push and 
pull factors argued to have encouraged the inappropriate application of conditional 
sentences support the former.  
Conditional sentences have allowed judges to impose sentences that give the 
impression of harshness, without inflicting the harms associated with incarceration. 
Notably for many judges, the sanction’s facilitated enforcement mechanisms are seen as 
effective motivators for compliance and, for those interested in direct offender 
 
544 R. v. Higgins, 2001 MBCA 177 at para 17. 
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management (e.g., through reviews, applications, or breach hearings), conditional 
sentences offer an efficient tool. As observed by the sentencing judge in Galang (one of 
the cases dealt with in Voong): 
Conditional sentences appealed to trial judges. Breaches of the terms of 
their order can be enforced swiftly, and significant consequences can be 
imposed promptly. The enforcement procedure is quite simple.545 
When speaking of the value of conditional sentences, many judges contrasted 
them favourably with probation and, when asked about evaluating the sanction’s 
effectiveness, most pointed to metrics related to reducing recidivism rather than reducing 
imprisonment. To paraphrase Bottoms (1981), while the stated goal of s.742.1 was 
based on the ‘avoiding prison’ theory, many judges were inclined to use conditional 
sentences as an alternative to the suspended sentence under a ‘special deterrent’ 
theory.546 Indeed, it could be argued that by addressing the enforcement challenges of 
the suspended sentence in the creation of the conditional sentence, Parliament 
unintentionally invited judges to use the new sanction in this latter fashion, quite possibly 
violating (or at least compromising) its intended purpose of reducing imprisonment.  
Aside from net-widening, conditional sentences also failed to capture any sizable 
proportion of the overall sentencing caseload. At its peak in BC, for instance, the 
sanction accounted for approximately 10% of (primary) sentences. This is notable in that 
it suggests that, even before the introduction of restrictions, conditional sentences were 
widely available but infrequently used (relative to traditional imprisonment). In its 
exploration of this issue, this thesis has put forward several push factors as possible 
explanations for this lack of uptake (e.g., inadequate resourcing, problematic 
construction). Notably, there is an additional consideration worthy of comment in this 
area; that is, that terms of imprisonment perform unique functions that are not 
reproduceable in any community-based form.   
Doob (1998) has suggested that part of the challenge of introducing prison 
alternatives lies in the fact that judges see custodial and non-custodial sanctions, not as 
interchangeable choices existing on a single continuum but, rather, as notably distinctive 
 
545 R. v. Galang, 2014 BCPC 0240 at para 30. 
546 Bottoms, supra note 191 at p.9. 
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options that are designed to accomplish different functions.547 Within this model, even a 
non-custodial sanction that is seen as being punitive may not be sufficiently so. In other 
words, judges will not use (and the public will not accept) intermediate sanctions in 
cases that are seen as “requiring imprisonment.” It is more than a matter of severity; it 
involves symbolic elements and the notion that certain sanctions may be appropriate for 
some offences, but not others.548  
The key is in understanding that the act of sentencing an offender includes an 
important symbolic element (i.e., an expression of values). This has been recognized in 
the Criminal Code through the incorporation of denunciation as an objective of 
sentencing. Notably, some have argued that it is the need for public condemnation of an 
offence that acts as the bright line dividing custodial and non-custodial sanction 
choice.549 Put another way, notwithstanding a commitment to restraint, it may be that 
conditional sentences will never be accepted as appropriate outcomes in certain cases—
precisely because, for some offences (or offenders), they simply are unable to “capture 
our punitive imagination.”550 Examples of these situations could include scenarios 
involving dangerous offenders, offences that for some reason elevate the need for 
denunciation (e.g., involving violence or a breach of trust), and, possibly, failures to 
comply with non-custodial court orders.551 Perhaps, as others have suggested, the 
answer lies not in finding more effective ways to punish but, rather, in normative change 
 
547 Doob, supra note 2 at p. 422. See also Doob, A. N., & Marinos, V. (1995). Reconceptualizing 
punishment: Understanding the limitations on the use of intermediate punishments. University of 
Chicago Law School Roundtable, 2(2), 413–433, at p.414. 
548 Doob & Marinos, ibid at p. 426. More recently, see Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 197. 
549 On this point, see Manson, et al., supra note 176 at pp. 538-539. 
550 Webster & Doob, supra note 1 at p. 197. 
551 These scenarios represent, generally, the three justifications put forth as rationales for 
imprisonment in earlier reports. See Government of Canada, supra note 48 at p. 38; Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, supra note 49 at p. 25. 
Given the prevalence and growth of administrative (non-compliance) offences, this is an area ripe 
for reform for those interested in reducing the use of imprisonment. Indeed, much has been done 
in this area within the last five years, often in the context of bail. See, for example, Deshman & 
Myers, supra note 503; Webster, supra note 503; Sylvestre, et al., supra note 347, Myers, N. M. 
(2015). Who said anything about justice? Bail court and the culture of adjournment. Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society. See also R. v. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, R. v. Zora, 2020 SCC 14, and Bill 
C-75, supra note 27. 
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that generates reflection regarding how we think about incarceration (as a “bad thing”), 
and even how we think about punishment itself.552 
 Learning from the experience of other countries 
The use of intermediate sanctions, including those that incorporate concepts of 
community custody, is certainly not unique to Canadian criminal law.553 Indeed, many 
Western nations have introduced alternatives to imprisonment in their attempts to reduce 
the use of custody. Whether successful or not, there are valuable lessons that can be 
learned and shared across boundaries. To that end, the journal Law and Contemporary 
Problems published a special edition (2019) that focused on the theory and practice of 
prison alternatives.554 Not surprisingly, several of the articles contained therein touch 
directly on issues raised in this thesis. Notably, the “precarious life” (and eventual 
demise) of the Australian suspended sentence provides key insights into the challenges 
of introducing and maintaining effective non-custodial sentencing options.555   
The Australian suspended sentence  
In Australia, the suspended sentence has gone by various names, though its 
essence is identified as a sentence of imprisonment that is imposed, but whose 
execution is partially or completely suspended for a prescribed period. The suspended 
portion of the sentence may have conditions attached, and the sentence may be 
executed upon non-compliance with conditions, or the commission of a further 
offence.556 The ambiguous nature of the sanction, and the public condemnation 
provoked by its use in serious cases, suggests many parallels with the Canadian 
conditional sentence. One of the similarities, for instance, is in its definition, not as an 
alternative to imprisonment but, rather, as a “substitute for imprisonment.” As Freiberg 
 
552 See, for instance, Tonry, M. (2014). Remodeling American sentencing: A ten-step blueprint for 
moving past mass incarceration. Criminology & Public Policy, 13, 503–533; Doob, A. N., & 
Webster, C. M. (2014). Creating the will to change: The challenges of decarceration in the United 
States. Criminology & Public Policy, 13, 547–559; Webster & Doob, supra note 75. 
553 Roberts, supra note 172. 
554 Gazal-Ayal, O. (Special Edition). (2019). Alternatives to imprisonment (Special issue). Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 82(1).  
555 Freiberg, A. (2019). Suspended sentences in Australia: Uncertain, unstable, unpopular, and 
unnecessary? Law and Contemporary Problems, 82(1), 81–110, at p. 81. 
556 Ibid at pp. 83-84. 
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(2019) argues, “the sanction’s ambiguous and paradoxical nature, which made it so 
appealing to lawyers and offenders, was also its fatal weakness.”557 
As has been suggested with conditional sentences, the Australian suspended 
sentence was seen by some as being illogical and fundamentally dishonest. While 
ranked as equivalent in severity to a term of imprisonment, the sanction clearly served a 
different function, and struggled to satisfy the more emotional and expressive aspects of 
sentencing. And indeed, like the Canadian conditional sentence, the effectiveness of the 
Australian suspended sentence as a mechanism of prison reduction was, at best, 
unclear. In terms of their overall effect on the use of imprisonment, suspended 
sentences were generally framed as being inflationary due to net-widening, the 
likelihood of incarceration upon breach, and the impact of longer (if not stronger) 
orders.558   
The death spiral for suspended sentences in some Australian states (e.g., 
Victoria) was precipitated by its use in a high-profile case that captured widespread 
attention.559 Intense public protests ensued, ultimately resulting in a series of 
government consultations, papers, and reports. The first set of restrictions (2006) added 
to the list of factors that judges had to take into account when considering a suspended 
sentence (e.g., the capacity of such a result to deter and denounce). In 2010, 
amendments precluded judges from suspending sentence for “serious” offences; in 2011 
this was expanded to “significant” offences.560 Notwithstanding the limits placed on its 
use, the suspended sentence remained unpopular and, by 2014, had been abolished in 
Victoria.561 In terms of other Australian jurisdictions, Tasmania introduced legislation in 
 
557 Ibid at p. 83. 
558 Ibid at pp. 93-94. Notably, suspended sentences were also argued to discriminate against 
Indigenous offenders who, as is the case in Canada, are over-represented in prison populations 
(p. 90). 
559 In 2004, for offences related to rape and indecent assault, the Supreme Court of Victoria 
upheld a sentence of imprisonment of two years and nine months that was suspended for three 
years (ibid at p. 86). 
560 Serious offences included serious violent offences, sexual offences against children, etc. 
Significant offences added certain drug offences, and others (ibid at p. 87). 
561 Notably, the suspended sentence in Victoria was replaced by a community correction order 
(CCO) which was also subject to criticism. The CCO could be made as a stand-alone order or in 
conjunction with a fixed term of imprisonment. Upon proven breach, the order could be varied or 
cancelled, and the offender could be resentenced on the original offence. In the wake of a 2014 
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2017 that would have the effect of phasing out suspended sentences and New South 
Wales abolished the sanction, though the law had not come into effect as of 2019.562  
Lessons learned regarding prison alternatives 
There are many lessons to be learned through the experiences of others who 
have attempted to introduce alternative sanctions. After all, hurdles are more easily 
overcome if they are visible. In their summary of the issues, Gazal-Ayal and Roberts 
(2019) identify several such obstacles, including short-term benefits that give way to net-
widening, resistance from the public and/or legal community, and inadequate 
resourcing.563 
A review of the literature suggests that while prison alternatives may initially act 
to reduce the use of imprisonment, as time passes, legislatures and the courts can forget 
the original purpose of the reform and can even, in some cases, change the nature of 
the sanction that was introduced. The suspended sentence in Israel is offered as an 
example. Introduced in 1954, the suspended sentence was intended to replace 
immediate incarceration for first-time offenders who would otherwise be facing 
imprisonment due to offence severity.564  
While initially seen as successful in terms of reduced incarceration, amendments 
enacted in 1963 that allowed for the partial suspension of sentence had the effect of 
changing the sanction from an alternative that avoided imprisonment, to one that acted 
 
judgment that confirmed CCOs could be used in place of imprisonment, concerns that the 
response was “soft on crime” were exploited by the opposition party. Ultimately, the maximum 
term of imprisonment that could be imposed with a CCO was limited to one year, and restrictions 
were placed on the sanction’s use for some serious offences. As Freiberg (2019) notes, the penal 
populism that led to the demise of the suspended sentence remained a factor: 
Sadly, and possibly inevitably, the measures instituted to replace the suspended sentence 
have been subjected to the same forces that regard any sentence other than imprisonment 
as an inadequate response to a wide range of offenses, further driving up imprisonment 
rates (ibid at p. 109).  
562 Ibid at pp. 107-108. 
563 Gazal-Ayal, O., & Roberts, J. V. (2019). Alternatives to imprisonment: Recent international 
developments (Foreword). Law and Contemporary Problems, 82, i–ix. 
564 Emmanuel, N., & Gazal-Ayal, O. (2019). Suspended sentences and service labor in Israel—
From alternatives to imprisonment to net-widening. Law and Contemporary Problems, 82(1), 
111–136, at p. 115. As originally envisioned, a judge would impose a term of imprisonment but 
then suspend its execution for a prescribed period of time. The order was not supervised, and the 
only requirement was that the offender not commit a further offence. In the event of a breach, the 
prison sentence that had been suspended, is activated. 
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as a supplement to imprisonment (net-widening).565 While the authors suggest that 
intermediate sanctions may still have a role in a principled sentencing structure, they 
argue against framing them as alternatives to imprisonment. They go on to conclude that 
“adopting alternatives to imprisonment is not an effective way to reduce incarceration. 
When the goal is to reduce the use of incarceration, one should probably look for the 
solution elsewhere.”566 
Gazal-Ayal and Roberts (2019) offer an additional warning regarding the net-
widening tendencies of sanctions introduced as prison alternatives. Noting that net-
widening occurs when the introduction of a new community-based sentencing option 
alters the way that judges use non-custodial sanctions that are already available, the 
authors suggest that the likelihood of this phenomenon occurring is increased when 
there are deficiencies (real or perceived) in the existing options.567 This warning 
resonates with the narrative around the conditional sentence, which was introduced at a 
time when deficiencies in the suspended sentence had already been identified and were 
also being discussed in Canada.  
Notably, in the context of prison alternatives, resistance from the public or legal 
community is often met with calls for enhanced severity or penal bite. In Canada, this 
has drawn attention to the need for public education and adequate resourcing. As Gazal-
Ayal and Roberts (2019) note, judicial enthusiasm for a sanction is tied, at least in part, 
to community confidence in it. The lesson to be learned, they suggest, is that 
“alternatives to imprisonment need to be carefully constructed and sold to the public as 
an adequate replacement for a term of custody.”568 Presumably, this would justify the 
punitive rhetoric that surrounds conditional sentences, as well as the more restrictive 
conditions imposed (e.g., house arrest or curfews).569  
 
565 Ibid at pp. 120-121. 
566 Ibid at p. 136. 
567 Gazal-Ayal & Roberts, supra note 563 at p. v. 
568 Ibid at p. vii. 
569 Frase (2019) offers somewhat of a counter-point in his discussion of the American suspended 
sentence, suggesting that legislation must guard against excessively long or onerous orders as 
they create problems in terms of enforcement, proportionality, and net-widening. In terms of order 
duration and content, for instance, he acknowledges the common-sense truism that the longer an 
offender is under scrutiny and the more restrictive the conditions by which he or she is bound, the 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, a summary of considerations relevant to the successful 
introduction of prison alternatives draws attention to several key decision points. In their 
simplest form, these would include ensuring that:   
• The concept underlying the new sanction “makes sense” or, at the very least, 
that it is not nonsensical or paradoxical. 
• Prison reduction is the sanction’s only (or sufficiently prioritized) goal—i.e., it is 
not undermined by a secondary goal that may present a conflict. 
• Deficiencies in existing community sanctions have been addressed to avoid 
net-widening. 
• Communication and education plans (for judges, counsel, the public) have 
been developed. 
• Adequate resources are in place for offender support and monitoring. 
With these requirements in mind, it is clear that conditional sentences have been 
fatally flawed as prison reduction strategies since their inception in 1996, and that their 
diminishment through the enactment of restrictions in 2012 should have been not only 
reasonably foreseeable, but indeed, expected. Efforts to “save” conditional sentences 
would require wholesale changes. If seeking to retain the sanction as some sort of prison 
alternative, reforms to be considered would likely include a reconsideration of its 
construction (re-branding), the inclusion of mandated (punitive) conditions, the provision 
of adequate monitoring resources, and a sustained campaign of public education. Even 
so, it may be necessary to lower the cap on sentence length if we wish to avoid re-
creating the circumstances that allowed penal populism to drive policy away from a focus 
on restraint.  
While we may still be able to frame the result as a “reformed (or salvaged) 
conditional sentence”, the scale of the changes that would be necessary suggests that 
the preferable route may be to simply start over. Indeed, one of the advantages of doing 
so is that it would allow for a “clean slate” mentality that would be more conducive to 
 
greater the likelihood that a breach will occur, be discovered, and the offender will be 
incarcerated. Again, it appears that legislatures can create prison alternatives that trigger some 
form of punishment only if the offender reoffends, or they can create onerous community-based 
sanctions with many conditions and efficient enforcement mechanisms that increase the 
likelihood that offenders will end up incarcerated. See Frase, R. S. (2019). Suspended sentences 
and free-standing probation orders in U.S. guidelines systems: A survey and assessment. Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 82(1), 51–80, at p. 73. 
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substantive change in terms of both policies and practices. Webster, Sprott, and Doob 
(2019) makes such an argument when applying the lessons learned from the successful 
decarceration experience with youths in Canada, suggesting that the introduction of a 
brand new law (the Youth Criminal Justice Act of 2003), “more effectively opened up 
space for cultural change than mere tinkering with the prior law. Indeed, it would be 
expected that almost everything would be different.”570 
In their foreword, Gazal-Ayal and Roberts (2019) suggest that appellate courts 
may be able to “address imperfections” found in the legislative definitions of a particular 
prison alternative.571 Certainly in the early years of conditional sentencing, the Supreme 
Court of Canada attempted to perform this function in Proulx. More recently (post Bill C-
10), there are provincial appellate decisions that have had the effect of salvaging the 
spirit of conditional sentences, even if not in name (most obviously Voong). In terms of 
the future of conditional sentencing, however, there may be no case more potentially 
consequential than Sharma, a decision out of the Ontario Court of Appeal that is 
currently (as of May 2021) pending before the Supreme Court of Canada. 
5.2 The Ontario Court of Appeal elevates the debate 
The issue in Sharma is not whether a suspended sentence can be justified for an 
offence no longer eligible for conditional sentencing but, rather, whether the statutory 
restrictions themselves represent infringements of constitutionally protected rights—
under sections 7 (liberty) and 15 (equality) of the Charter.572 Until recently (2020), 
Charter challenges to the conditional sentencing restrictions had failed, largely due to 
 
570 Webster, Doob & Sprott, supra note 75 at p. 1111. Webster (2015) makes a similar argument 
in the context of bail reform, framing both the Bail Reform Act of 1971 and the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act of 2003 as examples of successful decarceration efforts. See Webster, supra note 
503 at p. 12. 
571 Gazal-Ayal & Roberts, supra note 563 at p. ix. 
572 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
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the continued availability of suspended sentences.573 This changed with Sharma.574 At 
the Ontario Court of Appeal, Ms. Sharma argued that the restrictions that precluded 
conditional sentences for offences prosecuted by indictment in which the maximum term 
of imprisonment is 14 years or life, or for offences prosecuted by indictment involving the 
import, export, trafficking or production of drugs, where the maximum term of 
imprisonment is 10 years, were unconstitutional in that they infringed both her section 15 
rights (by discriminating on the basis of race), and her section 7 rights (by being 
overbroad and arbitrary).575 In a two-to-one decision released in 2020, the Court 
accepted both arguments, declaring the relevant restrictions to be of no force or effect, 
effective immediately.576 
In terms of the suggestion that the continued availability of suspended sentences 
lessened the impact of the loss of conditional sentences, the majority disagreed with the 
sentencing judge’s conclusion that other appellate courts, including the BC Court of 
Appeal, had accepted that a suspended sentence and probation is an appropriate 
alternative to a conditional sentence.577 They specifically noted that “[i]n Voong, the 
 
573  See, for instance, the rationale of Hill J. in R. v. Sawh, 2016 ONSC 7797, a case in which the 
Court rejected a section 12 challenge to the conditional sentencing restrictions: 
The difficulty with this argument is that it fails to recognize that s. 742.1(c) does not require 
the imposition of a minimum custodial sentence… It merely removes a conditional sentence 
as an available disposition. In exceptional circumstances… a court could …suspend the 
passing of sentence and impose a period of probation with appropriate terms (Sawh at para 
46). 
On the issue of Charter challenges to the conditional sentencing restrictions, see also R. v. Neary 
2017 SKCA 29 (challenges under ss. 7 and 12 dismissed). 
574 Ms. Sharma, an Aboriginal woman sentenced after pleading guilty to importing cocaine into 
Canada, was 20 years old at the time of the offence. In the lower court, Ms. Sharma challenged 
both the mandatory minimum sentence (two years) attached to the offence, and the conditional 
sentence restrictions that would be activated should the MMP be struck. The sentencing judge 
struck down the MMP, ruling it violated section 12 protections (Sharma, supra note 4). 
In terms of the conditional sentencing restrictions, the judge dismissed the Charter challenge 
under s. 15, in part because suspended sentences with probation remained available. Ms. 
Sharma was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment (R. v. Sharma, 2018 ONSC 1141). 
575 Sharma, supra note 4 at para 27. 
576 Sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(2). The Court found that these restrictions “deny the benefit of 
a conditional sentence in a manner that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating or exacerbating 
the disadvantage of Aboriginal offenders,” therefore violating s. 15 (para 132); the s. 7 
infringement was rooted in the findings of overbreadth, and the lack of connection between the 
purpose of the provisions and some of their effects (ibid at para 174). 
577 The sentencing judge supported this conclusion by referencing Neary, supra 573, R. v. Dickey, 
2016 BCCA 177, Voong, supra note 34, and R. v. Elliott, 2017 BCCA 214. 
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[BCCA] expressly acknowledged that it is a legal error to simply substitute a suspended 
sentence for a conditional sentence, as the two types of sentence are governed by 
different principles.”578 The Ontario Court of Appeal went on to clarify that conditional 
sentences and suspended sentences are neither equivalent, nor interchangeable.579 If a 
conditional sentence would have been appropriate (if available), then a suspended 
sentence would not. Having found that the sentencing judge erred, the Court proceeded 
to set aside the prison term, substituting it with a conditional sentence of 24 months less 
one day.580  
Writing in dissent, Miller J.A. accepted the conditional sentencing restrictions as 
“an exercise of one of Parliament’s most important functions—setting the boundaries of 
the adequate and necessary penalties for crimes.”581 The dissenting reasons focused on 
the section 15 argument, suggesting that, if the majority’s rationale were to be taken to 
its logical conclusion, “[n]othing short of unlimited availability of conditional sentences for 
all Aboriginal offenders, for all offences, would suffice.” Miller J.A. struggled to square 
such an outcome, noting that “Parliament was under no constitutional obligation to 
establish a conditional sentence regime in the first place.”582 
The issue was whether Parliament is entitled to decide that some offences, or 
categories of offences, should always result in incarceration, regardless of who commits 
them or in which circumstances. The dissent responded affirmatively, acknowledging 
that Parliament’s decision may have been harsh, even mistaken (or unwise), “[b]ut it is 
not for any of these reasons discriminatory.”583 Miller J.A. framed Parliament’s purpose 
 
578 Sharma, supra 4 at para 122 (citing Voong, supra note 34 at para 62). 
579 As established in Proulx, a conditional sentence is a jail sentence served in the community 
and can therefore serve the objectives of denunciation and deterrence; not so with a suspended 
sentence, which is intended to promote rehabilitation and is generally used when “deterrence and 
denunciation are not needed for the particular offender in the particular circumstances or where 
there are exceptional circumstances” (ibid at para 110). The Ontario Court of Appeal also noted 
that suspended sentences are “unreliable as an alternative to incarceration” given the 
inconsistent application of exceptional circumstances that often excludes many marginalized 
offenders, including Aboriginal offenders and especially Aboriginal women” (paras 116 and 117).  
580 Given that Ms. Sharma had already served her prison sentence, no further time on a 
conditional sentence was ordered. 
581 Ibid at para 192. 
582 Ibid at para 241. 
583 Ibid at para 260. If mistaken, Miller, J.A. found the infringement justifiable under section 1 in 
any event. 
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in enacting the legislation as being “to ensure that offenders who commit serious crimes 
do not receive what Parliament has determined to be an excessively lenient sentence.” It 
is a normative proposition—that certain offences require more severe punishment than a 
conditional sentence provides: 
Reasonable people may disagree as to whether this is a good policy 
judgment or a poor one. That is to be expected. This disagreement may 
give rise to further legislative change. But the question is for Parliament, 
not the court.584  
On the section 7 issue, Miller J.A. disagreed only with the majority’s conclusion 
that the legislation is overbroad, accepting instead that the decision to link offence 
seriousness to the maximum penalty prescribed by legislation was sufficiently linked to 
the purpose of the restrictions imposed. “I would not subordinate Parliament’s 
assessment of the seriousness of these offences to my own.”585  
 The potential impacts of Sharma – options for the SCC  
Though no hearing date has been set for Sharma, this in no way inhibits our 
ability to speculate on the potential impact(s) the decision may have. While, admittedly, 
the Court is not restricted to a “thumbs-up” or “thumbs-down” vote in this case, for the 
purpose of illustration, the following section addresses the issues raised in the event the 
decision is simply upheld or reversed. In the bigger picture, it is worth noting that Sharma 
is not the solution to the problem of sentencing restrictions imposed by Parliament. 
Indeed, the creation of law and broad sentencing policy should properly be a function, 
not of the courts but, rather, of Parliament.586 
Potential consequences of Sharma being upheld 
If the Supreme Court of Canada follows the Ontario Court of Appeal, the 
restrictions contained in sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(2) would be declared to be of no 
force or effect nation-wide. As a result, two of the conditions that preclude the imposition 
 
584 Ibid at para 280. 
585 Ibid at para 283. And so, in dissent, Miller J.A. would dismiss the appeal, having found that the 
restrictions placed on conditional sentencing by sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) do not infringe 
the appellant’s rights under either section 15(1) or 7 of the Charter. 
586 On this point, see Shanmuganathan, J. (2016). R. v. Nur: A positive step but not the solution to 
the problem of mandatory minimums in Canada. Supreme Court Law Review (2d), 76, 329–349. 
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of a conditional sentence would be removed.587 More specifically, offences would no 
longer be ineligible solely because they involve: 1) offences prosecuted by indictment for 
which the maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life; or 2) offences prosecuted 
by indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years, that involve the 
importing, exporting, trafficking or production of drugs.  
While this would be well received by some, it would also raise new challenges. 
The first is that it would result in a sentencing regime that is even more confusing and 
complex than it is presently. For those who already criticize Canadian criminal law as 
being the product of “ad-hocery,” it would provide yet another example of a change that 
is inconsistent with the remaining provisions. Indeed, while a conditional sentence would 
be available for an offender convicted of importing or trafficking in Schedule I drugs, it 
would remain unavailable for an offender convicted of motor vehicle theft or theft over 
$5,000, if prosecuted by indictment. Not only would such a result inject a layer of 
unnecessary incoherence into the provisions of section 742.1, but it would also 
potentially offend the fundamental principle of proportionality at sentencing. 
A second concern is that it leaves the court vulnerable to accusations of activism, 
effectively re-opening the debate around which agency in Canada is best positioned to 
establish broad sentencing policy. Indeed, in that sense, the respective roles of 
parliament and the courts remain largely unresolved. Notably, the Canadian Sentencing 
Commission (CSC) took the position that penal policy should be made by elected 
officials—legislative bodies that possess a national perspective and have the resources 
necessary to create comprehensive and integrated policy for all offences. As the 
Commission noted,  
Courts are primarily a reactive institution. They cannot initiate policy and 
must solve problems as they arise. …To expect that a uniform approach to 
sentencing can be developed with clarity and consistency by ten different 
courts is to over-simplify the complexity of the task of sentencing.588  
 
587 To be clear, the remaining restrictions on the use of conditional sentences would still apply 
and are not the subject of this appeal. 
588 CSC, supra note 38 at p. 85. 
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While decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada are binding on all lower courts, 
the high court does not regularly hear appeals on sentencing matters.589 Even if we 
could imagine a world in which it regularly dealt with sentence appeals to provide 
unifying guidance, we would want to proceed with caution. Courts must always be 
mindful of perceptions when purporting to interpret or apply legislation in a way that 
substantively expands their own discretion. When broad sentencing policy is established 
through appellate review, it can be more a reflection of (unelected) judicial policy 
preferences than one informed by principles and a consideration of social facts. While 
required to intervene in specific cases, the judiciary lacks the time, budget, resources, 
and expertise to set broad social policy. As Manfredi (2005) noted, while the courts could 
be provided with this capacity, that would effectively “erode the institutional differences 
between courts and other political institutions that justify judicial review in the first 
place.”590 
Finally, the most substantive challenge to simply removing the restrictions is that 
doing so, without resolving the concerns that led to the section 742.1 limitations, would 
risk pushing Canadian sentencing policy back at least a decade. And, while some may 
welcome the return to a time in which judges exercised greater discretion, it was also a 
time of considerable controversy in terms of conditional sentences. Most notably, the 
sanction was not generally accepted as a term of imprisonment and was the subject of 
public and community resistance when used in serious cases. While Harper’s 
conservative government can certainly be criticized for having politicized sentencing 
policy, that it was able to do so (with little resistance) says something about the crisis of 
confidence that existed at the time in terms of public perceptions of established 
sentencing practices.  
To ignore these facts while removing restrictions risks a return to the angry 
headlines that fueled penal populism in the mid-2000s. And in the absence of 
substantive reforms, there is no reason to expect a different result; that is, the eventual 
calls for restrictions or abolition. Indeed, any interest in avoiding the inevitable would 
 
589 “As a matter of established practice and sound policy, this Court rarely hears appeals relating 
to sentences.” Proulx, supra note 14 at para 2. 
590 Manfredi, C. P. (2005). Deja vu all over again: Chaoulli and the limits of judicial policymaking. 
In C. M. Flood, K. Roach & L. Sossin (Eds.), Access to care, access to justice: The legal debate 
over private health insurance in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, at p. 154. 
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require change in several areas that are under government (not judicial) control. At the 
very least, the lifting of restrictions should trigger a broad review of conditional sentences 
in terms of their purpose and value, if any, as prison alternatives. It may be, for instance, 
that the sanction has produced disappointing results in terms of prison reduction but has 
provided an effective form of net-mending and can be justified as being responsive 
(rightly or wrongly) to the needs of sentencing judges within the current sentencing 
model.   
Potential consequences of Sharma being reversed 
The Ontario Court of Appeal considered, and then explicitly rejected, the notion 
that there was any interchangeability between suspended and conditional sentences, 
confirming that if a conditional sentence would have been appropriate, then a suspended 
sentence would not. In its repudiation of such practices, the Court went on to explain that 
in Voong, the BC Court of Appeal had not endorsed the use of suspended sentences as 
alternatives to conditional sentences, essentially because that Court had declared that it 
would be a legal error to do so. And yet, neither court addresses the obvious question; 
that is, would the court be contorting itself to get to a suspended sentence if a 
conditional sentence remained available? Indeed, as the sentencing judge in Galang 
(one of the cases dealt with in Voong) acknowledged, “[w]hen conditional sentences 
were available for this type of offence, there was no practical reason for an accused to 
seek a suspended sentence.”591 
If the Supreme Court of Canada reverses Sharma, the restrictions contained in 
sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(2) would be re-instated (in Ontario) and we would return 
to the post Bill C-10 status quo, which is not necessarily a comfortable place to land. 
While the decision would resolve the constitutional issue, it is equally important that the 
Court provide guidance to judges regarding the use of suspended sentences (or other 
alternatives) in cases in which conditional sentences are no longer available. This could 
include direction regarding the applicability of the exceptional circumstances doctrine but 
should also offer much needed clarification on the nature of probation and the 
appropriateness of attaching what would otherwise be considered punitive conditions to 
 
591 Galang, supra note 545 at para 29. 
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orders that (coincidentally) are being imposed for offences that used to attract 
conditional sentences.   
We cannot lose sight of the fact that conditional sentences appealed to many trial 
judges. The sanction gave the appearance of punitiveness without subjecting offenders 
to the negative consequences of actual imprisonment (“doing less harm”). The factors 
leading to the sanction becoming problematic in terms of prison reduction, however, may 
be tied to the other (unintended) end of the spectrum—that is, “doing more good.” The 
following section explores this issue through a consideration of judicial perceptions 
regarding the purpose of sentencing and, indeed, their role as sentencing judges.  
5.3 The bigger picture – reconsidering judicial roles and the 
purposes & principles of sentencing 
Criminal justice policy in Canada has long distanced itself from the idea that 
judges can, through sentencing, reduce crime. As discussed in an earlier chapter (1.2.1), 
custodial sentences are considered more likely to increase (not decrease) the likelihood 
that a person will reoffend, and even non-custodial programming has tended to produce 
under-whelming results. At best, studies suggest that in certain circumstances, some 
programs may reduce reoffending by some degree in some offender groups. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a solid evidentiary foundation, there is a certain appeal to the 
notion that the justice system can transform offenders into law-abiding citizens. Notably, 
successive governments have failed to provide clear guidance to judges on this issue, 
choosing instead to perpetuate the belief that the purpose of sentencing is to “protect 
society” (s. 718), and that judges can achieve this purpose by imposing sentences that 
act to reduce future crime.592  
In fact, viewing sentencing decisions through the lens of doing “less harm” and/or 
“more good” (to offenders) is another way in which we can better understand the factors 
that influence judges, especially those who have adopted a crime-fighting or crime-
reducing role. In the early years of conditional sentencing, this manifested in the use of 
the sanction as robust probation (doing more good) and was justified by the belief that 
the immediate threat of imprisonment would promote compliance with conditions 
 
592 Doob argues that the purpose of sentencing should be honest and realistic in terms of what 
can (and cannot) be achieved. See Doob, supra note 171 at pp. 10-12. 
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imposed, often for the individual offender’s own good. In the wake of the restrictions 
imposed by Bill C-10, we saw this in decisions that circumvented the sentencing 
restrictions (doing less harm) and were justified by the belief that imprisoning offenders, 
especially those who may be dealing with up-tariffed offences, will increase the likelihood 
that they will reoffend upon release.   
 Judges as protectors of society  
Doing more good – conditional sentences as robust probation 
The notion that (at least some) judges view themselves as protectors of society 
or crime fighters offers yet another explanation for the failure of conditional sentences as 
prison alternatives. Again, initially many judges saw the sanction as being more 
enforceable than a suspended sentence and, by extension, likely more effective than 
probation attached to another sanction (e.g., a short jail term). Indeed, the imposition of 
conditional sentences in such instances likely accounts for much of the net-widening 
suggested by these findings. After all, it should not be surprising that judges who saw 
their role as being to reduce crime—e.g., by “fixing” offenders—were drawn to a non-
custodial option that provided great latitude in terms of the imposition of optional 
conditions, the possibility of tight control in the community, and a facilitated breach 
process that was expected to promote compliance.  
And so, in the wake of Proulx and its elevation of sentencing objectives relating 
to crime reduction,593 we saw longer and stronger conditional sentences, many with 
numerous treatment-oriented requirements.594 However, such orders can be 
problematic, notwithstanding good intentions. Notably, for instance, offenders dealing 
with significant substance abuse or mental health issues are at higher risk of technical 
breaches (i.e., non-compliance with conditions)595 and chronic (repeat) offenders are at a 
higher risk of future offending. To the extent that monitoring occurs, and proven 
 
593 To be clear, crime reduction in this context relates to reduced recidivism attributable to 
offender rehabilitation (“doing more good”), rather than to the avoidance of the negative 
(criminogenic) consequences of incarceration (“doing less harm”). 
594 Similar issues are raised when conditional sentences are imposed with strong deterrence-
oriented requirements—e.g., home confinement, no alcohol, etc. 
595 This factor may offer a partial explanation for the imposition of curfews (instead of house 
arrest) and the tendency of judges not to include electronic monitoring. 
   
230 
breaches are dealt with harshly, this may ultimately translate into the imprisonment of 
more offenders.  
Given the current purposes and principles of sentencing, however, it is difficult to 
criticize judges for pursuing codified objectives designed to reduce reoffending—for 
trying to do more good. They act, after all, under the authority of legislation, as it has 
been interpreted and applied by the appellate courts, including the Supreme Court of 
Canada.596 Yet, there is an apparent disconnect between judges who craft individualized 
sentences designed to address criminogenic factors, and the bulk of social science 
research that tells them they are not likely to get the outcome they seek. For instance, in 
a research project that focused on differences between Indigenous (n=749) and 
Caucasian (n=6,816) offenders serving conditional sentences in BC between 1996 and 
2015, the authors reported recidivism rates of 53.5% and 48.4%, respectively.597  
Notably, the apparent disconnect may be linked to modern-day efforts to 
reintroduce rehabilitation as an “animating principle” of criminal justice (referred to as 
“neorehabilitationism”).598 Purportedly evidence-based, this approach encourages the 
application of findings from social science research to correctional practices.599 Indeed, 
 
596 See the principles and purposes of sentencing as set out in sections 718 to 718.21; on this 
issue, see Proulx, supra note 14 and the inclusion of both prison reduction and crime reduction 
objectives for conditional sentencing.  
597 Note that recidivism was defined as a new conviction (excluding breaches) occurring within 
two years of the start of the conditional sentence. See Gutierrez, L., & Chadwick, N. (2020). Are 
conditional sentence orders used differently for Indigenous offenders? A comparison of 
sentences and outcomes in Canada. Canadian Journal of Criminology & Criminal Justice, 62(4), 
1–29, at p. 18. 
These findings are not referenced to support conditional sentences as either more (or less) likely 
to reduce recidivism than other sanctions (e.g., prison). The point being made is simply that for 
judges who define success as offenders who do not recidivate, approximately half of the 
conditional sentences imposed in BC between 1996 and 2015 failed to achieve this outcome.  
598 Klingele, C. (2016). The promises and perils of evidence-based corrections. Notre Dame Law 
Review, 91(2), 537–584, at p. 568. 
599 Klingele (2016) describes two strains of neorehabilitationism. The first is humanitarian, a form 
that supports the pursuit of rehabilitative aims regardless of the success of treatment effects. 
Humanitarian neorehabilitationists value rehabilitation as a philosophical approach that can soften 
otherwise harsh penalties that disproportionately impact marginalized populations (e.g., drug 
treatment and other specialized courts).  
Scientific neorehabilitationism, on the other hand, focuses primarily on reducing the likelihood that 
a particular offender will reoffend. Arguably more realistic than the rehabilitative approaches of 
the early 20th century, proponents maintain a belief that the problems associated with criminality 
can be identified and “cured” through the application of science. Ibid at p. 569. 
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the emergence and proliferation of specialized and problem-solving courts are linked to 
this movement. There are at least two challenges associated with returning to (or 
continuing with) such a model. First, there are relatively few methodologically sound 
studies on the effects of various criminal justice interventions. Involved agencies (e.g., 
police, courts, corrections) do not necessarily collect (or share) the types of data 
required for evaluative research, and programs rarely remain stable long enough for 
review.600 As a result, efforts to pursue evidence-based correctional practices have 
tended to apply “core principles” derived from a small body of research (e.g., the use of 
actuarial risk prediction instruments designed to assess offender risks and needs).601 
Second, the rehabilitative ideal tends to be associated with lengthy periods of 
court ordered community supervision, within which offenders are often required to 
comply with potentially onerous conditions. As Klingele (2016) points out, in some cases 
(e.g., drug addicted offenders being required not to possess or consume drugs), there 
can be a sense that offenders are being set-up to fail. Indeed, one of the sustained 
critiques of such practices has been that, instead of helping offenders, conditions 
imposed under the umbrella of offender rehabilitation can act to further marginalize, and 
even harm them. Put another way, instead of reducing “the reach of the penal state,” 
they “facilitate its growth.”602  
For these (and other) reasons, Klingele (2013) expresses skepticism regarding 
efforts to use prison alternatives at the sentencing stage.603 Even when imposed under 
the mantle of rehabilitation, community sentences are not benign and can result in an 
offender being subject to more control over a longer period. And so, while 
acknowledging the intuitive appeal of community sentences (e.g., to judges, lawyers, 
and offenders), Klingele promotes placing limits upon their utilization. Notably, she 
argues that if a judge concludes a non-custodial sanction is appropriate, he or she 
 
600 See Klingele, ibid at pp. 555-562; Slinger, E., & Roesch, R. (2010). Problem-solving courts in 
Canada: A review and a call for empirically-based evaluation methods. International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry, 33, 258–264. 
601 Klingele, ibid at p. 559. The author also refers to the use of behaviour management techniques 
and engaging pro-social community members and resources (p. 560). 
602 Ibid at p. 584. 
603 Notably, Klingele suggests that since a sentence involving community supervision also carries 
the threat of incarceration, it is not a true alternative to imprisonment but rather a “delayed form of 
[imprisonment].” See Klingele, C. (2013). Rethinking the use of community supervision. Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology, 103(4), 1015–1069, at p. 1015. 
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should choose one that does not put an offender at risk of imprisonment, suggesting that 
a fine or short jail term may be fairer than a “certain-to-fail” community sentence. 
Alternatively, where a community-based sentence is selected, the principle of restraint 
should inform its overall use, the inclusion of conditions, and the length of term 
(duration).604 
And yet, a gap remains—between what judges believe they are accomplishing 
and what studies that focus on outcomes can support. This disconnect can perhaps be 
best understood as a matter of scale. On the one hand, researchers and analysts tend to 
operate at the macro level, working with large (faceless) numbers and statistical 
probabilities. Judges, on the other hand, do their work at the individual (micro) level, 
often dealing with sympathetic (“sad”) offenders who are disadvantaged and/or 
marginalized. In such cases, there can be a strong temptation to problem-solve and to 
believe that you are making a positive difference, even when doing so may not ultimately 
be in an offender’s long-term best interest.605  
Doing less harm – circumventing the restrictions placed on conditional sentences  
The restrictions placed on the use of conditional sentences represented a 
substantial departure from established practice and, as such, were expected to result in 
noticeable increases in the use of imprisonment. Given the relative stability of 
imprisonment rates in Canada, however, it is possible that the anticipated negative 
 
604 Ibid at p. 1055. Ultimately, Klingele adopts a normative position, arguing that significant and 
sustained reductions in the use of imprisonment will only be realized when we, as a society, 
decide that “reducing the scale of the penal state is the right thing to do.” Klingele, supra note 598 
at p. 584. 
605 For instance, if the focus were simply on imposing proportional sentences, a homeless and 
drug-addicted, chronic petty offender might be facing a short (e.g., less than 60-day) jail 
sentence. In an effort to address “root causes”, however, a compassionate sentencing judge 
might choose, instead, to impose a six-month conditional sentence that mandates a curfew, drug 
treatment, abstention from drugs, and an area restriction (from the area in which drugs are known 
to be trafficked), perhaps even followed by probation to allow an extended term of support and 
supervision. Notably, while such a sentence may appear to be more lenient than a short period of 
incarceration, it leaves the offender at risk of imprisonment for a much longer period of time.  
Two of the judges interviewed addressed this general issue from their (earlier) point of view as 
defence counsel. Judge T spoke of his/her frustration when dealing with clients who saw such an 
order as a “get out of jail free card” without understanding the more serious ramifications that they 
would be subject to when they breached. Similarly, Judge F recalled recommending the fixed jail 
term in such situations, saying ““I would tell them I could pitch 45 days and I think the judge will 
buy it, because I think you’re going to blow it on a CSO.” 
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impacts of Bill C-10 were partially muted by judges who found ways to get around 
amendments thought to be fundamentally inconsistent with an entrenched sentencing 
culture that prioritizes restraint.606 
Notably, the Bill C-10 amendments put judges in the awkward position of having 
to reconcile contradictory statutory directions. On the one hand, the 1996 reforms (Bill C-
41) promoted restraint and encouraged the increased use of community-based 
sentencing alternatives.607 On the other hand, the 2012 amendments signalled a return 
to a tough-on-crime model that saw non-custodial sanctions as inappropriate responses, 
especially to more serious offences. Indeed, while the principle of restraint remained 
enshrined in sentencing law, the discretion necessary to give meaningful consideration 
to it had been largely removed.608  
 
606 Doob & Webster, supra note 80(c) at p. 362. 
607 This was confirmed by the SCC in Proulx, where the Court interpreted Bill C-41 as sending “a 
clear message to all Canadian judges that too many people are sent to prison” and explicitly 
framed conditional sentences as Parliament’s attempt to remedy “the problem of over 
incarceration” (supra note 14 at para 1). 
608 In considering the dilemma faced by judges who perceive a conflict between upholding the 
rule of law and the duty to dispense justice as they see it, Pomerance (2013) explored three 
possible responses. The first was that the judge could simply apply the law “without personal 
comment.” The second envisioned the judge similarly applying the law, but, while doing so, also 
expressing his/her condemnation of it. Finally, the third option was for the judge to not apply the 
law, effectively abdicating his/her responsibility to do so (Pomerance, supra note 3 at p. 308). 
Notably, the three options provided by Pomerance suggest a rigidity that does not exist in most 
sentencing law, namely that the choice is to apply the law or to not apply the law. The reality is 
that there are shades of grey between these choices. 
In their consideration of this issue, Doob and Webster (2016) identify three options for judges 
dealing with cases in which a strict application of the law may result in unfair or disproportionately 
harsh outcomes. The first is to use the Charter to have laws declared unconstitutional, something 
that we have certainly seen with many of the mandatory minimum penalties introduced by Bill C-
10 and, more recently, with respect to the restrictions placed on conditional sentencing.  
In terms of mandatory minimum penalties (MMPs), efforts to use the Charter to have specific 
provisions declared unconstitutional have been relatively successful. See table regularly updated 
by “Rangefindr” database, online at: https://mms.watch/. Similar challenges regarding conditional 
sentencing were not initially successful. See, for instance, Sawh, supra note 573. 
The second involves judges giving a creative or “benevolent interpretation” to the statute, and the 
third is to disregard parliamentary intention and compensate for the unfairness by adjusting the 
sentence elsewhere (Doob & Webster, supra note 80(c) at p. 403). In the context of the 
conditional sentencing restrictions, the grey area (between applying the law, or not) has included 
finding ways to get around the intention of the legislation while still appearing to comply with its 
literal meaning. Such practices fit neatly within the second option identified by Doob and Webster; 
that is, being creative and interpreting the law benevolently, wherever possible.  
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And so, we should not be shocked by judges’ willingness to circumvent the 2012 
restrictions on conditional sentences of imprisonment. In fact, it would not be the first 
time that judicial resistance strategies have been used in Canadian criminal law.  Two 
recent and relevant examples make the point. The first relates to the judicial response to 
the mandatory federal victim surcharge, the second to elements of the Truth in 
Sentencing Act609 that impacted calculations of credit for time served on remand. In both 
instances, Canadian judges employed strategies of “creative interpretation” or “sentence 
adjustment” to get around requirements seen as being unfair or excessively punitive. 
The federal victim surcharge 
Introduced in 1988, the federal victim surcharge is imposed at the time of 
sentencing. As of 2012, the surcharge (s. 737) was set at 15% of any fine, or, if no fine 
was imposed, $50 for each summary conviction offence and $100 for each indictable 
offence. Up until 2012, judges had the discretion to waive the surcharge in cases in 
which its imposition would cause undue hardship, and they regularly did so. This 
discretion was removed in 2013 and the amounts payable were effectively doubled at 
that time.610  
The decision to force judges to impose a financial penalty on every offender was 
not well received. Notably, a Department of Justice review identified several creative 
judicial responses. They included: 1) imposing the surcharge but giving no time to pay 
(default prison time of one-day would be noted as served); 2) imposing the surcharge but 
then allowing an extraordinarily long time to pay—e.g., 100 years; or 3) imposing a 
nominal fine (e.g., $1) to reduce the amount of the surcharge, which is calculated as 
30% of the fine.611  
In 2018, the controversial surcharge provision was declared of no force and 
effect by the Supreme Court of Canada. In its decision, the Court commented critically 
 
609 Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (limiting credit for time spent in pre-sentencing 
custody), 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., 2009, was proclaimed into force on February 22, 2010. Short title - 
Truth in Sentencing Act, S.C. 2009, c.29. 
610 Bill C-37 - Increasing Offenders’ Accountability for Victims Act, S.C. 2013, c 11. 
611 On this issue, see Law, M. A. (2016). The federal victim surcharge: The 2013 amendments 
and their implications in nine jurisdictions (Final Report) (p. 46). Ottawa, Canada: Minister of 
Justice and Attorney General of Canada. 
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on the practice of imposing a nominal fine as a way of reducing the surcharge payable, 
noting that such practices ignore legislative intent. As Martin J. explained, “it is more 
principled for this Court to either strike down the victim surcharge as unconstitutional, or 
to uphold its constitutionality and require judges to impose it in all cases as Parliament 
clearly intended.”612 The following year, Parliament responded by including alternate 
wording that returned discretion to the sentencing judge as part of Bill C-75.613 
Limiting credit for time served 
Prior to the 2010 enactment of the Truth in Sentencing Act (Bill C-25),614 the 
long-standing practice in Canada was to grant offenders 2:1 credit for time spent in 
custody prior to sentencing.615 This practice was consistent with earlier legislation that 
provided only general guidance to sentencing judges, allowing them to take into account 
any time spent in custody by the person as a result of the offence. Bill C-25 added the 
following restrictive language: “the court shall limit any credit for that time to a maximum 
of one day for each day spent in custody,” though it also allowed for the crediting of 1.5 
days for each day “if the circumstances justify it” and the time spent on remand was not 
related to the accused’s criminal record or to a failure to comply with bail conditions (s. 
719(3.1)).  
The new provisions restricted judicial discretion, ignored the entrenched culture, 
and resulted in a system of credit that was widely seen as being neither fair, nor 
equitable.616 The 1:1 regime meant that an accused person who was denied bail prior to 
sentencing spent more time in custody post-sentence than an offender convicted of the 
 
612 R. v. Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58, at para 92. 
613 Bill C-75, supra note  27. The current wording of s.737(2.1) allows judges to order that an 
offender pay no surcharge, or to pay a lesser amount if satisfied that the surcharge: a) would 
cause undue hardship to the offender; or b) would be disproportionate to the gravity of the 
offence or the degree of responsibility of the offender. 
614 Bill C-25, supra note 609. 
615 In the absence of a legislated formula, a practice developed whereby offenders were given 1.5 
to 2.0 days credit for each day spent in pre-sentence custody. This enhanced credit recognized 
two major differences between time spent on remand and time spent serving a sentence. First, 
other than life sentences, remand time (‘dead time’) is not considered when calculating an 
offender’s eligibility for remission, parole or statutory release. Second, accused persons in 
remand facilities generally face harsher conditions, and are often unable to access programming 
that is available to sentenced offenders (e.g., educational, or rehabilitative programs). See R. v. 
Wust, 2000 SCC 18. 
616 See Doob & Webster, supra note 305(a). 
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same (or similar) offence who was initially released but then sentenced to an equal term 
of incarceration. The provisions were seen by many as politically motivated: 
Unfortunately for those serving time in pre-sentence custody (and for those 
of us who continue to defend the normative principles of proportionality, 
parity, and fairness at sentencing), such politically motivated decisions are 
an indication of the government’s criminal justice priorities.617 
Notably, strategies adopted by lower courts to ameliorate unfair outcomes were 
ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Indeed, in 2014, the Court 
creatively applied rules of statutory construction to effectively reverse the legislative 
assumption that 1:1 credit was to be the rule and 1.5:1 the exception.618 Parliament 
subsequently responded by enacting legislation that softened the restrictions that had 
been placed on judicial discretion.619 
Circumvention in the context of Bill C-10 
The extent to which circumvention occurs is related to the degree of divergence 
or discontinuity with established theory and practice. In that respect, the comments of 
Judge “I” (in the context of the sentencing restrictions) are instructive. Comparing the 
complexity of the sentencing exercise to the nuanced task of engineering a soundboard, 
he/she explained that: 
Maybe we bump up the decibel level a little bit on specific deterrence 
because this person has offended a number of times in a similar way in the 
past. Whereas in another matter where it’s a first offender maybe we slide 
down the soundboard on specific deterrence because they have 
demonstrated an ability to live a responsible law-abiding life and this seems 
to be a one off. So, I look at it as being a constant sliding with each 
case…We bump down a little bit on rehabilitation [in cases where an 
offender] appears to be rehabilitated. I always have that visual in my head.  
This judge expressed frustration regarding the inflexibility introduced in 2012. 
Elaborating on the soundboard analogy, the judge explained that “we do these little 
 
617 Ibid at p. 390. 
618 Summers, supra note 520. Noting that to do otherwise would be incompatible with the 
principles of parity and proportionality, the Court defined “circumstances” broadly to include loss 
of eligibility for early release or parole (at paras 61-68). 
619 Judicial discretion to determine “if the circumstances justify [1.5:1]” was returned with an 
amendment that went into effect December of 2018. Bill C-51 – An Act to amend the Criminal 
Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act, 
S.C. 2018, c.29. See also R. v. Safarzadeh-Markali, 2016 SCC 14. 
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adjustments and then you punch in the coordinates and the ticket that gets spit out often 
will say [conditional sentence order]. You crumple that up and throw it away and you just 
put your head in your hands.” Clearly, this judge was responding to the apparent conflict 
between individualized sentences and restrictions which reduced judicial discretion in 
terms of selecting the appropriate “tool” (sanction). 
It is important to acknowledge circumvention and seek to understand its cause. 
After all, in the act of resistance, judges communicate. Not only can this tell us 
something about their understanding of the judicial role, but also, in a practical sense, 
what they believe they need to succeed in that role. Viewed this way, sentencing 
decisions are a form of “dialogue” and BC judges have been sending several (related) 
messages. The first is that the sentencing restrictions introduced by Bill C-10 are 
inconsistent with the principle of restraint in the use of imprisonment. As Pomerance 
noted, “in [place of conditional sentences] we see a return to real jail as the primary and, 
in many cases, the only sentencing alternative for many criminal offences.”620 
Second, many see their roles as being, at least in part, protectors of society (and 
reducers of crime). And, to fulfill these roles, judges are saying that they require flexibility 
and the discretion to craft individualized responses. This includes having access to a 
variety of non-custodial options whose use can reduce the harms associated with 
traditional imprisonment (e.g., allow offenders to maintain employment, relationships, 
and ties to the community) and support offenders in their efforts to address mental health 
and substance abuse issues. Notably, as part of this effort, there is an identified need for 
appropriate resourcing so that offenders can be supported and supervised while serving 
community-based sentences. 
Finally, judges want more (not fewer) tools in their sentencing toolbox. To that 
end, when dealing with an offence no longer eligible for conditional sentencing, some 
have taken to reconstructing suspended sentences by making them longer and stronger 
(more like conditional sentences). Amongst other things, this tells us that the judiciary 
has an interest in having (or creating) a non-custodial sanction that is less overtly 
punitive than prison, and that includes the elements of both a carrot and a stick. The 
proverbial carrot to offer suitable offenders the opportunity to remain in the community; 
 
620 Pomerance, supra note 3 at p. 308. 
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the stick to discourage offending behaviour and non-compliance with conditions 
imposed. More importantly, perhaps, this sanction must include breach provisions that 
are timely, avoid the delays associated with new (breach) offences, and allow judges to 
effectively respond to (or manage) offender behaviour.  
5.4 The future of conditional sentencing 
This thesis has identified several factors that may have contributed to the 
lacklustre performance of conditional sentences as mechanisms for prison reduction. 
Notably, and perhaps somewhat predictably, the core challenge has been its 
inappropriate application to offenders not otherwise facing imprisonment. This, in turn, 
has been tied to the existing sentencing framework and the perpetuation of crime 
reduction as a goal of sentencing, a linkage that appears to have impacted the use of 
conditional sentences in at least two ways. First, its facilitated breach provisions appear 
to have unintentionally encouraged judges to use the sanction as a form of robust 
probation. Second, in the wake of restrictions that presumably would have resulted in the 
actual imprisonment of a great number of offenders, judges found ways around unduly 
harsh results that they believed were more likely to increase (not decrease) reoffending.  
The restrictions imposed on the use of conditional sentences created tension in 
several ways. First, many judges saw the overall intention of Bill C-10 as being an 
overtly political effort to reduce their discretion, rather than a thoughtful package of 
reforms reflecting evidence-based policymaking. For some, this recognition delegitimized 
both the process and the outcome. Second, the restrictions introduced were inconsistent 
with jurisprudence that has repeatedly stressed the need for judicial discretion and 
deference towards sentencing judges. A regime that celebrates individualized 
sentencing seeks more, not less, flexibility and a greater range, not fewer tools.  
Making such a broad swathe of offences ineligible for conditional sentencing 
increased the likelihood that judges would experience conflicts in terms of their ability to 
reconcile the suggested outcome (prison) with their personal sentencing ideologies and 
with the principles and purposes of sentencing. Consider, for instance, the dilemma 
faced by judges who believe that: 1) their role in sentencing is to protect society through 
the imposition of sanctions that will reduce the likelihood an offender will reoffend; 2) 
imprisoning an offender is always costly, often cruel, and likely to increase, not 
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decrease, future reoffending; and 3) community-based sentencing options are less 
costly, more compassionate, and more likely to achieve positive results (or, at the very 
least, to avoid negative results). 
While some judges could reconcile the restrictions with their overarching 
obligation to apply laws duly passed, others sought creative approaches that would allow 
them to follow the letter of the law, if not its spirit. This project found that this included the 
use of suspended sentences reconstructed as disguised conditional sentence orders. 
This result is best understood in the context of section 718, which itself places an 
unrealistic burden on judges—the protection of society.621 It establishes a crime control 
model that is not evidence-based and is arguably dishonest in terms of the relationship 
between sentencing and crime.622 Sections 718.1 to 718.2 set out principles that are 
internally inconsistent and arguably unattainable. On the one hand, judges are directed 
to protect society, to impose proportionate sentences, to exercise restraint, to reduce 
crime, to deter, rehabilitate, and restore – on the other, their access to the tools that they 
believe they need to do so has, in many cases, been blocked.  
The consensus view is that prison is cruel and costly, and its use as a crime 
reduction strategy counter-productive; this was and is the core rhetoric of conditional 
sentencing. Notably, the fact that conditional sentences have never accounted for a 
large proportion of outcomes does not mean that they were not valued by judges as a 
tool appropriate for specific types of offenders. Judges tell us this directly through their 
use of conditional sentences, and indirectly by finding ways to reconstruct them when 
they became unavailable for given offences. That was one of the messages delivered 
through this project.  
 
621 718 - The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with 
crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and 
safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: 
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is 
caused by unlawful conduct; 
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; 
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; 
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; 
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and 
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to 
victims or to the community. 
622 Doob, supra note 171 at p. 12. 
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Notably, of the judges who commented on the viability of conditional sentences 
going forward, most (14/22) suggested that the sanction should be maintained as is or 
expanded.623 The remaining eight judges supported an enforceable intermediate 
sanction in some form, though they were less certain that a conditional sentence is the 
best or only option. Judge C, for example, expressed an openness to considering 
amendments to the suspended sentence (in place of conditional sentences), explaining 
that “if changes are made to deal with the enforcement provisions for suspended 
sentences, then I don’t really think you need conditional sentences. In that sense [CSOs 
would] still be viable but unnecessary.” 
Another suggestion that focused on reforming the suspended sentence (in place 
of the conditional sentence) came from Judge W, who explored the notion of developing 
a true suspended sentence, where the term would be announced but then suspended 
for a period in which the offender would be bound to comply with the conditions of a 
probation order. This judge argued that imposing a fixed term but then suspending its 
execution would do two things. First, it would encourage compliance with conditions 
because the results upon proven breach would be known in advance. Second, it would 
serve a public education function and likely be more acceptable to the public than 
available options. 
The legal and academic literature offers additional perspectives in terms of 
conditional sentences moving forward. On the one hand, legal commentary has tended 
to frame both MMPs and conditional sentencing restrictions as problematic in terms of 
the principle of proportionality, the need to individualize sentences, and the unforeseen 
negative impacts on Indigenous and marginalized populations.624 Indeed, legislative 
reforms that reduce judicial discretion are often criticized as reflecting either a 
politicization of crime policy (populism) or a distrust of the judiciary that is generally 
rooted in concerns around perceived leniency. In its simplest form, restrictions on judicial 
 
623 This is consistent with Stephens’ (2007) finding that, despite practical and ideological 
concerns, most of the judges she interviewed saw the conditional sentence as a “useful 
innovation” associated with a range of benefits. Stephens, supra note 161 at p. 45. 
624 See, for instance, Parkes, supra note 314 ; Sylvestre, M.-E. (2013). The (Re) Discovery of the 
Proportionality Principle in Sentencing in Ipeelee: Constitutionalization and the Emergence of 
Collective Responsibility. Supreme Court Law Review (2d), 63, 461–481; Healy, supra note 315; 
Pomerance, supra note 3; Paciocco, supra note 486. 
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discretion are presented as negatives and their removal (or efforts to restore discretion) 
as positives.  
Social scientists (criminologists), on the other hand, while generally agreeing with 
the potentially negative impacts of sentencing restrictions, have tended to offer more 
nuanced recommendations. Put another way, instead of defining restrictions as the 
problem and the removal of restrictions as the solution, some have chosen instead to 
explore the nature of the problem more fully. Notably, in doing so the issue can be re-
defined as a lack of judicial and/or public support for the sanction. This broader 
understanding has resulted in calls to reconsider the restrictions, not in isolation but, 
rather, in conjunction with other reforms that are intended to address the challenges that 
gave rise to them in the first place.  
Perhaps the most thoughtful amongst them are the proposals made by Reid and 
Roberts (2019), who call for a thorough parliamentary review of the conditional sentence 
and an exploration of the concept (and meaning) of net-widening.625 While supporting 
the removal of the restrictions placed on conditional sentences, the authors also offer 
several suggestions designed to increase judicial and public confidence in the sanction. 
These include “rebranding”, a greater investment in resources for community 
supervision, orders that carry greater “penal weight”, and lowering the ceiling on 
sentence length to remove more serious offences that may trigger media and public 
opposition.626 
And so, the question that remains is clearly this—do we continue with piecemeal 
efforts to salvage a severely flawed option, or is it time to start over with conditional 
sentences? Like the sanction itself, the answer is complicated, as evidenced by the 
range of solutions advanced above. Regardless, we sit now at a crossroads. We can 
remain in the shallows, adopting a narrow view that focuses on either abandoning, 
restoring, or repairing the conditional sentencing provisions, or we can take this 
opportunity to go deeper—to undertake a broad review of sentencing practices, one that 
 
625 Reid & Roberts, supra note 1 at p. 32. In terms of net-widening, the authors suggest that, in 
some cases, the concept should perhaps be understood not as the inappropriate application of a 
sanction but, rather, as “an understandable judicial reaction to an inadequately resourced 
community sanction” (at p. 35). 
626 Ibid at pp 33-34. 
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would (at long last) allow for the development of comprehensive, coherent, and 
principled policies. 
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Conclusions  
Limitations and future research 
This study adds to the existing literature on restraint in the use of imprisonment 
by offering an explanation for the failure of conditional sentences as tools of prison 
reduction in BC, and by documenting the use of resistance strategies employed by 
judges in response to the restrictions imposed on their discretion by Bill C-10. In terms of 
the latter, judges have acted to protect core values, most notably of restraint, 
proportionality, and fairness. The findings from the current study are consistent with 
other research that has tied such efforts to the introduction of laws seen as being unfair 
or unduly harsh. Similar projects should be undertaken in other provinces/territories to 
determine the extent to which this is a national phenomenon.   
The data relied upon in this investigation offered a new way of conceptualizing 
sentence decision-making, arguably one that is more relevant to judges and other 
practitioners. It did so by focusing on the primary sentence for each case (jail, conditional 
sentence, fine, suspended sentence, conditional or absolute discharge) and by treating 
probation more appropriately, as a secondary sanction. While the fact that a court 
sentencing database was created for the purposes of this study may raise concerns 
relating to data integrity and comparability, the fact that the findings consistently 
confirmed descriptions from official sources (e.g., predominantly summary offences, 
fewer and shorter conditional sentences after 2012, proportion of conditional sentences 
that included breach allegations, etc.) should provide readers with a high degree of 
confidence. Indeed, the primary limitation of this database would apply equally to 
existing official sources; that is, that it would have been helpful to have included offence 
dates, information regarding each offender’s custody status, and possibly “flags” to 
indicate whether prison terms were to be served intermittently or as straight time. 
The research design for this study was subject to both expected and unexpected 
limitations. In terms of the judicial survey, there was a relatively low response rate (25%). 
This was attributed in part to survey exhaustion and in part to an inability to employ best 
practices in conducting online surveys (e.g., sending out reminders). If the survey had 
been the only instrument used in collecting judicial “voices,” the response rate might 
   
244 
have been more of a concern; instead, this limitation was mitigated by the unexpectedly 
high number of judges (24) who agreed to participate in the (much lengthier) interviews. 
The decision to employ a semi-structured design in the interviews had both 
advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, this provided some 
standardization, while at the same time allowing for the exploration of issues raised by 
the judges. This was an advantage as many interesting themes emerged which were not 
formally included in the original interview script. This also ended up being a limitation, 
given that there was a lack of consistency across interview transcripts, which resulted in 
too many topics with too few responses. This complicated efforts to quantify the analysis 
and discuss results.  
Clearly, there is a need for further research that incorporates the voices of 
judges, whether collected through a survey, interviews, or focus groups. Given the 
growing practice of joint submissions on sentence, future efforts should similarly attempt 
to collect perspectives from prosecutors and defence counsel. This study has confirmed 
the importance of appropriate resourcing for community-based sentencing options; 
accordingly, correctional staff (probation officers) should be consulted on such issues to 
determine whether offenders are (or are not) being adequately supported and 
supervised in the community and, if not, to determine what is needed. Finally, in light of 
the focus (in BC) on rehabilitative objectives, future research should focus on sentence 
outcomes (recidivism) for offenders serving conditional sentences, and on establishing a 
process for providing such information to judges.627  
The impact of Bill C-75 (2019) must be evaluated, both provincially and 
nationally. While framed as reforms aimed at reducing delay, the provisions relating to 
breaches of court orders and the increased hybridization of indictable offences have 
obvious implications for sentencing. Amongst other things, future research should 
examine the impact of this legislation on Crown decisions: 1) to charge administrative 
offences; and 2) to proceed summarily to increase the sentencing options available (and 
indirectly to increase their ability to negotiate plea deals). The first area is relevant to an 
assessment of decarcerative strategies writ large, the second to an improved 
 
627 Several judges interviewed indicated they would be interested in receiving sentence outcome 
data as a form of feedback (positive or negative) regarding sentence choices in particular cases. 
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understanding of the role of prosecutorial discretion vis a vis the availability of conditional 
sentences.628 
Similarly, the status of Bill C-22 should be monitored, particularly in terms of 
principled opposition that would seek more meaningful and fundamental change. Subject 
to an early enactment date, the decision in Sharma may still be both relevant and 
provocative as a research topic. Close attention should be paid to the Court’s 
construction of social facts (e.g., conditional sentences as effective mechanisms for 
prison reduction) and handling of key issues. The respective roles of Parliament and the 
judiciary in establishing penal policy will be of particular interest, as will the Court’s 
comments regarding the notions of community custody and sanction interchangeability, 
the latter in terms of suspended and conditional sentences.  
It is appropriate that we strive for coherence and honesty in our sentencing 
provisions, and that we aspire, at all stages of the justice system, to exercise restraint in 
our use of imprisonment.629 In terms of crime reduction, however, we should prioritize 
efforts to keep people out of the system rather than looking for better ways to process 
them through it. As a quote generally attributed to Archbishop Desmond Tutu reminds 
us— “There comes a point where we need to stop just pulling people out of the river. We 
need to go upstream and find out why they’re falling in.” 
Where do we go from here? 
This thesis began as a broad exploration of judicial perspectives on the use of 
conditional sentences in BC. The initial focus was on the impact of legislated restrictions 
that were placed on the use of this sanction in 2012 as a means of shedding light on the 
politicization of crime and the judicial response to this phenomenon. However, in the 
wake of two (2019) evaluations that suggested the sanction had largely failed in its 
primary purpose as a tool for meaningful prison reduction, the scope of the project 
 
628 The second issue identified will be moot in the event the restrictions imposed on the use of the 
conditional sentence are removed (either through the court process or proposed legislation). 
629 For many reasons, those interested in substantive reductions in the use of imprisonment in 
Canada should probably concentrate on offenders who are denied (or unable to perfect) bail prior 
to trial or disposition. While we may have once held the view that the sentence is properly the 
focus of criminal proceedings, it is increasingly apparent that decisions made at the bail stage are 
at least as important in terms of prison reduction. 
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expanded its observational lens. Adopting a broader focus encompassing the ‘life of 
conditional sentences’ thus far, this thesis identifies possible explanations for these 
empirical findings, with particular attention being paid to the role of the judiciary.  
The relevance and timeliness of this broader research project increased with the 
release of R. v. Sharma—a 2020 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that has since 
gone to the Supreme Court of Canada.630 Given the government’s reluctance, up until 
this point, to reconsider the 2012 restrictions placed on conditional sentences, a decision 
by Canada’s top court would have been determinative of the fate of this criminal 
sanction. However, the federal Minister of Justice, perhaps anticipating the likely 
outcome of Sharma and wishing to be seen as progressively proactive rather than 
conservatively reactive, introduced a legislative package in early 2021 that, amongst 
other things, essentially removes the restrictions placed on conditional sentences by the 
previous (Conservative) government.631 Like the proverbial cat, this criminal sanction 
may have yet another life to live. By extension, this latest twist in the on-going saga of 
the conditional sentence of imprisonment only increases the need—if not urgency—for a 
better understanding of its persistent failure to fulfil its principal objective of reducing 
Canada’s use of prison.     
The narrative (so far) of conditional sentencing 
Restraint in the use of imprisonment is (and has been) a long-standing and 
entrenched principle of Canadian penal policy. It was codified in 1996 by Bill C-41 and 
manifested in the creation, as part of the same legislative package, of the conditional 
sentence—a sanction that allows offenders to serve certain terms of imprisonment in the 
community. Yet, decades after their introduction, we are still searching for a place for this 
controversial sanction within Canada’s sentencing ‘toolbox,’ particularly as a mechanism 
for prison reduction. Conceptually and practically flawed from the beginning, conditional 
sentences were implemented notwithstanding identified concerns (e.g., net-widening, 
the need for resources, public support) and were introduced without meaningful 
 
630 It is unclear what, if any, impact the introduction of Bill C-22 will have on the pending appeal at 
the Supreme Court of Canada. It is possible, for instance, that if the legislation passes quickly, 
the issue in Sharma (i.e., the constitutionality of restrictions on the use of conditional sentences 
that would no longer be in effect) may become moot. 
631 Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
First reading February 18, 2021.  
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consultation or adequate planning. Indeed, to the extent that efforts were made to “sell” 
the new sanction at all, public statements and press releases reassured the public that 
conditional sentences were intended to be used only for less serious and non-violent 
offences.632 Notably, the legislation contained no such restrictions and, in 2000, the 
Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that all offences that met the minimal requirements 
were eligible for conditional sentences (Proulx).   
In retrospect, many judges saw the Proulx decision as a turning point in the 
sanction’s development. After all, the Court had provided a methodology, clarified its 
punitive nature, and resisted efforts to limit its application. Judges who went on to make 
genuine efforts to apply the lessons of Proulx to otherwise prison-bound offenders, 
however, soon realized that the responsibility for “selling” conditional sentences of 
imprisonment to the public had been left to them, and that the resources necessary for 
monitoring offenders in the community had not been provided. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
while overall rates of imprisonment in British Columbia declined somewhat following the 
Supreme Court decision, its potential effect was short-lived (see Appendix G). Indeed, 
levels of provincial incarceration began a steady climb as early as 2003, returning to pre-
Proulx levels by 2007. 
And so, Proulx arguably contributed to the downfall of the conditional sentence 
as a mechanism of restraint in the use of imprisonment in at least two ways. First, by 
allowing for its use with serious offences, this decision set the stage for backlash from a 
public that struggled to reconcile traditional notions of punishment and imprisonment with 
the sight of an offender walking out the front door of the courtroom at the end of the day. 
It should not be surprising that some judges became increasingly more sensitive to this 
displeasure. The decision’s second impact can be seen in rhetoric that explicitly granted 
equal status to the goals of prison reduction and crime reduction (e.g., through the 
pursuit of rehabilitative or restorative objectives). In doing so, the Court created a longer 
and stronger community-based option that some judges used as a form of robust 
probation. While an understandable response, a consequent increase in breaches would 
be expected. 
 
632 News Release, supra note 155. 
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The decade following Proulx can be characterized as one of growing tensions 
and conflicting values. The judiciary sought to expand judicial discretion through 
decisions that focused on individualization and deference, while Parliament responded 
with legislative restrictions aimed at reducing judicial discretion. Conditional sentences 
remained controversial and increasingly subject to criticism due to their non-sensical 
construction (as terms of imprisonment), an apparent lack of resources for offender 
supervision in the community, and a lack of public support, especially when used for 
serious or violent offences. For these reasons, and others, the sanction generally failed 
to attract any sizeable proportion of the caseload otherwise bound for prison. Particularly 
in BC, it appears that the appeal of a non-custodial option with facilitated breach 
provisions led to net-widening, largely defeating its purpose of decreasing the use of 
imprisonment. Equally notable, for those (fewer) cases in which judges genuinely 
attempted to achieve prison reduction, the application of conditional sentences to 
offenders convicted of serious offences (i.e., who otherwise would be prison-bound) 
attracted considerable negative media and public attention. Consequently, sentencing 
became a more overtly political issue, one that was seized upon by the Conservatives 
and ridden into power, initially as a minority government (2006)633 and later as a majority 
(2011).634 
Upon gaining a Conservative majority in 2011, Parliament worked quickly to 
effectively limit the application of conditional sentences to summary offences (Bill C-10; 
2012). This tough-on-crime legislation was challenged by many as being overtly political, 
inconsistent with the entrenched culture of restraint, not supported on any evidentiary 
basis, and not responsive to any identified problem. For some judges, the negative 
 
633 For instance, in addition to a general ‘tough-on-crime’ approach to criminal justice policy, the 
2006 Conservative Party platform included rhetoric directed specifically at conditional sentences 
(referred to as sentences of “house arrest”): 
[A Conservative government] will ensure truth in sentencing and put an end to the Liberal 
revolving door justice system. The drug, gang, and gun-related crimes plaguing our 
communities must be met by clear mandatory minimum prison sentences and an end to 
sentences being served at home. 
Conservative Party of Canada. (2006). Stand up for Canada (p. 46) [Federal Election Platform], at 
p. 22.   
634 The 2011 Conservative Party platform was even more specific, promising that within 100 days 
of taking power, a Conservative majority government would pass legislation that would, amongst 
other things, “end house arrest” for “serious and violent criminals” and for “serious personal injury 
offences, such as sexual assault.” Conservative Party of Canada (2011). Here for Canada (p. 67) 
[Federal Election Platform], at p. 50. 
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effects of incarceration, the politicization of the process, and their belief that Parliament 
had not thought through the rationale for (or impact of) the restrictions, became 
justifications to find ways to get around them. Assisted in this approach by the BC Court 
of Appeal decision in Voong, some judges applied the doctrine of exceptional 
circumstances to justify suspending sentence on charges for which conditional 
sentences were no longer available. In many cases this included efforts to reconstruct 
suspended sentences as a form of disguised conditional sentence (e.g., by making the 
orders longer, including onerous conditions, and re-framing the order using the Sword of 
Damocles metaphor). While judicial circumvention of the intent of the new law did not 
appreciably further the role of the conditional sentence in reducing Canada’s reliance on 
prison, it would appear—at least in British Columbia—to have avoided the (expected) 
increase in rates of imprisonment.  
The findings of this study suggest at least two possible explanations for the 
muted negative impacts of Bill C-10. The first is that most of the reforms that were 
expected to have the greatest punitive effects applied to indictable offences that were, 
relatively speaking, quite rare. The second possibility is much more provocative in that it 
suggests that judges have found ways around legislative requirements seen as being 
unduly harsh or unfair. In the context of the conditional sentencing restrictions, this has 
included suspending sentence and placing an offender on probation or using noticeably 
short jail terms (often with probation) in place of much lengthier conditional sentences 
What the act of judicial resistance tells us 
In the end, British Columbia emerges—in many respects—as a potential 
microcosm of trends in imprisonment rates at the national level. Both national and 
provincial jurisdictions have struggled in reducing the use of imprisonment (for adults) in 
any sustained or meaningful way. However, it is equally notable that Canadians--like 
residents of British Columbia—have also somehow resisted increasing the use of prison 
over the past four to five decades despite a barrage of tough-on-crime legislation (of 
which Bill C-10 is only one example) under the Harper administration. This ‘feat’ is all the 
more laudable considering the experience in other countries, most particularly the United 
States, in which imprisonment rates have increased substantially.  
   
250 
A more restricted focus on conditional sentencing, in particular, does not appear 
to alter the similarities between these two jurisdictions. Just as overall levels of 
imprisonment in British Columbia were largely unaffected by either the sanction’s 
introduction in 1996, the Supreme Court of Canada’s endorsement in 2000 (in Proulx), 
or the restrictions imposed by Bill C-10 (2012), Canada’s imprisonment rates over this 
same period have remained generally stable. Notably, this stability has occurred 
notwithstanding reforms that have suggested shifts towards either restorative or punitive 
penal policy. Assuming that we can further extend these parallels between British 
Columbia and the wider country, it would seem that the judiciary has played an important 
role, particularly in the face of legislation that should have converted the vast majority of 
conditional sentences (on indictable offences) into prison terms. These legislative 
reforms should have resulted in a greater use of imprisonment. They did not. 
The findings from this study suggest that the lack of impact is rooted largely in 
judicial intervention. While net-widening practices arguably restricted the ability to reduce 
imprisonment rates through the use of conditional sentences in place of prison during 
the pre Bill C-10 era, it was seemingly done in part as a necessary response to 
longstanding deficiencies in suspended sentences. While the failure to reduce the 
overall use of imprisonment is clearly a missed opportunity, judicial intervention in this 
form should have been largely anticipated and ultimately mitigated through (repeatedly 
called for) reform to the suspended sentence.  
More importantly, judicial intervention during the post Bill C-10 era played a 
central role in avoiding an increase in imprisonment rates by largely circumventing the 
intent of the new legislation. With the removal of conditional sentences for a large portion 
of serious offences, judges have seemingly chosen in many cases to replace them with 
suspended sentences rather than imprisonment. One is strongly tempted to see the core 
of this judicial resistance as being firmly anchored in the principle of restraint and in its 
historical entrenchment as part of our national sentencing culture (see chapter 1). In 
perhaps classic or quintessential Canadian style, judges have arguably acted to 
maintain a level of balance and stability in what might otherwise have been a dramatic 
shift towards a more punitive, tough-on-crime sentencing culture. Notably, their ability to 
do so can be traced back to the fact that judges in Canada are somewhat insulated. In 
their analysis of this issue, for instance, Webster and Doob (2007, 2012) identify several 
so-called “protective factors” that relate specifically to judicial decision-making. These 
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include a commitment to the principle of judicial independence and an acknowledgement 
of the need to maintain some degree of judicial discretion (and deference).635   
Canadian judges are appointed, not elected, and cannot be easily removed. For 
these (and other) reasons, they are notionally protected from both direct political 
pressure and swings in public opinion. This freedom, along with the flexibility generally 
inherent in sentence policy, has allowed judges to ensure more just outcomes in 
exceptional cases or to exert a stabilizing force in the use of imprisonment, when 
needed. Applied to the findings of this study, one could argue that by finding ways to 
resist (or circumvent) legislated restrictions that threatened long-held principles, BC 
judges were acting as guardians of Canada’s core values, exercising restraint in the use 
of imprisonment and compassion in the handling of minority or marginalized populations.    
The story that has yet to be written 
After years of being criticized for not delivering substantive and progressive 
reform on criminal justice, Trudeau’s Liberal government caught many off-guard with the 
recent introduction of Bill C-22.636 As drafted, the legislation would repeal 20 mandatory 
minimum penalties and vastly increase the availability of conditional sentences. The 
restrictions rooted in sections 742.1(e) and (f)637 would be repealed in their entirety, 
resolving the inconsistency that might have otherwise emerged had Sharma been 
upheld. If passed, the legislation would return the conditional sentencing provisions to 
their 2006 form (prior to Bills C-9 and C-10) with one exception—the broad ineligibility 
established by section 742.1(c) relating to offences prosecuted by indictment for which 
 
635 Webster & Doob, supra note 108 at pp. 337-347; Webster, C. M., & Doob, A. N. (2012). 
Maintaining our balance: Trends in imprisonment policies in Canada. In K. Ismaili, J. B. Sprott, & 
K. Varma (Eds.), Canadian Criminal Justice Policy: Contemporary Perspectives (pp. 79–109). 
Oxford University Press, at pp. 92-93. 
636 Bill C-22, supra note 631. 
637 Section 742.1(e) currently makes a conditional sentence unavailable for any offence 
“prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years, that: 
(i) resulted in bodily harm, (ii) involved the import, export, trafficking or production of drugs, or (iii) 
involved the use of a weapon.  
Section 742.1 (f) currently makes a conditional sentence unavailable for any offence “prosecuted 
by way of indictment, under any of the following provisions: [lists 11 specific offences, including 
sexual assault, motor vehicle theft, and theft over $5,000].” 
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the maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life would be replaced with a narrower 
ineligibility that would apply only to attempted murder, torture, or advocating genocide.638 
Notably, this legislation is not framed as having a general prison reduction goal 
but rather, as being responsive to the “systemic discrimination and disproportionate 
representation of Indigenous peoples, as well as Black Canadians and members of 
marginalized communities as offenders and victims in the criminal justice system.”639 
While its introduction was largely welcomed by advocates for progressive penal policy, 
there was also a sense that Bill C-22 failed to go far enough.640 Perhaps ironically, one 
 
638 Section 742.1 (d) would remain as is: “the offence is not a terrorism offence, or a criminal 
organization offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of 
imprisonment is 10 years or more.” 
639 Department of Justice. (February 18, 2021). News release: Government of Canada announces 
measures to keep communities safe, fight systemic racism and make our criminal justice system 
more effective for all. Government of Canada. 
Specifically, the legislation is framed as being responsive to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, and 
the 2020 Statement of the Parliamentary Black Caucus. See statement released by The 
Honourable Kim Pate, C.M., Senator for Ontario – Statement: Bill C-22 Aims to do Justice for 
Some, Not All (February 18, 2021). 
640 Critics of the Bill C-10 restrictions welcomed their loosening while, at the same time, often 
expressing the view that the Bill C-22 reforms do not go far enough in terms of eliminating MMPs. 
See, for instance, Rudnicki, Chris [@chrisrudnicki_]. (2021, February 18). This is a really big deal. 
Parliament is breathing new life into the conditional sentence regime. This is going to change a lot 
of lives. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/chrisrudnicki_/status/1362478475450462214; Kerr, 
Lisa [@coleenlisa]. (2021, February 18). I am very excited indeed to stop complaining that the 
Liberals did not try to fix any of the Conservative-era sentencing policies. These are very 
welcome reforms that will make a real difference in people's lives. [Tweet]. Twitter. 
https://twitter.com/coleenlisa/status/1362476536604086281; Sankoff, Peter [@petersankoff]. 
(2021, February 18). You can argue that this is the best development in sentencing since 
conditional sentences were first enacted. The ridiculous restrictions on them gutted their utility. 
[Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/petersankoff/status/1362488030804680705; Parkes, Debra 
[@DebraParkes]. (2021, February 18). [Y]es…more people will get conditional sentences (house 
arrest) but we desperately need progressive folks to challenge the false dichotomy between 
"violent" and "non-violent" offences. [Tweet]. Twitter. 
https://twitter.com/DebraParkes/status/1362517266215014403; Pate, Kim [@KPateontheHill]. 
(2021, February 23). 9 in 10 [Canadians] want judges to have authority to not impose MMPs. Bill 
C-22 repeals a mere 19 of 43 MMPs that have already been struck down by courts at all levels. 
[Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/KPateontheHill/status/1364226845827244038.  
Notably, some also expressed concern regarding the potential impact of lifting the conditional 
sentencing restrictions. See, for instance, Walia, Harsha [@HarshaWalia]. (2021, February 18). 
However, conditional sentences can quickly become a de facto pipeline to incarceration, 
especially when punitive conditions such as house arrest, curfews or mandatory counselling are 
breached. [Tweet]. Twitter. https://twitter.com/HarshaWalia/status/1362465494943473671.  
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of the most vocal critics has been the former Minister of Justice, under whose watch—
and despite multiple calls—no changes to the conditional sentence were proposed.641 
An argument could be made that, at best, Bill C-22 represents a naïve and 
superficial effort to address two complex and deeply rooted fundamental challenges—
systemic racism and principled penal policy. While intersecting with the disproportionate 
incarceration of Indigenous and marginalized populations, the two issues are also 
distinct. The first draws attention to economic, social, and structural inequalities and 
systemic racism; the second to the need for rational, realistic, and principled penal 
policy. As Parliament is well aware, neither of these important issues lends itself to one-
dimensional “quick fixes”. And so, at worst, Bill C-22 reflects a deliberate effort to create 
the illusion of reform, possibly to pacify movements calling for more radical (or 
thoughtful) change. 
The stated intention of Bill C-22 is the removal of many of the sentencing 
restrictions imposed by the previous (Conservative) government. That it proposes to do 
so without acknowledging (or addressing) the challenges that created the environment 
within which they were spawned in the first place, is problematic. Indeed, the principal 
concern raised in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada endorsing the decision in 
Sharma (see 5.2.1) would apply. That is, in the absence of reforms designed to address 
the many flaws of conditional sentencing, there is little reason to expect that there would 
be a different outcome. In other words, if we do not deal with the longstanding problems 
(e.g., construction, resourcing, public support/education), we will simply be repeating the 
same mistake—and likely getting the same result.  
A glimmer of hope? 
If there is reason to hope that we might see more meaningful reforms this time, it 
resides in the consensus developing around the need for (and possibility of) normative 
change. Notably, many sentencing experts have drawn attention to the importance of the 
symbolic element of sentencing and its role as the expression of shared societal values. 
Indeed, while acknowledging that it may be possible to reduce the use of imprisonment 
 
641 See Wilson-Raybould, J., Pate, K., & Thomas Bernard, Wanda. (2021, February 23). Bill C-22 
is inadequate for the task of addressing injustice in Canada’s justice system. Globe and Mail. 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-bill-c-22-is-inadequate-for-the-task-of-
addressing-injustice-in/. 
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in other ways (e.g., by legislatively restricting the availability of custodial options), such 
reforms may not be well received by the public within the current punitive sentencing 
culture, especially if applied to serious and/or violent offences. For that reason, and 
others, several academics have suggested that lasting reform would require normative 
shifts in terms of how we collectively think about the need for punishment and the use of 
incarceration.642 In the context of conditional sentences, that could mean that instead of 
trying to convince the public that the sanction fits within a punitive paradigm (e.g., by 
making them longer and stronger, tightly monitored, and vigorously enforced), we 
change the paradigm. 
With that lens in place, there may be room for cautious optimism on two fronts. 
One relates to the public’s readiness for (or openness to) further sentencing reform, as 
reflected in recent national public surveys conducted by the Department of Justice.643 
The other, and perhaps more critical element in terms of normative change, has 
arguably emerged from the dialogue initiated by the social and racial justice movements 
that have grown partially out of concerns regarding systemic racism within both the 
American and Canadian criminal justice systems. Each of these influences will be briefly 
explored. 
In 2016 and 2017, the Department of Justice undertook a study designed to 
provide information regarding Canadians’ perceptions and priorities on justice-related 
issues.644 Despite the fact that the study pre-dated the social and racial justice 
movements that gained prominence in 2020, several findings are notable. First, 
respondents generally endorsed the principle of restraint, agreeing that incarceration 
should be reserved for offenders convicted of serious crimes (63%).645 There was also 
considerable support for the use of non-custodial sentences (e.g., conditional sentences 
 
642 See, for instance, Doob & Webster, supra note 552; Tonry, supra note 552 ;Klingele, supra 
note 604. 
643 Department of Justice, supra notes 110 and 111. 
644 This included a large-scale survey (n=4,200), a follow-up survey (n=1,863), a series of in-
person focus groups, and a three-day online discussion that sought to clarify findings (n=25). 
Given that participants volunteered to be part of these studies, however, the responses cannot be 
considered to be representative of all Canadians. Department of Justice, supra note 111 at pp. i. 
645 Department of Justice, supra note 110 at p. 54. 
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and probation646), especially in cases involving non-violent offences (56% very and 37% 
moderately supportive). In a related finding, 88% of respondents endorsed problem 
solving approaches to criminal justice that aimed at dealing with the root causes of crime 
and conflict. This included 58% that believed such methods should be promoted and an 
additional 30% who expressed moderate support for this position.647 
Respondents expressed concern that mandatory minimum penalties could lead 
to unfair or inappropriate sentences and fully 8 out of 10 (81%) believed judges should 
have the flexibility to consider an offender’s personal circumstances (e.g., mental or 
health issues).648 Notably, when presented with options that represented varying 
degrees of discretion, most (71%) participants believed that judges should have 
discretion on sentencing, but that this discretion should be limited by predetermined 
guidelines. Indeed, there was strong support for the introduction of sentencing guidelines 
(81%) and only slightly less backing for the creation of an independent sentencing 
commission (69%) in Canada.649 These findings are relevant to modern-day reforms in 
that they suggest that recent efforts to simply reverse the damage done by Harper’s 
Conservatives (e.g., Bill C-22) may represent a critical missed opportunity—that is, to 
engage in a thoughtful analysis of the purposes and principles of sentencing going 
forward.  
It is perhaps serendipitous that public support for principled law reform in Canada 
has been met with an energizing racial and social justice movement, but that is where 
we are. The videotaped police killing of George Floyd in 2020 triggered a summer of 
protests and a national reckoning on racial injustice in America. In the midst of a 
pandemic, Canadians marched as well, drawing attention to systemic discrimination and 
 
646 As suggested earlier, it would have been preferable to know what actual outcomes were 
captured under the heading of “probation”. Presumably, this ‘category’ was intended to reflect 
cases in which the most serious sentence was probation (i.e., where the primary sentence was a 
suspended sentence, conditional discharge, or fine). Given that the focus of the research was on 
public attitudes, it makes sense to use the generic (or generally understood) meaning of that 
term. 
647 Ibid at p. 34. 
648 Department of Justice, supra note 111 at p. 29. 
649 Department of Justice, supra note 110 at p. 24. In terms of activities for an independent 
sentencing commission, the top four were identified as: providing judges with guidelines (73%), 
conducting research aimed at identifying effective sentencing practices (65%), making 
recommendations regarding sentencing reforms to the federal government (60%), and providing 
information to crime victims and members of the public regarding practices and research (59%).  
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the disproportionate representation of minorities and marginalized populations in our 
criminal justice and prison systems. The public, through the media, was saturated with 
heart-wrenching tales of systemic abuse that elevated the reports of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered 
Indigenous Women and Girls. As a result, much of the focus in Canada has been on 
racism impacting primarily Indigenous offenders, though this has been recently 
broadened to capture other minority groups as well (e.g., Black offenders).650  
In a disappointing but perhaps unsurprising move, instead of taking advantage of 
the opportunity for a system-wide review of processes and policies, the government 
appears to have chosen the relatively quick political win. In the same way that Bill C-10 
and the tough-on-crime agenda was criticized for responding to populist cries for 
increased punishment, Bill C-22 could be similarly framed, as a political response to calls 
to decrease racial inequities. While many would argue that the removal of sentencing 
restrictions is an inherently positive move, it is risky for two reasons. First, assuming 
there has been no change in the “hearts and minds” of the Canadian public, we will have 
learned nothing and fixed nothing. To the extent that judges use their (returned) 
discretion to impose conditional sentences in cases seen to “require imprisonment,” we 
should expect to see (again) calls for the sanction’s restriction or abolition. Second, 
assuming there has been a normative change in the way in which Canadians think about 
punishment and/or jail, we will have taken a small step along the path of ad hoc 
amendments, instead of taking advantage of circumstances that might have allowed us 
to, at long last, adopt a comprehensive, coherent, principled, and rational approach to 
criminal justice policy development.651  
In a very real sense, the policy issues raised in the context of conditional 
sentencing and the debate regarding their role and application bring us full circle, back to 
the Canadian Sentencing Commission and the (unresolved) challenges that it identified 
 
650 For instance, in February of 2021 the Ontario Court of Appeal heard arguments in the case of 
R. v. Morris (C65766). At issue is the question of how courts should take systemic and 
background factors into account when sentencing Black offenders. Lower court decision: R. v 
Morris, 2018 ONSC 5186. 
651 Ideally such a review would be undertaken by a sentencing commission established for that 
purpose. At the very least, government should initiate an evidence-based analysis of the efficacy 
of sentences designed to deter and/or rehabilitate offenders. Legislation should not promote 
sentencing as a crime control strategy in the absence of consistent and compelling evidence 
supporting meaningful reductions in recidivism as a result of sentences imposed.  
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in 1987. These included: an absence of policy (clarity) from Parliament in terms of 
guiding principles; appellate courts that are ill equipped to provide guidance to judges; a 
lack of systematic information about sentencing practices; a lack of public confidence in 
sentencing; unwarranted disparity (inconsistency and inequity) in sentences; and an 
over-reliance on imprisonment.652 
Recent scholarly “thought pieces” offer a variety of perspectives on what is 
needed and how we might go about reforming sections 718 through 718.2, ideally under 
the umbrella of an independent sentencing commission.653 These discussion papers 
should form part of a larger national dialogue that incorporates views from a variety of 
stakeholders, including, amongst others: the judiciary, prosecution services, the defence 
bar, provincial correctional agencies, victim advocacy groups, and representatives from 
Indigenous communities. In addition to revisioning the purposes and principles of 
sentencing, the rationale for, and jurisdiction of, specialized or problem-solving courts 
should be clarified.  
The nature and function of conditional and suspended sentences should be fully 
considered before amendments to either are introduced. The experience in BC has 
contributed to the blurring of boundaries between the two community-based options, 
raising the question of whether both sanctions are necessary. Regardless, the 
discouraging (2019) evaluations of the conditional sentence suggest that it has not been 
wholly successful as a mechanism of prison reduction, at least in part due to its 
inappropriate application to offenders not otherwise bound for prison. From a policy point 
of view, the ramifications of these results must be carefully considered. At the very least, 
we should be clear on whether the restrictions are being removed because of, or 
despite, the sanction’s apparent failure in achieving its principal objective.   
 
652 CSC, supra note 38 at p. xxii. 
653 Doob, supra note 171; see also Berger, B. L. (2016). Reform of the purposes and principles of 
sentencing: A think piece (p. 15). Research and Statistics Division; Department of Justice 
Canada; Dunning, L. (2016). An opinion on reform changes with respect to the principles and 
purposes of sentencing (p. 13). Research and Statistics Division; Department of Justice Canada; 
Ferguson, G. (2016). A review of the principles and purposes of sentencing in sections 718-718.2 
of the Criminal Code (p. 24). Research and Statistics Division; Department of Justice Canada; 
Sylvestre, M.-E. (2016). “Moving towards a minimalist and transformative criminal justice system”: 
Essay on the reform of the objectives and principles of sentencing. Research and Statistics 
Division; Department of Justice Canada. 
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We can continue with a politicized and piecemeal approach to sentencing policy, 
or we can do the hard work required to establish an internally consistent, realistic, and 
evidence-based approach in this critical area. At the end of the day, we return to Doob’s 
(1990) evergreen caution that hopes and prayers are not enough. If we want to elevate 
the principle of restraint (i.e., reduce the use of imprisonment), we need both a 
Parliamentary endorsement of community sanctions and some way of providing 
sentencing judges with the authoritative and unambiguous guidance that they need.654 
Indeed, now is the time for such a reset in sentencing policy, one that addresses the 
problems manifest in our modern criminal justice system based on evidence, not politics. 
We must aspire to having an informed public, an engaged judiciary, and a government 
willing to make difficult decisions. At the very least, we should have a permanent and 
independent sentencing commission. That, more than anything, would be a promising 
first step.  
And finally, as we find ourselves (once again) at a crossroads with regards to the 
place of conditional sentences within our sentencing arsenal, we must remember that we 
are not likely to resolve the challenges of this criminal sanction by applying the same 
thinking that created them. Otherwise, history will almost assuredly repeat itself. Just as 
importantly though, we are past the point of tinkering. A genuine interest in salvaging a 
sanction capable of acting as a prison alternative will likely require a complete re-set, 
and we may (finally) be in a position to bring this task into fruition. At that point, history 
can plot a new course. To paraphrase C.S. Lewis, while we cannot go back and change 
the beginning, we can still change the ending. 
  
 
654 Doob, supra note 2 at p. 415. 
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Appendix A.   
 
Timeline of key events (legislation/cases)  
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Appendix B.   
 
Conditional Sentence of Imprisonment – s. 742.1 
CRANKSHAW-HIST 742.1 
Crankshaw’s Criminal Code of Canada655 
Legislative Histories - Gary P. Rodrigues 
Criminal Code - S. 742.1 
742.1 — History 
Statutory Reference: R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 742.1 
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sentencing), etc., S.C. 1995, c. 22 
Section 742.1 was enacted by S.C. 1995, c. 22, s. 6 as follows: 
742.1 
Imposing of conditional sentence — Where a person is convicted of an offence, except 
an offence that is punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment, and the court 
(a) imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, and 
(b) is satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would not endanger the 
safety of the community. 
the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, 
order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the offender’s 
complying with the conditions of a conditional sentence order made under section 742.3. 
Criminal Law Improvement Act, 1996, S.C. 1997, c. 18 
Section 742.1 was amended by S.C. 1997, c. 18, s. 107.1 by replacing 742.1(b) with the 
following: 
(b) is satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would not endanger the 
safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and 
 
655 Rodrigues, G. P. (2016-3). Crankshaw's Criminal Code of Canada: Legislative histories- s. 
742.1 (WestlawNext.CANADA). Retrieved September 4th, 2019, from 
https://nextcanada.westlaw.com/Document/I10b717dd93e063f0e0440003ba0d6c6d/View/FullTex
t.html?originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Category) 
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principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2. 
An Act to amend the Criminal Code (conditional sentence of imprisonment), S.C. 
2007, c. 12 
Section 742.1 was replaced by the following (S.C. 2007, c. 12, s. 1; in force November 30, 
2007): 
742.1 
Imposing of conditional sentence — If a person is convicted of an offence, other than 
a serious personal injury offence as defined in section 752, a terrorism offence or a 
criminal organization offence prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum 
term of imprisonment is ten years or more or an offence punishable by a minimum 
term of imprisonment, and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than 
two years and is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not 
endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental 
purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2, the court may, 
for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that 
the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the offender’s 
compliance with the conditions imposed under section 742.3. 
Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 
Section 742.1 was replaced by the following (S.C. 2012, c. 1, s. 34; in force November 20, 
2012): 
742.1 
Imposing of conditional sentence — If a person is convicted of an offence and the 
court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may, for 
the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the 
offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to the conditions imposed 
under section 742.3, if 
(a) the court is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would 
not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the 
fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2; 
(b) the offence is not an offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment; 
(c) the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the 
maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life; 
(d) the offence is not a terrorism offence, or a criminal organization offence, 
prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 
10 years or more; 
(e) the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the 
maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years, that 
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(i) resulted in bodily harm, 
(ii) involved the import, export, trafficking or production of drugs, or 
(iii) involved the use of a weapon; and 
(f) the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, under any of 
the following provisions: 
(i) section 144 (prison breach), 
(ii) section 264 (criminal harassment), 
(iii) section 271 (sexual assault), 
(iv) section 279 (kidnapping), 
(v) section 279.02 (trafficking in persons - material benefit), 
(vi) section 281 (abduction of person under fourteen), 
(vii) section 333.1 (motor vehicle theft), 
(viii) paragraph 334(a) (theft over $5,000), 
(ix) paragraph 348(1)(e) (breaking and entering a place other than a dwelling-
house), 
(x) section 349 (being unlawfully in a dwelling-house), and 
(xi) section 435 (arson for fraudulent purpose). 
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Appendix C.  
 
Validation of court dataset656 
Figure C-1  Comparison: Dataset 1 v CANSIM/COURTS – BC- fines - count (#) 
 
 
656 Results for the three matched sanctions (fines, jail, conditional sentences) suggest 
considerable consistency in terms of overall counts. Observed differences are consistent over 
time and likely reflect the ICCS reported undercount of drug offences. Note: Dataset 1 is 
organized by calendar year; the CANSIM dataset is organized by fiscal year. For the sake of 
comparisons, 2006/2007 is compared to the calendar year 2006. 
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Figure C-2  BC – Comparison – Dataset 1 v CANSIM – jail - count (#) 
 
Figure C-3  BC – Comparison – Dataset 1 v CANSIM – CSOs - count (#) 
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Appendix D.  
 
Online survey – text 
Instructions:  
Thank you for participating in this survey. All responses are anonymous; no identifying 
information will be requested or collected.  
Please respond to the following [20] questions. You will be invited to add comments to 
expand on or clarify your responses at the end of the survey. 
Note: Conditional sentences have been available as a sentencing option since 1996. For 
the purposes of this survey you are asked to provide your current perspectives, though 
you are welcome to comment on earlier views in the space provided. 
************************************************************************** 
1) What do you consider to be the single most important objective of conditional 
sentences? 
 
2) In your opinion, have conditional sentences reduced the number of offenders sent 
to custody in your court?  
a) Definitely yes   _________ 
b) Probably yes   _________ 
c) Probably not   _________ 
d) Definitely not   _________ 
e) I don’t know   _________ 
 
Note: The following five (5) questions ask you to compare conditional sentences to 
traditional terms of imprisonment in terms of their ability to achieve various sentencing 
goals. Each question starts the same – “Do you find that you are able to set conditions 
for a conditional sentence that are as effective as a normal sentence of imprisonment 
in…” and then asks you to focus on a specific objective or principle (e.g., deterrence, 
denunciation, etc.).  
3) Do you find that you are able to set conditions for a conditional sentence that are as 
effective as a normal sentence of imprisonment in… denouncing unlawful conduct? 
a) Always    _________ 
b) Usually    _________ 
c) Sometimes   _________ 
d) Almost never   _________ 
e) Never     _________ 
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4) Do you find that you are able to set conditions for a conditional sentence that are as 
effective as a normal sentence of imprisonment in… deterring the offender and 
other persons from committing offences? 
a) Always    _________ 
b) Usually    _________ 
c) Sometimes   _________ 
d) Almost never   _________ 
e) Never     _________ 
 
5) Do you find that you are able to set conditions for a conditional sentence that are as 
effective as a normal sentence of imprisonment in assisting in… the rehabilitation of 
offenders? 
a) Always    _________ 
b) Usually    _________ 
c) Sometimes   _________ 
d) Almost never   _________ 
e) Never     _________ 
 
6) Do you find that you are able to set conditions for a conditional sentence that are as 
effective as a normal sentence of imprisonment in assisting in… providing 
reparations for harm done to the victim or to the community? 
a) Always    _________ 
b) Usually    _________ 
c) Sometimes   _________ 
d) Almost never   _________ 
e) Never     _________ 
 
7) Do you find that you are able to set conditions for a conditional sentence that are as 
effective as a normal sentence of imprisonment in… ensuring that the sentence is 
proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the 
offender? 
a) Always    _________ 
b) Usually    _________ 
c) Sometimes   _________ 
d) Almost never   _________ 
e) Never     _________ 
 
8) Do you believe you receive adequate guidance from the Courts of Appeal on the use 
of conditional sentences? (yes/no; why or why not) 
 
9) Would you be inclined to use conditional sentences more frequently if there were 
more community and/or supervisory resources? (yes/no) 
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10) If yes, what more is needed?  
 
11) When imposing a conditional sentence, how often do you include conditions of 
house arrest and/or curfew?  
a) Always   __________ 
b) Often   __________ 
c) Occasionally  __________ 
d) Rarely   __________ 
e) Never   __________ 
 
12) When imposing house arrest on a conditional sentence do you regularly include 
electronic monitoring? (yes/no; why or why not?) 
 
13) Do you think that a conditional sentence has a different impact on an offender than 
a probation order with the same conditions?  
a) Definitely yes  __________ 
b) Probably yes  __________ 
c) Probably not  __________ 
d) Definitely not  __________ 
e) I don’t know  __________ 
 
14) In your opinion what are the most important differences between the breach 
provisions for conditional sentence orders (s.742.6 CCC) and the revocation 
provisions for suspended sentences (s.732.2(5) CCC)? 
 
15) What do you consider to be the main benefits of conditional sentencing? 
 
16) What do you consider to be the main challenges of conditional sentencing?  
 
17) In your opinion are there offences or offenders for which conditional sentences are 
particularly well suited? If so, what types of offences or offenders would you 
identify?  
 
18) In your opinion are there offences or offenders for which conditional sentences are 
particularly unsuited? If so, what types of offences or offenders would you identify?  
 
19) Do you think it would be beneficial for judges to receive information about sentence 
‘outcome’ once a sentence has been completed? This could include, for example, 
information regarding levels of supervision, program completion, and compliance 
with conditions. (yes/no/I don’t know) 
 
20) How has your utilization of conditional sentences been impacted by the restrictions 
introduced in 2012 by the Safe Streets & Communities Act (Bill C-10)?  
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Thank you for completing this survey. If you are interested in participating in a brief 
interview on this topic, please e-mail the researcher directly (xxxxx@xxx).  
Participation is voluntary; participants will not be identified; interviews will be arranged at 
your convenience. 
 
Background information (for survey participants): 
Current status:  Regular/fulltime ____ Senior/part-time____ 
Current assigned region:  
Vancouver ___ Fraser ____ Interior ____ Island _____ North _____ 
Number of years sitting as a judge:  
0-5 ___ 6-10 ___ 11-15 ___ 16-20____ 20+ _____ 
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Appendix E.   
 
Interview – Form B - Information & consent form 
Project (working title): PhD thesis – Conditional sentencing at the crossroads  
Principal Investigator:  Dawn North, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University 
Contact information:  xxxxxx@sfu.ca; cell # xxx xxx-xxxx 
Faculty Supervisor:   David MacAlister; xxxxxxxx@sfu.ca xxx xxx-xxxx 
 
Background: This research project is intended to satisfy PhD thesis requirements. 
Purpose: This study will examine conditional sentences (Bill C-41; 1996) in terms of 
their effect on overall sentencing patterns and will include a consideration of the 
consequences of restrictions introduced in 2012 by Bill C-10.  
Voluntariness: Your participation is strictly voluntary, and you may choose to withdraw at 
any point. There is no compensation, financial or otherwise, for participating in this 
research. 
Structure: Participation includes an interview of approximately one hour, scheduled at a 
time and location of your convenience. Subject to your agreement, the interview will be 
audio-recorded to ensure accuracy. Participants will be given the opportunity to review 
transcripts to ensure accuracy in transcription; once confirmed the audio recording will 
be destroyed.  
Risks: There are no foreseeable risks for participants.  
Benefits: Including the perspectives of judges in legal research promotes a more 
informed understanding of sentencing issues and provides an opportunity for these 
critical front-line decision makers to contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding the 
future of conditional sentencing. 
Confidentiality: Participants will not be identified as part of this study. Audio tapes will 
be destroyed upon transcription and transcripts will be attributed to pseudonyms only. 
During analysis and upon project completion all data will be securely stored on an 
external hard drive kept in a locked cabinet in the investigator’s private office. 
Future use of participant data: The results of this study will be reported in a graduate 
(PhD) thesis and may also be published in journal articles and books.  
If you have any concerns about your rights as a research participant and/or your 
experiences while participating in this study, you may contact xxxx, Director, SFU Office 
of Research Ethics, xxxxx@sfu.ca or xxx- xxx-xxxx 
 
 
Reviewed with participant  (signed by investigator)   Date 
Participant ID: 
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Appendix F.   
 
Interview schedule for judges 
This is a semi-structured interview and the questions asked to the participants may not be 
in the order of this interview schedule. Depending upon responses given by the 
participant, additional follow-up questions may be asked for clarification. 
Review of Form B “Information & consent form for interview participants – Judges”  
Date of interview: ________________________ 
Background information: 
 
1) Conditional sentences have evolved considerably since their introduction in 1996. 
How would you describe the current goals and application of conditional sentences? 
 
The following question does not ask you to comment on the merits or effect of 
government policy. It is intended to focus on the goals of conditional sentencing and 
your sense of how effectiveness could be measured.  
 
2) In your opinion what measures would be relevant to an assessment of conditional 
sentence effectiveness?  
  
3) When considering the imposition of a conditional sentence are there areas where 
you would prefer additional information? If so, what type of information would assist 
you? 
 
4) How would you compare conditional sentences and suspended sentences in terms 
of their ability to address deterrence and denunciation?  
 
The following question is not asking you to comment on your decision-making 
process in any way that could call into question your impartiality in future hearings.  
 
5) When making a decision on sentence to what extent do you focus on problem-
solving? 
 
How many years have you been a judge?   
  
0-5  6-10  11-15  16-20 20+  
 
Assigned region?  Vancouver  Fraser  Interior  Island  North  
 
Current status:  Regular/full-time  Senior/part-time  Retired _________ 
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6) What has been your experience with the breach provisions for conditional sentences 
and the revocation provisions for suspended sentences? 
 
7) Has your utilization of suspended sentences evolved over time? 
 
In a national survey done in 1998 judges were asked for their opinions on conditional 
sentencing, which was then a new sanction. When comparing the responses from BC 
judges then (1998) to the responses received in the current survey, several changes 
were noted, including: 
8) Judges in 2018 were more likely to identify deterrence and denunciation as primary 
objectives of conditional sentencing. 
 
9) Judges in 2018 were more likely to say that a conditional sentence has a greater 
impact on an offender than a probation order with the same conditions. 
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Appendix G.   
 
BC – Provincial Incarceration Rate (1990-2018) 




657 Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Socio-Economic Information Management System 
(CANSIM), using the CHASS Data Centre (University of Toronto). 
Bill C-41 
Proulx Bill C-10 
